R. Jones

The plaintiffs, Manubhai Lallub Patel and Manjula Patel, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's Order dismissing their action as abandoned, issued on February 28, 2014.

The action, commenced in 2013 following a 2011 collision, was never served on the defendants.

The plaintiffs' former counsel, Alpesh Patel, deliberately did not advance the litigation and later fabricated settlement documents, leading to a fraud charge against him.

The court applied the four Reid factors (explanation of delay, inadvertence, promptness of motion, and prejudice to defendants) in a contextual approach.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, as they did not even know the action had been commenced, and their former counsel's conduct was deliberate, not inadvertent.

While the motion was brought promptly after the dismissal order came to the plaintiffs' attention, the defendants demonstrated significant actual prejudice due to the loss of key medical evidence (OHIP summaries) and the inability to conduct timely independent medical assessments over a 12-year period.

The court also emphasized the principle of finality and the fact that the plaintiffs are pursuing remedies against their former solicitor.

Consequently, the motion to set aside the dismissal order was dismissed.

The 19-year-old first-time offender was found guilty of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and possession of 28.58 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 4 years, while the defence sought a net sentence of 2 years and 1 month after enhanced credit.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the danger of combining drugs and loaded firearms.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years (3 years for the firearm and 1 year consecutive for the drugs), less 200 days of pre-sentence and Downes credit, resulting in a remnant sentence of 3 years and 165 days.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine for commercial gain.

As a first-time offender with a strong employment history and family support, the court accepted a joint submission for a sentence of 2.5 years in custody on the trafficking count, with a concurrent 6-month sentence on another count.

DNA and weapons prohibition orders were also imposed.

The plaintiff was involved in a motor vehicle accident and commenced two actions: a tort action against the other driver and a breach of contract action against her long-term disability insurer.

After both actions were set down for trial and subsequently struck from the trial list due to counsel's non-attendance, the plaintiff brought a motion to have the actions consolidated or heard together.

The court granted leave under Rule 48.04 to hear the motion, applying a flexible approach as no trial dates would be delayed.

The court ordered the actions to be tried together or consecutively, finding they shared common questions of fact regarding the plaintiff's injuries and that hearing them together would save costs and avoid multiplicity of proceedings.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of the section 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The applicant faced charges arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015, including unlawfully being in a dwelling house, possession of a weapon, possession under $5,000, mischief to property, obstructing a peace officer, failing to comply with recognizance, and possession of MDMA.

The trial was originally scheduled to commence on November 9, 2016, but was delayed due to various procedural issues, including a defective information naming an incorrect accused, defence applications to quash the information and sever charges, and the recusal of the original trial judge.

The applicant argued that the total delay of approximately 18 to 20 months exceeded the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan and constituted an unreasonable delay.

The Crown argued that exceptional circumstances and defence delay should be deducted from the total delay, bringing it within acceptable limits for a transitional case.

A young person brought an application to stay charges pursuant to section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for breach of section 11(b) rights (right to be tried within a reasonable time).

The applicant faced charges on two informations arising from offences alleged to have occurred on October 25, 2015.

The application was heard following the recusal of the original trial judge.

The court considered the framework established in R. v. Jordan, 2016 SCC 27, and applied it contextually to a case involving a young person and proceedings that commenced before the Jordan decision was released.

The court found that the Crown established exceptional circumstances justifying the delay and that the defence failed to demonstrate a violation of section 11(b) rights.

In a medical malpractice jury trial, the court determined whether long‑term disability (LTD) and Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits should be deducted from damages for past and future income loss.

The plaintiff suffered a stroke after being discharged from hospital and claimed permanent inability to work.

The court held that CPP disability benefits are not deductible from income loss awards.

However, applying the Supreme Court of Canada’s guidance in IBM Canada Limited v. Waterman, the court concluded that the plaintiff’s employer‑funded LTD benefits functioned as indemnity for wage loss and should be deducted from any jury award to avoid double recovery.

The jury was therefore instructed to deduct LTD payments from both past and future wage loss damages.

Following sentencing for offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the court addressed the Crown’s request for forfeiture of property seized in connection with the offence, including cash, a cellular phone, and a motor vehicle.

The offender contested only the forfeiture of the vehicle.

The court found the circumstances materially similar to those considered in persuasive appellate authority and concluded that forfeiture was appropriate under s. 16 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The vehicle was therefore ordered forfeited along with the other seized items.

Sentencing following conviction after a non‑jury trial for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking under s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000.

Police executing a search warrant at a motel room seized 11.18 grams of crack cocaine, 3.21 grams of cocaine, digital scales, a debt list, and cash.

The offender had a lengthy criminal record for drug trafficking offences spanning decades and had served multiple prior custodial sentences.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for trafficking in crack cocaine while considering mitigating factors including a difficult personal background and relatively small quantities of drugs.

Enhanced credit for pre‑trial custody under s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code was denied because the offender’s remand detention arose from other charges.

A custodial sentence was imposed with credit for time served.

The applicant, charged with drug offences, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at his motel room.

He argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was deficient, the no-knock entry was unreasonable, and his rights were breached when he was questioned before being advised of his right to counsel.

The court found the ITO established reasonable grounds based on corroborated confidential informant tips, and the no-knock entry was justified by exigent circumstances.

While the pre-caution questioning breached the applicant's rights, the court applied the Grant framework and concluded the physical evidence should not be excluded, as society's interest in adjudicating the case on its merits outweighed the fleeting breach.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime under $5,000 following execution of a search warrant at a motel unit.

Police located crack cocaine and cocaine packaged in multiple baggies, a digital scale with cocaine residue, numerous small baggies, debt lists, multiple cell phones, and over $1,500 in small-denomination currency.

The accused was the sole occupant of the small, cluttered motel unit and his vehicle was parked outside throughout police surveillance.

The court held that constructive possession was established based on circumstantial evidence demonstrating knowledge and control over the drugs.

Considering the packaging, paraphernalia, expert evidence on trafficking indicators, and cash denominations, the court concluded the drugs were possessed for the purpose of trafficking and that the currency represented proceeds of crime.

The offender pleaded guilty to production of marijuana and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following the discovery of a large outdoor grow operation containing nearly 6000 plants.

The court considered the offender’s role as a gardener, absence of a prior criminal record, guilty plea, and compliance with bail conditions over several years.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of approximately fourteen and a half months, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the scale of the operation.

The court accepted that imprisonment was required but considered collateral immigration consequences, which could lead to removal from Canada if the sentence exceeded six months on a count.

A global custodial sentence structured to remain within an appropriate sentencing range while recognizing those collateral consequences was imposed.

The complainant alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 68 of the Labour Relations Act by refusing to take his discharge grievance to arbitration.

The employer raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the justness of the discharge had already been adjudicated in a prior complaint under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Board agreed, finding that the doctrine of res judicata prevented the complainant from relitigating the discharge against the employer.

The Board further dismissed the section 68 complaint against the union, concluding that the complainant suffered no harm from the union's refusal to arbitrate because he had already obtained an impartial adjudication of his discharge in the prior proceeding.

Appeal concerning Nova Scotia succession duties assessed against resident grandchildren following an estate-planning scheme using Alberta parent and subsidiary corporations to receive the residue of a Nova Scotia estate.

The majority held that the non-resident parent corporation was "beneficially entitled" to the estate property within the meaning of s. 2(5), because it had complete control over the named subsidiary beneficiary and could compel transfer of the residue.

The majority further held that the combined effect of ss. 2(5) and 8(2) imposed a valid in personam tax on resident successors and was intra vires the provincial legislature under s. 92(2).

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, holding that "beneficially entitled" carried its established equitable meaning and did not extend through the corporate structure.