Erinn O’Marra

The accused was charged with sexual assault, sexual touching of a person under sixteen, and breach of probation after engaging in sexual activity with a fourteen-year-old complainant whom he met on a dating application.

The accused raised the defense of honest but mistaken belief regarding the complainant's age, arguing he believed the complainant was eighteen.

The court found that the accused took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age, noting that the complainant lied about his age online, physically appeared older, and verbally confirmed he was eighteen and had a driver's license.

Consequently, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did not take all reasonable steps, and the accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused, S.J., was charged with sexually assaulting his former employee and friend, M., contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The trial was completed in less than a day, with only the complainant and the accused testifying.

The Crown invited the court to acquit, and the court did so, providing reasons.

The court found the accused’s denials unequivocal and unshaken, and even if not accepting the accused’s evidence, found the complainant’s evidence unreliable due to memory gaps and other concerns.

The decision discusses the distinction between credibility and reliability, referencing several appellate authorities.

The court considered whether the defence must bring an application under subsection 278.3(1) of the Criminal Code for production of a Law Enforcement Complaints Agency complaint form completed by the complainant prior to police involvement.

The court ruled that the accused must bring the application, following the technical requirements of the Criminal Code and Supreme Court authority, and set out directions for the process and timelines.

A young person pled guilty to robbery in connection with two bank robberies committed in November 2017.

The Crown sought a custody and supervision order for 12 months followed by two years probation.

Defence counsel sought probation for 12 to 15 months.

The court imposed a deferred custody and supervision order for six months followed by one year probation, along with ancillary orders including a DNA order, weapons prohibition, and forfeiture of the imitation firearm.

The sentencing considered the serious nature of the offences, the implicit threats of violence, the young person's background including trauma and systemic factors, expressions of remorse, lack of prior record, and compliance with bail conditions over 33 months.

The Crown applied to amend the indictment to conform with the evidence by changing the dates on three counts (assault and mischief) against the respondent.

The respondent opposed, arguing prejudice.

The court considered Section 601 of the Criminal Code, noting that time is not an essential element of the offences and no alibi defence was raised.

The court found that the respondent was not prejudiced as the defence theory, based on the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate, was not impacted by the proposed amendments, and cross-examination was not temporally restricted.

The Crown's application was granted.

The offender pleaded guilty to historical indecent assault, sexual interference, and breach of recognizance involving multiple young male victims over several decades.

The court accepted a joint submission, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for adult sexual predators who exploit children.

The offender was sentenced to a global term equivalent to 33.5 months of imprisonment, followed by three years of probation, along with lifetime weapons and section 161 prohibition orders.

A youth charged with multiple counts of sexual assault, sexual interference, and assault involving four complainants.

The court addressed preliminary applications regarding video-recorded statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code and similar fact evidence.

The trial judge found the defendant guilty of three counts of assault (one involving B.B.C., one involving N.C., and one involving M.S.) and one count of sexual assault (involving M.K.).

The defendant was acquitted of all sexual assault and sexual interference charges except for the one sexual assault conviction.

The judgment emphasizes the distinction between credibility and reliability of witness testimony, particularly regarding young witnesses, and addresses concerns about evidence tainting through rumour and collusion.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application arguing the approved screening device demand was not made 'forthwith' due to a short delay while waiting for another officer to bring the device.

The court dismissed the application, finding the delay was objectively reasonable for officer safety.

The court also found the breath tests at the station were conducted 'as soon as practicable' despite minor delays.

The accused was found guilty.

A youth charged with sexual assault (4 counts), sexual interference (3 counts), and assault (1 count) brought an application to stay the charges pursuant to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that the right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b) had been infringed.

The court dismissed the application, finding that although the total delay was just over 13 months, the delay was reasonable when considered holistically in light of the complexity of the case, the inherent time requirements, institutional resource constraints, and the serious nature of the charges.

The court found that institutional delay of approximately 3.5 to 4.5 months was justified given the case complexity, and that up to nine months could have been reasonable in the circumstances.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired care or control of a motor vehicle under s. 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted after finding the accused impaired while seated in the driver’s seat of a vehicle with the engine running, relying on the statutory presumption of care or control.

On appeal, the court held the trial judge failed to analyze whether the presumption of care or control under s. 258(1)(a) had been rebutted by the accused’s evidence that he did not intend to drive.

The trial judge also failed to conduct a proper risk-of-danger analysis required where the Crown seeks to establish actual care or control.

Because the reasons did not reveal the necessary analytical steps, appellate review was impossible and the conviction could not stand.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for impaired driving (care and control) arising from being found asleep in a parked vehicle with the engine running.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to find that the evidence raised a reasonable doubt regarding impairment and failed to adequately explain the rejection of the defence evidence that the behaviour observed by police was caused by fatigue rather than alcohol consumption.

The court held that the trial judge’s credibility findings and factual determinations were supported by the evidence and entitled to significant appellate deference.

The reasons, read as a whole, sufficiently explained the rejection of the defence theory and the application of the W.D. framework.

No error of law, misapprehension of evidence, or miscarriage of justice was established.

The Crown brought two applications to admit similar fact evidence in a prosecution for multiple commercial break and enter offences.

The first application sought admission of the accused’s prior convictions for numerous break and enters committed several years earlier.

The second sought to permit count‑to‑count similar fact reasoning among the charged offences.

The court held that the alleged similarities—such as targeting commercial food premises, nighttime entries, use of dark clothing, and removal of door glass—were generic and did not amount to a distinctive signature or sufficiently striking pattern.

The Crown also failed to establish a sufficient evidentiary link connecting the accused to the charged offences.

Both applications were therefore dismissed.

The accused applied for a declaration that the offence of trafficking a person under 18 under s. 279.011 of the Criminal Code was unconstitutional.

The applicant argued the provision violated s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on the basis that it was overly broad, impermissibly vague, and allowed conviction with insufficient mens rea.

The court held that the statutory requirement that the acts be done “for the purpose of exploiting or facilitating exploitation” imports a high subjective mens rea consistent with the serious stigma and penalties of the offence.

Interpreted purposively, the concepts of exploitation and the reasonable person standard provide sufficient precision and do not create unconstitutional overbreadth or vagueness.

The applicant failed to establish a Charter breach.