Dickson

On a rehearing, the Court ordered that money previously paid into court by the respondent be paid out to the appellant together with accumulated interest.

The Court also varied its earlier costs disposition to provide that the appellant recover its costs at trial and in the Supreme Court of Canada, while the respondent recover its costs in the Ontario Court of Appeal.

No costs were awarded for the rehearing itself.

The decision is a short oral disposition dealing solely with payout of funds in court and allocation of costs following the prior judgment.

The accused was charged with second degree murder but committed for trial on first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The Crown filed an indictment for first degree murder.

The accused challenged the committal by way of habeas corpus with certiorari in aid.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the mere filing of an indictment does not bar an accused from challenging a committal; an indictment is only 'preferred' when lodged with a trial court ready to proceed.

Furthermore, a preliminary inquiry judge only has jurisdiction to commit an accused for the specific charge laid in the information or an included offence, not for any other offence disclosed by the evidence.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder under s. 213(d) of the Criminal Code, where the underlying offence was indecent assault.

He appealed on the grounds that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the defence of drunkenness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding drunkenness and the mental elements of constructive murder, the error did not result in a miscarriage of justice because the jury's verdict indicated they were satisfied the appellant had the capacity to commit the indecent assault.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent corporation was charged with an offence under the Canada Grain Act.

At trial, the Crown attempted to call the manager of the respondent's elevator as a witness.

The trial judge ruled the manager was not compellable, equating his testimony to compelling the corporation itself, and acquitted the respondent.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that an employee or officer of a corporation, even if considered its 'directing mind and will', is a compellable witness for the prosecution.

The privilege against self-incrimination applies to the accused corporation, not to its individual employees testifying at trial.

The appellant was excluded from a closed competition in the Public Service because his maximum rate of pay was below the prescribed minimum.

He appealed, arguing that restricting eligibility based on a minimum salary level without regard to the occupational nature of the position was invalid under section 13 of the Public Service Employment Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada agreed with the dissenting judge in the Federal Court of Appeal, holding that the Commission adopted an unauthorized criterion for restricting eligibility.

The appeal was allowed and the decisions of the lower court and the Appeal Board were set aside.

The appellant, a business manager, sued the respondent for unpaid commissions based on an oral agreement.

The trial judge allowed the action, giving oral reasons that were not transcribed in time for the appeal.

Without the benefit of these reasons, the Court of Appeal reviewed the evidence de novo and reduced the award.

The appellant subsequently located the trial judge's oral reasons and appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and restored the trial judgment, holding that the Court of Appeal's substitution of its opinion for that of the trial judge on findings of fact and credibility was an unwarranted intrusion.

The Crown brought actions in the Federal Court, Trial Division to recover debts owed by the appellants under the Prairie Grain Advance Payments Act and the Canada Student Loans Act.

The appellants argued the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction, relying on previous jurisprudence that mere contractual claims by the Crown do not fall under federal law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the detailed statutory frameworks governing the advances and loans constituted existing and applicable federal law.

Therefore, the Federal Court had jurisdiction under section 17(4)(a) of the Federal Court Act and section 101 of the British North America Act.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant developer purchased lots in a subdivision but refused to assume the original subdivider's obligations to install municipal services.

After protracted negotiations failed, the respondent municipality passed a by-law without notice to the appellant, deeming the lots not to be a registered plan of subdivision.

The appellant sought judicial review to quash the by-law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the municipality's action was quasi-judicial and attracted the duty of fairness (audi alteram partem), the discretionary remedy of certiorari was denied because of the appellant's conduct in attempting to avoid its obligations and evade municipal regulation through checkerboarding.

The appellant appealed a judgment of the Federal Court of Appeal which upheld the Trial Division's finding that the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim regarding a joint venture contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Federal Court of Appeal was correct in its assessment of jurisdiction based on previous jurisprudence.

The appellant's husband, a police officer, was struck and killed by a vehicle while investigating an accident on a well-lit highway.

The trial judge found the driver solely responsible and awarded $195,000 in damages under the Fatal Accidents Act.

The Court of Appeal found the officer 25% contributorily negligent and reduced the damages by applying a fixed 7% discount rate based on recent Supreme Court jurisprudence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the trial judge's findings on liability and damages.

The Court clarified that the discount rate is a factual issue to be determined on the evidence in each case, not a fixed rule of law, and found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment.

The appellant served a notice of appeal in November 1974 but did not inscribe the appeal for hearing until February 1980, well beyond the one-year time limit under rule 59 of the Supreme Court Rules.

The appellant brought an oral motion to extend the time to inscribe the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion and held the appeal to have been abandoned.

The applicants sought an extension of time to hear their appeal, which had been postponed from the April 1980 sitting to October.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the motion, holding that the appeal was deemed to be abandoned under section 623(2) of the Criminal Code.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Manitoba Court of Appeal regarding a contract for the sale of land.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, finding that time was not of the essence in the contract and the vendor had accepted the conditions as terms imposing obligations upon him.

The Court held that the vendor was in default and guilty of premature repudiation, restoring the trial judge's award of damages to the purchasers.

The appellants appealed from a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Manitoba, which dismissed their applications for orders declaring that arbitrators nominated by the respondents under s. 387(2) of The Public Schools Act be disqualified.

The Supreme Court of Canada delivered an oral judgment dismissing the appeals, finding no reason to interfere with the judgments of the Court of Appeal.

The appeals were dismissed without costs.

The appellants sold a portion of surplus railway lands and applied for subdivision approval.

The Provincial Planning Board ruled that the 10% reserve requirement under the Planning Act should be calculated based only on the surplus lands, not the entire parcel.

The Alberta Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding the reserve applied to the entire parcel.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, setting aside the Court of Appeal's judgment and restoring the Board's order.

The appellant was injured when his bicycle hit a pothole on a municipal road.

He sued the municipality for negligence.

The trial judge found the municipality liable for failing to maintain a constant inspection system.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Municipal Act, the municipality had the power but not the duty to maintain highways.

The frequency of road inspections was a matter of policy, and absent operational negligence in carrying out that policy, the municipality could not be held liable.

The respondents appealed a CRTC decision approving a telephone rate increase to the Governor in Council under s. 64(1) of the National Transportation Act.

The Governor in Council denied the petitions without providing the respondents an opportunity to respond to submissions from government officials and the CRTC.

The respondents sought a declaration that the Governor in Council owed them a duty of fairness.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Governor in Council was exercising a legislative function and was not subject to a duty of fairness or natural justice in these circumstances.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellants were charged with conspiracy to effect an unlawful purpose under s. 423(2)(a) of the Criminal Code, specifically to prevent members of a union from participating in lawful union activities under s. 110(1) of the Canada Labour Code.

The Provincial Court quashed the information, but the Supreme Court of Ontario and the Court of Appeal ordered the matter to proceed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that 'unlawful purpose' in s. 423(2)(a) means contrary to law (prohibited by federal or provincial legislation).

Since preventing participation in union activities is not explicitly prohibited by legislation, the information did not disclose an offence known to law.

The appellant underwent surgery performed by the respondent surgeon to remove an occlusion in his carotid artery.

During or immediately following the surgery, the appellant suffered a massive stroke leaving him paralyzed.

The appellant sued for damages, alleging he was not informed of the specific risk of stroke from the surgery itself.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that failure to disclose risks sounds in negligence, not battery.

The Court established that the duty of disclosure requires a surgeon to inform a patient of all material risks.

Furthermore, the Court adopted a modified objective test for causation, asking whether a reasonable person in the patient's particular position would have foregone the surgery if properly informed.

The Court found the surgeon breached his duty and that a reasonable person in the appellant's position, being close to a vested pension and facing no immediate emergency, would have declined the surgery.

The trial judgment awarding damages was restored.

The appellant appealed his conviction for trafficking in a restricted drug, arguing that ignorance of subordinate legislation could serve as an excuse or a defence of due diligence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, relying on the reasons provided in the concurrent appeal of the appellant's accomplice, Molis v. The Queen.