Mark Hogan

The Crown sought to have Adam Nevills declared a Dangerous Offender under s. 753 of the Criminal Code following his conviction for sexually assaulting an elderly woman during a break and enter.

The court conducted a two-stage analysis, focusing on designation and sentencing.

While the court found Nevills presented a high likelihood of harmful recidivism, it was not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct was intractable, citing some prospect of treatability through a highly structured federal correctional program, the link between his offending and drug use (which could be monitored), and the anticipated effects of aging.

Consequently, the court declined to designate him a Dangerous Offender, instead designating him a Long Term Offender under s. 753(5)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with multiple drug trafficking offences and criminal organization offences related to his activities in Thunder Bay in the spring of 2020.

The Crown alleged that the accused, a member of the Eglinton West Crips (EWC), trafficked cocaine and fentanyl with the assistance of other gang members.

The court found that the EWC met the definition of a criminal organization and that the accused was a member.

Relying on extensive circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications and surveillance, the court concluded the accused was in constructive possession of drugs found on a co-conspirator, trafficked in fentanyl, and committed these offences for the benefit of and in association with the EWC.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused brought a lost evidence application arguing his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence was violated when police lost surveillance video footage from a covert camera.

The footage was properly bookmarked by the investigating officer but failed to save due to a software glitch in the police Genetec system.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown established the loss was not due to unacceptable negligence, as police were unaware of the specific software issue at the time.

Furthermore, the accused failed to show the lost video would have played an important role in his defence, as the view was obstructed and the issue of joint possession rendered the specific location of the bag insignificant.

The accused, Wilton Williams, pleaded guilty to possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence requested a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the quantity of fentanyl and cocaine, and numerous mitigating factors, such as the offender's lack of criminal record, youthfulness, remorse, significant rehabilitative efforts (obtaining welding qualifications), strong family support, and the impact of anti-Black racism on his life choices.

The court emphasized that deterrence and denunciation are primary objectives in fentanyl trafficking cases, but rehabilitation remains important, especially when social context evidence is presented.

The court found that a conditional sentence would be consistent with sentencing principles, promoting rehabilitation without endangering community safety, and would be more effective than institutional custody in ensuring the offender remains on a positive path.

The Crown sought to admit preliminary inquiry evidence of a police officer (PC Stamplecoskie) at trial under s.715 or s.715.01 of the Criminal Code, as the officer was unavailable due to a workplace injury.

The defence argued the unavailability under s.715 was not sufficiently proven.

The court found the evidence insufficient to establish unavailability for s.715 but admitted the transcript under s.715.01.

The court declined to compel the officer's attendance for cross-examination, finding no suggestion of unfairness or lack of full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and rejecting the defence's argument to read a necessity requirement into s.715.01.

The applicants, Vito Bailey-Ricketts and Victoria Dittmer, brought a pre-trial motion alleging violations of their ss. 8 and 9 Charter rights and seeking the exclusion of evidence obtained from warrantless searches incident to their arrest.

The central issue was whether police had reasonable and probable grounds to lawfully arrest the applicants for possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found that the totality of circumstantial evidence, including wiretaps, surveillance, and location data gathered during "Project Sunder" provided objectively reasonable and probable grounds for the arrests.

Consequently, the arrests did not violate s. 9 of the Charter, and the subsequent searches did not violate s. 8.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, who are creditors of the deceased, brought a motion to appoint an independent litigation administrator for the estate, alleging a conflict of interest among the beneficiaries.

The defendant beneficiaries opposed the motion and brought a countermotion to appoint one of the next of kin as estate trustee.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion, finding that creditors do not have the right to dictate who represents the estate in litigation they initiated, and granted the countermotion to appoint the next of kin as estate trustee.

The offender, Herminta Skardiute, pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought 15 to 18 months incarceration and a 3 to 5 year driving prohibition, while the defence requested a conditional sentence order (CSO) of two years less a day.

The offence involved driving unlicensed, at high speed (140 km/h in an 80 km/h zone), passing on a blind hill, resulting in severe, life-threatening, and permanent injuries to the victim, Adam Platt, and injuries to other passengers.

The court considered numerous mitigating factors, including the offender's remorse, guilty plea, community service, and role as a primary caregiver, against significant aggravating factors such as the extreme dangerousness of the driving, the unlicensed status, and the severe bodily harm caused.

The court determined that a CSO would not adequately address the principles of denunciation and general deterrence, particularly given the high moral blameworthiness and the notorious nature of the road where the collision occurred.

The court imposed a sentence of 15 months imprisonment and a 3-year driving prohibition.

The offender, C.B., was found guilty after trial of sexually assaulting his biological daughter, including sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching, when she was between 13 and 16 years old.

This decision outlines the reasons for sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as abuse of trust, the frequency and duration of the abuse, the victim's young age, and the degree of physical interference.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of a prior criminal record, community support, employment history, and mental health issues.

The court applied the principles from R. v. Friesen and R. v. D.D., emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary objectives for offences against children.

A global sentence of five years imprisonment was imposed, along with various ancillary orders including a non-communication order, a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a SOIRA order for life, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

The accused stood trial on charges of sexual assault, sexual interference, and invitation to sexual touching arising from alleged intrafamilial abuse of a child complainant over an extended period in the family home.

Applying the W. (D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence on material issues, accepted the complainant as credible and reliable, and found that delayed and incremental disclosure did not undermine her credibility in the circumstances.

The court also relied on supporting evidence from other witnesses that undermined the accused's account, including evidence concerning family dynamics, controlling behaviour, and the complainant's refusal to use the home theatre.

Convictions were entered on all counts.

The accused pleaded guilty to indecent assault and gross indecency committed against a child victim between 1970 and 1973 when the victim was 10 to 13 years old.

The Crown sought five years imprisonment; defence counsel sought a mid to upper reformatory sentence of 12 months to 2 years less one day.

The court imposed a four-year penitentiary sentence, finding that denunciation and deterrence were the predominant sentencing objectives.

The court rejected the defence position, noting the accused's lengthy criminal history of child sexual abuse, the persistent and invasive nature of the abuse, the profound impact on the victim, and the accused's continued risk to reoffend despite prior convictions and incarceration.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level exceeding the legal limit ("over 80").

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the breath demand and breath samples under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging an unreasonable search and seizure.

The defendant also challenged the Crown's reliance on the presumption of accuracy under the transitional provisions of Bill C-46.

The court found that the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion based on the strong odour of alcohol on the defendant's breath, satisfying the threshold for an approved screening device demand.

The court rejected the Charter application and found that the Crown could rely on the presumption of accuracy, adopting the reasoning from R. v. Does and R. v. Porchetta over R. v. Flores-Vigil.

The defendant was convicted.

The plaintiff brought a motion for contempt against two defendants, Peter Corbiere and Deborah Paine, for failing to comply with an order compelling examination in aid of execution and production of financial documents.

The court found both defendants in contempt.

This decision focuses on the sentencing of Peter Corbiere, as Deborah Paine's matter was adjourned due to partial compliance.

The court imposed a 60-day conditional sentence on Corbiere, including house arrest and compliance conditions, and ordered him to pay substantial indemnity costs of $14,529.53.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The court found the evidence insufficient to prove impaired driving beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) rights during the roadside investigation.

The court found breaches of ss. 8 and 10(a) because the accused was not promptly informed of the reasons for his detention, but found no s. 10(b) breach as he was ultimately provided a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence of the breath refusal under s. 24(2).

The accused was found guilty of refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation and subsequently arrested for impaired driving.

At trial, the accused argued that his Charter rights under ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) were violated, seeking exclusion of the breath test results under s. 24(2).

The court found no breach of ss. 8 or 10(a), but concluded that a 7-minute delay in providing rights to counsel violated s. 10(b).

Applying the Grant framework, the court declined to exclude the evidence, finding the breach minimal and the evidence reliable.

The court found the accused guilty of both impaired driving and driving with excess blood alcohol, entering a conviction on the impaired driving count and a judicial stay on the excess blood alcohol count.

The accused, a registered massage therapist, was charged with sexual assault under s. 271 of the Criminal Code.

The complainant alleged that during a massage treatment, the accused placed his hand under her underwear and touched her vagina with his fingers, then attempted to kiss her.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming he performed a legitimate orthopaedic test with the complainant's verbal consent.

The trial judge found the accused not credible, noting inconsistencies between his testimony and his post-incident conduct, including his apology and settlement offer.

The complainant's evidence was found credible and reliable despite minor inconsistencies regarding details such as the number of fingers used and the nature of the attempted kiss.

The court rejected the defence theory that the complainant and her husband conspired to extort money from the accused.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

During a family law trial to determine the parties' date of separation, the respondent sought to admit two emails sent by the applicant in 2004 and 2005.

The emails were recovered from an old company computer hard drive stored at the respondent's home.

The applicant opposed admission, arguing the emails were surreptitiously obtained and violated his expectation of privacy.

The court applied the three-part test for admissibility and admitted the emails, finding they were highly relevant to the separation date, the applicant had a reduced expectation of privacy in the abandoned company computer, and the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The appellant appealed his convictions on two counts of fraud and one count of uttering a forged document.

He challenged the application judge's denial of his pre-Jordan section 11(b) application for a stay of proceedings based on trial delay, and his Rowbotham application for state-funded legal representation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decisions, finding that the delay did not exceed Morin guidelines when properly calculated, and that the appellant failed to establish indigence or that his fair trial rights would be materially compromised without counsel.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The Crown withdrew the impaired charge at the close of its case.

The trial proceeded on the failure to remain charge.

The Crown and defence conceded that the actus reus was established.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's conduct was accompanied by an intention to escape civil or criminal liability.

The court found that the accused's post-accident conduct—including parking behind a building, driving away from the scene, passing by a police station without stopping, and continuing to drive away—demonstrated an intent to escape liability.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that he had changed his mind and intended to return to the scene.

The accused was found guilty.