Introduction

[1] In the early morning hours of October 31, 2014, two police officers entered an apartment at 10 Glen Everest Road in Toronto. They were accompanied by a resident of the apartment, whom they had arrested minutes before. When they entered the apartment, they found four men – Jordan Davis, Jason Jaggernauth, Jimal Nembrand-Walker and a youth. The officers suspected that the four men were drug traffickers. They called for back-up. When other officers arrived, the four men were arrested.

[2] By the end of the night, the police had seized a total of 145.23 grams of crack cocaine and 89.76 grams of powder cocaine from the apartment and the four men.

Trial Process

[3] Jordan Davis, Jason Jaggernauth and Jimal Nembrand-Walker are jointly charged in a three-count indictment alleging that on October 31, 2014 they were in possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking (2 counts) and in possession of the proceeds of crime. They were tried before me without a jury.

[4] Prior to trial, the three accused men applied to exclude the drugs and money seized pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, on the basis that the police had violated their rights guaranteed by s. 9, s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) of the Charter. They allege that they were arbitrarily detained, were not informed of the reasons for their detention or their right to counsel, and were denied timely access to counsel.

[5] On consent of all parties, the trial on the merits and the Charter application were heard together in a single blended proceeding.

[6] Following the evidence of one of the arresting officers, Officer Trenouth, the three accused sought a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter on the basis of abuse of process and a violation of their rights protected by s. 7 of the Charter. They allege that Officer Trenouth falsely attributed a chunk of crack to Mr. Jaggernauth, and gave false evidence concerning it.

[7] With the consent of all parties, I heard the remaining evidence on the trial and Charter application.

[8] I delivered my decision on July 31, 2017. I stayed the charges against Mr. Jaggernauth on the basis of an abuse of process that breached his s. 7 rights. I excluded the evidence against Mr. Davis and Mr. Walker on the basis of a breach of their s. 10(b) rights, and acquitted them. These are my reasons.

The Events Leading to the Arrests

[9] On October 31, 2014, at approximately 1:00 a.m., Officers Blakely and Trenouth were on uniform patrol near Kingston and Birchmount Roads. They observed a man riding a bicycle without a light, weaving on and off the road. He appeared to be intoxicated. Upon investigation, they discovered that there was an outstanding bench warrant for the man, whom they had identified as Ron Hebert. Officer Blakely arrested Mr. Hebert. The officers agreed to take Mr. Hebert’s bicycle to his apartment before taking him to 41 Division. They loaded Mr. Hebert’s bicycle into the trunk of the police cruiser, and drove him a short distance to 10 Glen Everest Road, Unit 606.

[10] At 10 Glen Everest Road the officers escorted Mr. Hebert, who was in handcuffs, through the building and up to Unit 606. Mr. Hebert had informed the officers that his girlfriend could be in the apartment. The officers knocked on the door. When there was no response, they used Mr. Hebert’s key to unlock the door and enter the apartment.

[11] Upon entering at 1:09 a.m., the officers saw four young men. They smelled burnt marijuana. They saw a knife and digital scale with a white residue on them sitting on the kitchen counter. Mr. Davis was standing near the kitchen counter. They saw a small amount of white powder on the floor near a chair where Mr. Jaggernauth was seated. Officer Trenouth also noticed some rolling papers on a table and a marijuana grinder on the floor near where Mr. Walker and the youth were seated.

[12] Both officers testified that they believed the four men were arrestable for possession of cocaine. They did not arrest them immediately however. The officers thought it would be safer to call for back-up before arresting the men because they were outnumbered, and had only one set of handcuffs (the other being on Mr. Hebert).

[13] Officer Trenouth called over his radio for other officers to attend. While waiting for back-up, the officers asked the four men for their identification and engaged them in small talk. Their goal was to stall for time until more officers arrived. Both officers agreed that they were detaining the four men. They did not tell the men the reason for their detention because they wanted the situation to remain calm. They suspected the men were drug traffickers and their experience told them that drug traffickers often carry weapons.

[14] Officers Kerr and Riegert testified that they heard Officer Trenouth’s request for assistance at 1:13 a.m. They arrived at the apartment five or ten minutes later. Sgt. Handsor, who did not testify, also arrived. After the back-up officers arrived, and were briefed, the four men were arrested for possession of cocaine at 1:31 a.m.

[15] The accused were removed from the apartment into the hallway, where they sat awaiting transport to the police station.

[16] Officer Blakely testified that he and Officer Trenouth remained at the apartment while Officer Hall, the Scenes of Crime Officer (“SOCO officer”), took photographs of the apartment. Officer Hall testified that she arrived at 2:03 a.m., took photographs as directed by Officer Trenouth or Officer Blakely or perhaps both, (she could not recall) and then transported the youth to the police station.

[17] Each accused was searched at the time of his arrest. They were also subjected to Level 3 strip searches at the police station. The searches revealed the following evidence.

Walker

[18] Officer Blakely arrested Mr. Walker, who at the time identified himself as Javane Watson. In a search incident to arrest, Officer Blakely located 9.56 grams of marijuana in Mr. Walker’s vest pocket, and 17.87 grams of MDEA, a change bag containing some American money and 8.5 grams of cocaine in the pockets of a pair of shorts he was wearing under his pants. Mr. Walker also had two cell phones in his pockets.

[19] During the Level 3 search, Officer Trenouth located six bags containing a total of 19.01 grams of crack and powder cocaine inside the fabric covering of the zipper of Mr. Walker’s jeans.

Davis

[20] Officer Riegert arrested Mr. Davis. As he approached Mr. Davis to do so, he saw a piece of crack cocaine directly below Mr. Davis’s left pant leg. When Mr. Davis complied with Officer Riegert’s order to stand, a very large ball (76.58 grams) of crack cocaine fell out of his pants. Officer Riegert handcuffed Mr. Davis and escorted him out to the hallway. As Mr. Davis walked, more pieces of crack cocaine fell out of his pants. Officer Riegert shook Mr. Davis’s pants and more crack cocaine fell out. Officer Riegert saw a translucent piece of plastic in Mr. Davis’s waistband. He removed it. It contained crack cocaine as well. Officer Riegert secured the crack that had fallen on the floor. In total, it weighed 27.33 grams.

[21] Officer Riegert also found $550, two pieces of government identification that did not belong to Mr. Davis, two cell phones and some keys in Mr. Davis’s pockets.

[22] During the Level 3 search of Mr. Davis, a small piece of crack cocaine weighing .1 grams fell from his pants.

Jaggernauth

[23] Officer Trenouth arrested and searched Mr. Jaggernauth. The search revealed that Mr. Jaggernauth had two cell phones and $85 on his person. He had no drugs on his person. Officer Trenouth however attributed two quantities of crack cocaine to Mr. Jaggernauth. The first was a small amount of a white substance on the floor within a foot of where Mr. Jaggernauth was seated. Officer Trenouth scraped that substance off the floor with a police contact card, known as a 208 card. The substance ultimately tested as cocaine. It weighed 2.26 grams.

[24] The second quantity of cocaine attributed to Mr. Jaggernauth by Officer Trenouth is a matter of controversy, and is the subject of the application to stay the proceedings. Officer Trenouth testified that he observed a large piece of crack cocaine on the floor near Mr. Jaggernauth’s foot when Mr. Jaggernauth stood to be arrested. Officer Trenouth testified that he did not see the crack fall, but assumed that it had fallen from Mr. Jaggernauth. I will deal in detail later in these reasons with this quantity.

The Youth

[25] Officer Kerr arrested the youth, who is not before this court. When Officer Kerr entered the apartment, she noticed the youth push a white plastic bag with his foot under a chair. She seized the bag and examined the contents after arresting the youth. Inside the bag, wrapped in several other bags, were 89.76 grams of powder cocaine. Officer Blakely seized the bag.

[26] When Officer Kerr searched the youth incident to arrest, she located a cell phone, loose change and a wad of money in the youth’s pockets. She left those items in the youth’s pockets.

[27] Officer Trenouth seized a blue bag that was on the floor near the chair in which the youth was seated. It contained a number of items, including 5.54 grams of marijuana, and 2.90 grams of crack cocaine.

Section 24(1) Application

Officer Trenouth’s Evidence and Exhibit 35A

[28] As I have indicated, the three accused applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 7 and s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging that there had been an abuse of process leading to a violation of their s. 7 rights.

[29] Officer Trenouth testified that he found a piece of crack cocaine that weighed 6.67 grams near Mr. Jaggernauth’s foot. The defence alleges that no such piece ever existed, and that Officer Trenouth created this exhibit to attribute it to Mr. Jaggernauth to secure a conviction. The defence also alleges that Officer Trenouth wrote his notes in a misleading fashion to make it appear that the piece of crack fell from Mr. Jaggernauth when he was arrested. Finally, the defence alleges that Officer Trenouth gave false evidence at the preliminary hearing and before this court at the trial regarding this piece of crack.

[30] In his notes, which were written after 3:19 a.m., Officer Trenouth wrote as follows, “I arrest #2 [referring to Mr. Jaggernauth]. Have male stand up from chair. Round solid white substance falls to ground by foot of #2. Appears to be chunk of crack cocaine, little bigger than eight ball, approximately 8 to 10 grams.”

[31] At the preliminary hearing, Officer Trenouth testified as follows, “When Jaggernauth stood up, the larger piece, the eight ball, was what I observed on the floor after he stood up as falling.” He further testified that, “The eight ball sized piece was the one that fell when I was in the process of arresting him and he stood up and was located on the floor.”

[32] At the trial, Officer Trenouth testified that he searched Mr. Jaggernauth incident to arrest and seized a piece of crack cocaine that had fallen on the floor by the foot of Mr. Jaggernauth. He said that he did not see it fall, but rather assumed that it had fallen from Mr. Jaggernauth. He testified that he did not think it was important to record that this was merely an assumption in his notebook. He agreed that the evidence he gave at the preliminary hearing was not accurate, but said that he had tried to recall the events as best as he could.

[33] At the preliminary hearing, Officer Trenouth was clear that he seized this large piece of crack cocaine after the SOCO officer had attended the apartment and taken photographs. He testified to that effect three times during his examination in chief at the preliminary hearing. He testified that he left the large piece of crack and the powder on the floor in the location where he first saw them until the SOCO officer arrived and photographed them. He further testified that once the SOCO officer completed the photographs at approximately 2:20 a.m., he seized the ball of crack and scraped the powder from the floor into a 208 card. He kept those two items in his possession and took them back to the police station, where he processed them and sent them for analysis.

[34] At the preliminary hearing, Officer Trenouth could not explain why the powder on the floor was photographed by the SOCO officer, but the large piece of crack was not. He suggested that it was possible that the piece had been kicked, stepped on, or moved when the accused were being removed from the apartment.

[35] Officer Trenouth testified differently at the trial. He testified that he seized the large piece of crack cocaine that had fallen on the floor, and placed it in his pocket when he arrested Mr. Jaggernauth at 1:31 a.m., prior to the arrival of the SOCO officer. Officer Trenouth testified that the SOCO officer did not photograph it because it was in his pocket.

[36] Officer Trenouth testified that all of the property seized in the apartment was taken to the Youth and Family Violence Office at 41 Division, and placed on a table to be photographed. He testified that the chunk of crack cocaine remained in his pocket until approximately 3:19 a.m., when he began processing the exhibits. When he removed it from his pocket, the crack was still in its solid rock form. After the SOCO officer photographed the exhibits, he weighed, processed and submitted them into a property locker. He weighed the piece of cocaine that he located near Mr. Jaggernauth’s foot, placed it in Envelope #C0199780, and placed it in locker 35 shortly after 8:57 a.m. The substance tested as cocaine. It weighed 6.79 grams. The crack is marked as Exhibit 35A in this trial.

[37] Officer Hall testified that she attended the Youth and Family Violence office shortly after 4:25 a.m., and took photographs of the items seized that night. Those photographs are contained in a cerlox-bound volume, marked as Exhibit 17. None of the items were in sealed bags at the time. Officer Hall testified that she believed that she photographed all of the exhibits. She was not told that she had missed anything. Officer Trenouth testified that he was present at the time. There is no photograph of Exhibit 35A. Officer Trenouth could not explain why it was not photographed with the other exhibits.

Positions of the Parties

[38] The defence position is that Officer Trenouth took cocaine seized from elsewhere in the apartment that night, and created Exhibit 35A to attribute it to Mr. Jaggernauth. At the preliminary hearing, Officer Trenouth realized that the SOCO officer had not photographed the exhibit. As a result, he changed his evidence at the trial, explaining that the piece of crack was not photographed in the apartment because he had picked it up and put it in his pocket. It is the defence position that Officer Trenouth lied about the existence of this piece of crack at both the preliminary hearing and the trial. The defence submits that the only appropriate remedy is a stay of proceedings against all of the accused.

[39] The Crown’s position is that although there is a mystery surrounding Exhibit 35A, the evidence falls short of establishing that Officer Trenouth has been dishonest with the court, and that he planted evidence. Mr. Leafloor submits that Officer Trenouth was honest, and admitted there were difficulties with his evidence, but tried hard to be clear and careful when recalling events that occurred 2½ years ago. He agrees however that a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy if I find that Officer Trenouth has planted evidence and misled the court.

Legal Framework

[40] Section 7 of the Charter guarantees everyone “the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.”

[41] Section 24(1) of the Charter provides that anyone whose rights have been infringed may apply to the court, “to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.”

[42] The accused assert that there has been an abuse of process and that their rights protected by s. 7 of the Charter have been violated. As a remedy, they seek a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter.

[43] The accused bear the burden of demonstrating on a balance of probabilities that their rights have been violated.

[44] The Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that a stay of proceedings is warranted in two categories of cases. The first category involves cases in which state misconduct compromises the fairness of the accused person’s trial. The second or “residual” category involves cases in which state misconduct undermines the integrity of the judicial process: R. v. Babos, 2014 SCC 16, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 309 at para. 31. The accused submit that this case falls within the residual category of cases.

[45] A stay of proceedings is a drastic remedy that is to be resorted to only in the “clearest of cases:” R. v. O’Connor, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 41.

[46] The following three requirements must be met before a stay is warranted:

(1) the prejudice caused by the abuse in question will be manifested, perpetuated or aggravated through the conduct of the trial, or by its outcome;

(2) no other remedy is reasonably capable of removing that prejudice; and

(3) where there is uncertainty about whether the abuse is serious enough to warrant a stay, the court must balance the interests served by the granting of the stay against society’s interest in having the matter determined on its merits: R. v. Regan, 2002 SCC 12, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297 at paras. 54 and 57.

[47] Justice Moldaver discussed the circumstances in which the first requirement is met in a residual category case at para. 35 of Babos:

… when the residual category is invoked, the question is whether the state has engaged in conduct that is offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency and whether proceeding with a trial in the face of that conduct would be harmful to the integrity of the justice system. To put it in simpler terms, there are limits on the type of conduct society will tolerate in the prosecution of offences. At times, state conduct will be so troublesome that having a trial — even a fair one — will leave the impression that the justice system condones conduct that offends society's sense of fair play and decency. This harms the integrity of the justice system. In these kinds of cases, the first stage of the test is met.

[48] In discussing the second requirement of the test, whether a remedy short of a stay will redress the prejudice to the integrity of the justice system, Justice Moldaver wrote that, “the focus is on whether an alternate remedy short of a stay of proceedings will adequately dissociate the justice system from the impugned state conduct going forward:” Babos at para. 39.

[49] The third requirement of the test, the balancing of interests, takes on more significance in cases in the residual category. The question with which the court must grapple is whether the integrity of the justice system is better protected by a stay of proceedings or by having a trial despite the state misconduct. The court must consider the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, whether it is isolated or systemic, the circumstances of the accused, the nature and seriousness of the charges against the accused, and society’s interest in an adjudication of the charges on their merits. Society’s interests in a trial on the merits is less likely to prevail in this balancing exercise when the state misconduct offends society’s sense of fair play and decency: Babos, at para. 41.

Findings of Fact

[50] I do not accept Officer Trenouth’s evidence that he found a chunk of crack cocaine near the foot of Mr. Jaggernauth when he arrested him. The following circumstances have led me to doubt the veracity of Officer Trenouth’s evidence.

▪ The evolution of his evidence about why the chunk of crack was not photographed by the SOCO officer in the apartment. At the preliminary hearing, he testified that he left the chunk on the floor to be photographed by the SOCO officer. He speculated that it was not photographed because it may have been kicked or moved during the arrest of the accused men. At trial, he testified that he collected the chunk of crack from the floor and put it in his pocket. That is why it was not photographed in the apartment.

▪ The false evidence Officer Trenouth gave at the preliminary hearing. Officer Trenouth acknowledged that his evidence about leaving the chunk of crack of the floor to be photographed was false. He said that he had made a mistake. He did not inform Crown counsel or the officer in charge of the case of his mistake during the ten months that elapsed between the preliminary hearing and the trial. I do not accept that a responsible police officer, who had made an honest mistake, would not have informed anyone of his error.

▪ The fact that the SOCO officer did not photograph the chunk of crack cocaine when she photographed the other exhibits shortly after 4:30 a.m. at 41 Division. The items seized from the apartment were laid out on a table in the Youth and Family Violence Office. They included the folded 208 card, which Officer Trenouth testified he had used to scrape the white powder off the floor near the chair where Mr. Jaggernauth was seated. Officer Trenouth testified that after he scraped the powder off the floor with the card, he folded the card and placed it in his pocket. He could not explain why the folded card was photographed on the table but the chunk of crack cocaine was not. He testified that he took the chunk out of his pocket at 3:19 a.m. and kept it with him in the Youth and Family Violence Office.

▪ The unlikelihood that a police officer such as Officer Trenouth, with eight years’ experience, would pick an unwrapped chunk of cocaine off the floor and put it in his pocket. Detective Andrew Lipkus, who testified as a drug expert in this trial, testified that it would be unreasonable and ridiculous to gather drug evidence from a crime scene in this fashion. The appropriate manner of gathering a large piece of crack in these circumstances would have been to photograph it prior to seizing it, and then place it in a property bag.

▪ The discrepancy between the appearance of Exhibit 35A and Officer Trenouth’s description of the evidence he seized at the scene. Officer Trenouth described the crack cocaine he seized from the floor as a hard, round, sold white substance, a little bigger than an eight ball, weighing approximately 8 to 10 grams. He said that when he removed it from his pocket at the police station it was still in its solid form. When he placed it in the sealed evidence bag it was still in its solid form. Officer Trenouth agreed that Exhibit 35A does not resemble the crack he described in his notes. It is not a solid chunk of crack cocaine. Exhibit 35A is a bag containing many small pieces of crack, the largest of which is somewhat smaller than a marble, and some crumbs. Mr. Leafloor submits that the change in the crack’s form may have been caused by the handling of it by Health Canada or by the movement of it back and forth to numerous court appearances. However, there is no evidence about how Health Canada handled the exhibit or about the movement of the exhibit after it was analyzed.

▪ Officer Trenouth’s inconsistent account of how the chunk of crack cocaine originally came to his attention. Why would Officer Trenouth record in his notebook some hours after the event that he had seen the chunk of cocaine fall from Mr. Jaggernauth if he had not? These notes are important. They are provided to Crown counsel to prepare for the prosecution of the charge, and disclosed to defence counsel to prepare for trial. I do not accept Officer Trenouth’s evidence that he did not consider it important to record that he only assumed the chunk of crack had fallen from Mr. Jaggernauth. Why would he testify at the preliminary hearing that the chunk had fallen on the floor when he was in the process of arresting Mr. Jaggernauth if he had not seen that happen? I have concluded that Officer Trenouth was deliberately misleading when he prepared his notes and testified at the preliminary hearing in an effort to strengthen the case against Mr. Jaggernauth.

[51] When taken together, these circumstances lead me to conclude that Officer Trenouth did not seize Exhibit 35A from near the foot of Mr. Jaggernauth when he arrested him, contrary to his sworn evidence before me at this trial. I am unable to determine where Exhibit 35A came from, or how it came into being. That would require me to speculate. I am, however, satisfied that Officer Trenouth was not forthright with the court about the origins of Exhibit 35A. I find that he testified in the manner that he did to falsely attribute a large quantity of crack cocaine to Mr. Jaggernauth’s possession. I also find that he prepared his notes and falsely testified at the preliminary hearing to make it appear that he saw the chunk of cocaine fall from Mr. Jaggernauth, when in fact he had not.

[52] I find that this conduct constitutes an abuse of process. The false attribution of evidence to an accused’s possession, and false testimony by a police officer constitute precisely the type of state misconduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial process.

[53] Although Officer Trenouth’s impugned evidence relates directly to Mr. Jaggernauth, it also affects Mr. Davis and Mr. Walker in this sense. The Crown’s theory of this case is that Officers Trenouth and Blakely interrupted the packaging of crack cocaine for sale by the accused when they entered the apartment. Mr. Leafloor submits that the accused were involved in a joint enterprise to possess the drugs seized for the purpose of trafficking. Although Officer Trenouth attributed Exhibit 35A to Mr. Jaggernauth, the Crown’s submission is that all of the accused had knowledge and control of all of the drugs in the apartment for the purpose of trafficking.

[54] For this reason, I find that the rights of all of the accused have been affected by the abuse of process. All of the accused have satisfied me on a balance of probabilities that their rights protected by s. 7 of the Charter have been breached.

The Remedy

[55] This case falls within the residual category of abuse of process cases. The accused seek to have the charges stayed pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter. I must determine whether the criteria for a stay, as set out in Regan, have been met.

Has the state engaged in conduct that is so offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency that proceeding with a trial would harm the integrity of the justice system?

[56] This criterion serves to protect the integrity of the justice system. The court must dissociate itself from state conduct that violates the community’s fundamental notions of fairness and justice.

[57] The role played by police officers in law enforcement is critical to the maintenance of a society that respects the rule of law. It is difficult to imagine how public confidence can be maintained in the rule of law when police officers present false evidence against accused persons. Our justice system cannot function unless courts can rely on the willingness of witnesses to honour their oath or affirmation, and tell the truth.

[58] Officer Trenouth’s conduct in falsely attributing an exhibit to an accused person, falsely recording his observations of it, and falsely testifying about it at the preliminary hearing and the trial in order to secure a conviction offends society’s sense of fair play and decency and undermines the integrity of the criminal justice system.

Is a remedy short of a stay capable of removing the prejudice to the justice system?

[59] Will an alternative remedy adequately dissociate the court from this conduct? In the case of Mr. Jaggernauth, who was directly targeted by Officer Trenouth’s evidence, I am satisfied that it would not. Crown counsel did not suggest any, and agreed that a finding that Officer Trenouth lied and planted evidence would fall into the category of cases that would lead to a stay of proceedings.

[60] A significant remedy is called for to recognize the serious breach of the community’s trust that has occurred, and to distance the court from this behaviour. In my view, nothing short of a stay of proceedings against Mr. Jaggernauth can accomplish that.

[61] Although Mr. Davis and Mr. Walker are subject to a prosecution in which I have found there has been an abuse of process, their jeopardy is not directly affected by Officer Trenouth’s evidence. They were both found in personal possession of cocaine. The breach of their rights guaranteed by s. 7 is a factor the court can consider as part of their application to exclude the evidence seized.

Balancing the interests

[62] Is the integrity of the justice system better served by the staying of the proceedings or by continuing with the proceedings in spite of the police misconduct? At this stage I must consider the nature and seriousness of the misconduct, and the nature and seriousness of the charges faced by the accused and society’s interests in having them adjudicated on their merits.

[63] There is no doubt that Mr. Jaggernauth is facing very serious charges that could lead to a substantial prison sentence. Police seized a substantial amount of crack and powder cocaine from the men in that apartment, although none from Mr. Jaggernauth’s person. Canadian courts have repeatedly recognized the immeasurable harm cocaine does to the fabric of our society. There is a strong public interest in having the charges adjudicated on their merits.

[64] However, to borrow the language of Justice Woollcombe, justice cannot only be about adjudicating the criminal acts of the accused on their merits. “It must also be about how the justice system does so, and the integrity of the process. The integrity of the process is greatly affected by the integrity of the state actors involved in that process:” R. v. Somerville 2017 ONSC 3311 at para. 162.

[65] On balance, I find in Mr. Jaggernauth’s case, that the serious nature of Officer Trenouth’s conduct requires a stay to distance the justice system from this conduct, and to ensure that the public is not left with the impression that the court condones such conduct. This is one of the “clearest of cases” in which a stay of proceedings is the appropriate remedy.

[66] For all of these reasons, I grant the application of Mr. Jaggernauth and stay the proceedings against him pursuant to s. 7 and s. 24(1) of the Charter.

[67] I am not satisfied that the circumstances of Mr. Davis and Mr. Walker represent the “clearest of cases” in which the drastic remedy of a stay is appropriate, and I therefore dismiss their s. 24(1) application.

Section 24(2) Application

[68] I turn now to the application brought by the accused pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude all of the evidence seized on October 31, 2014 on the basis that their rights guaranteed by s. 9, s. 10(a) and s. 10(b) of the Charter were violated. They submit that they were arbitrarily detained, that they were not informed of the reason for their detention or of their right to counsel, and that they were not given the opportunity to exercise their right to counsel without delay.

[69] Although it is not necessary to consider Mr. Jaggernauth’s s. 24(2) application in light of my ruling staying the proceedings against him, the matter was argued before me and in the interests of completeness, I will consider it as well.

Arbitrary Detention: s. 9

[70] There is no dispute between the parties that the accused were detained shortly after the officers entered the apartment. The onus thus falls on the Crown to satisfy me on a balance of probabilities that the detention was not arbitrary.

[71] I find that neither the detention nor subsequent arrest of the accused men was arbitrary for the following reasons.

[72] A detention is not arbitrary if a police officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that an individual is involved in a specific crime. The officer’s grounds must be based on, “a constellation of objectively discernible facts:” R. v. Simpson (1993), 12 O.R. (3d) 183 (C.A.) at para. 61

[73] Upon entering the apartment, Officers Blakely and Trenouth had reasonable grounds to suspect that the accused were in possession of cocaine. They both testified that they saw a knife and digital scale with white residue on them that appeared to be cocaine, and a white powdery substance that appeared to be cocaine on the floor. Officer Blakely testified that there was other drug paraphernalia in the apartment. Officer Trenouth testified that he saw a marijuana grinder and rolling papers. Both officers testified that there was a strong smell of burnt marijuana in the apartment.

[74] These facts, viewed objectively, provided the officers with reasonable grounds to detain the accused men.

[75] Officers Blakely and Trenouth testified that they believed very shortly after entering the apartment that they had reasonable grounds to arrest the accused for possession of cocaine. For reasons that I detail below, they did not arrest the men immediately.

[76] An arrest is lawful if a police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a criminal offence: s. 495(1)(a) Criminal Code. The reasonable grounds must have both a subjective and objective component: R. v. Storrey, [1991] 1 SCR 241 at para. 17. The circumstances outlined above that provided the basis for Officers Blakely and Trenouth to detain the accused also establish their reasonable grounds to arrest the accused men.

[77] For the above reasons, I find that the rights of the accused men not to be arbitrarily detained were not violated.

Right to be Informed Promptly of Reason for Arrest or Detention: s. 10(a)

[78] The accused submit that they were not informed promptly of the reason for their detention or their arrest, and therefore their rights guaranteed by s. 10(a) of the Charter were violated.

[79] It is not contested that Officers Blakely and Trenouth did not tell the accused why they were being detained between the time they entered the apartment and the back-up officers arrived, a period of 22 minutes.

[80] Shortly after the officers entered the apartment at 1:09 a.m., they believed the four men were arrestable for possession of cocaine. Both officers testified that they were concerned about their safety. There were four men to arrest and only two officers. In addition, they had only one pair of handcuffs, as Officer Blakely had placed his handcuffs on Hebert. They testified that their goal was to keep the situation calm until their back-up arrived. For that reason, they did not inform the men of the reason for their detention or of their right to consult counsel. Instead, they made small talk with the men. As Officer Blakely said, “They did what police officers do. They asked the men for their identification.”

[81] The defence submits that the evidence does not support the claim that the officers had safety concerns. The accused men surely knew they were in detention, even though they were not told. Officer Riegert testified that he saw no immediate officer safety concerns when he arrived, and Officer Kerr testified that the men were sitting quietly when she arrived. Mr. Davis testified on the voir dire that he knew that he was not going home that night. Officer Trenouth had ordered him to move away from the counter where the knife was located and to sit down. Defence counsel argued that despite the fact that the men knew they were being detained, they were compliant and did nothing to give rise to the officers’ concerns about their safety. Rather, the accused men were not informed of the reason for their detention because of the officers’ cavalier attitude towards the accused’s constitutional rights, in their submission.

[82] I find that the 22-minute delay in informing the accused of the reason for their detention was reasonable in the circumstances. Contrary to the defence argument, which I will deal with later, I find that the police officers came upon this situation unexpectedly. They were not expecting to find anyone in the apartment. They did not know the accused or their antecedents. They were outnumbered. Their concerns about their safety were reasonable. It was reasonable for the officers to call and wait for assistance, and delay informing the accused of the reason for their detention for 22 minutes.

[83] The defence argues that the officers’ evidence about returning to the apartment with an intoxicated man in custody to return his bicycle is false. The more likely scenario, according to the defence, is that Mr. Hebert offered to lead Officers Blakely and Trenouth to the four men in the apartment in exchange for some consideration when he was arrested. In those circumstances, Officers Blakely and Trenouth ought to have called for back-up immediately, and there would have been no need to detain the accused for 22 minutes without informing them of the reason and without giving them their rights to counsel.

[84] I do not accept this submission. Despite the unusual nature of officers’ evidence about returning the bicycle, it makes more sense to me than the defence’s theory that two police officers, with one set of handcuffs, went to an apartment in which they believed drug trafficking was taking place, with the informant in tow. If that were true, the officers would not only have been risking their own safety; they would also have been putting the safety of Mr. Hebert at risk. I accept the evidence of the officers on why and how they entered the apartment.

[85] As soon as the back-up officers arrived, the four men were arrested. Officer Blakely testified that he informed Mr. Walker at 1:31 a.m. that he was under arrest for possession of a controlled substance. Officer Trenouth testified that he informed Mr. Jaggernauth at 1:31 a.m. that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine. Officer Riegert testified that he informed Mr. Davis at 1:31 a.m. that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine. When Mr. Davis stood up, cocaine fell out of his pants. Officer Riegert took him into the hallway and informed him that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

[86] Mr. Davis testified that he was not told that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine or for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. This is contrary to his affidavit that was filed in support of his Charter application. In paragraph 9 of that affidavit, Mr. Davis indicated that he was arrested at approximately 1:35 a.m. when four other officers arrived. He further stated, “This was the first time I was advised of any charges, that I was under arrest, and that I could telephone a lawyer.”

[87] This inconsistency leads me to conclude that Officer Riegert told Mr. Davis that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine, and after taking him out to the hallway, told him that he was under arrest for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

[88] I find that that the delay in informing the accused of the reason for their detention was reasonably based on concerns for officer safety. I also find that the accused were informed promptly of the reason for their arrest. I therefore conclude that their rights protected by s. 10(a) of the Charter were not breached.

Right to Instruct Counsel without Delay and to be Informed of the Right: s. 10(b)

[89] The defence submits that the accused were neither informed of their right to counsel nor permitted to exercise it within a reasonable time.

[90] Section 10(b) of the Charter reads as follows: “Everyone has to right on arrest or detention … (b) to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be informed of that right.”

[91] The duty to inform an arrested person of the right to counsel arises immediately upon arrest, subject only to reasonable concerns for the safety of the public or the officers: R. v. Suberu, 2009 SCC 33 at para. 42.

[92] The duty to facilitate access to a lawyer arises immediately upon the request of the arrested party. It is the arresting officer’s duty to facilitate access to counsel at the first reasonably available opportunity. The Crown bears the burden of establishing that any delay was reasonable in the circumstances: R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50 at para. 24.

[93] With these principles in mind, I turn to an analysis of whether the rights of the accused protected by s. 10(b) were violated. The evidence with respect to each accused on this issue is different. I will deal with each of them individually.

Davis

[94] Officer Riegert testified that as Mr. Davis stood to be arrested at 1:31, a very large ball of crack cocaine fell out of his pants on to the floor. Officer Riegert handcuffed Mr. Davis, seized the ball of crack that had fallen, and walked Mr. Davis out to the hallway to separate him from the other accused. As Mr. Davis walked, pieces of crack continued to fall out of his pants. Mr. Davis was the one of the first men to be removed from the apartment. Officer Riegert secured the evidence that had fallen because he did not want it stepped on by the other officers who were dealing with the other men in the tiny apartment. Once in the hallway, Officer Riegert advised Mr. Davis of his right to counsel. Officer Riegert testified that it was very shortly after 1:31 a.m., perhaps three minutes later.

[95] Officer Riegert testified that Mr. Davis said that he understood his rights and that he had a lawyer but he was not sure that he was still in practice. He told Officer Riegert that he wanted to speak to a lawyer.

[96] Officers Riegert and Kerr transported Mr. Davis to 41 Division, arriving at 2:09 a.m. There was a line-up in the sallyport. Mr. Davis was not paraded before the booking sergeant until 3:23 a.m. Between 2:09 and 3:23, Mr. Davis remained in the back of the police car. During that time, Officer Riegert left the car to assist in the search of another prisoner. After being searched, Mr. Davis was placed in a holding room at approximately 3:36 a.m. It is an admitted fact that he spoke to duty counsel at 4:11 a.m.

[97] Mr. Davis testified that he was not read his rights to counsel until he was taken to the police car for transport to the police station. He also testified that despite repeated requests to make a phone call, he was not permitted to do so.

[98] As I have already indicated, Mr. Davis swore in his affidavit that he was advised of his right to counsel when the back-up officers arrived, and he was arrested. I accept Officer Riegert’s evidence that he informed Mr. Davis of his right to counsel when he arrested him for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

[99] I find that the very short delay, perhaps three minutes, between the time Officer Riegert arrested Mr. Davis for possession of cocaine and the time he advised him of his right to counsel was reasonable. This brief delay was caused by the need to collect the cocaine that was falling from Mr. Davis’s pant leg to prevent it from being stepped on.

[100] However, the delay in implementing Mr. Davis’s right to counsel was not reasonable.

[101] Mr. Davis asked to speak to a lawyer shortly after 1:31 a.m. He ultimately spoke to duty counsel two hours and forty minutes later, at 4:11 a.m. During that time, he sat in an apartment hallway for 30 minutes, sat in the back of a police cruiser for 75 minutes waiting to be paraded, and waited in a holding room for 35 minutes. I will deal with each time period separately.

[102] There is no evidence about why Mr. Davis waited in the apartment hallway for 30 minutes or why his right to access counsel was not facilitated while he waited.

[103] Officers Riegert and Kerr testified that there was a line up at the sallyport when they arrived at 41 Division, so it took longer than usual to process Mr. Davis into the station. They waited almost 90 minutes to parade Mr. Davis. Officer Riegert testified that he was unable to facilitate Mr. Davis’s right to counsel while they were in the sallyport because Mr. Davis could not be afforded any privacy. The in-car camera was operating, and Mr. Davis was being audio and video taped.

[104] While Mr. Davis waited in the sallyport, Officer Riegert assisted in the parade and search of Mr. Hebert, who was paraded at 2:26 a.m.

[105] I am not satisfied with the explanation for the delay in the sallyport. Mr. Davis arrived at the sallyport 33 minutes before Mr. Walker, yet was paraded 22 minutes after Mr. Walker. This does not make sense if the sole reason for the delay in parading Mr. Davis was the line up at the sallyport. Mr. Walker waited in the sallyport 19 minutes. Mr. Davis waited 75 minutes. This leads me to conclude that the line up at the sallyport was not the sole reason for the 75-minute delay.

[106] Once Mr. Davis was searched and placed in a holding room, he waited a further 35 minutes to speak to counsel. Officer Riegert testified that although it was his responsibility to facilitate a telephone call for Mr. Davis, he was not required to because he had been told that another officer had done that. He could not recall who gave him this information or the time at which he received it, other than it was sometime between 3:36 a.m. and 5:00 a.m.

[107] It is difficult to conclude, on any reasonable analysis of this evidence, that Mr. Davis was given the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay. By the time Mr. Davis spoke to counsel, more than three hours had passed since he had been first detained. Two hours and forty minutes had passed since he had indicated to Officer Riegert that he wanted to speak to a lawyer.

[108] There is no evidence that any effort was made to expedite Mr. Davis’s access to counsel. To have a prisoner sit in the back of a police car for 75 minutes and allow almost two hours to elapse from the time he asked to speak to counsel is not reasonable. Why was no thought given to allowing Mr. Davis to speak to a lawyer while he waited in the sallyport? Before the Level 3 search? Before he was placed in the holding room?

[109] Crown counsel submitted that the delay in permitting any of the accused to call counsel was reasonable because the investigators were considering obtaining a search warrant. Officer Trenouth testified that he had heard that some officers were considering the possibility of obtaining a warrant. This is not evidence that I can rely on to explain a delay.

[110] When time is of the essence to a successful prosecution, such as in the case of a charge of driving with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood, detained individuals must be transported to police stations, paraded before a booking sergeant, possibly searched, given an opportunity to consult counsel, and taken before a breath technician to provide samples of their breath. This must all be done within two hours of when the alleged impaired driving occurred. Police officers must therefore make it a priority to facilitate the right to counsel for a suspected impaired driver.

[111] Similarly, in my view, police officers must make it a priority to facilitate the right to counsel for an individual who has asked to exercise that right. It is simply not good enough to explain that detained individuals cannot be afforded privacy to contact counsel in the sallyport, and therefore must wait hours to exercise their right.

[112] I find that Mr. Davis’s right to counsel guaranteed by s. 10(b) of the Charter was violated by the unreasonable delay in permitting him access to counsel.

Walker

[113] Officer Blakely arrested Mr. Walker at 1:31 a.m., searched him, and removed him from the apartment into the hallway. He did not read Mr. Walker his rights to counsel until 2:27 a.m., 56 minutes later, when they were in the police car preparing to go to the police station. Mr. Walker indicated that he wanted to call a lawyer.

[114] Mr. Walker arrived at 41 Division at 2:39 a.m., was paraded before the booking sergeant at 3:01 a.m., searched, and then placed in a holding room at 3:19 a.m. He spoke to duty counsel at 4:04 a.m.

[115] Officer Blakely’s evidence about why he waited almost one hour to advise Mr. Walker of his right to counsel is troubling. In response to a suggestion put to him in cross-examination that giving Mr. Walker his right to counsel was not uppermost in his mind, Officer Blakely agreed. He testified indicated that his safety was on top of his mind. He also agreed, however, that once the accused were arrested, there were no officer safety concerns. When asked why he did not read Mr. Walker his right to counsel when Mr. Walker was seated in the hallway for an hour, Officer Blakely indicated that he was occupied, securing evidence in the apartment. It is difficult to understand why the securing of evidence at that point took precedence over advising Mr. Walker of his right to counsel when the police had secured the apartment and removed the accused.

[116] Officer Blakely testified that he gave Mr. Walker his right to counsel when he had the opportunity to do so. That, according to Officer Blakely, was when they were in the car on the way to the police station.

[117] Officer Blakely also testified that he took no steps to ensure that Mr. Walker’s right to consult counsel was implemented. He did not know if Mr. Walker was ever given a telephone call to contact a lawyer.

[118] Mr. Walker did not speak to duty counsel until 4:04 a.m., nearly three hours after he was first detained at 1:09, two and one-half hours after he was arrested, and more than an hour and a half after he told Officer Blakely that he wanted to speak to a lawyer. There is no evidence before me to explain this delay. There is evidence that between 1:09 and 2:27, Mr. Walker was handcuffed, sitting in the hallway of the apartment building. From 2:29 to 2:39, he was en route to the police station. From 3:01 to 3:15, he was paraded and searched. At 3:19, he was placed in a room at the police station.

[119] Officer Blakely’s explanation for his delay in advising Mr. Walker of his right to counsel is not reasonable in the circumstances. In addition, there is no evidence explaining the delay between the time Mr. Walker asked to speak to a lawyer at 2:27 a.m. and the time he did speak to a lawyer at 4:04 a.m. The only evidence before me is that the officer responsible for facilitating access to counsel, the arresting officer, Officer Blakely, did nothing to facilitate access.

[120] I find that both the informational and implementational components of Mr. Walker’s right to counsel protected by s. 10(b) of the Charter were violated.

Jaggernauth

[121] Officer Trenouth arrested Mr. Jaggernauth for possession of cocaine at 1:31 a.m. He handcuffed him and gave him his right to counsel. He asked Mr. Jaggernauth whether he wanted to speak to a lawyer now. Mr. Jaggernauth said, “Yea.” Officer Trenouth testified that Mr. Jaggernauth was turned over to Officer Leblanc at 2:15 a.m. for transport to the police station. It is an agreed fact that Leblanc advised Mr. Jaggernauth of his right to counsel at 2:15 a.m. In response to Leblanc’s question, “Do you want to call a lawyer now,” Mr. Jaggernauth replied, “Yes.”

[122] There is no evidence about what happened with Mr. Jaggernauth between the time he was turned over to Leblanc at 2:15 a.m. and 4:21 a.m., when he spoke to duty counsel.

[123] Officer Trenouth testified that he did not facilitate a telephone call to counsel for Mr. Jaggernauth. When asked why he did not, he testified that Mr. Jaggernauth was taken to the station by Officer Leblanc and things were busy and hectic. It was an oversight on his part. He agreed that it was his responsibility as the arresting officer to facilitate Mr. Jaggernauth’s access to counsel.

[124] There is no evidence to explain the lengthy delay in facilitating Mr. Jaggernauth’s access to counsel. Mr. Jaggernauth spoke to duty counsel at 4:21 a.m., almost three hours after the first time he said that he wanted to speak to counsel the first time, and more than two hours after he said that he wanted to the second time. This delay is not reasonable.

[125] I find that Mr. Jaggernauth’s rights protected by s. 10(b) of the Charter were violated.

Section 24(2) Analysis

[126] Having found that the s. 10(b) rights of all of the accused were breached, I turn now to a consideration of the exclusion of the evidence seized.

[127] Although not all of the evidence was seized as a result of the violation of the s. 10(b) rights of the accused, the analysis does not end there. The accused do not have to show a causal connection between the breach and the obtaining of the evidence before the court is required to engage in a s. 24(2) analysis. Rather, the accused must demonstrate a causal, temporal or contextual connection between the two that is not too tenuous or remote: R. v. Pino¸ 2016 ONCA 389. As Justice Laskin indicated in Pino at para. 72, “the court should consider the entire “chain of events” between the accused and the police to determine whether the evidence seized and the Charter breach are part of the same transaction or course of conduct.”

[128] In this case, there is a temporal and contextual connection between the breach of the s. 10(b) rights of the accused and the seizure of evidence both from the apartment and during the Level 3 searches of the accused.

[129] In determining whether the evidence ought to be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, I must consider the three factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353:

the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct;
the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected interests of the accused; and
society’s interest in the adjudication of the case on its merits.

The Seriousness of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)-Infringing State Conduct

[130] I consider the Charter-infringing conduct serious in the case of all of the accused. Their rights protected by s. 10(b) and s. 7 were violated.

[131] There is no legal uncertainty about the obligations of police officers to advise arrested people of their right to counsel immediately upon arrest and to facilitate access to counsel without delay. Yet despite the fact that each of the accused asked to speak to counsel, none of them were afforded that opportunity for approximately three hours or more and for nearly three hours from the time they requested access to counsel.

[132] In the case of Mr. Walker, he was not even advised of his right to counsel for almost one hour after his arrest and for more than one hour after he was originally detained.

[133] These are not minor or technical breaches. No extenuating circumstances have been put forward to explain these unreasonable delays. These officers disregarded the right of these men to consult counsel without delay. There is no evidence that any officer, either at the apartment or the police station, took any proactive step to ensure that the s. 10(b) rights of these men were implemented without delay.

[134] The conduct of Officer Trenouth, which resulted in a violation of the s. 7 rights of the accused, is also extremely serious. As I have already indicated, the false attribution of an exhibit to an accused and misleading testimony in court is precisely the type of state misconduct that undermines the integrity of the judicial system.

[135] The primary concern of this part of the inquiry is to preserve public confidence in the rule of law: Grant at para. 72. To do so, the court cannot condone police conduct that demonstrates disregard or indifference to well-established constitutional rights.

[136] This factor strongly favours exclusion of the evidence.

The Impact on the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)-Protected Interests of the Accused

[137] The impact of the breach of the rights of the accused was not fleeting, but significant. As Justice Doherty observed in R. v. McGuffie 2016 ONCA 365 at para. 80, “Access to legal advice while detained is fundamental to individual liberty and personal autonomy in a society governed under the rule of law.”

[138] These men were detained for more than three hours without access to counsel, despite asking for it. Mr. Walker was detained for more than one hour without being advised of his right to counsel.

[139] This factor also strongly favours the exclusion of the evidence.

Society’s Interest in an Adjudication on the Merits

[140] This factor favours the admission of the evidence. Society’s interest in the adjudication of these charges is high. A very large quantity of a dangerous drug was seized. The evidence is reliable and its exclusion will end the prosecution.

[141] The accused are facing very serious charges. However, as our courts have repeatedly recognized, society has a significant interest in knowing that the courts will not condone police misconduct in any case, whether the accused is facing serious penal consequences or not: see R. v. Paterson 2017 SCC 15 at para. 55; Grant at para. 84; McGuffie at para. 73.

Balancing of the Factors

[142] When the first two factors of the Grant analysis strongly favour exclusion, the third factor will seldom, if ever, tip the balance in favour of admission: McGuffie at para. 63. In this case, the balance weighs in favour of excluding the evidence against all of the accused. The admission of the evidence seized would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

Conclusion

[143] Mr. Jaggernauth’s application to stay the proceedings is granted.

[144] The application of Mr. Davis and Mr. Walker to exclude the evidence seized is granted. Given its exclusion, I find Mr. Davis and Mr. Walker not guilty of all charges.

Corrick J.

Released: August 8, 2017

CITATION: R. v. Davis, Jaggernauth, Walker, 2017 ONSC 4775

COURT FILE NO.: CR-16-90000384-0000

DATE: 20170808

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN

and -

Jordan Davis

Jason Jaggernauth

Jimal Nembrand-Walker

REASONS FOR DECISION

Corrick J.

Released: August 8, 2017

Introduction

Trial Process

The Events Leading to the Arrests

Walker

Davis

Jaggernauth

The Youth

Section 24(1) Application

Officer Trenouth’s Evidence and Exhibit 35A

Positions of the Parties

Legal Framework

Findings of Fact

The Remedy

Has the state engaged in conduct that is so offensive to societal notions of fair play and decency that proceeding with a trial would harm the integrity of the justice system?

Is a remedy short of a stay capable of removing the prejudice to the justice system?

Balancing the interests

Section 24(2) Application

Arbitrary Detention: s. 9

Right to be Informed Promptly of Reason for Arrest or Detention: s. 10(a)

Right to Instruct Counsel without Delay and to be Informed of the Right: s. 10(b)

Davis

Walker

Jaggernauth

Section 24(2) Analysis

The Seriousness of the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)-Infringing State Conduct

The Impact on the [Charter](https://www.canlii.org/en/ca/laws/stat/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11/latest/schedule-b-to-the-canada-act-1982-uk-1982-c-11.html)-Protected Interests of the Accused

Society’s Interest in an Adjudication on the Merits

Balancing of the Factors

Conclusion

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Expert Witnesses

Issues

Statutory Provisions 7

Legal Tests 3

Legislation 7