David Sydney Steinberg

The appellants appealed a judgment declaring the respondent the beneficial owner of 15% of a corporation's shares and finding their conduct oppressive under the OBCA.

The appellants narrowed their appeal to challenge only the order requiring production of financial statements dating back to 2014.

The Court of Appeal held that the production order was ancillary to the respondent's damages claim, not a standalone shareholder rights claim subject to a limitation period, and that compliance required only producing existing documents.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $30,000.

The defendants brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (money and a handgun) obtained during a police interaction, alleging multiple Charter breaches related to arbitrary detention, unlawful search and seizure, and denial of the right to counsel.

The court found no arbitrary detention at the initial stages of the police interaction and determined that the subsequent search and seizure were lawful, based on reasonable grounds of Liquor License Act and Cannabis Control Act violations.

While minor breaches of the right to counsel (failure to "hold off" questioning post-arrest) and a failure to report seized items to a justice were identified, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute, considering the seriousness of the conduct, the minimal impact on the defendants' rights, and society's strong interest in the adjudication of serious charges on their merits.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The Blankenstein and Fialkov families, joint owners of a 168-unit apartment building through corporate entities, sought to separate their interests due to an irreconcilable breakdown in their relationship, exacerbated by an internal dispute within the Fialkov family.

The Blankensteins applied for a winding-up of Godstone Limited and a court-ordered buy-out of the Fialkovs' 50% interest at fair market value.

The primary contentious issue was the valuation date for the buy-out, with the Blankensteins seeking a current date (January 2023 or later) to reflect a market downturn, and the Fialkovs advocating for March 2022 (the market peak).

The court found that a buy-out was appropriate under s. 207 of the OBCA and determined the fairest valuation date to be November 3, 2022, the date of the application hearing, balancing the parties' expectations and the market fluctuations.

The court also addressed the applicants' alternative request for a public sale, finding it unnecessary given the buy-out order.

The applicants, Patrick Agpoon and Shea Flemmings, sought a stay of proceedings due to an alleged breach of their s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the R. v. Jordan framework, calculating total delay, deducting defence-caused delay, and assessing the impact of the global pandemic as an exceptional circumstance.

While significant defence delays were attributed to both applicants, the Crown failed to adequately explain a 12-month delay in preferring a direct indictment, particularly given its earlier contemplation of this route and its successful use in a similar case during the pandemic.

The court found that even after reasonable adjustments for defence delay and a limited period for the pandemic, the net delay for both applicants exceeded the 30-month Jordan ceiling for superior courts.

Consequently, the court found an infringement of their s. 11(b) rights and stayed the charges.

The appellants appealed the motion judge’s dismissal of two actions and an application via summary judgment.

The motion judge had found the proceedings to be an abuse of process, that the claims had been previously released, and that they were barred by statutory limitation periods.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no errors in his assessment that there was no evidence of fraud tainting prior settlements or releases, and that the claims were indeed barred by abuse of process, releases, and limitation periods.

The court affirmed that summary judgment was an appropriate tool for addressing these threshold issues.

This is a ruling on a Corbett application to determine the admissibility of the accused's criminal record for cross-examination on credibility during a trial for second-degree murder.

The court balanced the probative value and prejudicial effect of the record, considering the nature, similarity, and remoteness of previous convictions, and the need to prevent an unbalanced picture for the jury.

The judge decided to admit an edited version of the record, excluding drug offences, mischief over $5000, crimes indicating antipathy to the justice system (assault peace officer, escape lawful custody), sexual assaults, and possession of a firearm, while allowing crimes of dishonesty (theft, possession of stolen property) and some assaults and breaches of court orders, with aggravated assault reduced to assault.

The respondent, as assignee of a debt owed for legal services provided in real property litigation, registered a mortgage on the property to secure the debt.

The appellants, claiming beneficial ownership interests in the property, appealed the motion judge's decision, arguing that no valid debt existed and that the respondent was not entitled to the secured funds based on unjust enrichment and misrepresentation on title.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that a debt was owed, noting the respondent's husband's testimony and the property owner's consent to the mortgage registration.

The court held that the respondent, as a bona fide purchaser for value with a registered interest, had priority over any unregistered beneficial interests of the appellants, and that there was no unjust enrichment as the assignment of the debt provided a juristic reason for the benefit received.

This costs endorsement addresses three motions within a consolidated proceeding.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to the Adair parties (defendants) against the Pichelli parties (plaintiffs) for their successful summary judgment motions, finding that the allegations of fraud and malfeasance were unsubstantiated.

For the summary judgment motion brought by the Vuletic defendants against the Pichelli parties, costs were reserved to the trial judge due to unresolved factual disputes, including an allegation of forgery.

Finally, for a motion to vary a previous decision regarding Ante Kegalj, the Pichelli parties were awarded partial indemnity costs, significantly reduced from their claim, due to the straightforward nature of the motion and issues with their bill of costs.

The respondent slipped and fell on a wet floor in the vestibule of a department store operated by the appellants, fracturing her kneecap.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for negligence under the Occupiers' Liability Act, concluding that the wet floor caused the fall and that the appellants lacked an effective inspection or maintenance system.

The appellants appealed, arguing the trial judge failed to require proof that the wet floor created an unreasonable risk of harm and erred in rejecting expert evidence about the safety of the tile flooring.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding the trial judge properly applied the statutory duty of care and reasonably rejected the expert evidence.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of fraud over $5,000.

Over approximately six years, he defrauded the Ministry of Community and Social Services of approximately $467,000 by falsely claiming his daughter suffered from diabetes, blindness, and developmental disability, and by submitting forged medical documents and false invoices for non-existent treatments.

Over 13 years, he defrauded Camp Quality, a charity for children with cancer, of approximately $80,000 by falsely claiming both his children had leukemia.

The accused had made restitution of $233,000 at the time of sentencing.

The court imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence concurrent on all counts, followed by three years of probation, along with a fine in lieu of forfeiture and a restitution order for outstanding amounts.

Two brothers were charged with assault against their cousin, with whom one was in a common law relationship.

The alleged assault occurred on January 18, 2016.

The complainant recanted her allegations at trial, denying she had been assaulted.

The only evidence supporting the Crown's case was hearsay testimony from the complainant's sister regarding statements made contemporaneous to the alleged assault.

The court found the hearsay admissible under the Khan principles but determined that the Crown had not met its burden of proof due to insufficient particulars, questionable witness reliability, and reasonable doubt regarding what actually occurred.

The charges were dismissed.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order of Newbould J. that required them to produce Alexander Rovt for examination for discovery on behalf of Princess Gates Hotel Limited Partnership.

The appellants argued the order was final because it disposed of Mr. Rovt's right to refuse to attend as a non-party.

The Court of Appeal held that the order was interlocutory as it merely determined which individual would be examined for discovery on behalf of a party to the action, and that the order obligated the appellants as defendants to produce Mr. Rovt, not Mr. Rovt himself.

The motion to quash the appeal was granted.

The accused was charged with assault arising from an incident in the holding cells at Scarborough courthouse.

The Crown's case relied entirely on surveillance video footage showing the accused and a co-accused striking and kicking the complainant.

The accused claimed self-defence, testifying that the complainant was armed with a shank and had threatened him.

The court reviewed the surveillance video and found it was of sufficient quality to clearly show the complainant's hands were empty and he possessed no weapon.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found no basis for a self-defence claim.

The accused was convicted of assault.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and obstructing police following a traffic stop on January 7, 2012.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2013, and continued on December 23, 2013, with a further continuation scheduled for September 3, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, arguing that approximately 31.5 months had passed from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled completion of trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was significant, it did not constitute unreasonable delay under the Morin framework.

The court apportioned the delay among inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional constraints, concluding that the majority of delay was attributable to inherent case requirements and defence preparation rather than Crown or institutional failures.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault against a distant relative with whom he had a close relationship.

The victim was 21 years old at the time of the assault, and the accused was 27, married with an infant child.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction with a maximum sentence of 18 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 11 months in custody, plus one month consecutive from a suspended conditional sentence for a prior computer fraud offense, followed by 18 months probation with conditions including counselling, no contact with the victim, participation in a sexual offender relapse prevention program, DNA sampling, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a 10-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged that the accused forced sexual intercourse on the complainant against her will.

The accused admitted to sexual intercourse but claimed it was consensual.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable due to material inconsistencies and self-serving assertions.

The court found that the complainant did not consent and was unambiguous in her resistance.

The court also rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding the accused was at least reckless in responding to the complainant's clear objections.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

A former senior banking executive sought recovery of forfeited restricted share units under an employer’s long-term compensation plan after resigning to start a hedge fund.

The plan provided that restricted share units would mature and be paid in cash three years after grant, but would be forfeited if the employee resigned before the maturity date.

The plaintiff argued that the forfeiture-on-resignation provision operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade and was therefore unenforceable.

The court held that the provision merely conditioned entitlement to deferred compensation on continued service and did not restrict the employee’s ability to work elsewhere.

Because the awards had not vested prior to maturity and the forfeiture was triggered solely by resignation rather than post-employment conduct, the clause was valid and enforceable.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion to strike portions of a claim alleging bad faith and punitive damages, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs totalling $7,994.

The defendant argued that no costs should be awarded or that costs should be payable in the cause, citing the reasonableness of bringing the motion and the plaintiff’s unsuccessful alternative argument for nunc pro tunc amendments to the pleadings.

The court held that the successful party on a contested motion generally has a reasonable expectation of receiving costs and that the defendant had not established grounds to depart from that principle.

However, the court reduced the claimed amount to reflect time spent on the unsuccessful alternative argument and fixed costs at $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax.

Following an application proceeding, the court considered written submissions regarding costs.

The applicant argued that because the respondents had not objected to proceeding by way of application, the issue of costs should be determined by the trial judge.

The court agreed that the trial judge would be better positioned to assess any costs thrown away as a result of the application and noted that the record lacked sufficient evidence regarding the parties’ positions on the procedural choice.

The court therefore declined to determine costs at this stage.

A former bank employee brought an application seeking payment of allegedly outstanding bonuses under a Restricted Share Unit plan following his resignation.

The employer denied liability on the basis that the plan provided for forfeiture of unvested units upon resignation.

The applicant argued that the forfeiture provision operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade and was unconscionable.

The court held that the evidentiary record was insufficient to determine whether the provision constituted an enforceable restraint of trade and concluded that the issues raised involved material factual disputes.

The court determined that the matter was not properly brought by way of application and directed that submissions be made regarding continuation of the proceeding as a trial.