Stephen Morris

During a trial for multiple counts of kidnapping, robbery, and firearm offences related to cargo thefts, the Crown brought an application to admit similar fact evidence across counts to prove identity.

The offences were alleged to have been committed by a rotating group of individuals.

The court applied the test from Perrier, finding that the offences were strikingly similar and that there was 'some evidence' linking each accused to the specific offences with which they were charged, primarily through cell phone tower data showing symmetry of movement.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect and ruled the similar fact evidence admissible across counts.

This ruling addresses the admissibility and use of association evidence as circumstantial evidence of identity in a multi-accused criminal trial involving charges of theft, kidnapping, and robbery.

The Crown sought to use evidence of association between the accused and others, combined with cell phone proximity data, to establish identity in joint enterprise crimes.

The accused argued against this, citing concerns about 'guilt by association.' The court permitted the use of certain categories of association evidence (phone contact, contact information, surveillance observations, witness testimony) for the limited purpose of considering cell phone patterns in the context of joint enterprise crimes, provided careful jury instructions were given to prevent 'guilt by association.' However, the court disallowed the use of 'mirrored phone movements' across different counts and the circumstances of collective arrests as association evidence, finding their prejudicial effect outweighed their probative value.

The accused in a 29-count indictment for theft, kidnapping, robbery, and possession of property obtained by crime brought directed verdict applications at the close of the Crown's case.

The applications were dismissed, with the court finding that the Crown's circumstantial evidence, particularly cell phone data showing symmetrical movement and association between the accused, was reasonably capable of supporting an inference of guilt for each count.

The court clarified the legal test for directed verdicts in circumstantial cases, rejecting the defence's argument that evidence must be inconsistent with any other explanation.

During a complex criminal trial involving multiple kidnappings and robberies, the Crown sought to introduce PowerPoint presentations as demonstrative aids to summarize voluminous cell phone records and plot cell tower locations.

The defence objected, arguing the presentations were misleading and distorted the evidence.

The court initially excluded the proposed presentations, finding they were confusing, assumed facts in dispute, and acted as a roadmap for the Crown's case.

However, the court subsequently admitted revised presentations that focused on individual phones, accurately distilled the records without assuming disputed facts, and were accompanied by cautionary instructions to the jury.

The accused brought pre-trial Charter motions seeking to exclude evidence from two separate police interactions.

For a July 2009 traffic stop, the court found the stop was unlawful due to a lack of credible police evidence regarding the reason for the stop, resulting in an arbitrary detention.

The evidence from that stop was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter due to serious state conduct involving a failure to take notes.

For an August 2009 interaction where police approached a parked vehicle in a high-crime area, the court found no detention occurred, as the accused was free to leave and voluntarily provided his identification.

Consequently, there were no s. 8 or s. 10(b) breaches, and the accused's statements were ruled voluntary and admissible.

During pre‑trial proceedings on a multi‑count indictment involving robbery, firearms, kidnapping, and related offences, the court conducted a voluntariness voir dire concerning a police statement made by one of the accused.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary because the accused allegedly did not receive a proper caution or right to counsel, and contended that breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Charter undermined the accused’s right to silence.

The Crown argued the statement was voluntary and that no inducements, oppression, or improper police conduct occurred.

The court held that the accused had been informed of the right to counsel, had consulted counsel, and understood the right to remain silent.

Considering the totality of the circumstances and the confessions rule, the Crown proved voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt and the statement was admissible.

In a pre-trial motion, the Crown sought to admit a police statement made by one of the co-accused.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to police inducements, oppression, and trickery during the interrogation.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found that the police conduct was appropriate, the accused's will was not overborne, and no shocking trickery was used.

The statement was ruled voluntary and admissible.

During a pre‑trial voir dire, the Crown sought to admit two statements made by one accused following separate arrests.

The defence challenged the voluntariness of the second statement given during a police interview after consultation with counsel.

The court reviewed the confession rule and assessed inducements, oppression, operating mind, and the overall interview context.

Although the accused was properly cautioned and treated appropriately before the interview, the officer’s aggressive tone, physical positioning, and comments undermining confidence in defence counsel raised concerns.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, the court found a reasonable doubt about voluntariness and excluded the November 18, 2009 statement while admitting the earlier statement.

In a multi‑accused jury trial involving numerous serious offences including robbery, kidnapping, firearms offences, and conspiracy, the court determined several pre‑trial jury selection issues.

The Crown sought an order empanelling fourteen jurors and selecting two alternate jurors under s. 631 of the Criminal Code due to the expected length and complexity of the trial.

The court granted the application, finding additional jurors advisable to reduce the risk of mistrial if jurors were excused.

The court also permitted a race‑based challenge for cause under s. 638(1)(b) given that the accused were members of visible minority groups, and established appropriate challenge questions referencing potential bias.

Finally, the court ruled that rotating triers would be used and ordered the exclusion of other jurors from the courtroom during the challenge process in the exercise of inherent jurisdiction.

The Crown sought to admit a roadside statement made by a vehicle passenger identifying himself to police during a traffic stop.

The defence argued the Crown had not proven the accused was the declarant and that the statement was involuntary because no caution was given.

The court held that for admissibility the Crown need only show “some evidence” that the accused was the declarant, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

On the evidence, identity was established and the statement was voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt because there were no inducements, oppression, or lack of operating mind.

The absence of a caution did not render the statement involuntary where the accused was not detained or suspected of an offence.

The union applied for certification to represent a bargaining unit of full-time drivers and mechanics.

The employer responded by proposing a combined full-time and part-time unit and gave notice under section 8.1 of the Labour Relations Act.

A representation vote was held, and the union won a majority in the combined unit but lost in the full-time only unit.

The parties then swapped their positions on the appropriate unit.

The Board found the combined unit appropriate and held that section 8.1 only requires the union to have 40 percent membership support in the unit proposed in its application, not the unit ultimately found appropriate.

The union was certified to represent the combined unit.