Franklin S. Gertler

The Quebec Court of Appeal was asked by reference whether the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, was ultra vires Parliament's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held the Act was valid except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which it found impermissibly altered Canada's constitutional architecture.

Both the Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the entire Act as constitutionally valid under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding that its pith and substance — protecting the well-being of Indigenous children, youth and families by promoting culturally appropriate child and family services and advancing reconciliation — falls squarely within Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians.

The Court also held that ss. 21 and 22(3) do not alter the constitutional architecture: s. 21 is a valid anticipatory incorporation by reference provision, and s. 22(3) is a permissible legislative restatement of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant, Atomic Energy of Canada Limited, sought a confidentiality order for technical documents related to the environmental assessment of nuclear reactors being built in China.

The Federal Court Trial Division and Federal Court of Appeal denied the order.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada established the test for granting confidentiality orders in civil litigation, adapting the Dagenais/Mentuck framework.

The Court held that a confidentiality order should be granted when necessary to prevent a serious risk to an important interest, such as a commercial interest, and when the salutary effects of the order outweigh its deleterious effects on the open court principle and freedom of expression.

Applying this test, the Court allowed the appeal and granted the confidentiality order.

The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers applied to the Canada Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for employees of Alberta Government Telephones (AGT).

The Board assumed jurisdiction, finding AGT to be a federal undertaking and not immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Federal Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

On appeal, the Supreme Court of Canada held that while AGT is an interprovincial undertaking within federal jurisdiction under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867, it is a provincial Crown agent and therefore immune from the Canada Labour Code.

The Court found no clear Parliamentary intention to bind the provincial Crown in the Code, and AGT did not waive its immunity by its conduct.

The appellant provincial telephone utility appealed a decision holding that, although it was a federal undertaking, it was not immune from federal telecommunications regulation.

The Court held that the utility's participation in an integrated national telecommunications network, together with its interprovincial transmission activities and organizational arrangements, made it an interprovincial undertaking under s. 92(10)(a) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The majority nevertheless concluded that, as an agent of the provincial Crown, it was protected by s. 16 of the Interpretation Act because the Railway Act did not clearly bind the Crown and the utility had not waived immunity through its conduct.

The appeal was allowed, with one judge dissenting on waiver.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years under Criminal Code provisions enacted after the offence was committed.

Had she been tried under the law in force at the time of the offence, her parole ineligibility would have been between 10 and 20 years.

After serving 10 years in an Ontario penitentiary, she applied for habeas corpus and Charter relief, arguing her continued detention under the 25-year ineligibility period violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Ontario courts had jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus, that the remedy was appropriate to review the legality of her parole ineligibility, and that applying s. 7 to her continuing deprivation of liberty did not constitute a retrospective application of the Charter.

The Court declared her eligible for parole.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a contract for the provision of hydro-electric energy.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as moot in light of its concurrent judgment in Newfoundland (Attorney General) v. Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corp.