Lindsay Kromm

This ruling addresses the admissibility of evidence in a first-degree murder trial.

The Crown sought to introduce "gang evidence" (rap videos, social media posts, and expert testimony) to establish motive and party liability, and an intercepted telephone communication as an admission.

The court found the gang evidence's probative value to be tenuous, as the deceased was not a gang member, and its prejudicial effect (moral prejudice, reasoning prejudice, and risk of unconscious bias against young Black men) significantly outweighed any probative value.

Consequently, the gang evidence and related expert testimony were deemed inadmissible.

However, the intercepted communication, despite its ambiguity, was found to have sufficient probative value as a potential admission and limited prejudicial effect, thus rendering it admissible.

Alex Yizhak was found guilty of possession of a prohibited firearm and a BB gun.

The court considered sentencing principles, including denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation, as well as aggravating factors (loaded, prohibited, concealable firearm in a condo) and mitigating factors (no prior record, strong community support, attenuated responsibility due to prior gun violence exposure).

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding it insufficient for denunciation and deterrence and a violation of parity.

A jail sentence of two years less a day, reduced to 20 months with credit for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail, was imposed, along with probation, a s. 109 order, and DNA order.

The applicant, Alex Yizhak, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay after being found guilty of firearms charges, claiming the Jordan ceiling was exceeded by 17 days.

The Ontario Court of Justice dismissed the application for two primary reasons.

First, the application was untimely, as the defence failed to raise concerns or act proactively regarding delay despite knowing the trial's temporal bounds months in advance, which deprived the Crown and Court of opportunities to remedy the delay.

Second, the court found that significant periods of delay were solely attributable to defence conduct, including inefficiency in reviewing disclosure and counsel's unavailability, which far exceeded the 17-day alleged breach.

The judge's medical leave, which caused "verdict deliberation delay," was deemed an exceptional circumstance and not a factor to "bump up" the delay beyond the Jordan ceiling.

The applicant, Alex Yizhak, sought to make inquiries of the presiding judge regarding her health-related leave, which had impacted the deliberative period of his criminal trial.

These inquiries were intended to support a s. 11(b) application for unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the request, finding that the information already provided was sufficient, the questions amounted to an improper cross-examination of the judge, probed into private health information, and resembled a public inquiry beyond the scope of a criminal trial.

The applicant, Alex Yizhak, sought a mistrial alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The judge, after delivering a guilty verdict, disclosed the reason for a five-month delay in judgment (a health-related leave) when the accused indicated a potential s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The applicant argued this unsolicited disclosure, which could favour the Crown in a Jordan analysis, constituted bias by shaping the evidentiary record.

The court dismissed the application, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing the presumption of judicial impartiality and the judge's proactive role in managing proceedings and providing relevant information.

The accused, Jonathan Salazar-Blanco, was charged with conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown alleged he conspired to find and kill Alex Vinogradsky in Costa Rica, motivated by tow-truck business disputes and retaliation for shootings.

The defence argued Salazar-Blanco merely pretended to agree to the scheme without genuine intent.

The court found Salazar-Blanco's police statement largely incredible but concluded that, despite his dishonesty, there was a reasonable doubt as to whether he truly intended to carry out the conspiracy's objective.

The court found no reliable evidence of motive or concrete acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, leading to an acquittal.

The applicant sought an order compelling the Crown to provide electronic disclosure in a searchable and indexed format, arguing that the current disclosure was not meaningful or reasonably accessible, thereby compromising his right to make full answer and defence.

The disclosure, comprising over 300,000 pages, was largely in unsearchable PDF format and poorly organized.

The court found that the Crown had failed to provide meaningful disclosure, violating the applicant's Charter rights.

While declining to order re-disclosure of previously provided documents, the court mandated that all future PDF documents, both type-written and hand-written, must be disclosed in a machine-readable format to ensure reasonable accessibility.

This is a bail hearing concerning 13 newly laid charges against the accused arising from allegations of serious abuse of two minor step-sons.

The charges include multiple counts of assault with weapons, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, threats to cause bodily harm, and assault causing bodily harm.

The accused had been released on bail two weeks prior by Justice Bovard on 26 related charges.

The Crown sought detention on the secondary and tertiary grounds under Section 515(10) of the Criminal Code.

The court found that detention was justified on the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to the serious nature of the charges, the apparent strength of the Crown's case, the vulnerability of the victims, and the pattern of protracted and cruel abuse alleged.

The accused, a transgender woman charged with murder, sought to introduce expert sociological evidence regarding the prevalence of violence against transgender people to support her claim of self-defence.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed evidence lacked logical relevance to the specific facts of the case, was unnecessary as the expected reactions to violence were not outside the normal experience of a jury, and carried a potential for prejudice that significantly outweighed its minimal probative value.

The applicant, charged with second-degree murder, sought to exclude a videotaped statement made to police, alleging a breach of her s. 10(b) Charter right to consult counsel without delay.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) breach due to a police officer's general practice of not facilitating counsel contact at the hospital.

However, the court determined that the subsequent statement was not obtained as a consequence of the breach, as there was a "fresh start" after the applicant consulted duty counsel, and the applicant would have spoken to the police regardless.

Applying the Grant factors, the court concluded that the breach was minor, had no impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in a trial on the merits favored inclusion.

The statement was ruled admissible.

The accused pleaded guilty to possessing a prohibited firearm (Glock 26 pistol) with readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought 21 months incarceration; the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with house arrest and 200 hours of community service, along with a DNA order and a 15-year s. 109 prohibition.

The court found that while the offence was serious and near the "true crime" end of the s. 95 spectrum, exceptional mitigating factors—including the accused's youth (just 18 years old), first-offender status, genuine remorse, cooperation with police, psychological counselling, and family support—justified a community-based sentence that could still achieve denunciation and general deterrence.

The defendant, Robert Shah, pleaded guilty to multiple counts of robbery and assault, including aggravated assault and assault causing bodily harm, against three female victims.

He was also found guilty of sexual assault after a trial.

The sentencing judge considered the severe physical and psychological impact on the victims, the defendant's criminal record involving prior assaults against women, and his apparent lack of insight into his violent and sexually inappropriate conduct.

The court emphasized the paramount importance of general and specific deterrence, denunciation, and public protection.

Despite the defendant's late guilty plea and some pre-trial custody credit for harsh conditions, the court imposed a global sentence at the lower end of the Crown's requested range, recognizing it as the defendant's first federal penitentiary sentence.

The defendant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000 for submitting false expense claims, misusing a corporate MasterCard, and misdirecting vendor refunds over an eight-year period (2004-2012), resulting in losses of $232,566 to her employer.

The Crown sought a 10-month jail sentence with restitution and a DNA databank sample.

The defence argued for a conditional sentence of two years less one day with monthly restitution payments.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day with house arrest, monthly restitution of $1,000 throughout the conditional sentence and three-year probation period, a stand-alone restitution order for the balance, and 200 hours of community service.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple counts of robbery and aggravated assault but proceeded to trial on one count of sexual assault against a female pedestrian.

The accused testified, claiming he was highly intoxicated and denying the sexual elements of the attack, despite having given a police statement claiming no memory of the events.

The trial judge rejected the accused's evidence as entirely unconvincing, applied the W.(D.) framework, and accepted the complainant's evidence that the accused tugged at her pants while demanding she 'get naked or give me money'.

The court found the elements of sexual assault proven beyond a reasonable doubt and entered a conviction.

The accused was convicted by a jury of multiple firearm possession offences and pleaded guilty to simple possession of cocaine.

He was also convicted of possessing a firearm while prohibited following the jury’s findings.

The court considered the sentencing principles in s. 718 of the Criminal Code and emphasized denunciation and deterrence in relation to illegal handgun possession while also weighing the offender’s background, remorse, and prospects for rehabilitation.

The court rejected the Crown’s request for an eight‑year sentence and determined that the appropriate range for a second firearm possession offence without additional aggravating factors was lower than that proposed.

A global sentence of five years and nine months’ imprisonment was imposed, including a consecutive term for breaching a firearms prohibition order, with credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The accused was charged with seventeen offences relating to a loaded firearm, folding knife, and cash seized during a search of his residence.

The Crown conceded that the search warrants were invalid due to the affiant's failure to properly investigate the credibility of untested confidential informants and the heavily redacted informations to obtain warrants that did not disclose reasonable grounds.

The court found a section 8 Charter violation and proceeded to determine whether the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2).

The court found the police conduct was seriously careless and reckless in drafting the informations, including misleading characterizations of the accused as a "Dangerous Offender" and failure to properly investigate the reliability of informants.

Balancing the Grant factors, the court excluded the firearm evidence, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute despite the serious nature of the offences and public interest in prosecuting gun crimes.