David Sydney Steinberg

The plaintiff moved to amend its statement of claim to add two corporate defendants and assert a fraudulent conveyance claim relating to rights under a letter of intent associated with a hotel development project.

The defendant opposed the amendment on the basis of res judicata, issue estoppel, limitation periods, and abuse of process, and also sought security for costs against the plaintiff corporation.

The court held that the proposed claim was not finally adjudicated in earlier summary judgment proceedings and that the new pleading asserted a different theory based on joint venture ownership and fraudulent conveyance.

The court also rejected the limitation defence, finding the amendment motion was effectively commenced within the limitation period.

The defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff corporation was impecunious or that the action was frivolous and vexatious.

The accused were charged with first degree murder arising from a shooting in a Toronto parking lot.

Prior to trial, multiple evidentiary motions were argued concerning hearsay statements of the deceased, references to one accused’s prior incarceration, rap videos and video clips allegedly amounting to confessions or demonstrating intent, gang expert evidence, weapons possession evidence, and alleged post‑offence conduct indicating consciousness of guilt.

The court applied principles governing hearsay admissibility, similar fact and bad character evidence, probative value versus prejudicial effect, expert evidence disclosure under s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code, and the law of post‑offence conduct.

Several items of Crown evidence—including rap videos, gang evidence, prior weapons conviction, and alleged consciousness‑of‑guilt conduct—were excluded due to minimal probative value and high prejudicial impact.

Limited evidence such as certain hearsay statements, a contemporaneous “locked and loaded” remark, and testimony that one accused possessed a revolver shortly before the shooting were admitted.

The accused were charged with conspiracy to commit robbery based primarily on intercepted wiretap communications over a three‑day period.

The defence argued the conversations amounted only to discussion or negotiation about a robbery and did not constitute an agreement.

The court reviewed the elements of conspiracy under s. 465 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing that the actus reus requires a true agreement or meeting of the minds to commit an indictable offence, though not all operational details must be settled.

Interpreting the wiretaps in context, the court found the accused had reached an agreement to rob a man seen counting money, conditional on obtaining a weapon and locating the target.

The subsequent failure to obtain the weapon merely frustrated the plan and did not negate the existence of the agreement.

The plaintiff, a trustee in bankruptcy for a healthcare provider, brought a motion seeking to compel the defendant insurer to produce 33 former employees for examination for discovery prior to the determination of the defendant's summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff also sought the return of $350,000 paid into court as security for costs and an order prohibiting the defendant from bringing further motions.

The court granted the request for discoveries, finding that the parties had previously agreed to them in Minutes of Settlement and that the plaintiff needed the evidence to put its best foot forward on the summary judgment motion.

The requests to reduce security for costs and prohibit further motions were dismissed.

The accused applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a Part VI intercept authorization, alleging a violation of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The investigation stemmed from an armed robbery at a pawn shop where the owner was shot.

The applicants argued the information to obtain (ITO) relied on unreliable confidential informant information and that police failed to exhaust alternative investigative methods.

The court reviewed the redacted ITO and found that, even excluding the contested informant information, the remaining evidence—including DNA matches and association evidence—provided reasonable grounds for the authorization.

A supplementary application regarding police obtaining contact information from Ontario Works without a warrant was also dismissed.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The appellants were passengers injured when another passenger, who was experiencing delusions, grabbed the steering wheel of a Greyhound bus, causing it to crash.

The appellants sued the bus company, the driver, and police officers who had interacted with the passenger before he boarded.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no breach of the standard of care by any of the respondents.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by excluding expert evidence on police crisis management and bus safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his gatekeeper function in excluding the expert evidence because it was not necessary to assist the trier of fact in determining the applicable standards of care.

A commercial property owner sought reimbursement from a real estate brokerage for marketing and advertising expenses incurred after retaining a third-party marketing firm during a listing agreement.

The owner argued the agreement required the brokerage to bear marketing and promotional costs.

The court interpreted the agreement in light of the factual matrix and commercial reasonableness, emphasizing that external marketing costs were subject to mutual agreement and that the brokerage was engaged primarily to sell or lease real estate, not to underwrite independent marketing initiatives.

The court also considered the owner's subsequent conduct, including retaining a marketing firm without consultation and raising the reimbursement claim only after receiving a demand for signage costs.

The court concluded that the agreement did not obligate the brokerage to reimburse the owner for the claimed expenses.

The accused was charged with assault arising from an incident in the holding cells at Scarborough courthouse.

The Crown's case relied entirely on surveillance video footage showing the accused and a co-accused striking and kicking the complainant.

The accused claimed self-defence, testifying that the complainant was armed with a shank and had threatened him.

The court reviewed the surveillance video and found it was of sufficient quality to clearly show the complainant's hands were empty and he possessed no weapon.

The court rejected the accused's credibility and found no basis for a self-defence claim.

The accused was convicted of assault.

The accused was charged with refusing to provide a breath sample and obstructing police following a traffic stop on January 7, 2012.

The trial commenced on June 20, 2013, and continued on December 23, 2013, with a further continuation scheduled for September 3, 2014.

The accused brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on unreasonable delay, arguing that approximately 31.5 months had passed from the swearing of the Information to the scheduled completion of trial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the delay was significant, it did not constitute unreasonable delay under the Morin framework.

The court apportioned the delay among inherent time requirements, defence actions, Crown actions, and institutional constraints, concluding that the majority of delay was attributable to inherent case requirements and defence preparation rather than Crown or institutional failures.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault against a distant relative with whom he had a close relationship.

The victim was 21 years old at the time of the assault, and the accused was 27, married with an infant child.

The Crown proceeded by summary conviction with a maximum sentence of 18 months.

The court imposed a sentence of 11 months in custody, plus one month consecutive from a suspended conditional sentence for a prior computer fraud offense, followed by 18 months probation with conditions including counselling, no contact with the victim, participation in a sexual offender relapse prevention program, DNA sampling, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a 10-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order.

The appellant owned a family camp property.

The respondent, her former son-in-law, had occupied, maintained, and improved the camp for over 20 years.

When the respondent refused to allow his son to use the camp, the appellant attempted to revoke his licence to occupy it.

The trial judge found that the respondent had an equitable right to use the camp during his lifetime based on proprietary estoppel and unjust enrichment, and granted an exclusive licence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no error in the trial judge's application of equitable principles or his choice of remedy.

The accused was tried for sexual assault after admitting intercourse with the complainant but asserting it was consensual.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant’s testimony and circumstantial corroboration from post‑incident communications with relatives.

The court applied the W.(D.) credibility framework and the doctrine of honest but mistaken belief in consent.

It accepted the complainant’s account that she resisted and rejected the accused’s evidence as unreliable and inconsistent.

The court concluded the accused was at least reckless as to consent and found him guilty of sexual assault.

The accused was charged with sexual assault.

The Crown alleged that the accused forced sexual intercourse on the complainant against her will.

The accused admitted to sexual intercourse but claimed it was consensual.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the accused's testimony as unreliable due to material inconsistencies and self-serving assertions.

The court found that the complainant did not consent and was unambiguous in her resistance.

The court also rejected the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding the accused was at least reckless in responding to the complainant's clear objections.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The defendant sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing its motion to strike the plaintiff's claims for punitive and aggravated damages.

The defendant argued that the bankruptcy trustee lacked the legal capacity to advance these in personam claims on behalf of the bankrupt company.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that it was not plain and obvious the trustee lacked capacity.

A former senior banking executive sought recovery of forfeited restricted share units under an employer’s long-term compensation plan after resigning to start a hedge fund.

The plan provided that restricted share units would mature and be paid in cash three years after grant, but would be forfeited if the employee resigned before the maturity date.

The plaintiff argued that the forfeiture-on-resignation provision operated as an unreasonable restraint of trade and was therefore unenforceable.

The court held that the provision merely conditioned entitlement to deferred compensation on continued service and did not restrict the employee’s ability to work elsewhere.

Because the awards had not vested prior to maturity and the forfeiture was triggered solely by resignation rather than post-employment conduct, the clause was valid and enforceable.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion to strike portions of a claim alleging bad faith and punitive damages, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought partial indemnity costs totalling $7,994.

The defendant argued that no costs should be awarded or that costs should be payable in the cause, citing the reasonableness of bringing the motion and the plaintiff’s unsuccessful alternative argument for nunc pro tunc amendments to the pleadings.

The court held that the successful party on a contested motion generally has a reasonable expectation of receiving costs and that the defendant had not established grounds to depart from that principle.

However, the court reduced the claimed amount to reflect time spent on the unsuccessful alternative argument and fixed costs at $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Director's Delegate of FSCO, which found she was not involved in an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant was injured while driving a pocket bike on the property of the bike's owner.

The Divisional Court upheld the Delegate's decision, finding that under the Off-Road Vehicles Act, the pocket bike was not required to be insured while operated on the owner's property.

Consequently, it did not qualify as an 'automobile' at the time of the collision, and the application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision granting carriage of a class action against Armtec Infrastructure Inc. to a competing group of plaintiffs and staying his action.

The Divisional Court reviewed the test for determining carriage motions in class actions, confirming that the motion judge correctly identified and applied the test from Setterington.

The court held that the motion judge's qualitative analysis of the competing actions and his ultimate decision to grant carriage to the competing action was an exercise of discretion entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision that directed the appellant not to carry out a proposal to suspend the registrations of a motor vehicle dealership and its salespersons.

The appellant argued the Tribunal's decision was unreasonable given the dealership's failure to provide adequate financial records and a salesperson's breach of registration conditions.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal applied the correct legal principles and reached a reasonable conclusion based on the evidence, including expert accounting testimony that the dealership could reasonably be expected to carry on business in a financially responsible manner.

Following an application proceeding, the court considered written submissions regarding costs.

The applicant argued that because the respondents had not objected to proceeding by way of application, the issue of costs should be determined by the trial judge.

The court agreed that the trial judge would be better positioned to assess any costs thrown away as a result of the application and noted that the record lacked sufficient evidence regarding the parties’ positions on the procedural choice.

The court therefore declined to determine costs at this stage.