Julie Anne Janiuk

Martin Moore pleaded guilty to multiple offences including attempted disarming of a peace officer, break and enter, fraud under $5000, and assaulting a peace officer.

The court rejected a joint sentencing submission of 120 days custody, finding it unhinged from the circumstances and offender's conduct.

The judge emphasized that an attempt to disarm a peace officer is as serious as a successful disarmament under s. 270.1 of the Criminal Code, and that the offender's failure to succeed is not mitigating.

The court imposed a global sentence of 300 days custody with enhanced presentence credit, probation, and ancillary orders, highlighting numerous aggravating factors including breach of recognizance, false identification, and violent conduct.

This is a sentencing decision following a conviction for sexual assault involving forced intercourse.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the victim's repeated protests, the lack of a condom, and significant psychological harm, against mitigating factors such as the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, youth at the time of the offence, and family support.

The Crown sought 4-5 years, while the defence sought a conditional or reformatory sentence.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing objectives for serious sexual assaults, particularly those involving forced penetration, and rejected the defence's argument for a unique circumstance.

A sentence of 3.5 years in the penitentiary was imposed, along with ancillary orders.

The applicant sought a stay of criminal proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter due to a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating a total delay of 649 days, which was 102 days over the 18-month (547-day) ceiling for provincial court cases.

After subtracting 15 days of defence-attributable delay for scheduling a Crown pretrial, the net delay remained 87 days above the ceiling.

Finding no exceptional circumstances or case complexity to justify the delay, the court granted the s. 11(b) application and stayed the proceedings.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault.

The complainant testified that she did not consent to sexual intercourse, cried, and repeatedly said no.

The defendant claimed the complainant consented and initiated the activity.

The court found the defendant's testimony unreliable due to numerous material contradictions with his police statement, where he admitted to fabricating details.

Conversely, the court found the complainant's evidence cogent, detailed, and compelling, dismissing defence arguments regarding minor inconsistencies as insignificant.

The court concluded that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant did not consent and that the defendant knew or was reckless/wilfully blind to the absence of consent.

The defendant was found guilty.

This sentencing decision concerns Andrew Wyvill, convicted of sexual interference with a 14-year-old complainant who was highly intoxicated and often unconscious.

The court detailed three instances of sexual violation and the profound physical and psychological impact on the victim and her family.

While acknowledging the offender's guilty plea and community support, the court found numerous aggravating factors, including the victim's extreme vulnerability, the repeated nature of the assaults, the offender's lack of understanding of consent, and his continued denial of guilt.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 2 years less one day, while the defence proposed a conditional sentence.

Applying the principles of denunciation and deterrence, and guided by recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence emphasizing increased sentences for child sexual abuse, the court rejected the defence's submission as "inappropriate and palpably offensive" and imposed a sentence of 30 months custody, along with a DNA order, a 10-year s. 109 order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The defendant brought a motion to compel production of an Approved Screening Device (ASD) printout and notes from two police officers regarding the storage and handling of the ASD used during a RIDE program stop.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The Crown resisted disclosure, arguing the ASD printout was a third-party record governed by the O'Connor test and that the officer notes were not relevant.

The court found the ASD printout was a third-party record not subject to first-party disclosure obligations and dismissed that portion of the application.

However, the court ordered disclosure of the officer notes from the two assisting officers, finding they were potentially relevant to the defendant's ability to make full answer and defence, particularly given the anticipated evidence regarding ambient temperature conditions and the placement of the ASD prior to testing.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, observations of impairment by civilian witnesses and police officers, and breath sample results of 260 and 250 mg/100mL of blood.

The accused challenged the detention and sought exclusion of evidence based on Charter violations.

The court found the Crown proved impaired operation beyond a reasonable doubt, rejected Charter violations regarding counsel access, but found an arbitrary detention between the hospital visit and police station release.

However, the court declined to stay proceedings or exclude evidence as the remedy was not warranted.

The accused was convicted on the first count with a stay of proceedings on the second count pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The accused was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol following a police response to a parking lot in Wasaga Beach.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample readings of 140 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defence raised three issues: whether the detention following breath sampling was arbitrary, whether the accused's right to counsel was violated, and whether the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found the samples were taken as soon as practicable and that no violation of the right to counsel occurred.

However, the court found an arbitrary detention breach under section 9 of the Charter, as the police decision to detain was based solely on blood alcohol readings without considering other relevant circumstances.

Nevertheless, the court declined to exclude the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the breach was modest and made in good faith.

The accused was found guilty.