W. Dorsey

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including robbery and firearms offences.

The sole issue was the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The principal witness had only a brief, dark observation of the assailants while intoxicated, and her subsequent in-dock identification was tainted by prior conversations and a flawed photo line-up.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by committing the applicant to trial where the identification evidence was so frail and uncertain that it amounted to no evidence at all.

The application was granted and the committal was quashed.

The accused, an HIV and HSV positive individual, was charged with three counts of aggravated sexual assault for non-disclosure of HIV status to three complainants, one count of sexual assault causing bodily harm for allegedly transmitting HSV to one complainant, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The Crown alleged the accused engaged in intimate relationships without disclosing his viral status.

The trial focused on whether non-disclosure vitiated consent and whether there was a realistic possibility of HIV transmission.

The court found that while the accused failed to disclose his HIV status, his undetectable viral load for more than six months negated any realistic possibility of transmission, distinguishing the case from the Supreme Court's decision in Mabior.

The court also found insufficient evidence to prove causation of the HSV infection.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused was charged with impaired driving after police conducted a roadside stop for speeding.

Officers detected an odour of alcohol on the driver's breath and requested an approved screening device (ASD).

Although the officers informed the driver that another officer would attend with an ASD, they did not advise him of his right to counsel or make a formal demand at that time.

A formal ASD demand was made 12 minutes later, which registered a fail.

The driver was arrested and subsequently provided breath samples showing alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The driver applied to exclude the breath test results under sections 8, 10(b), and 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court found no section 8 violation but determined there was a section 10(b) violation warranting exclusion under section 24(2).

The charge was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and over 80 contrary to the Criminal Code.

He brought an application to stay the proceedings based on a violation of his Charter right under s. 11(b) to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court applied the new framework established by the Supreme Court in R. v. Jordan, which sets a presumptive ceiling of 18 months for provincial court trials.

After deducting time for a discrete exceptional circumstance (judicial conflict of interest) and defence delay, the net delay was 15.5 months, falling below the ceiling.

However, the court found that the case had taken markedly longer than it reasonably should have, considering local institutional delay standards and the defence's meaningful efforts to expedite.

The court granted the stay, finding that under the previous Morin framework the case would have been stayed, and the Jordan framework should not transform previously unreasonable delays into reasonable ones in transitional cases.

The offender, a first-time offender, was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a 21-month custodial sentence, while the offender proposed a conditional sentence of 18 months to two years less a day.

The court imposed a 20-month conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender's strong rehabilitation prospects and low risk of reoffending.

The sentence included strict house arrest conditions, a DNA order, and a 10-year weapons prohibition, followed by 12 months of probation.

The accused was charged with "Over 80" (operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood).

The trial addressed two Charter issues: whether the police breached the accused's rights under section 10(b) by failing to provide an interpreter or Polish-speaking officer, and whether the police breached section 8 rights by making an illegal demand for a breath sample into an approved screening device.

The court found no breach of section 10(b) rights, as the accused demonstrated sufficient understanding of English and his rights to counsel.

However, the court found a serious breach of section 8 rights because the officer failed to provide direct evidence of forming a reasonable suspicion that the accused had alcohol in his body while driving, as required by section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The breath test evidence was excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in an acquittal.

The accused, MM, was charged with sexually assaulting his step-daughter, JN, who was 14 years old at the time of the alleged incident.

JN testified that MM massaged her back, unhooked her bra, and massaged her exposed breasts.

MM denied these allegations, stating he never touched JN inappropriately or massaged her.

The court, applying the principles of reasonable doubt, assessed the credibility and reliability of both witnesses.

The judge noted several inconsistencies in JN's testimony between the trial, preliminary inquiry, and police statement, as well as her admitted history of lying to her mother to achieve certain ends.

The timing of JN's disclosure to the police, occurring after her mother's encouragement following the breakdown of her marriage with MM, also raised concerns.

Ultimately, the court found that the Crown had not proven the sexual assault beyond a reasonable doubt, and MM was acquitted.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm contrary to section 267(b) of the Criminal Code for an incident occurring on December 14, 2014, involving his ex-partner.

The Crown alleged multiple punches to the face causing significant injuries requiring surgical intervention.

The defence claimed self-defence, asserting the complainant attacked with a broken beer bottle and held him by the hair.

The trial judge rejected the accused's credibility based on physical disparities between the parties, the severity and distribution of injuries, photographic evidence, and threatening statements made on video prior to the incident.

The court found the complainant's evidence largely credible and consistent with objective evidence.

The accused was convicted.

The appellant appealed summary conviction findings of guilt for impaired operation and refusing to provide a breath sample.

She argued the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds, unlawfully entered her residence in breach of s. 8 of the Charter, improperly detained her contrary to ss. 9 and 10, and that the evidence did not establish impairment or an intentional refusal to provide breath samples.

The appeal court held that the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors in credibility findings or factual conclusions.

The officer’s approach to the residence fell within the implied licence to knock doctrine, reasonable grounds existed to arrest based on civilian observations and indicia of impairment, and the evidence supported findings of impairment and intentional refusal.

The convictions were upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence.

The appellant contended the trial judge gave insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding the officers' reasonable grounds for the breath demand, and erred in the section 24(2) analysis.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officers had reasonable grounds based on the appellant's driving, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg/100 mL and impaired driving following a traffic stop on October 16, 2011.

The Crown's case relied on an approved screening device test, field sobriety tests, and breath samples from an Intoxilyzer showing readings of 210 mg/100 mL.

The defence challenged whether the accused validly waived his right to counsel under the Charter and whether the breath tests were administered as soon as practicable.

The court found that the accused did not validly waive his right to counsel due to his impaired state and lack of full understanding of his rights, but that the police acted lawfully in delaying the breath tests to allow the accused to speak with duty counsel.

The court convicted on the over 80 charge but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to insufficient evidence of impairment.

The accused was charged with theft over $5,000 on November 7, 2011, and robbery on December 2, 2011.

At the preliminary hearing, the Crown sought to establish the accused's identity as the perpetrator through a combination of eyewitness testimony identifying distinctive tattoos, surveillance video evidence, officer identification from video stills compared to mug shots, in-dock identification, fingerprint evidence, and circumstantial evidence linking the accused to rental vehicles used in the crimes.

The defence challenged the reliability of the identification evidence, particularly the in-dock identification and the chain of custody for surveillance video.

The justice determined that sufficient evidence existed to commit the accused to stand trial on both charges.