Marcus Bornfreund

The accused was charged with three offences: fraudulently possessing computer passwords obtained from the Genesis Market (an online marketplace for stolen credentials obtained through malware), possessing four forged pieces of identification, and breaching a probation order prohibiting possession of identity documents not legally issued in his name.

The Crown proved that the accused controlled two Genesis Market accounts and purchased thousands of stolen credentials using cryptocurrency funded through a Coinbase account registered in his name.

Four forged driver's licenses bearing the accused's photograph but different names were found in his residence.

The court found the accused guilty on all three counts after determining that the electronic evidence from the Genesis Market database was authentic and reliable, that the accused controlled the relevant accounts, and that the forged identification documents were clearly counterfeit.

The defendant was convicted of assaulting his intimate partner following a domestic dispute.

The assault occurred in the family home after the defendant took the victim's vehicle keys and purse, leaving their children in the van.

The defendant chased the victim around the kitchen island, swung at her with a closed fist, attempted to kick her, and then lunged and grabbed her.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, finding that while the defendant had no criminal record and demonstrated remorse through counselling, the serious nature of intimate partner violence, the context of coercive control, and the presence of children required a conviction to reflect denunciation and deterrence principles.

This decision involves the conviction of Joseph Herrington for assaulting his intimate partner, Janice Wu, contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code.

The court carefully analyzed the credibility and reliability of the witnesses, including the complainant, a neighbour, and the accused himself.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the judge found the complainant’s evidence credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies, supported by the neighbour’s independent testimony.

The accused’s evidence was found implausible and inconsistent.

The court rejected the defence’s de minimis argument, emphasizing the seriousness of intimate partner violence.

The accused was found guilty based on the totality of the evidence proving the assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

This decision addresses an application under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for a witness to testify behind a screen in an assault case involving intimate partner violence.

The court considered the statutory factors and relevant case law, including the lowered threshold for granting such orders.

The complainant expressed emotional distress and discomfort at testifying in the presence of the accused, which the court found sufficient to grant the application.

The ruling emphasizes the importance of facilitating truthful testimony without compromising the accused’s right to a fair trial.

This case concerns the accused, Jore Henry, charged with possession of a prohibited firearm, careless storage of a firearm, and possessing a firearm with a defaced serial number.

The firearm was found hidden in a vehicle registered to Mr. Henry.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Henry had knowledge and control of the firearm.

The court reviewed evidence including vehicle registration, video surveillance, witness testimony, and the hidden nature of the firearm.

The court found that while an inference of knowledge was available due to ownership and use of the vehicle, the presence of other users with access, including the prior owner with a firearm-related criminal record, raised reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all charges.

The offender, Joshua Johnson, was found guilty of manslaughter after being indicted for second-degree murder.

The court conducted a fact-finding exercise to determine the basis of the jury's verdict, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that Johnson was the principal offender who fatally shot the victim, Daniel Boima, during a planned robbery.

The sentencing decision considered aggravating factors such as the planned robbery, use of a firearm, the victim being unarmed, the shooting in a residential area, and the offender's attempts to cover up the crime.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, lack of criminal record, strong family support, and particularly harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

The court imposed a sentence of 10 years in prison, with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a further 4 years to serve, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The defendant, Damen Smith, faced charges including drug trafficking, possession for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and firearm offences.

The charges stemmed from a police surveillance operation, a vehicle takedown, and subsequent searches of a Nissan Rogue and an apartment.

The court relied heavily on wiretap intercepts and circumstantial evidence.

The defendant was found guilty of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime related to the vehicle.

However, the court found reasonable doubt regarding the firearm charges due to poor police handling of evidence and the presence of other occupants, and also found reasonable doubt for the drug and proceeds charges related to the apartment due to insufficient evidence of the defendant's primary residence and the presence of another individual.

The Crown sought to admit preliminary inquiry evidence of a police officer (PC Stamplecoskie) at trial under s.715 or s.715.01 of the Criminal Code, as the officer was unavailable due to a workplace injury.

The defence argued the unavailability under s.715 was not sufficiently proven.

The court found the evidence insufficient to establish unavailability for s.715 but admitted the transcript under s.715.01.

The court declined to compel the officer's attendance for cross-examination, finding no suggestion of unfairness or lack of full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and rejecting the defence's argument to read a necessity requirement into s.715.01.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of marihuana, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The evidence was obtained via a search warrant that contained an incorrect address, rendering it invalid.

The trial judge admitted the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, finding the breach minor due to good faith and no risk of entering the wrong house.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in minimizing the seriousness of the Charter breach but ultimately upheld the admission of the evidence based on a holistic application of the R. v. Grant factors.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's appeal of the three-and-a-half-year sentence, finding no error in the trial judge's sentencing approach.

The applicant sought a bail review, arguing a material change in circumstances due to delayed medical surgery while in custody and a new release plan including electronic monitoring.

The court found no material change, noting that the correctional centre had taken steps to schedule the surgery and could provide adequate post-operative care.

The court further held that even if a material change existed, bail would be denied on secondary and tertiary grounds due to the applicant's lengthy criminal record, history of breaches, and the extremely serious nature of the kidnapping and robbery charges.

Bail was denied.

The accused applied for a review of her detention order on charges including robbery with a firearm and kidnapping, arguing a material change in circumstances based on a new release plan with two sureties and a delay in medical treatment.

The court admitted the new sureties as fresh evidence but found the accused failed to meet her reverse onus on both the secondary and tertiary grounds.

The court held that the proposed release plan could not adequately address the risk of reoffending given the accused's extensive criminal record and history of breaching bail conditions.

The application for bail review was dismissed.

The accused, Dushane Peart, was found guilty of possession of a loaded handgun following a shooting incident.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video evidence and the accused's pre-arrest statement.

The court applied principles for identity proof in circumstantial cases and dismissed a mistrial application brought by the defence, finding no prejudice despite initial communication issues regarding the Crown's strategy for proving identity.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter after shooting his friend with an illegal, homemade 'slap-gun' during a dispute over a vehicle.

The court found the offender's moral blameworthiness to be high, given his possession of the prohibited firearm to protect his drug dealing business and his failure to disengage when he recognized the victim.

The court sentenced the offender to 10.5 years in prison and, finding exceptional circumstances demonstrating a need for specific deterrence and rehabilitation, ordered that he serve half of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a Corbett application to exclude his prior criminal record from evidence should he choose to testify.

The accused intended to argue self-defence and accident.

The court balanced the probative value of the record against the prejudicial effect of propensity reasoning.

The court excluded the accused's youth offences to prevent undue prejudice but permitted the Crown to cross-examine the accused on his adult convictions for assault, theft, drug trafficking, and dangerous driving, with a limiting instruction to the jury.

During jury selection, a sworn juror advised the court that he was an electrician foreman and his absence would prevent apprentices from working, causing hardship.

The court considered whether the juror could be discharged and replaced before the trial commenced.

Applying section 644(1.1) of the Criminal Code, the court found the juror's circumstances constituted 'other reasonable cause' and discharged him, allowing for a replacement to be selected from the panel.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal at the close of the Crown's case, arguing there was no evidence of the requisite intent for murder.

The defence contended that a 1.5-minute gap in the circumstantial evidence meant the jury would have to speculate on intent.

The court dismissed the motion, applying the common sense inference that a sane and sober person intends the natural consequences of their actions.

The court found that firing a shotgun at close range into the victim's lower torso provided a sufficient evidentiary foundation for a properly instructed jury to infer the intent required for murder.

Following jury convictions for participation in a criminal organization involved in trafficking firearms from Windsor to Toronto, the court imposed significant custodial sentences.

The organization coordinated the acquisition, transport, and distribution of numerous illegal firearms, some recovered through police surveillance and search warrants.

The accused participated at different levels of responsibility, with one acting as the leader organizing firearm transfers and others assisting as couriers and custodians.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for firearm trafficking and organized criminal activity, the court imposed consecutive sentences pursuant to s. 467.14 of the Criminal Code.

The leader received a total sentence of 12 years less credit for pre‑trial custody, while the courier received 6 years less credit.

Accused persons charged following a large police investigation sought disclosure of source materials underlying wiretap authorizations to support anticipated Garofoli and Dawson applications.

The defence argued that all investigative materials, including pre‑Part VI materials referenced or relied upon by the affiant, were presumptively relevant and disclosable under Stinchcombe principles.

The Attorney General of Ontario argued that disclosure should be limited to materials relevant to the accused’s ability to make full answer and defence at trial unless the defence first demonstrated a reasonable possibility that additional materials would assist in challenging the authorization.

The court acknowledged conceptual difficulties with the Crown’s narrower approach but held that existing authorities required an accused to meet a minimal relevance threshold before obtaining additional disclosure beyond what was before the authorizing judge.

Applying principles of judicial comity and following prior decisions adopting that approach, the court dismissed the disclosure applications.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence imposed after guilty pleas to two offences under the Securities Act for trading securities while subject to a cease trade order and trading without registration.

He argued that his guilty pleas were not unequivocal, voluntary, or informed and therefore constituted a miscarriage of justice, and alternatively that the custodial sentence imposed was cruel and unusual or unfit.

The court held that the plea inquiry conducted by the trial judge demonstrated that the pleas were unequivocal, voluntary, and informed, and that the appellant’s mistaken personal belief that a conditional discharge might be available did not invalidate the pleas.

The court further held that the 90‑day intermittent custodial sentence and probation order were entitled to deference and were not demonstrably unfit given the need for deterrence and denunciation in securities offences.

Four defendants charged with possession for the purpose of trafficking marijuana and related offences arising from a grow operation investigation applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The defendants had been before the court for approximately 21.5 months.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, allocating it among inherent delay, actions of the accused, actions of the Crown, and institutional resource limitations.

The court found that the total delay attributable to the Crown or systemic factors was 8 months and 19 days, which fell within the Askov/Morin guidelines of 8 to 10 months.

The court determined that the prejudice suffered by the defendants was modest and that society's interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the defendants' interest in prompt adjudication.

The application was dismissed.