SCJ 2015

The defendants made an offer to settle which the plaintiff accepted 11 months later, shortly before trial.

The defendants brought a motion to determine whether costs were payable to the plaintiff up to the date of the offer or the date of acceptance.

The court held that costs were payable only up to the date the offer was made, as allowing costs up to the date of late acceptance would discourage early settlements and contradict the purpose of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The accused was sentenced following convictions after a judge-alone trial for multiple violent offences arising from a home invasion, including sexual assault with a weapon, robbery with a weapon, unlawful confinement, break and enter, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The offences involved a home invasion targeting two occupants, during which the accused used a knife, sexually assaulted both victims, and robbed them.

The court considered extensive aggravating factors including the home invasion context, use of a weapon, severe sexual violence, and significant psychological harm to the victims.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, supportive family background, and limited expressions of remorse.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence while recognizing the offender’s status as a youthful first offender, the court imposed a global sentence of nine years’ imprisonment with credit for pre‑sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

The respondent union sought judicial review of a labour arbitration award that partially upheld the dismissal of a tenured university professor.

On an interim motion, the university asked the court to exclude an affidavit from counsel who had attended the arbitration hearing, arguing the material was inadmissible on judicial review.

Applying the principles from Keeprite and subsequent authority, the court held that affidavit evidence may be admitted in rare circumstances to demonstrate a complete absence of evidence on an essential point or a breach of natural justice.

Given the absence of a formal record of the arbitration proceedings and concerns regarding reliance on a disputed report, the court found the case fell within the exceptional category.

The affidavit evidence was permitted to be considered by the Divisional Court on the judicial review.

In a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit numerous ante‑mortem statements made by the deceased to friends and family describing the accused’s conduct and the deteriorating relationship between them.

The court reviewed the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the traditional “state of mind” exception and the principled hearsay exception requiring necessity and threshold reliability.

While acknowledging the risk of moral and reasoning prejudice associated with prior discreditable conduct and repetitive hearsay, the court held that most statements were relevant to motive, animus, planning and deliberation, and the criminal harassment component of constructive first degree murder.

The court excluded certain statements lacking sufficient reliability or probative value but admitted the majority of the evidence as part of the unfolding narrative of the relationship.

During a pre‑trial voir dire, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by one accused following separate arrests.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the second statement given during a police interview after consultation with counsel.

The court reviewed the confession rule and assessed inducements, oppression, operating mind, and the overall interview context.

Although the accused was properly cautioned and treated appropriately before the interview, the officer’s aggressive tone, physical positioning, and comments undermining confidence in defence counsel raised concerns.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded the November 18, 2009 statement while admitting the earlier statement.

Following a successful motion striking a statement of claim without leave to amend, the defendant sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court assessed the reasonableness of counsel’s hourly rates and time spent and considered the principles under Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court noted the plaintiff had repeatedly attempted to relitigate similar issues against the government, approaching vexatious conduct.

The requested costs were found reasonable and proportionate for the procedural step in the litigation.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the defendant.

Sentencing for assault causing bodily harm arising from a violent beating that left the victim with facial fractures, concussion, permanent scarring, and ongoing psychological and physical effects.

The court treated the offence as serious violence, emphasized denunciation, deterrence, and public protection, and considered aggravating factors including pursuit of the victim, repeated blows after the victim was down, breach of bail, and a prior record for violence.

Applying Gladue and Ipeelee principles, the court took into account the offender's Indigenous background, intergenerational residential school impacts, personal trauma, guilty plea, remorse, family support, and rehabilitative prospects.

A sentence of 11 months' imprisonment less seven months' combined credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions was imposed, leaving four months concurrent to an existing sentence, followed by 18 months' probation and ancillary orders.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation and sexual assault arising from alleged misconduct with a former student and volleyball player spanning the complainant’s late teenage years and early adulthood.

The court found the complainant to be credible but concluded the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that two alleged pre‑18 incidents constituted intentional touching for a sexual purpose under s. 153 of the Criminal Code.

With respect to later sexual encounters after the complainant turned 18, the court accepted that sexual activity occurred but found a reasonable doubt as to whether a position of trust continued or was abused so as to vitiate consent under s. 273.1(2)(c).

The Crown therefore failed to establish the elements of sexual exploitation or sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was tried for one count of sexual assault.

The complainant alleged that the accused, an old friend, sexually assaulted her in her apartment.

The accused testified and categorically denied any sexual contact, stating he left after the complainant became emotional.

Applying the W.D. framework, the court found the accused's testimony straightforward and credible, concluding his exculpatory explanation could reasonably be true.

The accused was acquitted.

Following a motion in which the plaintiff obtained an amendment to pleadings, the court considered written submissions on the issue of costs.

The court determined that although the plaintiff was successful on the amendment motion, the timing of the motion weighed against awarding costs.

Referring to reasons given in the earlier endorsement, the court concluded that the circumstances did not justify a costs award.

Accordingly, the court ordered that there be no order as to costs.

Following a four‑week jury trial arising from a motor vehicle collision caused by an impaired driver, the plaintiffs obtained a damages verdict of $220,000 but a much smaller net judgment after statutory deductions and accident benefits offsets.

Both parties sought costs, relying on competing Rule 49 settlement offers and arguments concerning proportionality and the impact of statutory deductibles.

The court held that statutory deductibles are not considered when determining entitlement to costs and rejected the defendant’s argument that its offers were more favourable.

After reviewing the complexity of the trial, expert evidence, motions, and proportionality considerations, the court fixed the plaintiffs’ costs at $250,000 in fees plus $126,598.48 in disbursements and applicable HST.

The court further concluded that recent amendments to the Insurance Act affecting cost calculations should not apply retroactively to this litigation.

The Crown brought a bail review under ss. 520–521 of the Criminal Code seeking to overturn a justice of the peace’s order releasing the accused on numerous fraud-related charges.

The reviewing judge found legal errors in the justice’s application of the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c), including reliance on a purported prohibition against pre-trial punishment and the imposition of a “maximum force” threshold not found in the legislation or jurisprudence.

Considering the seriousness and escalating nature of the alleged offences, including robbery and possession of a loaded restricted firearm after repeated breaches of release conditions, the court concluded the earlier decision was both legally erroneous and clearly inappropriate.

The release order was set aside and detention ordered to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The applicant, a fugitive from the United States facing a sentence for tax evasion and an indictment for failing to surrender, applied for judicial interim release under the Extradition Act.

The court assessed the proposed release plan, which included sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found that the applicant failed to discharge his reverse onus on both the primary ground (flight risk) and the tertiary ground (public confidence in the administration of justice).

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed and the applicant's continued detention was ordered.

Following a prior trial decision determining support obligations, the court invited the parties to make limited submissions addressing potential calculation errors in the support calculations.

The applicant instead filed an affidavit containing new documentation and income calculations that had not been part of the trial record.

The court held that the submissions process was restricted to identifying mathematical errors and did not permit the introduction of new evidence.

As the applicant had previously been given opportunities to present documentation during the trial, the court refused to consider the new materials.

The original support calculations therefore remained unchanged.

Sentencing decision following guilty pleas to 36 counts arising from a prolonged pattern of drugging and sexually assaulting 18 vulnerable victims, many of whom were sex-trade workers, while secretly videotaping the assaults.

The court treated denunciation and deterrence as the primary sentencing objectives, emphasizing the offender's planning, exploitation of vulnerability, abuse of professional pharmaceutical knowledge, and the unprecedented scale of the offending.

Expert psychiatric evidence diagnosed paraphilic coercive disorder and sexual sadism, with low recidivism risk only if treatment and sobriety were maintained.

A global sentence of 18 years was imposed, reduced by enhanced pre-sentence custody credit to 14 years remaining, with ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, and lifetime SOIRA orders, but the Crown's application to delay parole eligibility was dismissed.

The applicant sought custody and the return of a child removed from Ontario to the United States by the respondent.

The court found that the child’s habitual residence was Ontario and that Ontario had jurisdiction under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction despite a competing preliminary order issued by a Utah court.

However, the respondent had not attorned to the court’s jurisdiction and service of the application had not complied with the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extra Judicial Documents.

As a result, the court declined to grant judgment through an uncontested trial.

The matter was adjourned to permit proper service under the Hague Convention.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to sexual assault of the offender's spouse and sexual interference involving multiple child victims within the family.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence as the dominant sentencing principles for serious sexual offences against children, while also considering aggravating factors including multiple victims, abuse of trust, intrusive sexual acts, and lasting emotional harm.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea, expressions of remorse, willingness to engage in treatment, and family support.

The court accepted the joint submission and imposed a 4-year penitentiary sentence, concurrent on the second count, less 3 days' credit, together with DNA, lifetime SOIRA, a 3-year s. 161 order, and a s. 743.21 non-communication order.

The plaintiff commenced a civil action alleging lack of procedural fairness by a regulatory body and seeking compensatory damages.

The court reviewed the statement of claim and written submissions and found the action to be frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court held that the allegations against the regulatory body concerned matters of public law properly challenged through judicial review rather than civil damages proceedings.

Claims against the industry association were also found to be statute-barred and not actionable.

The action was dismissed under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct involving two former spouses in a first-degree murder trial.

The proposed evidence included allegations of jealousy, controlling behaviour, criminal harassment, and assault.

The Crown argued this similar fact evidence would assist in proving motive, identity, and the elements of first-degree murder.

The court applied the framework from R. v. Handy and concluded that the prejudicial effect of the evidence, particularly moral and reasoning prejudice, outweighed its probative value.

The Crown's application to admit the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre‑trial motion seeking to introduce third party suspect evidence suggesting another individual may have committed the homicide.

The defence argued that the third party had the opportunity to commit the offence and had connections with individuals associated with the deceased.

The Crown opposed the motion, submitting the proposed theory was speculative and unsupported by evidence linking the third party to the crime.

Applying the principles governing third party suspect evidence, including the requirement of a sufficient evidentiary nexus, the court held that the proposed theory lacked an air of reality and would invite speculation.

The prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value.