Bernard Letarte

Air carriers challenged federal regulations providing standardized compensation to passengers for flight delays, cancellations, denial of boarding, and lost or damaged baggage, arguing the regulations conflicted with the exclusivity principle in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention as implemented by the Carriage by Air Act and were therefore ultra vires the Canadian Transportation Agency's regulation-making authority under the Canada Transportation Act.

The Supreme Court held that the exclusivity principle applies only to 'actions for damages' that share the characteristics of judicial proceedings seeking individualized compensation tied to injury caused by another.

Because the impugned regulations create a consumer protection scheme providing standardized statutory entitlements irrespective of harm actually suffered, they do not constitute 'actions for damages' and do not fall within Article 29's scope.

The Court also clarified that the Mohan framework governs admissibility of expert evidence on questions of international law.

Appeal dismissed.

The Quebec Court of Appeal was asked by reference whether the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, was ultra vires Parliament's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held the Act was valid except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which it found impermissibly altered Canada's constitutional architecture.

Both the Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the entire Act as constitutionally valid under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding that its pith and substance — protecting the well-being of Indigenous children, youth and families by promoting culturally appropriate child and family services and advancing reconciliation — falls squarely within Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians.

The Court also held that ss. 21 and 22(3) do not alter the constitutional architecture: s. 21 is a valid anticipatory incorporation by reference provision, and s. 22(3) is a permissible legislative restatement of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The Quebec Court of Appeal was asked by reference whether the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, was ultra vires Parliament's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held the Act was valid except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which it found impermissibly altered Canada's constitutional architecture.

Both the Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the entire Act as constitutionally valid under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding that its pith and substance — protecting the well-being of Indigenous children, youth and families by promoting culturally appropriate child and family services and advancing reconciliation — falls squarely within Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians.

The Court also held that ss. 21 and 22(3) do not alter the constitutional architecture: s. 21 is a valid anticipatory incorporation by reference provision, and s. 22(3) is a permissible legislative restatement of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The Court considered whether section 27 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act removes Crown immunity from discovery when the Crown is not a party.

It held that immunity can be displaced only by clear statutory language, and section 27 applies only to proceedings against the Crown.

Because neither the Crown nor the chief investigator was a party, the investigator could refuse discovery.

The appeal was allowed and the respondents’ discovery motion was dismissed with costs throughout.

This appeal addressed federal Crown civil liability for the Minister of Justice's handling of mercy applications after a wrongful conviction.

The Court held that the mercy power was a core policy function protected by qualified immunity, and liability required bad faith or serious recklessness rather than simple fault.

The appellant did not prove that ministers acted in bad faith or that any alleged review failures caused compensable loss.

The Court also rejected additional damages, punitive damages, and claimed extrajudicial fees tied to alleged abuse of process.

On an appeal concerning judicial appointment eligibility under s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the appellants challenged the interpretation adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate any interpretive error in the lower court's analysis of s. 98.

Arguments relying on the prior reference regarding ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act were rejected as inapplicable because the constitutional and statutory contexts differed.

The appeal was dismissed for essentially the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal.