E. Quinlan

During a family law trial to determine the parties' date of separation, the respondent sought to admit two emails sent by the applicant in 2004 and 2005.

The emails were recovered from an old company computer hard drive stored at the respondent's home.

The applicant opposed admission, arguing the emails were surreptitiously obtained and violated his expectation of privacy.

The court applied the three-part test for admissibility and admitted the emails, finding they were highly relevant to the separation date, the applicant had a reduced expectation of privacy in the abandoned company computer, and the probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Following a four-week trial where the plaintiff was awarded over $7 million for a traumatic brain injury sustained after jumping from a moving school bus, the court determined the costs payable by the defendant.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs up to the date of the plaintiffs' offer to settle, and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court adjusted the 2005 Costs Grid for inflation to determine appropriate hourly rates for counsel.

In assessing disbursements, the court reduced several expert witness fees because the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient information regarding the experts' hourly rates and time spent.

The court also disallowed the premium for adverse costs insurance, finding it was not a compensable disbursement as it did not advance the litigation.

Total costs of $741,266.08 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The appellant homeowner appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent contractor $12,528 for home renovation work.

The homeowner argued the trial judge failed to consider expert engineering evidence and witness testimony regarding significant deficiencies in the contractor's work.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by ignoring relevant evidence of defective workmanship and remedial costs.

The court substituted its own decision, finding the cost to remedy the deficiencies exceeded the amount owed to the contractor, and dismissed the contractor's claim entirely.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming his incapacity to consent to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant, who had a history of schizophrenia and psychosis, argued the Board misconstrued the evidence.

The Superior Court of Justice applied the reasonableness standard of review and found that the Board had clear and cogent evidence demonstrating the appellant was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment due to his delusions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants, convicted of producing over 500 marihuana plants, brought a constitutional challenge against the two-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 7(2)(b)(v) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

They argued the provision violated s. 12 of the Charter.

The court found that while the sentence was not grossly disproportionate for the applicants themselves, it was grossly disproportionate for reasonably foreseeable hypothetical offenders, such as those involved in regulatory licensing infractions.

The court concluded the provision violated s. 12, was not saved by s. 1, and declared it of no force or effect.

The accused, charged with second degree murder and aggravated assault, applied for the production of medical and counselling records of the Crown's key witness.

The applicant argued the records were necessary to make full answer and defence, as they related to the witness's credibility, reliability, and inconsistent statements.

The court applied the O'Connor and McNeil frameworks and found the records were likely relevant.

After reviewing the records, the court ordered partial production subject to redactions and strict conditions to balance the accused's right to make full answer and defence with the witness's privacy interests.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder and aggravated assault, brought an application to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his trial.

The defence argued that sitting in the dock carried a stigma and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication.

The Crown opposed, citing security concerns and the lack of exceptional circumstances.

The court dismissed the application, holding that the customary position is in the dock, the accused failed to show exceptional circumstances, and there were valid security concerns given his criminal record and outstanding charges for violent offences in custody.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection, a deemed custody order in favour of the mother, and an order limiting the father's access to written communication.

The father opposed the motion, alleging the mother had engaged in parental alienation.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, concluding that the father's relentless focus on parental alienation had caused the child emotional harm and placed her at risk of physical harm, culminating in the child threatening self-harm with a knife.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the child in need of protection and ordering deemed custody to the mother with limited written access for the father.

The appellant, a forensic inpatient diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medication.

The appellant argued the Board erred in its application of the capacity test and relied on uncorroborated evidence from his attending physician.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the Board reasonably concluded that the appellant's persecutory delusions prevented him from appreciating the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The court also held that the physician's evidence was adequately corroborated by the appellant's own testimony.

Following jury convictions for sexual interference and sexual assaults involving three complainants, the sentencing judge addressed the extent of factual findings available after a jury verdict and applied the governing framework for resolving sentencing facts in a jury case.

The court held that the verdicts implicitly accepted the core evidence of the complainants and, in any event, independently found repeated abuse, grooming behaviour, abuse of trust, multiple victims, and digital penetration proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, harm to children, and the offender's predatory conduct, while recognizing the absence of a criminal record and community support as mitigating, the court imposed a global custodial sentence structured by the totality principle.

Ancillary no-contact, DNA, weapons, SOIRA, and child-protection orders were also made.

The applicant, charged with marijuana-related offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a breach of his s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 33 months.

The court applied the Askov/Morin framework, attributing portions of the delay to inherent time requirements, institutional delay, the Crown, and the defence.

The court found the unjustified delay of almost 15 months fell within the Morin guidelines and that evidence of actual prejudice was weak.

The application was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering a threat against his step-daughter, as well as his 5-month sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in dismissing an application to reopen the trial to admit fresh evidence regarding taxi records, misapprehended evidence, and erred in principle on sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct test for fresh evidence, made credibility findings supported by the record, and imposed a fit sentence given the aggravating factors, including the vulnerability of the victim and the breach of trust.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought a motion for partial summary judgment against the defendant general contractor for unpaid subcontract balances.

The defendant argued it was entitled to withhold funds due to outstanding close-out documentation, a delay claim, and a back-charge for a transfer-switch.

The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff for $77,501.62 regarding the delay claim, finding the defendant provided no credible evidence to substantiate it.

However, the court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the outstanding documentation and the transfer-switch back-charge due to conflicting evidence, and directed a trial on those remaining issues.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order requiring the respondents to permanently remove a dog weighing over 25 pounds from their unit, in compliance with the condominium's rules.

The respondents argued the dog was a service/therapy dog required for the respondent's mental disability and sought accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

The court found the respondents failed to establish a disability within the meaning of the Code, as the medical evidence only cited stress and lacked a specific diagnosis.

The court ordered the removal of the dog and declared the applicant had not discriminated against the respondents.

The plaintiff brought an action for defamation after the defendant, her former tenant, sent emails to her employer alleging she evicted him because he was gay and used cipher encoded messages to organize a conspiracy against him.

The plaintiff moved for a permanent injunction, summary judgment, and to strike the defendant's counterclaim.

The court found the defendant's statements clearly defamatory and impossible to justify, granting summary judgment and awarding $10,000 in damages.

The court also granted a permanent injunction and struck the defendant's counterclaim as scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The applicants appealed a decision by the Township's Chief Building Official to issue a building permit for the construction of a riding arena on a neighbouring property.

The subject property was located within the Oak Ridges Moraine Linkage Zone, which permitted agricultural uses but not riding arenas.

The court found that the riding arena was not a permitted agricultural use under the zoning by-law and that its construction constituted major development requiring a watershed plan under the Official Plan.

The court concluded that the building permit was issued in error, rescinded the Chief Building Official's decision, and revoked the permit.

The appellant sought to quash convictions for sexual interference arising from allegations that he repeatedly touched a child complainant under her clothing during family tickling incidents at a cottage.

The appeal argued that the trial reasons were insufficiently responsive to the defence theory of mistake, that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence, and that demeanour evidence was given undue weight.

Applying the functional sufficiency-of-reasons approach and reviewing the credibility analysis, the court held that the trial judge adequately addressed the live issues, made no material misapprehension, and did not over-rely on demeanour.

The appeal was dismissed and the surrender order was confirmed.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings entered on impaired driving and excess alcohol charges for breach of the respondent’s right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal turned on whether delay following unsuccessful trial dates was properly attributed to the defence or to institutional delay.

The court held that where a case is not reached and must be rescheduled, the matter should receive priority and isolated defence unavailability within multi-month periods does not necessarily convert the resulting delay into defence delay.

The trial judge did not err in treating the rescheduling delay, including delay flowing from the need for a further trial date after the s. 11(b) application, as institutional delay.

The appeal was dismissed and the stay of proceedings was upheld.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them jointly liable with a co-defendant for unpaid invoices owed to the respondent contractor.

The respondent had performed mechanical and electrical work on a property being developed by the appellants and the co-defendant.

The deputy judge found that a partnership or joint venture existed between the appellants and the co-defendant, and that the co-defendant had contracted with the respondent as an agent for the venture.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the deputy judge's findings of fact regarding the existence of a joint venture or partnership.

The court held that the appellants were jointly liable for the debts incurred on behalf of the venture, and dismissed the appeal.

Following convictions for sexual exploitation, sexual assault, incest, and assault against a child family member, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code.

The court considered whether the pre‑2008 or post‑2008 dangerous offender regime applied and held the earlier regime governed because the offence period straddled the legislative amendments and the offender was entitled to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

Expert psychiatric evidence established alcohol abuse disorder, coercive sexual preference paraphilia, and mixed personality disorder, together with actuarial assessments placing the offender in a high risk category for violent and sexual recidivism.

The court concluded there was no reasonable possibility that the offender’s risk could eventually be controlled in the community, even with intensive supervision, medication, or treatment under a long‑term supervision order.

The offender was therefore declared a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate period of detention.