Samuel Chayer

Two enterprises in airport and marine transportation security, and an employee, challenged provincial offence proceedings under Quebec’s Private Security Act on interjurisdictional immunity grounds.

The Court held that aspects of the provincial licensing scheme gave a provincial administrative body final control over how security activities at the core of exclusive federal aeronautics and navigation and shipping powers were conducted.

It found impairment of the federal core powers and concluded the impairing provisions were unseverable from the legislative scheme.

The statute was therefore declared constitutionally inapplicable to the appellants, and both appeals were allowed with costs.

Two appeals from the Quebec Court of Appeal concerning whether the statutory exclusion of first-level managers from Quebec's Labour Code labour relations regime infringed freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Canadian Charter and s. 3 of the Quebec Charter.

The majority (Jamal J., Karakatsanis, Kasirer and O'Bonsawin JJ.) held that there is one unified framework under s. 2(d) — the two-part substantial interference test originating in Dunmore — and that the Dunmore factors do not constitute a separate elevated-threshold test for positive rights claims.

Applying that framework, the Court found no substantial interference because the respondent association had managed to organize, voluntarily bargain, and had access to court remedies, with no causal link shown between the legislative exclusion and the employer's conduct.

Wagner C.J. and Côté J. concurred in the result but maintained that the distinct three-step Dunmore framework applies to positive rights claims.

Rowe J. also concurred, agreeing the Dunmore framework should be preserved for positive claims.

Appeals allowed.

The Quebec Court of Appeal was asked by reference whether the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, was ultra vires Parliament's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held the Act was valid except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which it found impermissibly altered Canada's constitutional architecture.

Both the Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the entire Act as constitutionally valid under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding that its pith and substance — protecting the well-being of Indigenous children, youth and families by promoting culturally appropriate child and family services and advancing reconciliation — falls squarely within Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians.

The Court also held that ss. 21 and 22(3) do not alter the constitutional architecture: s. 21 is a valid anticipatory incorporation by reference provision, and s. 22(3) is a permissible legislative restatement of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The Quebec Court of Appeal was asked by reference whether the Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, S.C. 2019, c. 24, was ultra vires Parliament's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal held the Act was valid except for ss. 21 and 22(3), which it found impermissibly altered Canada's constitutional architecture.

Both the Attorney General of Quebec and the Attorney General of Canada appealed.

The Supreme Court upheld the entire Act as constitutionally valid under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding that its pith and substance — protecting the well-being of Indigenous children, youth and families by promoting culturally appropriate child and family services and advancing reconciliation — falls squarely within Parliament's jurisdiction over Indians and Lands reserved for the Indians.

The Court also held that ss. 21 and 22(3) do not alter the constitutional architecture: s. 21 is a valid anticipatory incorporation by reference provision, and s. 22(3) is a permissible legislative restatement of the doctrine of federal paramountcy.

The appellant challenged the Quebec Court of Appeal's opinion that ss. 1 to 7 of the Genetic Non-Discrimination Act, S.C. 2017, c. 3, exceeded Parliament's criminal law power under s. 91(27) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The majority held that the pith and substance of the impugned provisions — prohibiting compelled genetic testing and non-consensual use or disclosure of genetic test results in connection with contracting and the provision of goods and services — was a valid exercise of the criminal law power, as the provisions respond to a reasoned apprehension of harm to autonomy, privacy, equality, and public health.

A concurring minority agreed on the result but characterized the pith and substance more narrowly as protecting health by giving individuals control over the intimate information revealed by genetic testing.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that the impugned provisions lacked a well-defined threat and adequate evidentiary foundation to constitute a valid criminal law purpose, falling instead within provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights under s. 92(13).