Gary Grill

The accused was charged with robbery after stealing a vehicle at gunpoint from an innocent family in a mall parking lot.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence, arguing he stole the vehicle to escape after being attacked during a drug deal and firing his own handgun.

The court found that while the accused reasonably believed a threat of force was being used against him and acted for a defensive purpose, his response of robbing innocent bystanders at gunpoint was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The accused's reckless role in creating the dangerous situation by bringing a loaded handgun to a drug deal weighed heavily against the reasonableness of his actions.

The accused was found guilty of robbery.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded, restricted firearm, careless use of a firearm resulting in injury, and possession of cocaine for trafficking.

The court imposed a global five-year sentence with credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a two-year custodial term followed by three years of probation.

The decision extensively addresses systemic racism, the deplorable conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre, and the impact of family separation on the offender's children.

The court balanced denunciation and deterrence with rehabilitation, restraint, and consideration of the offender's difficult life experiences and strong family support.

O'Shane Mitchell pleaded guilty to three counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and one count of possession of a loaded firearm.

The charges arose from a shooting incident where Mitchell, acting in self-defence against one aggressor who died, recklessly injured three other individuals.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a loaded firearm in an enclosed space, injuries to multiple victims, and the unrecovered firearm.

Mitigating factors included Mitchell's youth, difficult upbringing in a violent, racialized community, early guilty plea, remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (lockdowns, triple-bunking).

The court also considered the impact of anti-Black racism on the offender's background.

The judge imposed a global sentence of six years' imprisonment, reduced from an initial inclination of seven years due to the harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

With credit for 735 days (enhanced to 3 years), Mitchell was sentenced to serve a further three years.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime firearms prohibition, a DNA order, and a no-contact order.

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce "gang evidence" (rap videos, social media posts, and expert testimony) to establish motive and party liability, and an intercepted telephone communication as an admission.

The court found the gang evidence's probative value to be tenuous, as the deceased was not a gang member, and its prejudicial effect (moral prejudice, reasoning prejudice, and risk of unconscious bias against young Black men) significantly outweighed any probative value.

Consequently, the gang evidence and related expert testimony were deemed inadmissible.

However, the intercepted communication, despite its ambiguity, was found to have sufficient probative value as a potential admission and limited prejudicial effect, thus rendering it admissible.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on two counts of first degree murder and one count of attempted murder arising from three closely timed shootings in northwest Toronto.

The Crown’s case depended primarily on circumstantial evidence linking the accused to a specific SIM card and phone number through cell site records, surveillance images, post-offence travel under a false identity, and attendance at a funeral of a known participant.

Applying the reasonable doubt standard, the D.W. framework, and Villaroman, the court held that the user of the relevant phone was one of the shooters and that the accused was that user.

The court further held that transferred intent under s. 229(b) supported liability for the death of an accomplice accidentally shot during the planned and deliberate murder of the intended victim.

Guilty verdicts were entered on all three counts.

The defendant, Dwight Dube, was charged with impaired driving and over 80.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) due to excessive force during arrest and improper implementation of the right to counsel.

The court found that police used excessive force, violating section 7 of the Charter, but found no violation of sections 8, 9, or 10(b).

Applying the Grant test, the court excluded the breath sample evidence and police observations of potential impairment, leading to an acquittal on both charges.

The applicants, charged with first degree murder and attempted murder, brought pretrial applications to exclude evidence.

They challenged warrantless police searches (s. 8 Charter), the grounds for their arrest, and alleged excessive force during arrest and transport.

The court dismissed all applications, finding that the applicants lacked standing to challenge the searches of the rental vehicle and condominium premises, that the police had reasonable grounds for arrest, and that the force used during the dynamic takedown and subsequent transport was justified given the high-risk nature of the arrest and the applicants' resistance.

The applicant, charged with two counts of murder, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence extracted from an iPhone seized upon his arrest.

The applicant argued that the search warrant was overly broad, the police ignored its limitations, the affiant misled the issuing justice, and the police failed to file reports to a justice and lost a USB key containing the extracted data.

The court found that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the stolen phone and that the failure to file reports and the loss of the USB key violated his s. 8 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant test, the court concluded that the evidence was highly reliable and crucial to the Crown's case, and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a decision staying sexual offence charges against the respondent for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was under the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the application judge erred by failing to attribute a 42-day period to defence delay when the defence rejected earlier trial dates offered by the Crown.

The Court also found that the application judge erred in his under-the-ceiling analysis by failing to properly consider local circumstances in Brampton, the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Crown's proactive steps to secure earlier dates.

The appeal was allowed, the stay was set aside, and the matter was remitted for trial.

The applicant, one of four individuals charged with first-degree murder, brought applications to sever his trial from his co-accused or, alternatively, to admit a co-accused's post-arrest statement as hearsay.

The applicant, alleged to be the second getaway driver, sought to rely on the co-accused's statement that he was highly intoxicated on the morning of the murder to support defences of lack of intent and abandonment.

The court dismissed the severance application, finding the proposed evidence was largely inadmissible self-serving hearsay and lacked proximity to the offence.

The court also dismissed the hearsay application, concluding the co-accused was a highly unreliable source, the statement contained double hearsay, lacked corroboration, and its admission would be highly prejudicial to the other co-accused.

The accused, an animal rights activist, was charged with breaking and entering a mink farm with intent to commit mischief.

He admitted to trespassing and surreptitiously videotaping the animals to publicize their living conditions, but denied intending to commit mischief.

The Crown argued that the videotaping and subsequent publication of the farmer's personal information constituted mischief.

The court found that the surreptitious videotaping of a commercial property did not interfere with the lawful use of the property and caused no harm to the animals.

The accused was acquitted as the Crown failed to prove the intent to commit mischief.

Ridwan Dalmar, a 20-year-old first offender, was sentenced on two counts of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, one count of possession of a prohibited device, and one count of careless discharge of a firearm.

The Crown sought a 5-6 year sentence, while the defence sought two years.

The court considered the gravity of the offences, the offender's background, and prevailing legal principles, including the social context of the offences and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration conditions.

The judge found the offences grave but acknowledged the offender's moral blameworthiness was influenced by his fear for safety in his community and distrust of police.

The court applied pre-trial custody credits (Summers and Duncan credits) and a 6-month reduction for collateral consequences of serving a sentence during the pandemic.

The final sentence imposed was two years less one day in a reformatory, concurrent for all charges, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and a DNA order.

The accused, Kyle Sparks-MacKinnon, was charged with second-degree murder.

He admitted to fatally shooting the victim but claimed self-defence, asserting the victim pointed a gun at him.

The Crown argued the accused shot the victim while he was in his car, in retaliation for prior incidents.

The court found that while the accused's credibility was questionable on some points, his testimony, supported by other evidence, raised a reasonable doubt regarding whether he faced a threat of force from the victim.

Despite the accused's significant role in instigating the confrontation by brandishing an illegal firearm, the court concluded that his response of using lethal force when facing a threat of death was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

The Crown applied for a review of a second bail judge's decision to release the accused, who was charged with first-degree murder and conspiracy.

The second bail judge had found a material change in circumstances based on new evidence regarding the identity of a purchaser of GPS trackers and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's application, finding that the second bail judge made a palpable and overriding error in assessing the strength of the Crown's case and erred in law by treating the pandemic as an automatic material change without considering it in the context of the first bail judge's findings.

The accused was ordered detained pending trial.

The applicant, charged with second degree murder, applied for a directed verdict of acquittal.

The Crown's case was wholly circumstantial, relying on evidence of animus, opportunity, means, and post-offence conduct.

The court applied the test for a directed verdict, engaging in a limited weighing of the circumstantial evidence to determine if reasonable inferences of guilt could be drawn.

The court concluded that the cumulative evidence could support a reasonable inference that the applicant was the shooter, and dismissed the application.

The applicant sought bail on a charge of first-degree murder, which involved a highly organized, gangland-style execution.

The Crown opposed release on all three grounds: flight risk, danger to the public, and erosion of public confidence.

The court found the applicant's pre-apprehension behavior alarming, the offence grave, the Crown's case compelling, ties to the community minimal, the release plan weak, and a history of non-compliance with court orders.

Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions, the court concluded that detention was necessary on all three grounds, particularly given the brazen nature of the attack and the applicant's role in a sophisticated criminal plot.

The application for bail was dismissed.

The applicant, PETA, sought judicial review of Astral Media's decision to remove its animal rights advertisements from Toronto bus shelters and the City of Toronto's refusal to compel Astral to reinstate them.

Astral had removed the ads following a complaint from Canada Goose, citing its private contract with PETA which allowed removal of unacceptable content.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction because the decisions were private and contractual in nature, not exercises of statutory or public authority subject to public law remedies.

Animal Justice Canada intervened in support of the applicant.

A young person was convicted of manslaughter, aggravated assault, careless use of a firearm, and possession of a firearm without licence or registration following a judge-alone trial.

The appellant appealed the convictions for manslaughter, aggravated assault, and careless use of a firearm, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge rejected the self-defence claim, finding that the appellant fired his gun at retreating attackers and therefore acted unreasonably.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error in finding that the appellant knew his attackers were retreating before he fired the first shot, and that the trial judge failed to properly apply the objective reasonableness standard for self-defence by imposing an unreasonably high burden on the appellant to weigh his response to a nicety within five seconds of being attacked.

The court allowed the appeal and entered acquittals on all three appealed charges.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to various wiretap authorizations, general warrants, and search warrants, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown conceded a s. 8 breach regarding a May 3, 2016 general warrant due to an error in identifying the specific condominium unit.

The court found that the other authorizations and warrants were validly issued and that the police did not act negligently or in bad faith.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from the May 3, 2016 general warrant should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the prosecution.

The application was dismissed.