Pierre Bienvenu

Air carriers challenged federal regulations providing standardized compensation to passengers for flight delays, cancellations, denial of boarding, and lost or damaged baggage, arguing the regulations conflicted with the exclusivity principle in Article 29 of the Montreal Convention as implemented by the Carriage by Air Act and were therefore ultra vires the Canadian Transportation Agency's regulation-making authority under the Canada Transportation Act.

The Supreme Court held that the exclusivity principle applies only to 'actions for damages' that share the characteristics of judicial proceedings seeking individualized compensation tied to injury caused by another.

Because the impugned regulations create a consumer protection scheme providing standardized statutory entitlements irrespective of harm actually suffered, they do not constitute 'actions for damages' and do not fall within Article 29's scope.

The Court also clarified that the Mohan framework governs admissibility of expert evidence on questions of international law.

Appeal dismissed.

A lawyer referred his clients to a financial advisor who was his personal friend, and over a period of four years repeatedly endorsed and encouraged the clients to invest with the advisor's firm.

The investments turned out to be part of a Ponzi scheme and the clients lost over $5 million.

The trial judge dismissed the professional liability claim, finding no causal link between the lawyer's faults and the clients' losses.

The Quebec Court of Appeal reversed, finding the trial judge had assessed the evidence through a distorting lens leading to palpable and overriding errors.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal correctly identified palpable and overriding errors and that the lawyer's breaches of his duty to advise and duty of loyalty were a true cause of the clients' losses; the intervening fraud did not break the chain of causation.

The Supreme Court considered whether provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec limiting family patrimony, compensatory allowance, partnership of acquests, and spousal support to married and civil union spouses infringed s. 15(1) of the Charter by excluding de facto spouses.

A 5-4 majority on s. 15(1) found the exclusion violated equality rights based on marital status.

However, the Chief Justice found the infringement justified under s. 1, joining the four judges who found no s. 15(1) violation, resulting in a 5-4 decision upholding the constitutionality of the impugned provisions.

The dissent would have struck down some or all of the provisions as unjustified discrimination against de facto spouses.