Craig Bottomley

The young person pleaded guilty to eight counts of reckless discharge of a firearm and one count of accessory after the fact.

The offences involved a crime spree where the young person and co-accused shot at multiple businesses and a school, and later destroyed evidence related to a homicide.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted a maximum three-year youth sentence but disagreed on credit for presentence custody.

The court imposed the maximum three-year sentence of custody and supervision with no credit for presentence custody, finding that the full term was necessary to hold the young person accountable given his central role in the offences.

The appellant, a young Indigenous man, pleaded guilty to four counts of dangerous driving causing death and was convicted after trial of related drug-driving counts under s. 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code for operating a conveyance while his blood THC concentration was eight times the 5 ng/mL legal limit, causing the deaths of four persons during a high-speed police pursuit.

He appealed conviction, arguing the THC limit was arbitrary and overbroad under s. 7 of the Charter, and appealed his 17-year global sentence as demonstrably unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, holding the THC limit is neither arbitrary nor overbroad: it is rationally connected to Parliament's dual objectives of deterrence and enhanced detection, functions as a reasonable proxy analogous to the blood alcohol regime, and the overbreadth threshold was not met by the narrow class of frequent and chronic users who may exceed the limit after impairment subsides.

On sentence, the court found no error in principle and upheld the 17-year term as justified by an exceptional constellation of aggravating factors including four deaths, two separate high-speed police pursuits, a record of 15 prior driving convictions, and a highly elevated degree of subjective fault, offset but not outweighed by Gladue considerations, youth, remorse, and guilty pleas.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after stabbing and killing his husband.

He proceeded to trial before a judge alone.

The defence argued the accused should be found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, relying on two forensic psychiatrists who opined he was experiencing psychosis at the time of the killing.

The court found the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time but held that the defence had not established on a balance of probabilities that he was incapable of appreciating the moral wrongfulness of his actions, as the expert opinions relied heavily on inadmissible hearsay.

The court further found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused had the requisite intent for murder, finding him guilty of second-degree murder.

The offender pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after losing control of his vehicle at high speed, resulting in serious injuries to his passenger.

The court considered the offender's dated but related criminal record, his general good character, and the severe impact on the victim.

A conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by 12 months of probation and a one-year driving prohibition, was imposed.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of police conduct during the execution of search warrants at his residence and the subsequent search of his cellular phone.

The court found multiple violations of sections 8 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, including: an unreasonable manner of executing the search warrant at the residence; a warrantless search of the cellular phone; execution of a phone search warrant outside its authorized time frame; and failure to provide the accused with his right to counsel immediately upon arrest.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Sentencing for a mid-level trafficker convicted after trial of possessing significant quantities of fentanyl and cocaine for the purposes of trafficking, possessing a loaded prohibited handgun, resisting arrest, and possessing proceeds of crime.

The court held that trafficking fentanyl in a vulnerable Northern Ontario community, near an elementary school, while armed with a loaded concealed handgun, substantially increased both the gravity of the offences and the offender’s moral blameworthiness.

The court applied the Kienapple principle, imposed consecutive sentences for fentanyl trafficking and the firearm offence, and treated Charter breaches, anti-Black racism social context, traumatic childhood history, family separation consequences, and stringent bail and remand conditions as mitigating factors.

A global 12-year sentence was reduced to 10 years under the totality principle, with additional pre-sentence credit.

The court sentenced Jaleem Abdella-Smith for second degree murder, following a jury verdict.

The sentencing reasons review the facts of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, the impact on the victim’s family, and the applicable sentencing principles and ranges.

The court imposed a life sentence with 12 years of parole ineligibility, considering the impulsive nature of the shooting, the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, difficult background, and the particularly harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody.

The decision also addresses the weight of jury recommendations and the importance of denunciation and deterrence in gun violence cases.

This decision addresses three mid-trial applications in a first-degree murder case.

The Crown's application to read in preliminary hearing evidence of an evading witness under s. 715(1) of the Criminal Code was granted, with the court finding that evasion of service constitutes refusal to testify.

The defence's application for a directed verdict on first-degree murder was dismissed, as the court found sufficient circumstantial evidence of planning and deliberation for the jury to consider.

Finally, the defence's application to have self-defence left to the jury was granted, with the court determining there was an air of reality to the defence, even though the accused did not testify, based on the evolving circumstances of a second encounter with the victim.

The accused was arrested for possession of cocaine and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking following surveillance and confidential informant tips.

A search of his vehicle incident to arrest yielded a loaded handgun, ammunition, large quantities of drugs, and cash.

The accused brought a Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the arrest and searches were lawful, but found a breach of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) due to a delay in notifying the accused of his change in jeopardy after the firearm and drugs were found.

Applying the Grant test, the court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2).

On the trial proper, the court found the circumstantial evidence proved the possession offences beyond a reasonable doubt and found the accused guilty of all charges, including resisting arrest.

The defendant, Kelvon Clarke, was charged with possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime not exceeding $5,000.

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment, finding controlled substances and cash.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on video evidence showing Clarke entering the building with a distinctive purple bag, which was later found in the apartment containing the bulk of the drugs.

The court found Clarke guilty, concluding that the only reasonable inference based on the totality of the evidence was his knowledge and control of the drugs, either through physical possession, constructive possession, joint possession, or aiding.

The applicants, Mahmoud Al-Ramahi and Atour Paul, sought a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence under ss. 24(1) and 24(2) of the Charter, alleging improper interception and handling of solicitor-client privileged communications during a wiretap investigation ("Project Siphon").

Al-Ramahi claimed widespread violations of his ss. 7 and 8 Charter rights due to intercepted audio calls and text messages with his lawyers.

Paul joined the application, arguing the overbroad search and "unfair advantage" to police affected him.

The court found that Al-Ramahi failed to prove improper interception or handling of audio calls but succeeded in demonstrating that his privileged text messages were improperly accessed and handled, breaching his ss. 7 and 8 rights.

The court dismissed the request for a stay of proceedings, finding it too drastic, but ordered the exclusion of all of Al-Ramahi's text messages intercepted after May 29, 2020.

Paul's application was dismissed as he did not suffer a breach of his own Charter rights and lacked standing to claim a remedy based on breaches of another's rights.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) rights during the execution of a search warrant at an apartment where he was a found-in.

The police discovered approximately 1.3 kgs of fentanyl in the apartment and smaller quantities of drugs and cash on the applicant.

The applicant alleged police used excessive force by tackling and punching him, and conducted an unreasonable search.

The Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach due to a 30-minute delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court dismissed the other Charter claims, finding the police use of force and manner of detention were reasonable given the dynamic and potentially volatile situation.

The court declined to stay the proceedings or exclude the evidence under s. 24, concluding the physical evidence was not obtained as a result of the s. 10(b) breach and its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The defendant, Trevell Rumbaki, was charged with several firearm offences after an encounter with police officers who targeted him without grounds.

The defendant fled when ordered to return to his vehicle, discarding a loaded handgun in a compost bin during the pursuit.

A subsequent warrantless search of the vehicle led to the discovery of a second loaded handgun.

The court found that the police conduct constituted an arbitrary detention and an unlawful search, violating the defendant's Charter rights.

Applying the framework from R. v. Le, the court excluded both firearms under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first-degree murder and one count of attempted murder, challenged a judicially authorized wiretap warrant, arguing it violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to alleged material omissions and misrepresentations in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

Specifically, he contended that the ITO failed to disclose his home address and house arrest status, which would have provided an innocent explanation for his mobile phone's location near the crime scenes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's address was in fact present in the ITO, albeit not explicitly referenced in the mobile phone section, and that any omission was not deliberate.

The court concluded that even considering the omitted information, the totality of the evidence, particularly the coordinated movement and contact between the applicant's and a co-perpetrator's phones, provided sufficient grounds for the warrant's issuance.

The accused was charged with impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and refusing to provide a breath sample after his vehicle plunged into Lake Ontario, resulting in the death of a passenger.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused was driving.

The court accepted the accused's testimony that he and the deceased had switched seats prior to the accident, raising a reasonable doubt as to identity.

The court also found that the accused's symptoms of impairment were equally consistent with hypothermia, and that the breath demand was not unequivocal.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The accused was driving a sports car at speeds up to 163 km/h in an 80 km/h zone on a highway, shortly after passing two motorcycles.

As he approached an intersection with a green light, a vehicle turned left into his path, resulting in a collision that killed three people and injured two others.

The court found the accused guilty of dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm, concluding his excessive speed near an intersection was a marked departure from the standard of care.

However, the court acquitted him of criminal negligence, finding a reasonable doubt that his conduct amounted to a marked and substantial departure showing wanton or reckless disregard.

The accused applied to exclude evidence of 18 kilograms of cocaine, 7 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, and over $200,000 in cash seized during a drug trafficking investigation.

They alleged multiple Charter violations, including unreasonable search of a condominium parking garage, arbitrary arrest, warrantless entry into a dwelling, and denial of the right to counsel.

The court found that the police did not violate sections 8 or 9 of the Charter, as the accused had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the garage and the police had reasonable grounds for arrest.

However, the court found breaches of section 10(b) due to a failure to hold off questioning and a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute and dismissed the application.

Brady Robertson was sentenced for four counts of dangerous driving causing death, four counts of causing death while having excess THC in his blood, and one count of dangerous driving from an earlier incident.

The Crown sought a 23-year jail sentence, while the defence proposed 7 years.

The court considered aggravating factors including the profound victim impact (four deaths, including three children), the offender's extensive and irresponsible driving record, egregious driving conduct on two separate occasions (including fleeing police and driving with suspended licenses and no insurance), and drug consumption (THC and flubromazolan) while driving.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth (20 years old at the time of offences), lack of an adult criminal record, guilty pleas to some charges, expressed remorse, and harsh pre-trial custody conditions exacerbated by the pandemic.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation, deterrence, proportionality, and parity, and considering Gladue principles due to the offender's Indigenous ancestry, the court imposed a sentence of 17 years imprisonment.

After deducting 34 months for pre-trial custody, the remaining sentence is 14 years and 2 months.

A 34-year driving prohibition and an in-custody DNA order were also imposed.

The court declined to order delayed parole eligibility, finding no demonstrated need for additional punishment beyond the significant penitentiary term.

The accused, Brady Robertson, brought a constitutional challenge against sections 320.14(1)(c) and 320.14(3) of the Criminal Code and section 2 of SOR/2018-148, which establish a per se limit of 5 ng/ml of THC in blood for drivers.

The challenge argued that the per se limit violated section 7 of the Charter by being arbitrary and overbroad, particularly for frequent and chronic cannabis users who might have residual THC levels above the limit without being impaired.

The Crown argued the legislation was a precautionary measure to deter impaired driving.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the legislation's objective was to strengthen impaired driving laws and deter cannabis users from driving when they pose a risk.

The court concluded that the 5 ng/ml per se limit was neither arbitrary nor overbroad, as it was rationally connected to the legislative objectives and did not criminalize harmless conduct in a manner inconsistent with fundamental justice principles.

Seymour Young pleaded guilty to manslaughter while using a firearm.

The offence occurred during a drug transaction where the 15-year-old victim attempted to rob Young with an imitation firearm, leading Young to fatally shoot the victim.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the use of a firearm, involvement in the drug trade, and the victim being a child.

Mitigating factors included an early guilty plea, genuine remorse, no prior criminal record, and a difficult upbringing marked by violence and deprivation.

The court also accounted for the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody due to the COVID-19 pandemic, granting a seven-month reduction to the sentence.

A final sentence of five years' imprisonment was imposed, along with a lifetime firearms prohibition and a mandatory DNA order.