minicounsel

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159

The Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) and the Cree Regional Authority Appellants

The Attorney General of Canada, the Attorney General of Quebec, Hydro‑Québec and the National Energy Board Respondents

and

Sierra Legal Defence Fund, Canadian Environmental Law Association, Cultural Survival (Canada), Friends of the Earth and Sierra Club of Canada Interveners

Indexed as: Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board)

File No.: 22705.

1993: October 13; 1994: February 24.

Present: Lamer C.J. and La Forest, L'Heureux‑Dubé, Sopinka, Gonthier, Cory, McLachlin, Iacobucci and Major JJ.

on appeal from the federal court of appeal

Public utilities ‑‑ Electricity ‑‑ Licences ‑‑ National Energy Board granting licences for export of electrical power to U.S. ‑‑ Licences granted subject to environmental assessments of future generating facilities ‑‑ Whether Board erred in granting licences ‑‑ National Energy Board Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N‑7 ‑‑ Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84‑467.

Following lengthy public hearings at which the appellants made numerous submissions, the National Energy Board granted Hydro‑Québec licences for the export of electrical power to the states of New York and Vermont. At the time the licence applications were filed, the Board was required to satisfy itself both that the power sought to be exported was not needed to meet reasonably foreseeable Canadian requirements and that the price to be charged by the power authority was just and reasonable in relation to the public interest. After the hearings but prior to the Board's ruling, these two explicit criteria were removed from the National Energy Board Act, leaving only the requirement that the Board is to have regard to all conditions that appear to it to be relevant. In evaluating the environmental impact of the applications, the Board considered itself bound by both its own Act as amended and the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order. The licences were granted subject to two conditions relating to the successful completion of environmental assessments of future generating facilities. The Federal Court of Appeal rejected the appellants' argument that the Board erred in several respects in granting the licences, but allowed the appeal by Hydro‑Québec and the Attorney General of Quebec, concluding that the Board had exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the environmental assessment conditions. It severed these two conditions and allowed the licences to stand. This appeal is to determine (1) whether the Board properly conducted the required social cost‑benefit review; (2) whether the Board's failure to require that Hydro‑Québec disclose in full the assumptions and methodologies on which its cost‑benefit review was based breached the requirements of procedural fairness; (3) whether the Board owed the appellants a fiduciary duty in the exercise of its decision‑making power, and, if so, whether the requirements of this duty were fulfilled; (4) whether the Board's decision affects the appellants' aboriginal rights; and (5) whether the Board failed to follow the requirements of its own Act and of the Guidelines Order in conducting its environmental impact assessment.

Held: The appeal should be allowed and the order of the Board restored.

Hydro‑Québec provided evidence on which the Board could reasonably conclude that the consideration of cost recoverability was satisfied. The Board did not err in considering relevant to this issue the fact that the export contracts had received the approval of the province. Also, as this was only one of the factors considered, the Board did not improperly delegate its decision-making responsibility. It has not been shown that the Board's discretion to determine what evidence is relevant to its decision was improperly exercised in this case so as to result in inadequate disclosure to the appellants. The Board had sufficient evidence before it to make a valid finding that all costs would be recovered, and the appellants were given access to all the material before the Board. While there is a fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown and the aboriginal peoples of Canada, the function of the Board in deciding whether to grant an export licence is quasi‑judicial and inherently inconsistent with the imposition of a relationship of utmost good faith between the Board and a party appearing before it. The fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the appellants thus does not impose a duty on the Board to make its decisions in the appellants' best interests, or to change its hearing process so as to impose superadded requirements of disclosure. Moreover, even assuming that the Board should have taken into account the existence of the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the appellants, the Board's actions in this case would have met the requirements of such a duty. The appellants had access to all the evidence that was before the Board, were able to make submissions and argument in reply, and were entitled to cross‑examine the witnesses called by Hydro‑Québec. On the issue of whether the Board's decision will have a negative impact on the appellants' aboriginal rights, it is not possible to evaluate realistically the impact of the Board's decision on the appellants' rights without reference to the James Bay Agreement, on which the appellants disavowed reliance. Moreover, even assuming that the Board's decision is one that has, prima facie, an impact on the appellants' aboriginal rights, and that for the Board to justify its interference it must at the very least conduct a rigorous, thorough, and proper cost‑benefit review, the review carried out in this case was not wanting in this respect.

The Board did not exceed its jurisdiction under the National Energy Board Act in considering the environmental effects of the construction of future generating facilities as they related to the proposed export, an area of federal responsibility. The Court of Appeal erred in limiting the scope of the Board's environmental inquiry to the effects on the environment of the transmission of power by a line of wire across the border. Even though the Board found that the new facilities contemplated would have to be built in any event to supply increasing domestic needs, if the construction of new facilities is required to serve the demands of the export contract, among other needs, then the environmental effects of the construction of such facilities are related to the export. In these circumstances, it becomes appropriate for the Board to consider the source of the electrical power to be exported, and the environmental costs that are associated with the generation of that power. In defining the jurisdictional limits of the Board, this Court must be careful to ensure that the Board's authority is truly limited to matters of federal concern, but the scope of its inquiry must not be narrowed to such a degree that the function of the Board is rendered meaningless or ineffective. The Board met its obligations under the Guidelines Order in attaching to the licence the two impugned conditions. Having concluded that the environmental effects of the construction and operation of the planned facilities were unknown, the Board was required by s. 12(d) of the Order to see either that the proposal was subjected to further study and subsequent rescreening, or that it was submitted to a public review. The conditions imposed by the Board meet in substance this obligation. They do not amount to an improper delegation of the Board's responsibility under the Guidelines Order, but rather are an attempt to avoid the duplication warned against in the Order, while continuing the Board's jurisdiction over this matter.

Cases Cited

Referred to: R. v. Sparrow, 1990 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio‑television and Telecommunications Commission), 1989 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722; In re Canadian Radio‑Television Commission and in re London Cable TV Ltd., 1976 CanLII 2305 (FCA), [1976] 2 F.C. 621; Parke, Davis & Co. v. Fine Chemicals of Canada Ltd., 1959 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 219; Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, 1979 CanLII 184 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602; Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643; Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer, 1992 CanLII 37 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165; Guerin v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., 1989 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574; Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369; Gitludahl v. Minister of Forests, B.C.S.C., Vancouver A922935, August 13, 1992; Dick v. The Queen, F.C.T.D., T‑951‑89, June 3, 1992; Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3; Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) (1989), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 201 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd 1990 CanLII 13098 (FCA), [1991] 1 F.C. 641 (C.A.); Friends of the Island Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), 1993 CanLII 2942 (FC), [1993] 2 F.C. 229.

Statutes and Regulations Cited

Act to amend the National Energy Board Act and to repeal certain enactments in consequence thereof, S.C. 1990, c. 7, s. 32.

Constitution Act, 1867, s. 91(2).

Constitution Act, 1982, s. 35(1).

Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84‑467, ss. 2, 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 8, 10(2), 12.

Hydro‑Québec Act, R.S.Q., c. H‑5, s. 24.

James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act, S.C. 1976‑77, c. 32.

National Energy Board Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N‑7 [am. 1990, c. 7], ss. 2, 22(1), 24, 118, 119.02, 119.03, 119.06(2), 119.07, 119.08, 119.09, 119.093.

National Energy Board Part VI Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1056, ss. 6, 15(m).

Authors Cited

Canada. Energy, Mines and Resources Canada. Canadian Electricity Policy. Ottawa: Energy, Mines and Resources Canada, 1988.

Canada. National Energy Board. The Regulation of Electricity Exports: Report of an Inquiry By a Panel of the National Energy Board Following a Hearing in November and December 1986. Ottawa: The Board, 1987.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal, 1991 CanLII 13572 (FCA), [1991] 3 F.C. 443, 83 D.L.R. (4th) 146, 7 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 315, 132 N.R. 214, severing conditions from licences granted by the National Energy Board, [1991] 2 C.N.L.R. 70, and allowing the licences to stand. Appeal allowed.

Robert Mainville, Peter W. Hutchins and Johanne Mainville, for the appellants.

Jean‑Marc Aubry, Q.C., and René LeBlanc, for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada.

Pierre Lachance and Jean Robitaille, for the respondent the Attorney General of Quebec.

Pierre Bienvenu, Jean G. Bertrand and Bernard Roy, for the respondent Hydro‑Québec.

Judith B. Hanebury, for the respondent the National Energy Board.

Gregory J. McDade and Stewart A. G. Elgie, for the interveners.

The judgment of the Court was delivered by

IACOBUCCI J. -- This appeal arises from the decision of the respondent National Energy Board ("the Board") to grant to the respondent Hydro-Québec licences for the export of electrical power to the states of New York and Vermont. This decision followed lengthy public hearings at which the Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec) and the Cree Regional Authority ("the appellants"), along with other concerned groups, made numerous submissions.

The Attorneys General of Quebec and of Canada appeared as respondents to this appeal, as did the Board. The Court also heard the joint submissions of the Sierra Legal Defence Fund, the Canadian Environmental Law Association, Cultural Survival (Canada), Friends of the Earth and the Sierra Club of Canada ("the interveners").

The appellants argued before the Federal Court of Appeal that the Board erred in several respects in granting the licences. The respondents Hydro-Québec and the Attorney General of Quebec claimed that the Board erred in making the granting of the licences conditional on the successful completion of environmental assessments of the power generation facilities contemplated by Hydro-Québec for future construction. The Federal Court of Appeal rejected the argument of the appellants, and concluded that the Board had erred in imposing the conditions impugned by the respondents. The Court of Appeal severed these conditions, and allowed the licences to stand. The appellants now appeal to this Court.

I. Facts

On July 28, 1989, Hydro-Québec applied to the Board for licences to export blocks of power to New York and Vermont. These applications involved nine blocks of power which were to be provided over periods ranging from five to twenty-two years, pursuant to two agreements signed with the U.S. power companies that covered a total of 1 450 MW of power and were projected to generate nearly $25 billion in income for Hydro-Québec. The purpose of the export was to raise sufficient revenue such that Hydro-Québec would be able to implement its development plan for expansion to meet the constantly rising demand for the provision of electrical services within the province.

The Board held public hearings during the months of February and March of 1990 on the application for licences for export. A number of interested parties, including the appellants, took part. At the time the applications were filed, the Board was required by s. 118 of the National Energy Board Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-7, to satisfy itself both that the power sought to be exported was not needed to meet reasonably foreseeable Canadian requirements at the relevant times, and that the price to be charged by the power authority was just and reasonable. After the hearings but prior to the Board's ruling, s. 118 was modified by the Act to amend the National Energy Board Act and to repeal certain enactments in consequence thereof, S.C. 1990, c. 7 ("Bill C-23"). These two explicit criteria were removed from the statute, leaving only the requirement that the Board is to have regard to all conditions that appear to it to be relevant. The parties made submissions before the Board on the effect of these amendments.

On September 27, 1990, the Board granted the export licences, subject to a list of conditions. The appellants appealed the Board's decision to grant the licences to the Federal Court of Appeal. The respondents Hydro-Québec and the Attorney General of Quebec also appealed the decision of the Board, challenging the validity of the imposition of two of the conditions to the licences, which related to environmental assessment of future generating facilities. The Federal Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appellants' appeal and allowed the appeal of Hydro-Québec and the Attorney General of Quebec. The Court of Appeal severed the two conditions but otherwise allowed the licences to stand.

II. Relevant Statutory Provisions

National Energy Board Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. N-7 (as amended by S.C. 1990, c. 7):

In this Act,

"export" means, with reference to

(a) electricity, to send from Canada by a line of wire or other conductor electricity produced in Canada,

(1) An appeal lies from a decision or order of the Board to the Federal Court of Appeal on a question of law or of jurisdiction, after leave to appeal is obtained from that Court.
(1). . . hearings before the Board with respect to the issuance, revocation or suspension of certificates or of licences for the exportation of gas or electricity or the importation of gas or for leave to abandon the operation of a pipeline shall be public.

119.02 No person shall export any electricity except under and in accordance with a permit issued under section 119.03 or a licence issued under section 119.08.

119.03 (1) Except in the case of an application designated by order of the Governor in Council under section 119.07, the Board shall, on application to it and without holding a public hearing, issue a permit authorizing the exportation of electricity.

(2) The application must be accompanied by the information that under the regulations is to be furnished in connection with the application.

119.06 (1) The Board may make a recommendation to the Minister, which it shall make public, that an application for exportation of electricity be designated by order of the Governor in Council under section 119.07, and may delay issuing a permit during such period as is necessary for the purpose of making such an order.

(2) In determining whether to make a recommendation, the Board shall seek to avoid the duplication of measures taken in respect of the exportation by the applicant and the government of the province from which the electricity is exported, and shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant, including

(b) the impact of the exportation on the environment;

(d) such considerations as may be specified in the regulations.

119.07 (1) The Governor in Council may make orders

(a) designating an application for exportation of electricity as an application in respect of which section 119.08 applies; and

(b) revoking any permit issued in respect of the exportation.

(3) Where an order is made under subsection (1),

(a) no permit shall be issued in respect of the application; and

(b) any application in respect of the exportation shall be dealt with as an application for a licence.

119.08 (1) The Board may, subject to section 24 and to the approval of the Governor in Council, issue a licence for the exportation of electricity in relation to which an order made under section 119.07 is in force.

(2) In deciding whether to issue a licence, the Board shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant.

119.09 (1) The Board may, on the issuance of a permit, make the permit subject to such terms and conditions respecting the matters prescribed by the regulations as the Board considers necessary or desirable in the public interest.

(2) The Board may, on the issuance of a licence, make the licence subject to such terms and conditions as the Board may impose.

119.093 (1) The Board may revoke or suspend a permit or licence issued in respect of the exportation of electricity

(b) where a holder of the permit or licence has contravened or failed to comply with a term or condition of the permit or licence.

National Energy Board Part VI Regulations, C.R.C. 1978, c. 1056:

(1) Every applicant for a licence for the exportation of power shall furnish to the Board such information as the Board may require.

(2) Without restricting the generality of subsection (1), the information required to be furnished by any applicant described in subsection (1) shall, unless otherwise authorized by the Board, include

(y) evidence that the applicant has obtained any licence, permit or other form of approval required under any law of Canada or a province respecting the electric power proposed to be exported;

(z) evidence to demonstrate that the price to be charged by the applicant for electric power and energy exported by him is just and reasonable in relation to the public interest, and in particular that the export price

(i) would recover its appropriate share of the costs incurred in Canada,

(ii) would not be less than the price to Canadians for equivalent service in related areas, and

(iii) would not result in prices in the country to which the power is exported being materially less than the least cost alternative for power and energy at the same location within that country; and

(aa) evidence on any environmental impact that would result from the generation of the power for export.

Every licence for the export of electric power and energy is subject to such terms and conditions as the Board may prescribe and, without restricting the generality of the foregoing, is subject to every statement set out by the Board in the licence respecting

(m) the requirements for environmental protection.

Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84-467:

In these Guidelines,

"proposal" includes any initiative, undertaking or activity for which the Government of Canada has a decision making responsibility.

The Process shall be a self assessment process under which the initiating department shall, as early in the planning process as possible and before irrevocable decisions are taken, ensure that the environmental implications of all proposals for which it is the decision making authority are fully considered and where the implications are significant, refer the proposal to the Minister for public review by a Panel.
(1) An initiating department shall include in its consideration of a proposal pursuant to section 3

(a) the potential environmental effects of the proposal and the social effects directly related to those environmental effects, including any effects that are external to Canadian territory; and

(b) the concerns of the public regarding the proposal and its potential environmental effects.

(1) Where a proposal is subject to environmental regulation, independently of the Process, duplication in terms of public reviews is to be avoided.

(2) For the purpose of avoiding the duplication referred to in subsection (1), the initiating department shall use a public review under the Process as a planning tool at the earliest stages of development of the proposal rather than as a regulatory mechanism and make the results of the public review available for use in any regulatory deliberations respecting the proposal.

These Guidelines shall apply to any proposal

(b) that may have an environmental effect on an area of federal responsibility;

Where a board or an agency of the Government of Canada or a regulatory body has a regulatory function in respect of a proposal, these Guidelines shall apply to that board, agency or body only if there is no legal impediment to or duplication resulting from the application of these Guidelines.
(1) Every initiating department shall ensure that each proposal for which it is the decision making authority shall be subject to an environmental screening or initial assessment to determine whether, and the extent to which, there may be any potentially adverse environmental effects from the proposal.

(2) Any decisions to be made as a result of the environmental screening or initial assessment referred to in subsection (1) shall be made by the initiating department and not delegated to any other body.

Every initiating department shall screen or assess each proposal for which it is the decision making authority to determine if

(a) the proposal is of a type identified by the list described under paragraph 11(a) [one that would not produce any adverse environmental effects], in which case the proposal may automatically proceed;

(b) the proposal is of a type identified by the list under paragraph 11(b) [one that would produce significant adverse environmental effects], in which case the proposal shall be referred to the Minister for public review by a Panel;

(c) the potentially adverse environmental effects that may be caused by the proposal are insignificant or mitigable with known technology, in which case the proposal may proceed or proceed with the mitigation, as the case may be;

(d) the potentially adverse environmental effects that may be caused by the proposal are unknown, in which case the proposal shall either require further study and subsequent rescreening or reassessment or be referred to the Minister for public review by a Panel;

(e) the potentially adverse environmental effects that may be caused by the proposal are significant, as determined in accordance with criteria developed by the Office in cooperation with the initiating department, in which case the proposal shall be referred to the Minister for public review by a Panel; or

(f) the potentially adverse environmental effects that may be caused by the proposal are unacceptable, in which case the proposal shall either be modified and subsequently rescreened or reassessed or be abandoned.

III. Judgments Below

A. National Energy Board, Decision No. EH-3-89, August 1990 (Fredette, Gilmour and Bélanger, members)

A. National Energy Board

The Board wrote lengthy reasons for its decision, which set out in some detail the status of the applicant, Hydro-Québec, the nature of the licences for which Hydro-Québec was applying, and the evidence of the applicant as it related to surplus, price, and fair market access, the three criteria expressly set out in the former provisions of the National Energy Board Act. The Board also considered the nature of the export markets, the reliability of the system proposed for implementing the export contracts, and the environmental impact of the exports for which the applications were made.

The Board noted that, were the licences to be granted, sufficient power could be generated to service the contracts by the combined use of the existing facilities of Hydro-Québec as well as those contemplated by its development plan. In other words, the exports did not require the use of facilities other than those existing, or already planned. However, the Board found that some of the facilities contemplated by the development plan for future construction would need to be built earlier than if no power were to be exported. The Board then examined the submissions of the various interveners, along with those of the appellants, as to the advisability of granting the licences.

In its disposition of the application, the Board noted that the amendments to the National Energy Board Act had removed the express requirement that the Board satisfy itself that the power to be exported was surplus to reasonably foreseeable Canadian requirements, and that the price to be charged was just and reasonable in the public interest. Nonetheless, there was nothing in the amended Act which would preclude the Board from taking these factors into account. The Board therefore explicitly considered the issues of cost recovery and whether pricing was competitive to rates charged within Canada. On the issue of cost recovery, the Board concluded (at p. 30):

The Board notes that Hydro-Québec did provide information on the magnitude of the revenues expected to be generated by the proposed export sales and that these would be significant, totalling more than $24 billion. . . . In addition, Hydro-Québec provided some details on the methodology used in carrying out its feasibility study as well as on the economic, financial and other relevant assumptions underlying that analysis. The Board has examined this information and finds that the methodology and assumptions described are reasonable.

The Board was accordingly persuaded that the export price charged would provide for recovery of the applicable costs incurred in Canada.

In evaluating the environmental impact of the application, the Board considered itself bound by both its own Act and by the Environmental Assessment and Review Process Guidelines Order, SOR/84-467 ("the EARP Guidelines Order"). The Board held (at pp. 37-38):

The Board recognizes that when electric utilities negotiate long-term system-to-system firm sales agreements, there can be circumstances in such arrangements that require capacity to come from generating facilities to be built at some future date and for which the necessary detailed environmental assessments have not been completed at the time of the export application. The proposed export contracts now before the Board have been negotiated on this basis. Nonetheless, for the Board to reach its decision on Hydro-Québec's applications, and at the same time meet its obligations under the Act and EARP Guidelines Order, it must take into account the environmental impacts arising from the construction of such future facilities.

The Board granted the applications subject to several conditions. In particular, in order to satisfy itself that the electricity to be exported would originate from facilities that had been subjected to the appropriate environmental reviews, the Board attached to the licence the following two conditions:

This licence remains valid to the extent that

(a)any production facility required by Hydro-Québec to supply the exports authorized herein, for which construction had not yet been authorized pursuant to the evidence presented to the Board at the EH-3-89 hearing that ended on 5 March 1990, will have been subjected, prior to its construction, to the appropriate environmental assessment and review procedures as well as to the applicable environmental standards and guidelines in accordance with federal government laws and regulations.

(b)Hydro-Québec, following any of the environmental assessment and review procedures mentioned in subcondition (a), will have filed with the Board

i) a summary of all environmental impact assessments and reports on the conclusions and recommendations arising from the said assessment and review procedures;

ii) governmental authorizations received; and

iii) a statement of the measures that Hydro-Québec intends to take to minimize the negative environmental impacts.

The generation of thermal energy to be exported hereunder shall not contravene relevant federal environmental standards or guidelines.

B. Federal Court of Appeal, 1991 CanLII 13572 (FCA), [1991] 3 F.C. 443 (Pratte, Marceau and Desjardins JJ.A.)

B. Federal Court of Appeal

Writing for the Federal Court of Appeal, Marceau J.A. dealt first with the validity of conditions 10 and 11 to the licence. He noted that the Board had imposed those conditions so as to meet its perceived mandate under the EARP Guidelines Order. In his view, this raised the questions of the application of this Order to the Board, and to Hydro-Québec as an agent of the Crown in right of the Province, as well as the question of the constitutional validity of the Order itself.

However, Marceau J.A. held that he did not have to deal with these concerns, since it was clear that, in this case, the imposition by the Board of the conditions to the licence emanated from its concerns as to the potential effects of the eventual construction of the production facilities planned to meet the increased demand for electrical power. Marceau J.A. held that the Board had no jurisdiction to make the granting of a licence to export certain goods subject to conditions which pertained to their production. He stated (at pp. 450-51):

The factors which may be relevant in considering an application for leave to export electricity and the conditions which the Board may place on its leave clearly cannot relate to anything but the export of electricity. Section 2 of the Act defines what is meant by export (in French "exportation") in the case of electricity:

"export" means, with reference to

(a) power, to send from Canada by a line of wire or other conductor power produced in Canada...

It seems clear that, as it is understood in the Act with respect to electricity, export does not cover production itself, and it is only reasonable that this should be so. Of course, anyone wishing to export a good must produce it or arrange for it to be produced elsewhere, but when he produces it or arranges for its production elsewhere he is not exporting it, and when he is exporting it he is not producing it.

I do not think anyone would dispute for a moment that in considering an application for leave to export electricity, the Board must be concerned about the environmental consequences, since the public interest is involved. . . . However, the only question can be as to the environmental consequences of the export, namely the consequences for the environment of "[sending] from Canada . . . power produced in Canada".

Marceau J.A. held that the Board had therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in affixing to the licence conditions 10 and 11. That did not mean, however, that the entire decision was vitiated. Marceau J.A. found the two sections to be severable from the remainder of the licence.

Marceau J.A. then considered the contention of the appellants that the Board erred in its decision to grant the licences. The appellants argued that the Board erred in taking into account the amendments to the National Energy Board Act which came into force while its decision was reserved. In the version of the Act in force at the time of the application, and at the time of the subsequent hearing, applicants for licences were required to satisfy the Board that the export price charged would recover the appropriate share of the costs incurred in Canada. This condition was deleted from the version of the Act in force at the time that the decision was rendered. The appellants argued that, in following the new provisions, the Board applied the requirement of cost recovery incorrectly.

Marceau J.A. noted that the new Act was designed to deregulate and simplify the licence application process. The express requirement of cost recovery had been deleted. The new provisions simply required the Board to take into consideration all factors which appeared to it to be relevant. Marceau J.A. held that the Board was correct in considering itself bound by the new provisions of the Act. Nonetheless, he found that, even if he was incorrect in so concluding, the argument of the appellants did not lead anywhere. The Board chose, despite the amendments, to analyze the application in light of the former price criteria.

The appellants argued in the alternative that, if the Board did consider the issue of cost recovery, it could not have concluded that this requirement was met, since there was no direct evidence before the Board on this point. Marceau J.A. agreed that the evidence on this point was not direct in all respects. In particular, the financial data relating to proposed production facilities was reviewed by an accountant, who then testified as to its veracity. He held, however, that nothing required the Board to decide this point on direct evidence. There was persuasive indirect evidence before it. To reevaluate the weight of this evidence was not a task for the courts, since appeals from decisions of the Board were limited by s. 22 of the National Energy Board Act to questions of law or jurisdiction.

IV. Issues on Appeal

Although the parties to this appeal have made numerous specific allegations of error on the part of the Board and of the Court of Appeal, discussed individually below, the issues in this appeal can be reduced to the following three questions:

Did the Federal Court of Appeal err in holding that the National Energy Board acted within its jurisdiction in granting the export licences to the respondent Hydro-Québec?
Did the Federal Court of Appeal err in holding that the National Energy Board erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction in its imposition of conditions 10 and 11 of the licences?
If the Federal Court of Appeal was not in error with respect to these two findings, did it nonetheless err in holding that conditions 10 and 11 were severable from the rest of the licences?

V. Analysis

The appellants challenge on a number of grounds the validity of the decision of the Board to grant the export licences. First, the appellants argue that the Board did not properly conduct the required social cost-benefit review. Second, they argue that the failure of the Board to require that Hydro-Québec disclose in full the assumptions and methodologies on which its cost-benefit review was based breached the requirements of procedural fairness by depriving the appellants of the opportunity for full participation in the review process. Third, the appellants argue that the Board owed them a fiduciary duty in the exercise of its decision-making power, and that the requirements of this duty were not fulfilled. Fourth, the appellants assert that the decision of the Board affects their aboriginal rights, and that the Board is therefore required to meet the justification test set out by this Court in R. v. Sparrow, 1990 CanLII 104 (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. Finally, the appellants submit that the Board failed to follow the requirements of its own Act and of the EARP Guidelines Order in conducting its environmental impact assessment. I will consider each of these arguments in turn.

A. Social Cost-Benefit Review

The appellants argue that the Board was required to carry out a social cost-benefit review which would consider all direct and indirect costs, including economic and social costs, arising from the exports for which the licences were sought. The appellants claim that, in relying on solely the indirect evidence of Hydro-Québec and the fact that the proposal had been approved by the government of Quebec, the Board failed to carry out this review properly. The duty to carry out such a review is ostensibly found in the National Energy Board Part VI Regulations, s. 6(2)(z)(i), which states:

(1) Every applicant for a licence for the exportation of power shall furnish to the Board such information as the Board may require.

(i) would recover its appropriate share of the costs incurred in Canada,

It appears that both the Canadian Electricity Policy, September 1988, and the Board's own internal report, entitled The Regulation of Electricity Exports, June 1987, interpret this requirement to mean that all direct and indirect costs, including environmental, land use, and economic costs ("social costs"), should be considered. However, I need express no opinion on the correctness of these interpretations or on whether the requirement in the regulations that the applicant for a licence furnish such evidence also means that the Board is required to consider it, especially in light of s. 119.08(2) of the Act, which gives the Board the discretion to determine which considerations are relevant to its decision, and of the terms of s. 6(2) itself, which gives the Board the authority to dispense with proof of any of the items specifically enumerated thereafter. In this case, it is clear that the Board considered that evidence of the nature and recoverability of such costs was relevant to its decision (reasons of the Board, at p. 29).

While the respondents are correct in asserting that the principle of curial deference applies to the weighing of the evidence by the Board in the exercise of its discretion, this principle cannot be invoked to save a decision for which there is no foundation in the evidence or that is based on irrelevant considerations. Once the Board decides that a particular factor is relevant to its decision, there must be some evidence to support the conclusion reached relating to it. The Board must not act unreasonably in evaluating the evidence it requests to make its decision: Bell Canada v. Canada (Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission), 1989 CanLII 67 (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1722.

However, in this appeal, it cannot be said that the Board was without evidence on which it could reasonably have concluded that the consideration of cost recoverability was satisfied. The Board, in its decision, summarized the evidence given by Hydro-Québec on this point as follows (at p. 13):

Hydro-Québec did not supply the Board with copies of the cost-benefit analyses for the advancement of facilities required to meet its obligations under the two contracts. Nevertheless it did provide information on the methodology, assumptions and the revenues used in the private and social cost-benefit analyses. It also underlined that the costs and benefits associated with the environmental impacts of the advancement of production facilities had been considered, including the funds necessary to compensate, if required, the economic losses resulting from impacts on forests, trapping regions or even agricultural lands.

The Applicant provided additional proof to demonstrate that the export price would allow recovery of the appropriate costs in Canada while maintaining the confidentiality of certain of its financial information. To that end, Hydro-Québec hired a chartered accountant whose mandate was to undertake verification of the accuracy of the assessment. . . .

The accountant testified before the Board and was cross-examined by the appellants.

It is, of course, insufficient for Hydro-Québec to ask the Board simply to accept a bare assertion that all costs will be recovered. However, that is not what happened in this case. Hydro-Québec provided evidence on which the Board could reasonably conclude that the requirement in s. 6(2)(z)(i) was met. This is evident from the conclusions of the Board, which state (at pp. 30-31):

Interveners raised concerns with regard to potential adverse environmental impacts outside of Québec but any specific costs that might be associated with such impacts were not identified. There were no other identified costs. . . .

Finally, the Board is convinced that the parties to these contracts have negotiated at arm's length and under free market conditions. The Board thus has no reason to believe that there would not be net benefits accruing from the proposed exports.

The interveners argued that the final sentence in this passage shows that the Board made its decision in the absence of positive evidence on cost recovery. When the sentence is read in context, however, it indicates rather that the Board was satisfied on the evidence before it that the relevant costs would be recovered. The Board cannot simply rely on the conclusions of the respondent as to cost recovery without evaluating their validity, but that does not appear to have been the situation here. Moreover, a prohibition on the reliance on the unsubstantiated affirmations of the applicant should not be transformed into a duty on the Board to conduct its own independent analysis where such an undertaking is unnecessary.

The Board did consider relevant to the issue of cost recovery, in addition to the evidence presented by Hydro-Québec, the fact that the export contracts had received the approval of the province. Evidence of such approval is expressly referred to in s. 6(2)(y) of the Part VI Regulations as a factor which the Board may wish to consider. The appellants contend, however, that this approval is irrelevant to the s. 6(2)(z)(i) cost-benefit analysis, as the orders-in-council pursuant to the Hydro-Québec Act, R.S.Q., c. H-5, under which provincial approval was given, require only that the contracts be consistent with sound financial management, not that they be in the public interest. Section 24 of the Hydro-Québec Act requires Hydro-Québec to maintain the rates charged for power at a sufficient level to defray operating expenditures and interest on its debt. In my view, sound financial management of a public utility is part of the public interest. While such a factor is obviously only one of the many relevant considerations in such a determination, it cannot be said that evidence of governmental approval is wholly irrelevant in the context of cost recovery, such that the Board committed a jurisdictional error in considering it.

I also reject the appellants' argument that the mere fact that all contracts in Quebec require such approval renders consideration of this factor by the Board an improper delegation of its decision-making power. The Board must, of course, make its own decision as to whether the cost-benefit requirement is satisfied. It cannot delegate that responsibility to the Government of Quebec or to any other body. In this case, for such a delegation to have occurred, the Board would have had to treat the mere existence of government approval as sufficient in and of itself to satisfy the cost-benefit requirement, without any independent consideration of the issue. But that was not the case here. Therefore, it cannot be said that there was any jurisdictional error committed by the Board in this aspect of its decision.

B. Opportunity for Fair Participation in the Review Process

Given my conclusions on the nature and scope of the cost-benefit review undertaken by the Board, the appellants' arguments relating to procedural fairness can be dispensed with rather simply. The appellants argue that the Board breached the requirements of procedural fairness in failing to require disclosure to the appellants by Hydro-Québec of all information pertinent to the issue of cost recovery. In particular, they point to the failure of the Board to require Hydro-Québec to reveal in full the assumptions and methodologies on which its cost-benefit analysis was based.

In general, included in the requirements of procedural fairness is the right to disclosure by the administrative decision-maker of sufficient information to permit meaningful participation in the hearing process: In re Canadian Radio-Television Commission and in re London Cable TV Ltd., 1976 CanLII 2305 (FCA), [1976] 2 F.C. 621 (C.A.), at pp. 624-25. The extent of the disclosure required to meet the dictates of natural justice will vary with the facts of the case, and in particular with the type of decision to be made, and the nature of the hearing to which the affected parties are entitled.

The issue in this case, then, is not the sufficiency of the disclosure made by Hydro-Québec. That relates to the question, discussed above, of whether there was evidence before the decision-maker on which it could reasonably have reached the decision which it did: Parke, Davis & Co. v. Fine Chemicals of Canada Ltd., 1959 CanLII 52 (SCC), [1959] S.C.R. 219, at p. 223, per Rand J. Rather, the issue is whether the Board provided to the appellants disclosure sufficient for their meaningful participation in the hearing, such that they were treated fairly in all the circumstances: Martineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, 1979 CanLII 184 (SCC), [1980] 1 S.C.R. 602, at pp. 630-31; Cardinal v. Director of Kent Institution, 1985 CanLII 23 (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 643, at p. 654; Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren v. Hofer, 1992 CanLII 37 (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 165, at p. 226, per McLachlin J. (dissenting on another ground).

In carrying out its decision-making function, the Board has the discretion to determine what evidence is relevant to its decision. It has not been shown that, in this case, the discretion was improperly exercised so as to result in inadequate disclosure to the appellants. As noted above, the Board had sufficient evidence before it to make a valid finding that all costs would be recovered. The appellants were given access to all the material that was before the Board. The Board specifically found that the appellants themselves presented no evidence of added social costs, and did not call into question the veracity of Hydro-Québec's report. Therefore, it cannot be said that, on this basis, the Board erred in its decision to grant the licences.

C. Fiduciary Duty

The appellants claim that, by virtue of their status as aboriginal peoples, the Board owes them a fiduciary duty extending to the decision-making process used in considering applications for export licences. The appellants' argument is that the fiduciary duty owed to aboriginal peoples by the Crown, as recognized by this Court in R. v. Sparrow, supra, extends to the Board, as an agent of government and creation of Parliament, in the exercise of its delegated powers. The duty applies whenever the decision made pursuant to a federal regulatory process is likely to affect aboriginal rights.

The appellants characterize the scope of this duty as twofold. They argue that it includes the duty to ensure the full and fair participation of the appellants in the hearing process, as well as the duty to take into account their best interests when making decisions. The appellants argue that such an obligation imports with it rights that go beyond those created by the dictates of natural justice, and that in this case, at a minimum, the Board should have required disclosure to the appellants of all information necessary to the making of their case against the applications. The respondents to this appeal, on the other hand, dispute both the existence of a duty, and, if it does exist, that the Board failed to meet it.

It is now well settled that there is a fiduciary relationship between the federal Crown and the aboriginal peoples of Canada: Guerin v. The Queen, 1984 CanLII 25 (SCC), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. Nonetheless, it must be remembered that not every aspect of the relationship between fiduciary and beneficiary takes the form of a fiduciary obligation: Lac Minerals Ltd. v. International Corona Resources Ltd., 1989 CanLII 34 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 574. The nature of the relationship between the parties defines the scope, and the limits, of the duties that will be imposed. The courts must be careful not to compromise the independence of quasi-judicial tribunals and decision-making agencies by imposing upon them fiduciary obligations which require that their decisions be made in accordance with a fiduciary duty.

Counsel for the appellants conceded in oral argument that it could not be said that such a duty should apply to the courts, as a creation of government, in the exercise of their judicial function. In my view, the considerations which apply in evaluating whether such an obligation is impressed on the process by which the Board decides whether to grant a licence for export differ little from those applying to the courts. The function of the Board in this regard is quasi-judicial: Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National Energy Board, 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, at p. 385. While this characterization may not carry with it all the procedural and other requirements identical to those applicable to a court, it is inherently inconsistent with the imposition of a relationship of utmost good faith between the Board and a party appearing before it.

It is for this reason that I do not find helpful the authorities cited to me by the appellants as indicative of this evolving trend: Gitludahl v. Minister of Forests, B.C.S.C., August 13, 1992, Vancouver A922935, unreported, and Dick v. The Queen, F.C.T.D., June 3, 1992, Ottawa T-951-89, unreported. Those cases were concerned, respectively, with the decision-making of the Minister of Forests, and the conduct of the Crown when adverse in interest to aboriginal peoples in litigation. The considerations which may animate the application of a fiduciary duty in these contexts are far different from those raised in the context of a licence application before an independent decision-making body operating at arm's length from government.

Therefore, I conclude that the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the appellants does not impose a duty on the Board to make its decisions in the best interests of the appellants, or to change its hearing process so as to impose superadded requirements of disclosure. When the duty is defined in this manner, such tribunals no more owe this sort of fiduciary duty than do the courts. Consequently, no such duty existed in relation to the decision-making function of the Board.

Moreover, even if this Court were to assume that the Board, in conducting its review, should have taken into account the existence of the fiduciary relationship between the Crown and the appellants, I am satisfied that, for the reasons set out above relating to the procedure followed by the Board, its actions in this case would have met the requirements of such a duty. There is no indication that the appellants were given anything less than the fullest opportunity to be heard. They had access to all the evidence that was before the Board, were able to make submissions and argument in reply, and were entitled to cross-examine the witnesses called by the respondent Hydro-Québec. This argument must therefore fail for the same reasons as the arguments relating to the nature of the review conducted by the Board.

D. Aboriginal Rights

This Court, in R. v. Sparrow, supra, recognized the interrelationship between the recognition and affirmation of aboriginal rights constitutionally enshrined in s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, and the fiduciary relationship which has historically existed between the Crown and aboriginal peoples. It is this relationship that indicates that the exercise of sovereign power may be limited or restrained when it amounts to an unjustifiable interference with aboriginal rights. In this appeal, the appellants argue that the decision of the Board to grant the licences will have a negative impact on their aboriginal rights, and that the Board was therefore required to meet the test of justification as set out in Sparrow.

It is obvious that the Board must exercise its decision-making function, including the interpretation and application of its governing legislation, in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution, including s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. Therefore, it must first be determined whether this particular decision of the Board, made pursuant to s. 119.08(1) of the National Energy Board Act, could have the effect of interfering with the existing aboriginal rights of the appellants so as to amount to a prima facie infringement of s. 35(1).

The respondents in this appeal argue that it cannot. They assert that, with the signing by the appellants of the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement, incorporated in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Native Claims Settlement Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 32 ("the James Bay Act"), the appellants ceded and renounced all aboriginal rights except as set out in the Agreement. Since the act of granting a licence neither requires nor permits the construction of the new production facilities which the appellants claim will interfere with their rights, and since the Agreement itself provides for a participatory review process to authorize the construction of such facilities, Hydro-Québec and the Attorney General of Quebec argue that no prima facie infringement results from the decision of the Board.

The evaluation of these competing arguments requires an examination and interpretation of the Agreement as embodied in the James Bay Act. The appellants, however, requested that this question be determined without reference to the Agreement or to the Act, since its interpretation and application form the subject of other legal proceedings involving the parties to this appeal. The appellants accordingly placed no reliance on this document in their assertion of a breach of aboriginal rights.

In my view, it is not possible to evaluate realistically the impact of the decision of the Board on the rights of the appellants without reference to the James Bay Act. The respondents assert that the rights of the appellants are limited to those set out in this document. The validity of this assertion cannot be tested without construing the provisions of the Agreement.

Moreover, even assuming that the decision of the Board is one that has, prima facie, an impact on the aboriginal rights of the appellants, and that the appellants are correct in arguing that, for the Board to justify its interference, it must, at a minimum, conduct a rigorous, thorough, and proper cost-benefit review, I find, for the reasons expressed above, that the review carried out in this case was not wanting in this respect.

E. Environmental Impact Assessment

Given that the social cost-benefit analysis appears to have been reasonable, the sole remaining ground on which the decision of the Board can be impugned relates to the environmental impact assessment carried out by the Board. It must be determined both whether the Board followed the procedures for such an assessment set out in the National Energy Board Act and in the EARP Guidelines Order, and whether the imposition of conditions 10 and 11 was a valid mechanism for fulfilling these requirements. If it is found that the conditions imposed by the Board caused it to exceed, or alternately to fail to exercise, its jurisdiction, it must also be determined whether the conditions are severable, and the order of the Board nonetheless remains valid.

(a) The National Energy Board Act

It is clear, and indeed it does not appear to have been seriously contested by the parties that, while the Board in making its decision was bound by the Act as amended, it was nonetheless entitled to require evidence of the factors listed in the former Act, since s. 119.08(2) of the amended Act gives to the Board the mandate to consider any matters which it deems relevant in the circumstances.

The proper interpretation of the scope of the Board's inquiry is found by looking at the procedural framework created by the Act as a whole. The procedure for the issuing of permits for the export of electricity is set out in Division II of Part VI of the Act. In the version of the Act in force at the time that the initial application was made by Hydro-Québec, each applicant was required to apply for a licence, and the factors which the Board was to consider in its determination whether to grant the licence were explicitly listed.

By the terms of the Act as amended by Bill C-23, the Board is in general now required, on application and without a public hearing, to issue permits for export (s. 119.03). However, the Board may recommend to the Minister that the granting be delayed and that an inquiry be held. Section 119.06(2) provides that, in determining whether to make such a recommendation:

. . . the Board shall seek to avoid the duplication of measures taken in respect of the exportation by the applicant and the government of the province from which the electricity is exported, and shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant, including

(b) the impact of the exportation on the environment:

(d) such considerations as may be specified in the regulations.

If the Minister accepts this recommendation, the application is designated as one to which s. 119.08 applies, and a licence is required rather than a permit. The enumerated factors which the Board was required to take into account at this stage, in considering whether a licence should be granted, were eliminated by the amendments to the Act. Now, the section simply provides:

119.08 . . .

(2) In deciding whether to issue a licence, the Board shall have regard to all considerations that appear to it to be relevant.

Section 6 of the Part VI Regulations governs the information that must be furnished to the Board in an application for a licence. The section gives the Board the power both to request any information that it might require, and to dispense with the provision of any evidence that it deems unnecessary. However, s. 6(2) nonetheless sets out a long list of factors that must be furnished by the applicant unless the Board otherwise authorizes. The subsections relevant to this appeal are ss. 6(2)(z) and 6(2)(aa), which require:

(i)would recover its appropriate share of the costs incurred in Canada,

(ii)would not be less than the price to Canadians for equivalent service in related areas...

(aa) evidence on any environmental impact that would result from the generation of the power for export.

In this case, the Board considered the environmental effects of the actual transmission of the electricity to the United States, and the resulting effects on the U.S. environment, and found them to be either neutral or beneficial. The real area of concern for negative environmental impact, as raised by the appellants and other parties appearing at the public hearing, was the future construction of production facilities, as contemplated by the development plan, to meet increased needs for power. The Board specifically found that these planned facilities would have to be built to meet the projected increase in the domestic demand for electrical power even if the licences were not approved. The Board also found that, if the licences were granted, the construction of some of these contemplated facilities would take place earlier than would otherwise be necessary. Finally, the Board held that the additional environmental effects occurring solely as a result of the acceleration of construction would be negligible.

However, the Board found that the potential environmental effects of the actual construction of these future facilities were not known with certainty. It therefore imposed conditions 10 and 11 to the licences, which require compliance with federal standards, and successful completion of existing review processes. In this appeal, the prime dispute in the area of environmental impact is whether the Board was entitled to consider, as relevant to its decision to grant the licences sought, the environmental impact of the construction by Hydro-Québec of these future facilities.

The Court of Appeal in this case found that, in deciding whether to grant a licence, the Board was limited solely to the consideration of the environmental effects of export as that term is defined in the National Energy Board Act. As noted above, s. 2 of the Act provides:

"export" means, with reference to

(a)electricity, to send from Canada by a line of wire or other conductor electricity produced in Canada,....

As mentioned above, the Court of Appeal (at pp. 450-51) interpreted the section to mean that

. . . the Board's jurisdiction still is and has always been the granting of leave to export electricity. The factors which may be relevant in considering an application for leave to export electricity and the conditions which the Board may place on its leave clearly cannot relate to anything but the export of electricity. . . .

I do not think anyone would dispute for a moment that in considering an application for leave to export electricity, the Board must be concerned about the environmental consequences, since the public interest is involved. The Board's function in this respect is in any case confirmed in several enactments. However, the only question can be as to the environmental consequences of the export, namely the consequences for the environment of "[sending] from Canada . . . power produced in Canada".

The Board is specifically permitted by s. 119.06(2) of the National Energy Board Act to take into consideration, in its decision whether to recommend to the Minister that the matter proceed by way of a licence application with a public review rather than by the issuance of a permit, both the environmental effects of the exportation of the electricity, and, as specified in the Regulations, the effects on the environment of the generation of the power for export. Once a licence application review process is instituted, s. 119.08(2) of the Act gives to the Board the power to consider all factors which appear to it to be relevant. In my opinion, given that the Board is permitted at the earlier stage to take such factors into account, it would be inconsistent to prohibit the Board from having regard to such factors at this later stage, although such concerns continue to be relevant.

I am of the view that the Court of Appeal erred in limiting the scope of the Board's environmental inquiry to the effects on the environment of the transmission of power by a line of wire across the border. To limit the effects considered to those resulting from the physical act of transmission is an unduly narrow interpretation of the activity contemplated by the arrangements in question. The narrowness of this view of the Board's inquiry is emphasized by the detailed regulatory process that has been created. I would find it surprising that such an elaborate review process would be created for such a limited inquiry. As the Court of Appeal in this case recognized, electricity must be produced, either through existing facilities or the construction of new ones, in order for an export contract to be fulfilled. Ultimately, it is proper for the Board to consider in its decision-making process the overall environmental costs of granting the licence sought.

However, such a task is particularly difficult in this case, given the Board's finding that, although existing facilities were not sufficient to service the contracts, the new facilities contemplated would have to be built in any event to supply increasing domestic needs. The approval of the application for the licences would therefore simply have the effect of accelerating construction of these facilities, and the environmental effects of the acceleration alone were found not to be significant. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the Board did not err in giving some weight to the environmental effects of the construction of the planned facilities. To say that such effects cannot be considered unless the Board finds that, but for the export contracts, the facilities would not be constructed, is to create a situation in which the construction of a generating facility may be contemplated solely for the purpose of fulfilling the demands of a number of export contracts, but because no one export contract can be said to be the cause of the facility's construction, its environmental effects will never be considered.

A better approach is simply to ask whether the construction of new facilities is required to serve, among other needs, the demands of the export contract. If this question is answered in the affirmative, then the environmental effects of the construction of such facilities are related to the export. In these circumstances, it becomes appropriate for the Board to consider the source of the electrical power to be exported, and the environmental costs that are associated with the generation of that power.

The respondents expressed concern that giving such a scope to the inquiry of the Board might then bring into its contemplation areas which are more properly the subject of provincial regulation and control. I hasten to add that no constitutional question was raised in this appeal, and I expressly refrain from making any determinations relating to the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution Act, 1867. However, it is nonetheless important that the jurisdiction of the Board be delineated in a manner that respects these concerns. Obviously, while matters relating to export clearly fall within federal jurisdiction according to s. 91(2) of the Constitution Act, 1867, as part of the federal government power over matters relating to trade and commerce, it is undeniable that a proposal for export may have ramifications for the operation of provincial undertakings or other matters under provincial jurisdiction.

In defining the jurisdictional limits of the Board, then, this Court must be careful to ensure that the Board's authority is truly limited to matters of federal concern. At the same time, however, the scope of its inquiry must not be narrowed to such a degree that the function of the Board is rendered meaningless or ineffective. In this regard, I find helpful the reasons of this Court in Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Minister of Transport), 1992 CanLII 110 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 3, a decision released after the Federal Court of Appeal had rendered judgment in this case.

In Oldman River this Court considered, among other issues, the constitutional validity of the EARP Guidelines Order. La Forest J., for the majority, concluded, in words I find apposite to this appeal (at p. 64):

It must be recognized that the environment is not an independent matter of legislation under the Constitution Act, 1867 and that it is a constitutionally abstruse matter which does not comfortably fit within the existing division of powers without considerable overlap and uncertainty.

Therefore (at p. 65):

. . . the solution to this case can more readily be found by looking first at the catalogue of powers in the Constitution Act, 1867 and considering how they may be employed to meet or avoid environmental concerns. When viewed in this manner it will be seen that in exercising their respective legislative powers, both levels of government may affect the environment, either by acting or not acting.

As noted earlier, the vires of the National Energy Board Act is not in dispute in this appeal. If in applying this Act the Board finds environmental effects within a province relevant to its decision to grant an export licence, a matter of federal jurisdiction, it is entitled to consider those effects. So too may the province have, within its proper contemplation, the environmental effects of the provincially regulated aspects of such a project. This co-existence of responsibility is neither unusual nor unworkable. While duplication and contradiction of directives should of course be minimized, it is precisely this dilemma that the EARP Guidelines Order, specifically ss. 5 and 8, is designed to avoid, and that the Board attempted to reduce with the imposition of conditions 10 and 11 to the licences.

It is also worth noting that the Board is the forum in which the environmental impact attributable solely to the export, that is, to the impact of the increase in power output needed to service the export contracts, will be considered. A focused assessment of these effects may be lost if subsumed in a comprehensive evaluation by the province of the environmental effects of the projects in their totality. In this way, both levels of government have a unique sphere in which to contribute to environmental impact assessment.

I conclude, therefore, that the Board did not exceed its jurisdiction under the National Energy Board Act in considering the environmental effects of the construction of future generating facilities as they related to the proposed export, an area of federal responsibility. The Board is permitted by s. 15 of the Regulations to the Act to attach conditions to the licences which it grants, including conditions relating to environmental protection: s. 15(m). The only issue that remains, then, is whether in imposing conditions 10 and 11, the Board failed to meet its obligations under the EARP Guidelines Order.

(b) The EARP Guidelines Order and the Validity of Conditions 10 and 11

That the EARP Guidelines Order applied to the Board in its decision whether to grant the export licences does not appear to be in serious dispute. The EARP Guidelines Order applies to all "initiating department[s]", defined in s. 2 as "any department that is, on behalf of the Government of Canada, the decision making authority for a proposal". "Proposal" is also defined in s. 2, as "any initiative, undertaking or activity for which the Government of Canada has a decision making responsibility".

The key feature to be extracted from these somewhat circular definitions is that the application of the EARP Guidelines Order to the Board relates to the aspect of Hydro-Québec's undertakings for which it has decision-making authority, that is, the decision to grant a licence permitting export. That does not artificially limit the scope of the inquiry to the environmental ramifications of the transmission of power by a line of wire, but it equally does not permit a wholesale review of the entire operational plan of Hydro-Québec. Section 6(b) of the EARP Guidelines Order makes it clear that "[t]hese Guidelines shall apply to any proposal . . . that may have an environmental effect on an area of federal responsibility". As will be evident from the reasons which follow, I am of the view that the Board in its decision struck an appropriate balance between these two extremes.

The main goal of the Process created by the EARP Guidelines Order is that "the initiating department shall, as early in the planning process as possible and before irrevocable decisions are taken, ensure that the environmental implications of all proposals for which it is the decision-making authority are fully considered and where the implications are significant, refer the proposal to the Minister for public review by a Panel" (s. 3). The overarching purpose of the EARP Guidelines Order is to avoid, in situations in which multiple regulatory steps impinge on an undertaking or proposal, disregard for the fundamentally important matter of the protection of the environment.

The EARP Guidelines Order also notes explicitly, as mentioned above, that duplication in review is to be avoided (ss. 5(1) and 8), although the initiating department is prohibited from delegating its task of environmental screening or initial assessment to any other body: s. 10(2). The Board in this case was therefore required by s. 12 of the EARP Guidelines Order to determine whether the export proposal would not produce any adverse environmental effects, would produce significant adverse environmental effects, would produce effects which were insignificant or mitigable with known technology, or would produce effects which were unknown. In the words of the Board (at pp. 34-35):

In conducting a screening of electricity export proposals, the Board examines the potential environmental and corresponding social effects in and outside of Canada, of the production, transmission, and end use of the electricity proposed to be exported. The purpose of such a screening is to enable the Board to reach one of the conclusions required in section 12 of the EARP Guidelines Order.

The Board noted that Hydro-Québec had provided information that approval of the export arrangements would mean that the facilities contemplated by its general development plan would be built two to six years earlier than anticipated. Hydro-Québec took the position that the effect of permitting the exports on the environmental impact of the implementation of the plan would be insignificant. As a result, it did not provide information on the overall impact of the construction and operation of the planned facilities. The Board noted (at pp. 37-38):

Hydro-Québec argued only that the early construction and operation of facilities to serve the exports would not result in significant environmental impacts and consequently it provided no evidence on this point. Specifically, Hydro-Québec did not provide a comprehensive environmental assessment of the impact of the construction and operation of facilities required to support the proposed exports. In this regard, the Board is of the view that the issue of environmental impact does not hinge on whether or not it should consider the impact of the construction and operation of facilities or only the impact of their advancement. Sufficient evidence was provided indicating that major hydro-electric facilities such as those required to meet the proposed exports do have environmental effects. Hydro-Québec itself did not deny this. The issue rather is whether, on balance, the environmental consequences are acceptable or mitigable. This, the Board does not know at this time.

However, it was apparent that all the facilities in issue would be subject at later dates either to provincial review under the James Bay Agreement or to review by other federal departments under the EARP Guidelines Order or other enactments. Therefore, the Board held (at pp. 39-40):

The Board is also of the view that, to the extent that Hydro-Québec's future facilities are subjected to the EARP Guidelines Order review process, or any equivalent review process, and are subsequently accepted for construction, the environmental and social impacts of these projects, as well as the related public concerns, will have been adequately addressed. . . .The Board is therefore satisfied that to the extent that such reviews take place and the facilities are accepted for construction, then the environmental impact of the construction and operation of the facilities required to support the proposed exports will be known and mitigable with known technology.

In order to satisfy itself that these reviews would be carried out, the Board attached conditions 10 and 11 to the licences.

The respondents challenge the validity of conditions 10 and 11 on the grounds that the jurisdiction of the Board in considering an application for an export licence does not extend to the environmental effects of the construction and operation of facilities which will generate the power to be exported. As noted above, I am of the view that the jurisdiction of the Board can properly encompass such a review. The appellants, however, also challenge the validity of these conditions. They argue that to approve the Board's transfer of the responsibility for environmental review to these future processes is to permit the Board to avoid its responsibilities under the EARP Guidelines Order.

The conclusion of the Board in this case appears to have been, not surprisingly, that the environmental effects of the construction and operation of the planned facilities were unknown. The Board is therefore required by s. 12(d) of the EARP Guidelines Order to see either that the proposal is subjected to further study and subsequent rescreening, or that it is submitted to a public review. In my view, the conditions imposed by the Board meet in substance this obligation. They do not amount to an improper delegation of the Board's responsibility under the EARP Guidelines Order. Rather, they are an attempt to avoid the duplication warned against in the Order, while continuing the jurisdiction of the Board over this matter.

In the same way that the EARP Guidelines Order does not require an initiating department to wait for the results of a public review before proceeding with a proposal (see Canadian Wildlife Federation Inc. v. Canada (Minister of the Environment) (1989), 4 C.E.L.R. (N.S.) 201 (F.C.T.D.), aff'd 1990 CanLII 13098 (FCA), [1991] 1 F.C. 641 (C.A.)), it does not require the Board to suspend its decision-making until the environmental assessment of all future generating facilities is completed. In this appeal, it is presently unclear exactly when and to what extent these contemplated facilities will be used to fulfil the requirements of the export contracts. This will not be known with certainty until those portions of the contract arise for completion. It is not unreasonable for the Board to exert some control over the timing of this process, while at the same time waiting for the results of environmental reviews which will be tailored to the specifications of the facilities as they are actually constructed.

This case appears to me to be just such a situation where the nature of the proposal means that the flexibility of the process set out in the EARP Guidelines Order is helpful. In this regard, I adopt the words of Reed J. of the Trial Division of the Federal Court in Friends of the Island Inc. v. Canada (Minister of Public Works), 1993 CanLII 2942 (FC), [1993] 2 F.C. 229, where she stated (at p. 264):

It is not disputed that it is preferable to identify potential environmental concerns relating to a project before private sector developers (or public sector developers for that matter) proceed to a final design. It is also desirable to use the process as a planning tool and to avoid duplication. I am not convinced however that it is useful to consider whether the Guidelines Order requires the assessment of [a] proposal at the concept stage or at a more specific design stage. What is required may very well depend on the type of project being reviewed. What does seem clear is that the assessment is required to take place at a stage when the environmental implications can be fully considered (s. 3) and when it can be determined whether there may be any potentially adverse environmental effects (s. 10(1)). [Emphasis in original.]

The Board retains the power, through s. 119.093(1) of the National Energy Board Act, to revoke the licences if the conditions are not fulfilled. The conditions relate to contemplated environmental review and regulation in the federal sphere. By proceeding in this way, the full environmental effects of the proposals are known to the Board before the construction is to proceed, and before the decision to grant the licences is irrevocable. At the same time, duplication is minimized and Hydro-Québec is not required to provide concrete evidence of the effects of proposals for future construction still some years away. The Board has thus fulfilled its mandate under the EARP Guidelines Order in a manner which, I would add, is not unreasonable in the circumstances.

VI. Conclusion and Disposition

At issue in this appeal are jurisdictional facts. While it is the proper function of this Court to determine whether the Board erred in the exercise of its jurisdiction, this Court will not interfere with the factual findings of the Board on which it bases that exercise, where there is some evidence to support its findings. I conclude that the appellants were given a full and fair opportunity to be heard before the Board, and that the Board had sufficient evidence to reach the conclusions which it did. In particular, I find that the order as set out by the Board neither exceeded nor avoided the scope of the Board's review in the area of the environmental impact of the proposed exports.

The reinstatement of the order as made by the Board is not the result sought by either the appellants or the respondents Hydro-Québec and the Attorney General of Quebec. This does not mean, however, that such a result is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Both the appellants and the respondents appealed the decision of the Board to the Federal Court of Appeal. These appeals were consolidated, and the court ruled that the appeal of the present appellants should be dismissed, and the appeal of the respondents allowed. It is this decision, in toto, that the appellants appeal to this Court.

I am of the view that the Court of Appeal erred in allowing the appeal of the respondents, and that it should have dismissed both appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to make the order that the court below should have made. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed, the judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal is set aside, and the order of the Board restored. Given the nature of the result, each party will bear its own costs here and in the court below.

Appeal allowed.

Solicitors for the appellants: Robert Mainville & Associés, Montréal.

Solicitor for the respondent the Attorney General of Canada: Jean‑Marc Aubry, Ottawa.

Solicitors for the respondent the Attorney General of Quebec: Pierre Lachance and Jean Bouchard, Ste‑Foy.

Solicitors for the respondent Hydro‑Québec: Ogilvy Renault, Montréal.

Solicitor for the respondent the National Energy Board: Judith B. Hanebury, Calgary.

Solicitor for the interveners: Gregory J. McDade, Vancouver.

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159

I. Facts

II. Relevant Statutory Provisions

III. Judgments Below

A. National Energy Board

B. Federal Court of Appeal

IV. Issues on Appeal

V. Analysis

A. Social Cost-Benefit Review

B. Opportunity for Fair Participation in the Review Process

C. Fiduciary Duty

D. Aboriginal Rights

E. Environmental Impact Assessment

VI. Conclusion and Disposition

Quebec (Attorney General) v. Canada (National Energy Board), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 159

I. Facts

II. Relevant Statutory Provisions

III. Judgments Below

A. National Energy Board

B. Federal Court of Appeal

IV. Issues on Appeal

V. Analysis

A. Social Cost-Benefit Review

B. Opportunity for Fair Participation in the Review Process

C. Fiduciary Duty

D. Aboriginal Rights

E. Environmental Impact Assessment

VI. Conclusion and Disposition

Cited By (7 cases)

R. v. Al-Akhali, 2025 ONCA 229

Reference re Impact Assessment Act , 2023 SCC 23

R. v. Chung, 2018 ONSC 6633

Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 251

Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5637

Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103

Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2002 SCC 79

Cited By (7 cases)

R. v. Al-Akhali, 2025 ONCA 229

Reference re Impact Assessment Act , 2023 SCC 23

R. v. Chung, 2018 ONSC 6633

Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2017 ONSC 251

Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 5637

Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, 2010 SCC 53, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103

Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada, 2002 SCC 79