Susan Orlando

Following a jury trial, the offender was convicted of human trafficking, receiving a benefit from sexual services and human trafficking, assault, and cocaine trafficking, all involving his wife.

The Crown sought a 12-year global sentence, while the Defence proposed 42 months.

The court applied the principles of sentencing, including the Tang/Miller factors, and considered aggravating factors such as abuse of an intimate partner, breach of trust, using drugs to maintain exploitation, and the devastating impact on the victim.

Mitigating factors included a challenging personal background and potential for rehabilitation.

The court imposed a global sentence of 9 years, with sentences for the related offences running concurrently, and applied 6 months of credit for pre-sentence house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 8.5 years imprisonment.

Ancillary orders for DNA, weapons prohibition, communication ban, and forfeiture were also made.

The Crown applied under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a key witness, residing in Nova Scotia, to testify by video conference at the trial.

The respondent opposed, arguing mere inconvenience was insufficient to displace the presumption of in-person testimony.

The court granted the application, finding that despite the witness's convenience being the primary reason, the evidence was constrained, safeguards could be implemented, and significant court staffing shortages in Toronto justified the order to prevent further delays, especially given the accused was in custody.

The order was conditional on the witness testifying from a courthouse to preserve solemnity.

The offender, Pitchou Kanyanga, pleaded guilty to procuring a person to offer sexual services for consideration, receiving a material benefit from sexual services, and advertising sexual services.

The Crown sought a five-year jail sentence, while the defence requested a three-year sentence with enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody, aiming for a time-served disposition.

The court found the offender's conduct to be at the lower end of the exploitative scale compared to other cases.

Considering aggravating factors such as a lengthy criminal record and possession of a firearm, and mitigating factors including a guilty plea, remorse, difficult upbringing, and strong family support, the court initially warranted a four-year imprisonment.

However, significant "Duncan credit" was applied due to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (lockdowns, triple-bunking), resulting in a net sentence of one day in jail, effectively time served.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA sample order.

The offender, Dylan Dolman-Kencher, pleaded guilty to exploiting a person under 18 (s. 279.011(1) Criminal Code) and breach of probation (s. 733.1(1) Criminal Code).

The Crown sought a six-year sentence, while the defence sought five years.

The court considered aggravating factors, including breach of trust, victim vulnerability, provision of drugs, and prior breach of probation, and mitigating factors such as youth, guilty plea, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions (Duncan credit).

The court imposed a six-year sentence, reduced by a nine-month Duncan credit and a 1.5:1 Summers credit for 792 days of pre-trial custody, resulting in a remaining sentence of 2 years less 2 days, plus 6 months concurrent for the probation breach, followed by two years probation.

The applicant, charged with numerous human trafficking and sexual assault offences, brought an application alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 48 to 50 months.

The court deducted periods of defence delay, including delay caused by the withdrawal of previous counsel and waiver of delay.

The court also deducted the entire two-year period of the COVID-19 pandemic as a discrete exceptional circumstance, noting the suspension of jury trials.

After deductions, the net delay fell well below the 30-month presumptive ceiling, and the court found the delay was not otherwise unreasonable.

The application was dismissed.

This decision provides written reasons for oral rulings made during a jury trial for human trafficking and related charges.

The court addressed the admissibility of two key pieces of evidence: a police bulletin seeking information on other alleged victims and escort advertisements found using a commercial computer program called "Traffic Jam." The police bulletin was deemed inadmissible due to its minimal probative value and significant moral and reasoning prejudice, as it suggested the accused's involvement in wider trafficking without sufficient corroboration.

The escort advertisements themselves were found admissible as they corroborated the complainant's testimony about engaging in sex work.

However, information generated by the "Traffic Jam" program, such as an associated email address, was ruled inadmissible as hearsay and for lacking proper expert foundation, requiring redaction.

The offender was convicted of receiving material benefits from sexual services after selling cocaine to a sex worker and encouraging her to continue sex work to pay for the drugs.

The Crown sought a 3-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a 12-month conditional sentence.

The court considered the unique facts, noting the offender was not a 'pimp' but a drug dealer, and weighed mitigating factors including the offender's rehabilitation, family support, and systemic factors related to anti-Black racism.

The court imposed a 17-month conditional sentence followed by 12 months of probation.

The three accused were charged with various offences related to the human trafficking and sexual exploitation of an 18-year-old complainant.

The Crown alleged that one accused recruited the complainant into the sex trade, acted as her pimp, and exploited her while she suffered from a severe cocaine addiction.

The other two accused were alleged to have participated in her exploitation, sexual assault, and procuring.

The court carefully assessed the complainant's credibility, noting her memory was affected by trauma and heavy drug use, but found her core allegations against the primary accused were corroborated by digital evidence and the recovery of firearms she disposed of on his behalf.

The primary accused was found guilty of human trafficking, procuring, receiving material benefits, advertising sexual services, unauthorized possession of a firearm, and uttering threats.

The second accused was found guilty only of receiving a material benefit from sexual services (selling her cocaine), and acquitted of the other charges due to reasonable doubt.

The third accused was acquitted of all charges due to the unreliability of the complainant's evidence against him.

A defence application for a stay of proceedings based on lost police cruiser video and unrecorded interviews was dismissed.

The accused, Amari Buchanan, faced charges including criminal harassment, trafficking in persons, and threatening bodily harm.

The Crown sought to admit two videotaped cautioned statements of the recanting complainant, J.J., for their truth under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (Khelawon application).

J.J. testified as a hostile witness, denying her prior allegations and claiming police pressure, drug influence, and memory loss due to a concussion.

The court found J.J.'s testimony lacked credibility, her memory loss contrived, and her hostility transparently aimed at exonerating the accused.

The court concluded that the police statements met the threshold reliability test, finding that J.J. appreciated the seriousness of her statements and the consequences of lying, and that the videotapes allowed for assessment of her demeanour.

The statements were admitted for their truth.

The accused brought an application for review of his detention order on secondary ground concerns while on trial for human trafficking, living off the avails, cruelty to animals, criminal harassment, and failure to comply with probation.

The accused had been in custody since June 12, 2019.

The trial judge considered whether there had been a substantial change in circumstances material to the detention order.

Despite material changes including the weakness of the Crown's case, the unpredictability of the complainant, an offer of house arrest with electronic monitoring, and COVID-19 risks, the court found the accused had not met the Prete test and had not satisfied his onus that he would comply with terms of release.

The application for release was denied.

The accused brought a Code section 523(2) review of his detention order on charges including criminal harassment, procuring, trafficking in persons, threatening bodily harm, wounding an animal, and failing to comply with probation.

The Crown sought to file an affidavit prepared for a bail review in Superior Court in which the accused falsely deposed that he was housed with one or two inmates during a 13-day period, when detention centre records showed he was the sole occupant of his cell.

The court exercised its discretion to permit the Crown to file the affidavit as evidence of the accused's intent to mislead the court, but restricted cross-examination to the specific false statement regarding cell occupancy.

Two young men were charged with ten offences related to human trafficking, procuring, and sexual services offences occurring between September 1, 2014 and April 13, 2015.

The Crown's case rested almost entirely on the testimony of the complainant, a young woman with a history of mental health issues who had herself been charged with similar offences and made her complaint to police approximately one year after her own arrest.

The trial lasted nearly 27 months across 64 court days.

The court found the complainant's testimony unreliable due to significant contradictions with her prior statements, inconsistencies regarding key facts such as how she met the accused and her ownership of a vehicle, and most critically, Facebook Messenger communications that contradicted her account of meeting one of the accused.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove exploitation, which was essential to the human trafficking and material benefits charges.

All counts against both accused were dismissed.

The applicant brought a third party records application seeking production of therapeutic and counselling records relating to the complainant in a human trafficking prosecution.

The applicant sought to access records from the complainant's psychiatrist, hospital, and mental health treatment facility covering the period between the complainant's arrest in April 2015 and her police interview in April 2016.

The applicant argued the records were necessary to challenge the complainant's credibility and reliability, contending she had fabricated allegations during therapy to escape prosecution.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant had failed to establish that the records were likely relevant to any issue at trial or to the competence of the witness.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking case to testify via closed-circuit television (CCTV) from outside the courtroom, and to have a Human Trafficking Advocate sit close to her during testimony.

The accused opposed both aspects of the application.

The court granted the CCTV order but denied the request for the advocate's close presence.

The decision addresses the evidentiary threshold under the amended Section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code, which changed from a "necessity" test to a "facilitate" test, and considers what evidence is required to support such applications.

The Crown brought a certiorari application to quash a preliminary inquiry justice's decision to commit the accused to trial for assault simpliciter rather than the charged offence of sexual assault.

The preliminary inquiry justice had found that the brief struggle in an apartment vestibule lacked any sexual contact, language, or motive, and that inferring a sexual purpose was mere conjecture.

The reviewing court held that the preliminary inquiry justice committed no jurisdictional error in concluding the evidence did not reasonably support an inference of sexual assault.

The application was dismissed.