Henry S. Brown

The appellant, a US-based distributor of the patented medicine Thalomid, sold the drug to Canadians through the Special Access Programme.

The Patented Medicine Prices Review Board requested pricing information, asserting jurisdiction under the Patent Act over medicines 'sold in any market in Canada'.

The appellant argued that under commercial law principles, the sales occurred in the United States.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Board's decision, finding that a purposive interpretation of the Patent Act supported the Board's consumer protection mandate to regulate prices of medicines delivered and dispensed in Canada, regardless of the commercial locus of the sale.

Appeal concerning whether a mining project in the James Bay Territory, approved under the environmental assessment regime in a modern treaty, was nevertheless subject to a further federal environmental assessment before a fisheries authorization could issue.

The majority held that the treaty is protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, but does not exclude the operation of federal laws of general application requiring CEAA compliance before issuance of a Fisheries Act permit.

The treaty's single-review provision governed internal treaty review processes only and did not eliminate the proponent's obligation to obtain necessary post-approval federal permits.

The Court varied the Court of Appeal's order to confirm that any fisheries authorization must comply with CEAA procedures and the Crown's duty to consult.

The appellants challenged the trial judge's decision to discharge a civil jury on the grounds of complexity, arguing it violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter does not confer a right to a jury trial in civil matters.

The court held that the jeopardy of a civil damages award does not engage section 7, and the class of civil defendants denied a jury trial does not form an analogous ground under section 15.

The respondents, members of the Maliseet and Mi'kmaq First Nations, were charged with unlawful possession or cutting of Crown timber under New Brunswick's Crown Lands and Forests Act.

They claimed an aboriginal right to harvest timber for personal use.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the respondents possess an aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally used for that purpose by their respective First Nations.

The Court clarified the Van der Peet test, holding that a practice undertaken for survival purposes can be considered integral to an aboriginal community's distinctive culture, and that the right to harvest wood for domestic uses has no commercial dimension.

The appellant, who grew marijuana for medical purposes, was charged with unlawfully producing cannabis and elected to be tried by a judge and jury.

At trial, the judge directed the jury to return a guilty verdict and told them they were bound to abide by his direction.

The jury returned a guilty verdict, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge deprived the appellant of his constitutional right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter by usurping the jury's function.

The Court further held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code could not apply because there was, in effect, no jury trial at all.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant, manufacturer of BARBIE dolls, opposed the respondent's application to register the trade-mark 'Barbie's' for its chain of restaurants.

The Trade-marks Opposition Board rejected the opposition, finding no likelihood of confusion given the significant difference in the nature of the wares and services.

The Federal Court and Federal Court of Appeal upheld the decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable.

The Court confirmed that while a trade-mark's fame is an important factor, it does not trump all other factors under section 6(5) of the Trade-marks Act, and the totality of the circumstances must be considered.

The appellant appealed a decision finding that funds held in a self-directed registered retirement savings plan were not exempt from seizure.

The appellant argued the plan constituted an annuity or a trust under the Civil Code of Québec.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the plan did not qualify as an annuity because there was no alienation of capital, nor did it qualify as a trust because the owner-annuitant retained control over the assets and the trustee did not have exclusive administration.

Consequently, the funds were not exempt from seizure.

The respondents on an application for leave to appeal sought to include the costs of expert evidence and related travel expenses as disbursements in their bill of costs after the leave application was dismissed.

The Registrar disallowed these expenses, ruling they were not covered by Part II of Schedule B of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondents brought a motion to review the Registrar's decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that expert fees are not specifically authorized as disbursements under the Rules and can only be allowed if expressly authorized by the Court under Rule 58.

The Crown brought a motion to quash an appeal as of right filed by a young offender to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The young offender had been found guilty of indictable offences and his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal with one judge dissenting.

The Supreme Court granted the motion and quashed the appeal, holding that section 27(5) of the Young Offenders Act clearly precludes appeals as of right to the Supreme Court, requiring leave to appeal in all such cases.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault and indecent assault based primarily on the testimony of the complainant.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge's reasons did not adequately explain why the evidence did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that a court of appeal cannot set aside a verdict that is reasonably supported by the evidence merely because the trial judge failed to indicate expressly that all relevant considerations were taken into account.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's admission of expert psychiatric evidence regarding the complainant's behaviour and history of abuse.

The appellant sued Quebec asbestos companies in British Columbia for damages related to asbestos exposure.

He sought discovery of documents.

The respondents refused, citing the Quebec Business Concerns Records Act, which prohibits removing business documents from Quebec pursuant to foreign judicial orders.

The BC courts declined to rule on the constitutionality of the Quebec statute and dismissed the application to compel production.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the BC courts and the SCC had jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of the Quebec statute.

Applying the principles from Morguard, the Court held that the Quebec blocking statute was constitutionally inapplicable to proceedings in other provinces because it offended the principles of order and fairness inherent in the Canadian federation.

The Attorney General for Ontario applied to intervene in a criminal appeal on a non-constitutional issue regarding the cross-examination of a complainant on medical records.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the application, holding that very special circumstances must be shown to permit a provincial Attorney General to intervene on non-constitutional issues in a criminal appeal originating from another province.

The applicant failed to establish such circumstances or show that its submissions would provide a fresh perspective beyond those of the parties.

The United States sought to extradite the appellant for fraud-related charges.

After a warrant of committal was issued, the Minister of Justice signed a warrant of surrender.

The appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Minister violated section 7 of the Charter by relying on a confidential internal memorandum not disclosed to the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus for impending secondary detention like a warrant of surrender.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional or actual bias in the Minister's decision-making process, and concluding that the internal memorandum was protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The appellant, a Seventh-day Adventist, was unable to work his scheduled Friday evening shift due to his religious beliefs.

The employer and the appellant found a workable accommodation that required an exception to the collective agreement, but the union refused to consent and threatened a policy grievance.

The employer subsequently terminated the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that both the employer and the union have a duty to accommodate an employee's religious beliefs short of undue hardship.

The union's refusal to cooperate in a reasonable accommodation made it jointly liable with the employer for the adverse effect discrimination.

The appeal was allowed and the member designate's decision in favour of the appellant was restored.

The appellant applied for an order of reversal of judgment pursuant to s. 70 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Crown consented to a reversal of the judgment appealed from to the extent that a new trial be ordered.

The appellant, who had previously resisted a similar Crown application, undertook that the only relief sought was a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada granted the motion, reversing the judgment of the Nova Scotia Supreme Court, Appeal Division, and remitting the matter for a new trial.

The Crown brought a motion for an order of reversal of judgment under s. 70 of the Supreme Court Act, consenting to a new trial.

The appellant resisted the motion, as he sought an acquittal based on fresh evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while s. 70 applies to criminal appeals, it cannot be used to force a consent order on an unwilling appellant unless the disposition gives the appellant all the relief that would be available if completely successful.

Since the appellant could potentially be acquitted if completely successful, the Crown's unilateral consent to a new trial was insufficient.

The motion was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with having sexual intercourse with a female under the age of 14, contrary to s. 146(1) of the Criminal Code.

They challenged the constitutionality of the provision, arguing it violated ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 146(1) violated s. 7 because it created an absolute liability offence punishable by imprisonment, denying the accused a defence of honest mistake of fact regarding the complainant's age.

The Court found this infringement was not justified under s. 1.

However, the Court held that the provision did not violate the equality rights under s. 15, as the biological realities of the offence meant it could only be committed by males.

The appeals were allowed, the offending words were struck down, and new trials were ordered.

The applicant applied to vary an order refusing leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The original order was made on the basis of written material only.

After the refusal, it was brought to the Court's attention that the lower court had relied on a decision that was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.

The Court held that while Rule 50 is narrow and reflects the common law rule of functus officio, Rule 7 empowers the Court to remedy an injustice where the rules are deficient.

The Court concluded it had jurisdiction to reconsider the decision and granted leave to appeal to the applicant.

The applicant applied to vary an order refusing leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The original order was made on the basis of written material only.

After the refusal, it was brought to the Court's attention that the lower court had relied on a decision that was subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court.

The Court held that while Rule 50 is narrow and reflects the common law rule of functus officio, Rule 7 empowers the Court to remedy an injustice where the rules are deficient.

The Court concluded it had jurisdiction to reconsider the decision and granted leave to appeal to the applicant.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder.

The trial judge had applied a lesser standard of intent in the jury charge, which was delivered before the principle restricting the requisite mens rea for attempted murder to the intent to kill was enunciated.

The Court of Appeal found the jury had no alternative but to find the requisite intent to kill.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.