S. Smith

The accused, S.J., was charged with sexually assaulting his former employee and friend, M., contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code.

The trial was completed in less than a day, with only the complainant and the accused testifying.

The Crown invited the court to acquit, and the court did so, providing reasons.

The court found the accused’s denials unequivocal and unshaken, and even if not accepting the accused’s evidence, found the complainant’s evidence unreliable due to memory gaps and other concerns.

The decision discusses the distinction between credibility and reliability, referencing several appellate authorities.

This motion concerned an application by the Crown to quash a subpoena issued by the defence to the lead Crown counsel, Monica Gharabaway.

The defence sought to compel Ms. Gharabaway's testimony in an abuse of process motion, alleging improper disclosure of mobile phone data and other evidence.

The court found that the defence failed to demonstrate that Ms. Gharabaway's evidence was material, relevant, or necessary, characterizing the subpoena as a "fishing expedition." The court emphasized the stringent test for compelling opposing counsel to testify and outlined a new procedure for issuing subpoenas to opposing counsel.

The application to quash the subpoena was granted.

The applicant sought directions regarding the testamentary estate of Mary Frances Rae, specifically concerning the beneficial ownership of a property transferred by Mary to the respondent in 2004.

The core issue was whether the property was held on a resulting trust for Mary's estate or passed to the respondent by right of survivorship.

The court found that the respondent successfully rebutted the presumption of resulting trust with clear, convincing, and cogent evidence of Mary's donative intention, concluding that full beneficial ownership passed to the respondent upon Mary's death.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an order to continue the action, as the primary plaintiff was an undischarged bankrupt.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement that had been accepted by the plaintiffs' former counsel.

The plaintiffs argued the settlement should not be enforced because the plaintiff had a 'change of heart' shortly after acceptance and had not calculated his net recovery.

The court granted the order to continue and enforced the settlement, finding that a valid agreement was reached and a mere change of heart did not justify exercising discretion to set it aside.

The plaintiffs requested an adjournment of the defendants' motion to enforce a settlement arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The plaintiffs' new counsel, retained shortly before the hearing, required time to finalize motion materials.

Despite the defendants' objection to the late request, the court granted a brief adjournment to prevent prejudice, ordering the plaintiffs to pay $500 in costs to the defendants.

At a case conference, the court scheduled a timetable for three upcoming motions: the defendants' motion to enforce a settlement, the plaintiff's counsel's motion to be removed as solicitor of record, and a motion for an order to continue given the plaintiff is an undischarged bankrupt.

The court directed that the order to continue be heard first, followed by the removal motion, and finally the motion to enforce the settlement.

The defendants brought a motion to enforce a settlement after the plaintiff's counsel communicated acceptance of an offer to settle, which the plaintiff subsequently rescinded.

The court established a timetable for the motion to enforce the settlement and noted that the plaintiff's counsel intended to bring a motion to be removed as solicitor of record.

The plaintiff moved to amend her statement of claim to include damages for the destruction of her vehicle and associated punitive and aggravated damages.

The defendants opposed, arguing that a punitive damage claim is not stand-alone, there was no independent actionable wrong for property damage, and it would constitute an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that punitive damages are not available for Family Law Act claims in fatal accidents, the property damage claim was statute-barred, and punitive damages require an independent actionable wrong which was absent in this case.

In a jury trial arising from a planned home invasion robbery, the court delivered written reasons for several evidentiary and procedural rulings made during the trial.

The accused sought a mistrial based on the Crown’s opening statement, challenged the admissibility of autopsy photographs and expert textile‑damage evidence, and requested a directed verdict removing first‑degree murder from the jury’s consideration for two accused.

The court dismissed the mistrial application, admitted the photographs and expert evidence, and held that there was sufficient evidence on which a jury could find the relevant accused to have been substantial and integral causes of death under the constructive first‑degree murder provisions of the Criminal Code.

Additional rulings addressed corrective jury instructions, the absence of a required Vetrovec warning for a key civilian witness, and a defence request that the Crown or court call additional witnesses.

The jury ultimately convicted one accused of first‑degree murder and the others of second‑degree murder.

The Crown applied for a ruling that a post‑arrest statement made by an accused during a police interview was voluntary and admissible at trial in a first‑degree murder prosecution.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to alleged physical intimidation, suggestions that the accused needed to speak, implied threats regarding the accused’s girlfriend, and inducements suggesting a robbery admission could avoid a murder charge.

The court reviewed the full interview and applied the voluntariness principles from leading Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence.

It held that the accused had been properly cautioned, had consulted counsel, and chose to speak despite knowing his right to silence.

The court concluded the will of the accused was not overborne and that the statement, except for a later portion conceded by the Crown as induced, was voluntary and admissible.

The Crown charged William Pav and Dylan Violo with assault with a weapon and assault causing bodily harm arising from an incident on College Street in Toronto on January 13, 2013, where the defendants allegedly participated in a swarming attack on Joseph Kau.

A directed verdict was granted on the assault with a weapon charge against Violo.

The trial focused on identification evidence and was corroborated by DNA evidence linking the defendants' clothing and Pav's hands to the victim's blood.

The court found both defendants guilty of assault causing bodily harm but acquitted Pav of assault with a weapon due to insufficient evidence of weapon use.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000 on November 7, 2011, and robbery on December 2, 2011.

At the preliminary hearing, the Crown sought to establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator through a combination of eyewitness testimony identifying distinctive tattoos, surveillance video evidence, officer identification from video stills compared to mug shots, in-dock identification, fingerprint evidence, and circumstantial evidence linking the accused to rental vehicles used in the crimes.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification evidence, particularly the in-dock identification and the chain of custody for surveillance video.

The justice determined that sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to stand trial on both charges.

The offenders were sentenced following a jury trial where Bengy was convicted of second degree murder and Modeste was convicted of manslaughter in relation to the stabbing death of Brandon Ramdeen.

Bengy, who stabbed the unarmed victim while he was overpowered, was sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 11 years.

Modeste, who participated in the group assault but did not stab the victim, was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment, with 49.5 months remaining after credit for pre-trial custody.