CITATION: Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89 v. Dominelli, 2015 ONSC 3661
BARRIE COURT FILE NO.: 14-1387 DATE: 20150608
ONTARIO
SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
SIMCOE CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION NO. 89
Applicant
– and –
JOSEPH STEFANO DOMINELLI and DIANNA LABRANCHE
Respondents
COUNSEL: S. Hodis, Counsel for the Applicant F.A. McFarlane, Counsel for the Respondents
HEARD: April 1 and 30, 2015
REASONS FOR DECISION
QUINLAN J.:
Overview
[1] Dianna Labranche has a dog that weighs over 25 pounds. Despite the fact that Ms. Labranche and her fiancé, Mr. Dominelli (the respondents), were aware that the condominium owned by Mr. Dominelli has a 25-pound weight restriction on pets, Ms. Labranche brought her dog with her when she moved into Mr. Dominelli’s condominium.
[2] The respondents sought no permission or accommodation from the Condominium Corporation (the applicant) until they failed in their efforts to have the dog remain as a therapy dog for Ms. Labranche’s work with autistic children.
[3] When the applicant’s property manager advised the respondents that the dog had to be a service dog for a resident of their unit in order for the 25 pound weight restriction to be overridden, Ms. Labranche obtained letters from a doctor that supported the notion that the dog is a therapy dog for her.
[4] The issue before me is whether the respondents have established that Ms. Labranche has a disability within the meaning of the Human Rights Code[^1] (the Code) and that she requires a dog of over 25 pounds to meet her disability-related needs. If so, has the applicant fulfilled its duty to accommodate?
Nature of the Application
[5] The applicant seeks orders requiring the respondents to permanently remove the dog from their unit and the common elements of the condominium and permitting the applicant to inspect their unit. The applicant also seeks a declaration that it has not discriminated against the respondents in violation of the Code.
Evidence
The Condominium
[6] Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89 (the applicant) is a residential condominium located in Barrie, Ontario, comprised of fifty-seven residential units located in three separate three-storey buildings. None of the buildings have elevators. The only means of ingress and egress from the units is by way of a common stairway and hallway. Approximately seventy percent of the residents have been described as senior citizens.
[7] The applicant’s governing documents include a Declaration, By-laws and Rules. Rule 42 restricts the size of a dog or a cat that an owner or occupier can have in a unit, to an animal that is 25 pounds or less. The Rule setting the 25-pound weight restriction on dogs and cats was implemented by the applicant in 2005 to address safety concerns. Rules such as these are commonplace in multi-level condominiums and have been found to be neither unreasonable nor inconsistent with the Condominium Act, 1998[^2] [^3] (the Act).
[8] The Declaration requires owners and occupiers to comply with the Rules, as does s. 119 of the Act.
[9] Mr. Dominelli owns one of the condominium units. Ms. Labranche moved in with Mr. Dominelli in July 2014. The two are engaged and reside in a common law relationship. Ms. Labranche also brought her dog when she moved into the unit. The dog is a “Miniature” Golden Retriever/Australian Shepherd mix.
[10] The respondents were aware of the 25-pound weight restriction imposed by the Condominium Corporation when Ms. Labranche moved into the unit with her dog. They did not seek permission or accommodation from the applicant to allow the dog to reside on the property.
[11] On August 22, 2014, the applicant’s property manager sent the respondents a letter advising them that they had to remove the dog from the unit within two weeks because it weighed over 25 pounds, and was in violation of the applicant’s Rules.
[12] On September 10, 2014, Mr. Dominelli informed the applicant that the dog was being used by Ms. Labranche as a therapy dog for her work with autistic children.[^4] The applicant’s property manager advised the respondents that the rule would be enforced, and on September 19, 2014, sent the respondents a final notice advising them to remove the dog.
[13] On September 20, 2014, Mr. Dominelli asked how to call a meeting of the owners and confirmed that the dog was being placed in a kennel.
[14] On September 22, 2014, the applicant’s property manager received a requisition for an Owner’s Meeting to vote on removing the 25-pound weight restriction in the Rules. The requisition was initiated by the respondents as they wanted to change the 25-pound rule. The respondents stated that that the dog was a therapy dog for children with special needs and autism and that the dog “plays an important role in their [the children’s] lives as well as [Ms. Labranche’s]”. In support of their request to obtain the required signatures to apply for the requisition, Ms. Labranche wrote a letter purportedly from the dog, signed with a paw print and “Love, Peaches.”[^5]
[15] On September 25, 2014, the respondents met with the applicant’s Board. Ms. Labranche stated that the dog helps autistic children and that because the dog was now in a kennel, “[the dog] wasn’t able to visit the children”. Ms. Labranche provided letters from some of the parents of the children with whom she works. Ms. Labranche said that she was very attached to the dog and needed it in her life as well. Mr. Dominelli confirmed at the meeting that he was aware of the 25-pound weight restriction and brought the dog onsite anyway because he and Ms. Labranche were involved in a serious relationship. He threatened that he would go to the local media to expose the dog issue.
[16] After meeting with the Board, Ms. Labranche e-mailed the applicant’s property manager. She stated that a handler and dog are trained to work together to provide a service to those in need, that the dog in question “is [her] service dog because she is trained to work for [her] and as a team to provide this service for the many children that benefit from it.” Ms. Labranche further stated,
I understand that the service is being used for someone other than myself, however, having me as her handler is what allows her to provide this service ... I will continue to fight for the rights of my service dog, myself as the handler, and the children that she supports.
[17] On September 29, 2014, the applicant’s property manager emailed the respondents that the dog had to be removed from the premises unless it “service[d] a resident of that unit”.
[18] On October 2, 2014, the respondents advised the applicant that Ms. Labranche needed the dog for her own use, and that the dog was a service dog for her as well as for the children with whom she works. They provided an undated letter from Dr. Charles Vanderwater. The respondents stated that, in accordance with the letter from Dr. Vanderwater, the dog was a service animal and they would pick the dog up from the kennel and bring her back to their unit.
[19] Dr. Vanderwater’s letter stated that, “[E]vidence has shown that the dog is in fact a service/therapy dog ... and provides a direct role for [Ms. Labranche], in her struggles with stress and past abuse.” It spoke of Ms. Labranche’s “emotional needs” as an individual who has struggled with the emotional impact of previous traumas. The doctor personally endorsed the dog as serving a valuable medical role for Ms. Labranche individually in her personal/private life, as well as a role in the context of serving others. He stated that the dog is a “far better solution to the medical and emotional needs of [Ms. Labranche] (the alternative being medication)”. Dr. Vanderwater further stated that “it is not reasonable that [Ms. Labranche] would have to disclose personal medical details to a condominium board in order to validate her claim of need for [the dog] as providing a personal service to her”. The letter, which is undated, is appended to these Reasons as Appendix “A”.
[20] When cross-examined on her affidavit, Ms. Labranche testified that Dr. Vanderwater is not her family doctor. She described him as the doctor that she “use[s] down here [in Barrie]”. Ms. Labranche sees Dr. Vanderwater on an “as-needed basis”, and did not know how long she had been seeing him. She testified that she “typically” contacts Dr. Vanderwater by e-mail.
[21] After the applicant’s property manager received the request for accommodation, the applicant’s property manager and the applicant’s solicitor contacted the respondents to arrange a meeting to discuss the request.
[22] On October 10, 2014, the applicant’s solicitor asked the respondents for a release or direction to allow Dr. Vanderwater to speak to the applicant, and advised Ms. Labranche that, under the Code, she had the obligation to establish that she had a disability and that the dog was required to assist with her disability-related needs. A meeting, with or without legal counsel and her doctor, was again requested.
[23] An Owner’s Meeting was held on October 27, 2014, and the majority of owners (29 to 10) voted against removing the 25-pound weight restriction in the Rules.
[24] On November 3, 2014, the applicant’s solicitor again requested to meet with Ms. Labranche and asked her to provide a release or direction to allow Dr. Vanderwater to provide information to the applicant. The respondents told the applicant’s property manager to speak to Dr. Vanderwater directly and advised that they would not attend any meeting.
[25] The applicant’s solicitor attempted on several occasions to obtain written confirmation and/or a copy of a release confirming that Dr. Vanderwater would speak to them. Ms. Labranche did not provide a release and Dr. Vanderwater confirmed in a letter dated November 18, 2014 that Ms. Labranche was not prepared to complete a release of information document and had no obligation to do so. Dr. Vanderwater stated that, “It should be sufficient that The (sic) requirement for a Service Dog for her personal wellbeing is a medical decision that I fully support and concur with.” Dr. Vanderwater stated that Ms. Labranche was in the process of filing a human rights complaint and that he would be writing letters and documents of support of her claim.[^6] Dr. Vanderwater’s letter dated November 18, 2014, is appended as Appendix “B”.
[26] Ms. Labranche confirmed at her cross-examination that she only gave her doctor permission to “reaffirm that he had written a letter” and tell the Board what he had put in his letter and no more.
[27] By letter dated November 26, 2014, the Board denied the respondents’ request for accommodation on the basis that there was no objective medical evidence that supported or identified that Ms. Labranche had a disability under the Code; what her disability-related needs were; and how the dog is specifically required to address her disability-related needs. The Board’s Decision stated that Dr. Vanderwater had not provided any clear diagnosis or identified any disability which would require accommodation and the limitations or needs associated with that disability, but had only identified symptoms such as stress, which do not in itself establish a disability under the Code which must be accommodated. The Decision further stated that the Board found that there was no indication that Ms. Labranche required a dog that was more than 25 pounds to address any need. The Decision noted the Board’s concerns about whether the request for accommodation had been made in good faith given the history of events.
[28] The letter set out the consequences of the Board’s Decision: the respondents were to permanently remove the dog by December 1, 2014 and an inspection of their unit would take place to ensure compliance.
[29] The respondents advised the applicant’s property manager on November 27, 2014, that they would remove the dog by December 1, 2014, but would not confirm that they would permanently remove the dog. They also advised that they would not allow an inspection of their unit.
[30] The respondents removed the dog by December 1, 2014, but returned the dog to the unit on January 17, 2015, without the applicant’s permission. The dog remains in the unit.[^7] At her cross-examination, Ms. Labranche testified that she will not permanently remove the dog without a court order.
[31] Ms. Labranche deposed in her affidavit that the dog is necessary for her well-being. She has a fear of being alone and the dog comforts her. She has a strong bond and as a result of having the dog, does not need to take medication for her “condition”. She spoke of her anxiety “from prior traumatic historical situations that continue to adversely affect [her]” and stated that the dog saved her life and continues to assist her. She is unable to cope without the dog and was not able to go to work when the dog was in the kennel. An exhibit to Ms. Labranche’s affidavit confirmed absences from work.
[32] On January 15, 2015, Dr. Vanderwater supplied a third letter stating that Ms. Labranche “has a medical condition which has been mitigated by the presence of her Service Dog.” He stated that he is convinced of the benefit and utility of the dog “for medical reasons”. He outlined his view of the requirements for a service dog and the information that needs to be given to a condominium board, and then wrote that he “confirm[ed] the presence of a medical condition that her service dog is part of her treatment for”. His letter is appended as Appendix “C”.
Issues
[33] Does Ms. Labranche’s dog weigh more than 25 pounds?
[34] If so, have the respondents established that Ms. Labranche has a disability within the meaning of the Code and that she requires a dog weighing more than 25 pounds due to disability-related needs?
[35] If so, has the applicant fulfilled its duty to accommodate?
Analysis
1. Does the dog weigh over twenty-five pounds?
[36] The respondents argue that there is no objective evidence that the dog weighs over 25 pounds. Ms. Labranche raised this issue in her affidavit sworn February 12, 2015; however before that affidavit she and Mr. Dominelli had acknowledged that fact. For example, in the letter Ms. Labranche wrote and signed with a paw print and “Love Peaches”, Ms. Labranche admitted that her dog weighed more than the allowable maximum weight for dogs to live in the condominium. The respondents asked on September 22, 2014 that there be an Owner’s Meeting at which they would request an amendment to the Rule prohibiting dogs over 25 pounds from living in the condominium so that their dog could remain. In a September 10, 2014 email, Mr. Dominelli wrote that he understood that “our [dog] is above the 25-pound weight limit”.
[37] Ms. Labranche was subsequently cross-examined on her affidavit. I consider her answers to questions concerning her dog’s weight to be evasive and vague. Notwithstanding the communications to which I have referred, she testified that she did not know her dog’s weight. She admitted, however, that the dog “could” weigh over 25 pounds.
[38] I find that Ms. Labranche’s dog weighs over 25 pounds.
2.a. Has Ms. Labranche established that she has a disability?
[39] The respondents argue that Ms. Labranche has a disability within the meaning of the Code: in particular, a “condition of mental impairment” or “mental disorder”. They rely on evidence from Ms. Labranche and letters written by Dr. Vanderwater.
The law
[40] The respondents bear the initial onus of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the Code: they must establish that Ms. Labranche has a disability within the meaning of the Code and that a requirement imposed by the applicant, in this case the 25 pound weight restriction on pets, adversely affects her because of her disability.[^8] If the respondents establish a prima facie case of discrimination, the inquiry shifts to whether or not the applicant has fulfilled its duty to accommodate to the point of undue hardship.[^9] Under the Code, “disability” includes a condition of mental impairment or a mental disorder.
[41] The Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (the Tribunal) has outlined the necessary evidence to prove discrimination on the basis of mental disability. In Crawley v. LCBO et al,[^10] the Tribunal referred with approval to a decision of the British Columbia Human Rights Tribunal, which held that, “[A] bare assertion of pain or anxiety is not... a sufficient basis upon which to allege that one has a mental disability...”[^11]
[42] “Stress” of itself is not a disability for the purposes of the Code:
... In order to come under the important protection of human rights legislation, there needs to be a diagnosis with some specificity and substance. References to “stress” and “psychological problems” by themselves ... do not meet that standard.[^12]
[43] To establish a “mental disability”, a diagnosis of some recognized mental disability, or at least a “working diagnosis or articulation of clinically-significant symptoms” that has “specificity and substance” is required.[^13]
Ms. Labranche’s evidence
[44] Ms. Labranche deposed to her “situation”, “special needs”, “plight”, “mental health”, “condition”, “illness”, “anxiety” and “fear of being alone”; she requires her dog “for medical purposes”, “for [her] own personal use”, so that she does not need to resort to medication, for her “well-being” and “to protect and comfort [her]”; she has a “strong bond” with her dog and that her dog “saved [her] life”; she could not function properly when the dog was out of the unit and she was frequently ill, anxious and unable to go to work.
[45] Her employment calendar was an exhibit to her affidavit. It indicated that she was absent from work one-and-a-half unaccounted days during the approximately two months the dog was out of the unit. Other absenteeism was clearly unrelated, including attending at Dr. Vanderwater’s office to pick up letters he had written for this proceeding, as she acknowledged when cross-examined on her affidavit.
Assessment of Ms. Labranche’s evidence
[46] Ms. Labranche damaged her credibility by refusing to admit that her dog weighs over 25 pounds when she had previously acknowledged this fact. She did nothing to enhance or repair her credibility when she claimed that she could not work when her dog was out of the unit, an assertion contradicted by her aforementioned evidence on cross-examination and her employment calendar. Her credibility is also adversely affected by her failure to be forthright in her affidavit: she deposed to having attempted to negotiate a “reasonable resolution” with the Board, but this is not the evidence. She did not attempt to “resolve the issue”. She obtained the first of Dr. Vanderwater’s letters and then refused the Board’s requests for further information.
[47] Ultimately, I do not accept the evidence of Ms. Labranche. She was prepared to modify her evidence as she perceived a need to do so. I conclude that Ms. Labranche simply wanted to keep her dog in violation of the applicant’s Rules of which she was aware when she moved into the condominium.
[48] Ms. Labranche knew by October 10, 2014 that she was obliged to establish that she had a disability. This was clearly, fairly and accurately outlined in the letter of that date from the applicant’s solicitor and reiterated in the Board’s November 26, 2014 decision. But nowhere in Ms. Labranche’s affidavit or during her cross-examination did she provide evidence that she has a disability. I infer that this is because Ms. Labranche was unable to provide such evidence.
Dr. Vanderwater’s letters
[49] I infer that Dr. Vanderwater hinted at a potential human rights complaint when he referred in the first of his letters to the matter possibly being “taken to another level”. He no longer hinted at such in the second of his letters when he referred to a human rights complaint that Ms. Labranche was “in the process of filing” and that he would support. But Dr. Vanderwater never wrote that Ms. Labranche has a “disability” within the meaning of the Code. He never provided a diagnosis. He referred only to symptoms such as “stress”, to Ms. Labranche’s “medical and emotional needs”, “personal wellbeing” and “medical condition”. He referred to the dog performing a “valuable medical role”, a “personal service” and being part of Ms. Labranche’s treatment for a medical condition. Dr. Vanderwater wrote that service dogs are “legitimate for those with seizure disorders, PTSD, and cancer patients”, but he did not relate any disorder to Ms. Labranche and did not provide a diagnosis of “mental impairment”, “mental disorder” or any other “disability”.
Assessment of Dr. Vanderwater’s opinion
[50] Dr. Vanderwater’s letters appear to lack that degree of objectivity and impartiality I would expect from a professional providing an opinion that he knows, or can anticipate, will be tendered in court. Dr. Vanderwater described his first correspondence as a “letter of factual support”. He referred to his second letter as providing “information”. He described his third letter as a “note”. But it is clear to me that Dr. Vanderwater purported in all three letters to provide a medical opinion supportive of Ms. Labranche in her dispute with the condominium Board. Although there is no positive obligation on the part of a physician to assist the court when providing a medical opinion, I would expect that any such opinion provided be based on medical evidence that would inherently be of assistance to the court.
[51] Dr. Vanderwater’s letters strike me as partisan and argumentative. As expressed, Dr. Vanderwater felt that “validation” by a “third party” and a note from a “medical professional” alone should “suffice”—even if those letters did not provide factual support for a diagnosis of a disability. He appears to have adopted the role of advocate, and fails to provide the evidence Ms. Labranche was obliged to put before the court: that she has a disability. I infer that Dr. Vanderwater did not do so because he was unable to do so.
[52] Counsel for the respondents argued that “privacy” concerns prevented the respondents from obtaining evidence that Ms. Labranche has a disability, but it was Ms. Labranche who put her mental health in issue. Having done so, she can hardly raise privacy concerns to prevent the issue from being fully explored. The respondents’ counsel also argued that the applicant was obliged to obtain medical evidence concerning Ms. Labranche’s “disability”, however, the law to which I have referred establishes that the onus is on the respondents to satisfy the court that Ms. Labranche has a “disability”.
Determination as to disability
[53] The test for disability as phrased in Crowley v. LCBO et al.[^14] requires medical evidence, a diagnosis of some recognized mental disability, or “working diagnosis” or “articulation of clinically-significant symptoms” that has “specificity and substance”. Dr. Vanderwater’s medical evidence to assert Ms. Labranche’s diagnosis did not provide that.
[54] Furthermore, I rely on the decision of Justice Flynn in Waterloo North Condominium Corp. No. 186 v. Weidner[^15] to determine whether the medical opinion provided by Dr. Vanderwater falls within the definition of a “disability”. In Waterloo North Condominium Corp. No. 186, the applicant Condominium Corporation forbade residents from keeping pets in their respective units and was seeking an order requiring the respondent to remove her dog from the condominium. The respondent claimed that she suffered from a mental disorder and that enforcement of the prohibition against pets would be an act of discrimination within the meaning of s. 10(1) of the Code. The court stated that despite a physician providing confirmatory evidence that the respondent suffered from depression and that giving up the dog would adversely affect her mental health, there was no evidence before the court that depression was a “mental disorder” such that it would render it a “disability” within the meaning of s.10(1) of the Code.
[55] Similarly, in the case at hand, there is no evidence before this court that Dr. Vanderwater’s generic labelling of Ms. Labranche’s diagnosis as a “medical condition” falls under the definition of a “disability” within the meaning of s. 10(1) of the Code. As such, I find that Ms. Labranche has not established that she has a disability within the meaning of the Code.
[56] The respondents have accordingly not established a prima facie case of discrimination.
2.b. Do Ms. Labranche’s disability-related needs require a dog over 25 pounds?
[57] Even if I had found that the respondents had established that Ms. Labranche has a disability, she has not satisfied me that she needs a dog weighing over 25 pounds to meet her disability-related needs. Considering Dr. Vanderwater’s apparent lack of objectivity and his reference to “evidence” without describing the evidence to which he refers, I find I can give no weight to his opinion that “the dog is in fact a service/therapy dog” that “provides a direct role for [Ms. Labranche] in her struggles with stress and past abuse” and a “valuable medical role for [Ms. Labranche] individually in her personal/private life...”
3. Has the applicant fulfilled its duty to accommodate?
[58] Given my findings, I do not need to determine if the applicant met its duty to accommodate Ms. Labranche under the Code to the point of undue hardship. However, even if I were to assume that the applicant had a duty to accommodate Ms. Labranche in respect of her claim that she needed the dog because of her disability-related needs, I would find that the applicant fulfilled its duty.
[59] The applicant was entitled to seek further information about Ms. Labranche’s disability-related needs, at which point the respondents had a duty to cooperate in the accommodation process by providing the applicant with appropriate medical documentation confirming those needs.
[60] Ms. Labranche was advised by the applicant that they required information to make their decision and that they wished her to sign a release to allow them to speak to Dr. Vanderwater. I reject the respondents’ position that they provided consent to speak to Dr. Vanderwater and that Dr. Vanderwater would have spoken to the applicant about Ms. Labranche’s purported disability: the evidence is clearly to the contrary. The respondents chose not to provide information about Ms. Labranche’s disability-related needs, taking the position that the letters from Dr. Vanderwater were sufficient.
[61] They should have provided the requested information. The applicant was entitled to adequate, objective medical information with a diagnosis of a mental disability and information about Ms. Labranche’s disability-related needs. By refusing to provide such information, the respondents failed to cooperate in the accommodation process.
[62] Through the applicant’s explicit request for medical documentation, I find that the applicant took reasonable steps to ascertain whether Ms. Labranche had a disability and a disability-related need to have a dog over 25 pounds, and thereby fulfilled the procedural aspect of any duty it would have had to accommodate Ms. Labranche. The substantive aspect of any duty to accommodate would not have been triggered because the respondents did not respond to the applicant’s reasonable request for medical information.
[63] As the Supreme Court of Canada held in Central Okanogan School District No. 23 v. Renaud,[^16] a person seeking accommodation must do her part in the accommodation process. The respondents refused to provide adequate objective medical documentation to the applicant. To the extent that Ms. Labranche might have had a need for accommodation which was not met, it was because of her refusal to respond to the applicant’s reasonable request for information.[^17] I would dismiss the respondents’ claim in these circumstances.
Conclusion
[64] I accordingly grant:
An order under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998 requiring the respondents, the owner and occupant of Unit 134, to comply with their obligations under section 119 of the Condominium Act, 1998, Part XIII (2) of the Declaration and Rule 42 of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89 and to permanently remove the dog referred to as Peaches from the unit and the common elements of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89, as the dog weighs more than 25 pounds.
An order under s. 134 of the Condominium Act, 1998 prohibiting the respondents or any owners or occupants of Unit 134 from keeping in the unit or on the common elements of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89, either permanently or temporarily, any household pet that does not comply with their obligations under section 119 of the Condominium Act, 1998 and the Declaration and Rules of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89.
An order that the applicant be permitted to enter Unit 134 on eight hours’ notice which can be given by e-mail, in writing or by telephone to inspect the unit to ensure that the respondents are complying with the provisions in the Declaration and Rules of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89.
A Declaration that the respondents are in breach of, i) Section 119 of the Condominium Act, 1998; ii) Part XIII(2) of the Declaration of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89; and iii) Section 42 of the Rules of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89.
A Declaration that Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89 has not discriminated against the respondents in violation of the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, C.H. 19 or breached any provision of the Human Rights Code by requiring the respondents to comply with their obligations under the Condominium Act, and the Declaration and Rules of Simcoe Condominium Corporation No. 89.
Costs
[65] If the parties are unable to agree on costs, I will receive written submissions from the applicant by June 17, 2015 followed by responding submissions from the respondents June 26, 2015. Any reply by the applicant should be filed by July 3, 2015. Costs Submissions shall be no more than three pages in length, exclusive of any Costs Outline or Offers to Settle. If no submissions are received by July 3, 2015, the issue of costs will be deemed to have been settled as between the parties.
QUINLAN J.
Released: June 8, 2015
[^1]: R.S.O. 1990, C.H. 19. [^2]: York Condominium Corp. No. 382 v. Dvorchik, [1997] O.J. No. 378 (C.A.) at para. 6. [^3]: S.O. 1998, c.19. [^4]: In that e-mail, Mr. Dominelli confirmed that the dog was above the 25-pound weight limit. [^5]: In that letter, Ms. Labranche confirmed that the dog was above the 25-pound weight limit. [^6]: Although it was obvious from the letter that Dr. Vanderwater would not discuss Ms. Labranche’s medical condition with the Board, he ended his letter indicating he could be contacted if he could be of further assistance. [^7]: Although Ms. Labranche testified at her cross-examination on March 5, 2015 that “they” were moving in six months, there was no information provided at the hearing that the respondents have taken any steps in that regard. [^8]: Supra note 1, s. 10(1). [^9]: Taite v. Carlton Condominium Corporation No. 91 et al, 2014 HRTO 165 at paras. 53-54. [^10]: 2011 HRTO 1429. [^11]: Ibid at para. 57, referring to Dow v. Summit Logistics, 2006 BCHRT 158, at para. 18. [^12]: Ibid at para. 58, referring to Re Skytrain and CUPE, Local 7000 (Olsen) (2009), 99 C.L.A.S. 4, 2009 CLB 11377 at para. 69. [^13]: Ibid at para. 63. [^14]: Supra note 10. [^15]: 2003 CanLII 44549 (ON SC), 65 O.R. (3d) 108, 123 A.C.W.S. (3d) 953 at para. 39. [^16]: 1992 CanLII 81 (SCC), [1992] S.C.J. No. 75, [1992] 2 S.C.R. 970 at p. 31 [^17]: Baber v. York Region District School Board, 2011 HRTO 213 at para. 106.