Greg Dorsz

The offenders pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded restricted firearm following a gunfight in a bar where both shot each other.

Brown was rendered a quadriplegic as a result of his injuries.

Green carried the firearm for protection while trafficking drugs.

The court sentenced Brown to a conditional sentence of two years less a day due to his severe permanent disability.

Green was sentenced to four years imprisonment, which was fully satisfied by his pre-sentence custody credit calculated at 1.5:1.

The appellant, a building superintendent, was convicted of sexually assaulting a tenant in her apartment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence, scrutinized evidence unevenly, and improperly relied on his bad character.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge engaged in impermissible moral reasoning by rejecting the appellant's evidence based on his misogynistic views and lack of respect for the complainant.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The court sentenced the accused after trial for assault arising from a public confrontation in which the victim was putting up posters of Israeli child hostages.

The sentencing judge found the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate against the victim as a member of the Jewish community and as a person publicly expressing support for Jewish hostages, making denunciation and general deterrence primary sentencing objectives.

While the accused was a first offender and judicial restraint remained relevant, the court held that a discharge or suspended sentence would be contrary to the public interest and disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and its significant victim and community impact.

A 150-day conditional sentence with GPS monitoring, house arrest and curfew terms, followed by 12 months' probation, was imposed together with a five-year weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, Norbert Budai, was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his estranged wife, Henrietta Viski, who died after being doused with gasoline and set on fire.

Budai pleaded not guilty to first-degree murder but guilty to second-degree murder, which the Crown did not accept.

The court, sitting without a jury, found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the murder was planned and deliberate, rejecting the defence's argument that Budai's consumption of alcohol and fentanyl limited his capacity to plan and deliberate.

Budai was found guilty of first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle and flight from police, arguing errors in principle and demonstrable unfitness.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the respondent's prior custodial sentences and mischaracterized her criminal record as unrelated.

The Court concluded that the original six-month custodial sentence was demonstrably unfit given the gravity of the offences and the respondent's high degree of moral responsibility and history of defying authority.

The appeal was allowed, and an additional 18 months less a day of incarceration was imposed.

The defendants, Basil Dixon and Nathan Brown, were charged with conspiracy to import cocaine following a large-scale police investigation ("Project Southam").

The trial, heard by a judge alone, relied heavily on intercepted communications and surveillance.

The court found that voice identification evidence from a detective constable was unreliable due to limited exposure and lack of formal training.

However, based on circumstantial evidence, including intercepts and surveillance footage, the court identified Dixon as "B" and Brown as "R" in the communications.

Applying the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, the court found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Dixon conspired to import cocaine from Guyana (Count One) and that both Dixon and Brown conspired to import cocaine using a pilot (Count Three).

Deborah Omolade Oguntoyinbo pleaded guilty to numerous fraud-related charges and breaches of release orders spanning several years.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 6 years imprisonment, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of 18-24 months.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, citing the defendant's extensive criminal record of over seventy prior convictions (predominantly fraud-related), her persistent and flagrant breaches of release conditions (including cutting off a GPS monitor), and a lack of demonstrated rehabilitation efforts.

Emphasizing specific deterrence and denunciation, the judge imposed a global sentence of five years imprisonment, along with significant restitution orders totaling over $86,000 to multiple victims who suffered financial and personal harm, including new Canadians and small business owners.

The court also granted credit for pre-sentence custody and harsh custodial conditions.

The applicant sought a stay of charges due to a breach of his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating total delay, subtracting defence delay (including prolonged non-attendance, inefficient re-tracing of procedural steps, time pursuing resolution, and defence counsel unavailability), and accounting for the COVID-19 pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

Despite significant Crown efforts, the net delay still exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court cases by 22 days.

The court found the s. 11(b) right was breached and stayed the charges.

This decision provides written reasons for oral rulings made during a jury trial for human trafficking and related charges.

The court addressed the admissibility of two key pieces of evidence: a police bulletin seeking information on other alleged victims and escort advertisements found using a commercial computer program called "Traffic Jam." The police bulletin was deemed inadmissible due to its minimal probative value and significant moral and reasoning prejudice, as it suggested the accused's involvement in wider trafficking without sufficient corroboration.

The escort advertisements themselves were found admissible as they corroborated the complainant's testimony about engaging in sex work.

However, information generated by the "Traffic Jam" program, such as an associated email address, was ruled inadmissible as hearsay and for lacking proper expert foundation, requiring redaction.

The accused, charged with human trafficking offences, applied for a bail review to vary his release conditions to allow him to work in the music business.

The court found an error of law in the lower court's imposition of the strictest form of release, including full house arrest and electronic monitoring, despite finding the primary ground was not a concern and the Crown's case was only moderately strong.

The court varied the conditions to add a third surety, allow exceptions to the curfew for work in Ontario, and deleted the electronic monitoring requirement.

The defendant, Prince Adjei-Boateng, was charged with trafficking heroin and possession of proceeds of crime following an undercover police investigation.

The Crown alleged he was the supplier for a drug dealer, Michael Patania.

The court considered the admissibility of co-conspirator statements and the defendant's spontaneous exculpatory statement.

Despite strong circumstantial evidence, the court found reasonable doubt due to inconsistencies in the evidence, corroboration of the defendant's alternative explanation (used car parts business), and the police's failure to examine seized cell phones for direct communication between the defendant and the drug dealer.

The defendant was acquitted on all charges.

J.G. was convicted of sex trade-related offenses (influencing/directing, advertising, obtaining material benefit from a minor's sex trade) and child pornography offenses (possession and distribution).

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years and six months.

Key legal considerations included the unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for the sex trade offenses, the inadmissibility of the accused's unrequested disciplinary records from custody, and the application of systemic racism as a mitigating factor in sentencing Black offenders.

The court found mandatory minimums unconstitutional, excluded the disciplinary records, and took judicial notice of systemic racism's deleterious impacts as a mitigating factor.

Credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown days due to COVID-19 was also applied.

The appellant pleaded guilty to four offences arising from a large-scale marijuana grow operation: production of marijuana, theft of electricity, theft of water, and injury to property.

The operation consisted of 864 plants with an estimated value between $324,000 and $518,000.

The sentencing judge imposed the mandatory minimum sentence of three years for production, with concurrent 12-month sentences for the remaining counts.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentence.

On appeal, the court found the mandatory minimum unconstitutional and determined a fit sentence of 14 months imprisonment for the production offence, with concurrent sentences for the property offences remaining undisturbed.

The applicant brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of her right to a speedy trial under Section 11(b).

The applicant was arrested on November 30, 2016, and charged with driving over 80.

The information was sworn on December 5, 2016.

Trial dates were scheduled for August 21 and 22, 2018, resulting in a total delay of approximately 626 days or 20 months and 26 days.

The court found that the net delay, after accounting for defence waiver of 11(b) rights during resolution discussions, exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The Crown failed to establish exceptional circumstances to justify the delay.

The primary causes of delay were inadequate disclosure practices, particularly the failure to timely provide booking videos and the identity of a searching officer, lack of Crown resources, Crown unavailability for earlier trial dates, and institutional resource constraints.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and was sentenced to six months' imprisonment.

He appealed the sentence, seeking a reduction to six months less a day because he was unaware of the significant immigration consequences at the time of his plea and sentencing.

The Crown consented to the reduction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the requested reduction modest and the proposed sentence fit.

This voir dire ruling addresses the admissibility of inculpatory statements made by Joshua Barreira to police following his arrest for first-degree murder.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary due to police oppression (cold, sickness, hunger, exhaustion, denial of right to silence) and inducements related to his wife and brother's arrests.

The court found no oppression, noting Barreira was a "savvy and experienced individual" who understood his rights and repeatedly attempted to negotiate a deal.

The court also determined that the idea of a false confession to protect family members was self-generated by Barreira, and the police officer's actions did not constitute improper inducements.

Consequently, the statements were deemed voluntary and admissible at trial, subject to editing out references to Barreira's criminal record.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct involving two former spouses in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included allegations of jealousy, controlling behaviour, criminal harassment, and assault.

The Crown argued this similar fact evidence would assist in proving motive, identity, and the elements of first-degree murder.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Handy and concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, particularly moral and reasoning prejudice, outweighed its probative value.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to introduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual may have committed the homicide.

The defence argued that the third party had the opportunity to commit the offence and had connections with individuals associated with the deceased.

The Crown opposed the motion, submitting the proposed theory was speculative and unsupported by evidence linking the third party to the crime.

Applying the principles governing third party suspect evidence, including the requirement of a sufficient evidentiary nexus, the court held that the proposed theory lacked an air of reality and would invite speculation.

The prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit numerous ante‑mortem statements made by the deceased to friends and family describing the accused’s conduct and the deteriorating relationship between them.

The court reviewed the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the traditional “state of mind” exception and the principled hearsay exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

While acknowledging the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice associated with prior discreditable conduct and repetitive hearsay, the court held that most statements were relevant to motive, animus, planning and deliberation, and the criminal harassment component of constructive first degree murder.

The court excluded certain statements lacking sufficient reliability or probative value but admitted the majority of the evidence as part of the unfolding narrative of the relationship.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing or refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Crown alleged the accused was pulled over for traffic violations, exhibited signs of impairment, and failed to provide a suitable breath sample.

The defence challenged both the validity of the breath demand and whether impairment was proven.

The court found that the officer lacked both subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the breath demand, having confused the lower "reasonable suspicion" standard applicable to approved screening device demands with the higher "reasonable and probable grounds" standard required for breath demands.

The court also found the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt, noting inconsistencies in officer observations, the absence of translation of field sobriety test instructions, and the accused's apparent competent performance on the tests.