Colin Richard George Henderson

During jury selection for a second-degree murder trial, the accused requested the trial judge use the expanded stand-by power under s. 633 of the Criminal Code to ensure at least one Black juror was selected.

The Crown opposed the request.

The trial judge conducted a detailed analysis of the legislative history and conflicting jurisprudence regarding s. 633.

The court concluded that while s. 633 can be used to enhance jury diversity to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice, the specific grounds advanced by the defence—that a Black juror could help others understand cultural norms—did not constitute reasonable cause.

The request was denied.

The accused, a Black man charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to challenge prospective jurors for cause based on anti-Black racism.

The court determined the specific anti-bias instructions and questions to be posed to the jury panel.

The court also ruled that, under the new legislative regime, the trial judge rather than defence counsel would ask the challenge for cause questions to preserve objective neutrality and underscore the court's commitment to an impartial jury.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of second-degree murder.

He argued that inconsistencies between two key witnesses regarding the shooter's identity precluded committal, relying on principles from eyewitness identification cases.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, holding that the Crown's case was circumstantial, not based on direct eyewitness identification.

The court found that the preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the whole of the evidence and that a reasonable inference was available that the applicant shot the deceased.

The accused, charged with manslaughter alongside two co-accused, sought to bring several pre-trial applications, including a recusal motion, a jurisdictional challenge against transferring the trial out of Brampton, a section 10(b) Charter application, and an application for removal of counsel.

Due to counsel's medical issues and scheduling conflicts, the court had to set a firm timetable for the filing of materials and the hearing of these applications to ensure the scheduled trial date could be maintained.

The court ordered strict deadlines for the filing of application records and factums, scheduling the recusal application first, followed by the substantive applications.

The case involves three accused charged with manslaughter.

Due to courtroom shortages in Brampton, the trial was scheduled to be held in Kitchener.

Counsel for one of the accused suffered medical issues, leading to an adjournment.

Counsel subsequently indicated an intention to bring motions to transfer the trial back to Brampton or be removed from the record, but later attempted to unilaterally delay bringing these motions.

The case management judge rejected this delay, emphasizing the need for efficiency under the Jordan framework, and ordered strict deadlines for the defence to perfect any such applications.

During a trial for multiple counts of kidnapping, robbery, and firearm offences related to cargo thefts, the Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across counts to prove identity.

The offences were alleged to have been committed by a rotating group of individuals.

The court applied the test from Perrier, finding that the offences were strikingly similar and that there was 'some evidence' linking each accused to the specific offences with which they were charged, primarily through cell phone tower data showing symmetry of movement.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and ruled the similar fact evidence admissible across counts.

This ruling addresses the admissibility and use of association evidence as circumstantial evidence of identity in a multi-accused criminal trial involving charges of theft, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Crown sought to use evidence of association between the accused and others, combined with cell phone proximity data, to establish identity in joint enterprise crimes.

The accused argued against this, citing concerns about 'guilt by association.' The court permitted the use of certain categories of association evidence (phone contact, contact information, surveillance observations, witness testimony) for the limited purpose of considering cell phone patterns in the context of joint enterprise crimes, provided careful jury instructions were given to prevent 'guilt by association.' However, the court disallowed the use of 'mirrored phone movements' across different counts and the circumstances of collective arrests as association evidence, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The accused in a 29-count indictment for theft, kidnapping, robbery, and possession of property obtained by crime brought directed verdict applications at the close of the Crown's case.

The applications were dismissed, with the court finding that the Crown's circumstantial evidence, particularly cell phone data showing symmetrical movement and association between the accused, was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt for each count.

The court clarified the legal test for directed verdicts in circumstantial cases, rejecting the defence's argument that evidence must be inconsistent with any other explanation.

During a complex criminal trial involving multiple kidnappings and robberies, the Crown sought to introduce PowerPoint presentations as demonstrative aids to summarize voluminous cell phone records and plot cell tower locations.

The defence objected, arguing the presentations were misleading and distorted the evidence.

The court initially excluded the proposed presentations, finding they were confusing, assumed facts in dispute, and acted as a roadmap for the Crown's case.

However, the court subsequently admitted revised presentations that focused on individual phones, accurately distilled the records without assuming disputed facts, and were accompanied by cautionary instructions to the jury.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter motions seeking to exclude evidence from two separate police interactions.

For a July 2009 traffic stop, the court found the stop was unlawful due to a lack of credible police evidence regarding the reason for the stop, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The evidence from that stop was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to serious state conduct involving a failure to take notes.

For an August 2009 interaction where police approached a parked vehicle in a high-crime area, the court found no detention occurred, as the accused was free to leave and voluntarily provided his identification.

Consequently, there were no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches, and the accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

During pre‑trial proceedings on a multi‑count indictment involving robbery, firearms, kidnapping, and related offences, the court conducted a voluntariness voir dire concerning a police statement made by one of the accused.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused allegedly did not receive a proper caution or right to counsel, and contended that breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter undermined the accused’s right to silence.

The Crown argued the statement was voluntary and that no inducements, oppression, or improper police conduct occurred.

The court held that the accused had been informed of the right to counsel, had consulted counsel, and understood the right to remain silent.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and the confessions rule, the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was admissible.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit a police statement made by one of the co-accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to police inducements, oppression, and trickery during the interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the police conduct was appropriate, the accused's will was not overborne, and no shocking trickery was used.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

During a pre‑trial voir dire, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by one accused following separate arrests.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the second statement given during a police interview after consultation with counsel.

The court reviewed the confession rule and assessed inducements, oppression, operating mind, and the overall interview context.

Although the accused was properly cautioned and treated appropriately before the interview, the officer’s aggressive tone, physical positioning, and comments undermining confidence in defence counsel raised concerns.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded the November 18, 2009 statement while admitting the earlier statement.

In a multi‑accused jury trial involving numerous serious offences including robbery, kidnapping, firearms offences, and conspiracy, the court determined several pre‑trial jury selection issues.

The Crown sought an order empanelling fourteen jurors and selecting two alternate jurors under s. 631 of the Criminal Code due to the expected length and complexity of the trial.

The court granted the application, finding additional jurors advisable to reduce the risk of mistrial if jurors were excused.

The court also permitted a race‑based challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(b) given that the accused were members of visible minority groups, and established appropriate challenge questions referencing potential bias.

Finally, the court ruled that rotating triers would be used and ordered the exclusion of other jurors from the courtroom during the challenge process in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

The Crown sought to admit a roadside statement made by a vehicle passenger identifying himself to police during a traffic stop.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven the accused was the declarant and that the statement was involuntary because no caution was given.

The court held that for admissibility the Crown need only show “some evidence” that the accused was the declarant, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the evidence, identity was established and the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt because there were no inducements, oppression, or lack of operating mind.

The absence of a caution did not render the statement involuntary where the accused was not detained or suspected of an offence.

Summary conviction appeal from convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample arising from erratic operation of a tractor trailer followed by a civilian witness into a truck stop.

The appellant argued the trial judge improperly inferred identity and care and control from circumstantial evidence, relying on alternative explanations such as a passenger or attendant.

The appeal court held that alternative theories not grounded in evidence were speculative, and that the totality of the evidence supported the finding that the appellant was the driver.

The court also held that the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the breath demand even apart from proof beyond a reasonable doubt of identity.

A young person was charged with sexual assault and wearing a disguise with intent following an incident on June 28, 2013, in Mississauga.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the masked perpetrator.

The Crown relied on eyewitness identification from the victim and a neighbour who recognized the accused, corroborated by security footage, physical evidence (a mask found near the building), and the accused's own statements to police.

The defence challenged the reliability of eyewitness identification, citing poor time perception and limited observation conditions.

The court found the identification evidence credible and reliable, particularly the neighbour's recognition evidence based on three years of daily contact.

The court rejected the accused's denials and found him guilty on both counts.

The accused brought a Charter application under s.11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms seeking a stay of proceedings for delay in trial.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood.

The information was sworn on August 13, 2013, and the trial was scheduled for January 5-6, 2015, representing a delay of approximately 17 months.

The court applied the four-factor test from R. v. Morin, examining the overall length of delay, waiver by the accused, reasons for delay, and prejudice.

The court found institutional and Crown delay of 11.5 months, which while exceeding the 8-10 month guideline, did not constitute a violation of s.11(b) rights when balanced against society's interest in a trial on the merits and the absence of material prejudice to the accused.

The accused, a packaging manager employed by a major retailer, was charged with fraud after directing supplier companies participating in a rebate program to issue cheques to a company he controlled rather than to his employer.

Over several years, the accused deposited approximately $3.9 million into his own account.

The defence asserted that a confidential agreement with a company vice-president authorized him to retain rebate funds exceeding a certain threshold.

The court rejected the credibility of this claim, relying on witness testimony, documentary evidence, and the absence of any written authorization.

Applying the framework in R. v. W(D), the court found the defence evidence neither credible nor capable of raising a reasonable doubt and concluded that the accused intentionally deprived his employer of the funds.