Suzanne Cote

The mother was successful in dismissing the father's motion to vary his child support obligations retroactively.

The mother sought costs of $12,975.84, while the father argued each party should bear their own costs.

The court found the mother was presumptively entitled to partial indemnity costs and that her claimed amounts were reasonable, especially compared to the father's legal fees.

The court ordered the father to pay $8,500 in costs, enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office as a child support order.

This costs endorsement followed a motion to change spousal support.

The applicant initially sought termination of spousal support, later amending his position to seek variation.

The respondent sought to maintain support, obtain life insurance, and a retroactive cost-of-living adjustment.

The court varied spousal support, rejected the life insurance request, and granted a partial retroactive cost-of-living adjustment.

In determining costs, the court considered the parties' success, the reasonableness of their positions and settlement offers, and their financial circumstances.

The applicant was deemed the more successful party overall, despite his initial unreasonable position, and was awarded net costs of $4,220.83, with enforcement stayed.

The applicant brought a motion to change seeking to terminate or reduce his spousal support obligations, arguing that his retirement and poor health constituted a material change in circumstances.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the retirement was voluntary to avoid support, and sought retroactive indexation of support and life insurance to secure it.

The court found that the applicant's retirement was reasonable given his age and medical conditions, constituting a material change.

Spousal support was reduced based on the parties' current incomes.

The court also granted the respondent's request for retroactive indexation back to October 2011, but dismissed her request for life insurance.

The applicant sought supplementary directions on the calculation of retroactive spousal support arrears following a prior decision overriding portions of a separation agreement under the Miglin framework.

The dispute turned on whether arrears should be calculated by netting child support and section 7 payments against spousal support, or by accounting for the tax consequences of a retroactive lump-sum spousal support award.

The court held that Ontario and appellate authority required consideration of the tax ramifications of retroactive lump-sum support awards tied to the SSAG.

It rejected the applicant's proposed netting approach and fixed arrears at $14,363.02 less a 37% reduction for the payor's average marginal tax rate, for net arrears of $9,048.70.

The applicant sought retroactive and ongoing spousal support pursuant to the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines despite a separation agreement that effectively eliminated further support through a net disposable income formula tied to child support payments.

Applying the two‑stage test in Miglin v. Miglin, the court examined both the circumstances surrounding the agreement’s formation and whether its continued enforcement remained consistent with the objectives of the Divorce Act.

The court concluded that enforcement of the agreement would be unconscionable because it failed to recognize the applicant’s compensatory and non‑compensatory entitlement arising from career sacrifices, primary caregiving responsibilities, and health issues.

The court found that the parties could not reasonably have contemplated that the agreement would eliminate ongoing spousal support once the respondent regained stable employment.

The court therefore overrode the relevant provisions of the separation agreement and fixed mid‑range SSAG spousal support retroactive to March 1, 2012, while extending the termination date of support.

The Crown applied for an assessment order under section 672.12(3) of the Criminal Code to determine whether the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder at the time of committing uttering threat offences and breaches of probation.

The accused opposed the application, arguing the Crown had not met the statutory threshold of "reasonable grounds to doubt" criminal responsibility.

The court granted the Crown's application, finding that the evidence, including Dr. Komer's assessment and the accused's history of mental illness, pointed to a potential inability to understand the nature and consequences of his actions or that they were wrong as contemplated by section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown applied pursuant to section 672.12(3)(b) of the Criminal Code for an order to assess whether the accused was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

The accused had been ordered to undergo a fitness assessment, which found him fit to stand trial but raised concerns about potential NCRMD.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, holding that the Crown may only raise the NCRMD issue at two specific junctures: when the accused puts mental capacity into issue, or after a finding of guilt but before conviction.

The application was brought before trial, violating the principles established in R. v. Swain.