Charlena Tamara Claxton

Noah Spencer was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm with an overcapacity magazine while subject to a weapons prohibition, and possession of fentanyl, methamphetamine, and crack cocaine for trafficking.

The Crown sought a global sentence of 6 years less pre-sentence custody, while the defence sought a one-year conditional sentence.

The judge balanced aggravating factors, including the dangerous combination of drugs and firearms and breach of a weapons prohibition, against mitigating factors such as Spencer’s youth, disadvantaged upbringing, systemic racism, and demonstrated rehabilitation efforts.

The court imposed a global sentence of 4 years less pre-sentence custody, with consecutive sentences for firearms, CDSA, and prohibition offences, resulting in a net sentence of just over 20 months to serve, followed by probation and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The accused, Noah Spencer, was charged with five firearms offences and three drug trafficking offences.

He brought a Charter application (ss. 8, 9, 10(b)) seeking exclusion of evidence, alleging unlawful detention, search, and racial profiling by police.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the police acted lawfully based on reasonable suspicion and officer safety concerns, and explicitly rejecting claims of racial profiling.

The court found Spencer guilty of all firearms and drug trafficking charges, concluding he was in physical possession of the items and engaged in a joint venture with a co-accused.

The accused pleaded guilty to assault with a weapon against his common-law partner.

The court imposed a two-year penitentiary sentence followed by three years of probation.

The sentencing was aggravated by two prior assaults against the same victim in 1999 and 2012, both involving weapons.

The court emphasized the seriousness of domestic violence in intimate relationships and the breach of trust involved.

Conditions included a no-contact order, weapons prohibition, anger management and domestic violence counselling, and restitution of $1,234.45.

The three accused were charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The police entered an apartment, detained the accused, and later arrested them, seizing crack and powder cocaine.

The accused brought Charter applications alleging arbitrary detention, failure to inform of reasons for arrest, and denial of the right to counsel.

During the trial, it was revealed that an arresting officer falsely attributed a chunk of crack cocaine to one of the accused and gave false testimony.

The court found this constituted an abuse of process and stayed the proceedings against that accused.

For the other two accused, the court found their s. 10(b) rights were violated due to unreasonable delays in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the drug evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter and acquitted the remaining two accused.

The offender pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following an unprovoked attack on an older victim.

The offender, who has a history of schizophrenia, sought enhanced pre-sentence custody credit beyond the standard 1.5 to 1 ratio due to time spent in segregation.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 5-year sentence.

The court declined to award enhanced credit, noting a lack of jurisdiction absent a Charter challenge, and finding that the offender's time in segregation was largely at his own request and did not constitute particularly harsh treatment.

The defendant pleaded guilty to production of a Schedule II substance contrary to section 7(2)(b) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking contrary to section 5(3)(a) of the CDSA.

Following a trial of an issue (Gardiner hearing), the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant produced and possessed marijuana for the purpose of trafficking.

The defendant was an authorized medical marijuana producer who significantly exceeded his authorized production limits.

The court rejected the defendant's evidence that he was engaged in a two-stage operation for personal consumption, finding instead that the scale of the operation, the packaging of marijuana in one-pound quantities with brand names, and the defendant's lack of credibility supported an inference of trafficking.

The court sentenced the defendant to five months concurrent imprisonment on both counts, imposed a 109 order for ten years, ordered a DNA sample, and placed the defendant on probation for two years with conditions prohibiting marijuana production.

The Applicant sought to set aside a separation agreement and claim retroactive and ongoing spousal support after approximately 12 years of common-law cohabitation.

The court found the separation agreement to be valid and binding, including the waiver of spousal support.

The Applicant failed to prove lack of financial disclosure, duress, or a lack of understanding of the agreement's nature and consequences.

The court also determined that the waiver of support did not result in unconscionable circumstances at the time of trial.

The application was dismissed.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter motions seeking to exclude evidence from two separate police interactions.

For a July 2009 traffic stop, the court found the stop was unlawful due to a lack of credible police evidence regarding the reason for the stop, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The evidence from that stop was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to serious state conduct involving a failure to take notes.

For an August 2009 interaction where police approached a parked vehicle in a high-crime area, the court found no detention occurred, as the accused was free to leave and voluntarily provided his identification.

Consequently, there were no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches, and the accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

During pre‑trial proceedings on a multi‑count indictment involving robbery, firearms, kidnapping, and related offences, the court conducted a voluntariness voir dire concerning a police statement made by one of the accused.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused allegedly did not receive a proper caution or right to counsel, and contended that breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter undermined the accused’s right to silence.

The Crown argued the statement was voluntary and that no inducements, oppression, or improper police conduct occurred.

The court held that the accused had been informed of the right to counsel, had consulted counsel, and understood the right to remain silent.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and the confessions rule, the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was admissible.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit a police statement made by one of the co-accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to police inducements, oppression, and trickery during the interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the police conduct was appropriate, the accused's will was not overborne, and no shocking trickery was used.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

The Crown sought to admit a roadside statement made by a vehicle passenger identifying himself to police during a traffic stop.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven the accused was the declarant and that the statement was involuntary because no caution was given.

The court held that for admissibility the Crown need only show “some evidence” that the accused was the declarant, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the evidence, identity was established and the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt because there were no inducements, oppression, or lack of operating mind.

The absence of a caution did not render the statement involuntary where the accused was not detained or suspected of an offence.

In a multi‑accused jury trial involving numerous serious offences including robbery, kidnapping, firearms offences, and conspiracy, the court determined several pre‑trial jury selection issues.

The Crown sought an order empanelling fourteen jurors and selecting two alternate jurors under s. 631 of the Criminal Code due to the expected length and complexity of the trial.

The court granted the application, finding additional jurors advisable to reduce the risk of mistrial if jurors were excused.

The court also permitted a race‑based challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(b) given that the accused were members of visible minority groups, and established appropriate challenge questions referencing potential bias.

Finally, the court ruled that rotating triers would be used and ordered the exclusion of other jurors from the courtroom during the challenge process in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

During a pre‑trial voir dire, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by one accused following separate arrests.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the second statement given during a police interview after consultation with counsel.

The court reviewed the confession rule and assessed inducements, oppression, operating mind, and the overall interview context.

Although the accused was properly cautioned and treated appropriately before the interview, the officer’s aggressive tone, physical positioning, and comments undermining confidence in defence counsel raised concerns.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded the November 18, 2009 statement while admitting the earlier statement.

Following a five-day trial, the defendant was convicted of public mischief, attempted fraud over $5,000, and perjury.

The defendant falsely reported the theft of a motor vehicle to defraud an insurance company, obtained a proof of loss statement by false pretence, and lied under oath regarding the number of keys he possessed.

The defendant, a 37-year-old engineer with no prior criminal record, was sentenced to 90 days in jail for perjury, with sentence suspended for the remaining counts and placed on probation for one year with conditions including no contact with specified individuals and a DNA sample order.

The defendant was charged with public mischief, attempted fraud over $5,000, false pretence, and perjury arising from a false report of motor vehicle theft.

The Crown alleged the defendant falsely reported the theft of a 2004 Land Rover Range Rover to defraud his insurance company.

The evidence established that the defendant purchased the vehicle, ordered a second key nine days later, had the vehicle serviced, and then reported it stolen.

The defendant made false statements in his insurance claim and under oath regarding the number of keys he possessed.

The court found the defendant guilty on all counts after analyzing the voluntariness of his police statement, the admissibility of his sworn examination, and the corroboration requirements for perjury.

Two offenders pleaded guilty to armed bank robberies committed in Windsor and four additional robberies in Toronto involving firearms, disguises, and violence against bank employees.

The parties jointly proposed a global sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.

The court held that although a higher sentence in the range of 12 to 15 years would otherwise be fit given the seriousness and multiplicity of the offences, the joint submission did not meet the high threshold required to reject it.

The court also considered the application of the Truth in Sentencing Act and the proper credit for pre‑sentence custody under s. 719 of the Criminal Code.

Credit was granted at 1:1 for the period before the guilty pleas and 1.5:1 for the period after the pleas due to sentencing delay beyond the offenders’ control.