J. E. Thompson

The appellant appealed a decision of the Federal Court of Appeal regarding a denial of access to information by the Clerk of the Privy Council.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, adopting the reasons of the Federal Court of Appeal, which found the Clerk was justified in denying access.

However, the Court awarded costs to the appellant throughout.

The respondent's refugee claim was rejected and a deportation order was issued.

After exhausting immigration review and Federal Court appellate processes, the respondent brought a constitutional challenge in the Ontario Court (General Division).

The motions court judge stayed the application, finding the Federal Court was the appropriate forum.

The Court of Appeal set aside the stay.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the motions court judge properly exercised his discretion to stay the proceedings, as Parliament had created a comprehensive scheme of review in the Federal Court.

The appellant, a citizen of Iran, arrived in Canada and claimed Convention refugee status.

He was referred to a secondary examination by an immigration officer, during which he omitted important factual details about his claim.

He was not advised of his right to counsel until the conclusion of this examination.

The appellant argued that the secondary examination constituted a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter and that his s. 7 rights were violated.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a secondary examination at a port of entry is a routine part of the screening process and does not constitute a detention within the meaning of s. 10(b).

Furthermore, the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 do not require the provision of counsel during routine information gathering at a port of entry.

The appeal was dismissed.

The United States sought to extradite the appellant for fraud-related charges.

After a warrant of committal was issued, the Minister of Justice signed a warrant of surrender.

The appellant sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the Minister violated section 7 of the Charter by relying on a confidential internal memorandum not disclosed to the appellant.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue habeas corpus for impending secondary detention like a warrant of surrender.

However, the Court dismissed the appeal, finding no institutional or actual bias in the Minister's decision-making process, and concluding that the internal memorandum was protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The appellant municipality sought restitution from the federal and provincial governments for monies paid to support juvenile delinquents placed in group homes under an ultra vires provision of the Juvenile Delinquents Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the municipality failed to establish that its payments conferred an 'incontrovertible benefit' on either level of government.

Neither government was under a legal obligation to pay for the juveniles' care, and the payments did not discharge a liability or save them an inevitable expense.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic based largely on intercepted private communications.

The trial judge refused to open the sealed packets containing the affidavits supporting the wiretap authorizations.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused is entitled to access the sealed packet, subject to editing to protect informants, to make full answer and defence.

The Court established that a trial judge may review the authorization to determine if it complies with s. 8 of the Charter, and if unlawful, the evidence must be excluded under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code.

The Court also held that the accused may cross-examine the affiant with leave of the trial judge if necessary to make full answer and defence.

A new trial was ordered because the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine.

The appellant was subjected to a strip search by customs officers upon entering Canada, which revealed concealed cannabis resin.

She was not informed of her right to counsel prior to the search.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a strip search at customs constitutes a detention under s. 10(b) of the Charter, meaning the appellant's right to counsel was violated.

However, the Court found that the search provisions of the Customs Act do not violate s. 8 of the Charter due to the lower expectation of privacy at international borders.

Despite the s. 10(b) violation, the Court admitted the evidence under s. 24(2), reasoning that it was pre-existing real evidence and the officers acted in good faith pursuant to statutory authority.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent newspaper challenged the constitutionality of s. 442(3) of the Criminal Code, which mandated a publication ban on the identity of a complainant in a sexual assault case upon request.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the mandatory ban infringed the freedom of the press under s. 2(b) of the Charter, it was a reasonable limit justified under s. 1.

The Court found that the objective of encouraging victims of sexual offences to come forward by protecting them from the trauma of publication was of pressing and substantial concern, and that a discretionary ban would not achieve this objective as it would deprive victims of certainty.

The Court also held that the provision did not infringe the accused's right to a public hearing under s. 11(d).

The appellant was laid off due to a strike by another local of his union at his place of employment.

He applied for unemployment insurance benefits but was denied on the basis that he was 'financing' the strike under s. 44(2)(a) of the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, because a portion of his mandatory union dues was diverted to the International Union's strike fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'financing' requires active and voluntary involvement by the claimant.

The mandatory payment of union dues did not constitute financing the labour dispute, and the appellant was therefore entitled to benefits.