T.B. Smith

The Crown brought actions in the Federal Court, Trial Division to recover debts owed by the appellants under the Prairie Grain Advance Payments Act and the Canada Student Loans Act.

The appellants argued the Federal Court lacked jurisdiction, relying on previous jurisprudence that mere contractual claims by the Crown do not fall under federal law.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the detailed statutory frameworks governing the advances and loans constituted existing and applicable federal law.

Therefore, the Federal Court had jurisdiction under section 17(4)(a) of the Federal Court Act and section 101 of the British North America Act.

The appeals were dismissed.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(2) of the Fisheries Act after spilling 3,000 gallons of diesel fuel into tidal waters.

The appellant sought an order of prohibition, arguing that s. 33(2) was ultra vires the federal Parliament as it related to general water pollution rather than fisheries, and that the information was multiplicitous.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 33(2) is intra vires as its true nature and character is the protection and preservation of fisheries, a valid exercise of federal power under s. 91(12) of the B.N.A. Act.

The Court also found the information was not multiplicitous, as the accused was not prejudiced in preparing a defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a member of the regular armed forces, was convicted by a Standing Court Martial of trafficking and possession of narcotics under the Narcotic Control Act, pursuant to section 120 of the National Defence Act.

He appealed on the grounds that trial by a military tribunal for ordinary criminal offences deprived him of his right to an independent and impartial tribunal and his right to equality before the law under the Canadian Bill of Rights.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the military justice system was established pursuant to a valid federal objective under section 91(7) of the British North America Act and did not offend the Canadian Bill of Rights.

Appeal concerning Nova Scotia succession duties assessed against resident grandchildren following an estate-planning scheme using Alberta parent and subsidiary corporations to receive the residue of a Nova Scotia estate.

The majority held that the non-resident parent corporation was "beneficially entitled" to the estate property within the meaning of s. 2(5), because it had complete control over the named subsidiary beneficiary and could compel transfer of the residue.

The majority further held that the combined effect of ss. 2(5) and 8(2) imposed a valid in personam tax on resident successors and was intra vires the provincial legislature under s. 92(2).

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, holding that "beneficially entitled" carried its established equitable meaning and did not extend through the corporate structure.

The appellant was charged under s. 33(3) of the Fisheries Act for depositing logging debris into a stream that flowed into fish-bearing waters.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the subsection ultra vires the federal Parliament.

The County Court and Court of Appeal upheld the legislation as valid under the federal power over sea coast and inland fisheries.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 33(3) is a blanket prohibition of activities subject to provincial jurisdiction without linking the proscribed conduct to actual or potential harm to fisheries.

Therefore, it is not necessarily incidental to effective fishery legislation and is ultra vires.

The applicant, Gulf Oil Corporation, applied to the Supreme Court of Canada under s. 43 of the Canada Evidence Act to enforce letters rogatory issued by United States courts.

The letters sought the production of documents held by the applicant's Canadian subsidiaries for use in US anti-trust litigation regarding a uranium cartel.

The Canadian government opposed disclosure on public policy grounds, citing the Uranium Information Security Regulations and Canadian sovereignty.

The Court assumed jurisdiction but dismissed the application, holding that it would be a wrongful exercise of discretion to enforce the letters rogatory contrary to the stated public policy of the Canadian government.

The appellant credit union held a fixed and floating charge over the assets of the debtor company.

A receiver was appointed and realized the assets.

The Crown claimed priority for unremitted source deductions (income tax, CPP, UI) made by the employer prior to receivership, and for deductions on wages paid by the receiver after appointment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the receiver must remit deductions on wages it paid.

For pre-receivership deductions, the Crown had priority for CPP and UI deductions due to statutory deeming provisions applying in a 'liquidation', but lacked priority for income tax deductions which were not kept separate and apart.