MacKenzie J.

The moving insurer sought summary judgment dismissing an underinsured motorist claim arising from a Florida motor vehicle accident.

The responding insureds had settled the Florida action for US$300,000 despite the tortfeasor's US$1,000,000 policy limits, and then sought recovery under the OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement.

The court held that the insureds were not entitled to rely on an unsupported assertion of the tortfeasor insurer's potential insolvency where they had not conducted due diligence to determine whether the policy limits were unavailable at the time of settlement.

Applying Rule 20 and the governing underinsurance authorities, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action.

The plaintiff employee brought a motion for a determination of law regarding the enforceability of a termination clause in his fixed-term employment contract, and a motion for summary judgment for damages for wrongful dismissal.

The court found the termination clause to be ambiguous regarding the continuation of benefits and whether the amounts paid were exhaustive, rendering it unenforceable and triggering the common law entitlement to reasonable notice.

However, the court declined to grant summary judgment for the balance of the fixed term, finding that a genuine issue for trial existed regarding the appropriate reasonable notice period and the plaintiff's duty to mitigate.

The court ordered a mini-trial under Rule 20.04(2.2) to hear oral evidence on these issues.

The applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis for three motions, arguing the respondent acted in bad faith and unreasonably by failing to provide financial disclosure and thwarting a settlement conference.

The court rejected the respondent's arguments that his behaviour was reasonable and that costs should be deferred.

Finding the respondent's conduct warranted full recovery, the court awarded the applicant $22,000 in costs, to be paid from the respondent's share of the matrimonial home proceeds.

The plaintiff moved for judgment on an accepted offer to settle, seeking a determination on the applicable prejudgment interest rate.

Shortly before the offer was accepted, an amendment to the Insurance Act came into force, reducing the prejudgment interest rate for non-pecuniary damages.

The plaintiff argued the amendment was substantive and did not apply retroactively, while the defendants argued it was procedural and did apply.

The court held that the amendment to the calculation of prejudgment interest was procedural in nature and therefore applied retroactively, resulting in the lower interest rate being applied to the settlement amount.

Following the quashing of the defendant's appeals, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the defendant's conduct constituted an abuse of process.

The court reviewed the standard for elevated costs and found the defendant's conduct was not reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The court awarded costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $6,000.

The respondent husband sought leave to appeal an interim order requiring him to pay retroactive spousal support of $25,894 per month.

He argued there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order because the motion judge failed to consider the tax implications of retroactive support, which might not be deductible.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the interim nature of the order meant the trial judge retained discretion to adjust the support amount upwards or downwards to address any unfair tax consequences.

The plaintiff brought a motion to dismiss the defendants' appeal from orders setting aside a certificate of stay and directing the enforcement of a writ of possession for a property.

The defendants had failed to pay rent under a lease agreement tied to an uncompleted purchase and sale transaction.

The court found that the orders appealed from were not stayed by the filing of a notice of appeal, as they were not orders under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court also concluded that the appeals were manifestly devoid of merit and quashed them, directing the sheriff to enforce the writ of possession.

The applicants moved for leave to appeal a costs order to the Divisional Court.

The underlying order dismissed a motion to set aside a $1.2 million judgment and awarded substantial indemnity costs against the respondent, but denied the applicants' request for costs payable personally by the respondent's lawyer.

The court held that the costs order against the non-party lawyer was part of the final judgment and could not be severed.

Therefore, the Divisional Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, as appeals of final orders over the monetary limit lie to the Court of Appeal.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal from a Small Claims Court order, the court determined the issue of costs.

The successful respondents sought costs despite their counsel acting on a pro bono basis.

The court rejected the appellant's arguments against awarding costs in pro bono cases, applying Court of Appeal precedent that costs awards are appropriate and necessary for successful pro bono litigants to ensure access to justice.

The court awarded the respondents partial indemnity costs of $2,557.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his Charter application to exclude breath sample evidence.

The appellant contended the trial judge gave insufficient reasons, misapprehended evidence regarding the officers' reasonable grounds for the breath demand, and erred in the section 24(2) analysis.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the officers had reasonable grounds based on the appellant's driving, odour of alcohol, and unsteadiness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent moved to quash the appellant's appeal to the Divisional Court on the basis that the appellant failed to comply with previous court orders requiring financial disclosure and payment of costs.

Applying the three-part test under Family Law Rule 14(23), the court declined to exercise its discretion in favour of the non-complying appellant given her history of non-compliance.

However, recognizing the importance of the core issue on appeal, the court ordered that the appeal would be quashed only if the appellant failed to pay the outstanding costs and provide the required disclosure by specified dates.

The tenant appealed an interim eviction order of the Landlord and Tenant Board, which had severed her rent abatement claims under s. 82 of the Residential Tenancies Act from the landlord's eviction application.

The landlord brought a motion to quash the appeal on the basis that it did not raise a question of law.

The Divisional Court dismissed the tenant's motions to amend her notice of appeal and strike an affidavit.

The court held that the Board did not err in law in its interpretation and application of sections 82 and 83 of the Act.

The landlord's motion to quash the appeal was granted and the stay of eviction was vacated.

The appellant bank appealed from Small Claims Court decisions where the trial judges declined to award contractual interest and pre-proceeding collection expenses on uncontested credit card debt claims.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, holding that pre-proceeding collection expenses calculated as a fixed percentage of the debt constitute a liquidated demand for money.

The Court also held that, absent exceptional circumstances, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest must be awarded at the rate stipulated in the credit card agreement.

The applicant moved to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing his application for judicial review for delay.

The applicant had filed a duty of fair representation complaint against his union two years after his dismissal, which the Ontario Labour Relations Board dismissed for delay.

The applicant then delayed in serving his application for judicial review and adding the Board as a party.

The Divisional Court applied the three-part test from Chiu and found that while the applicant had a bona fide intention to comply, he failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay.

Furthermore, the justice of the case did not require an extension as the Board's decision was not patently unreasonable.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal, which denied her request to designate her property as 'Farm Property Class' for reduced tax rates.

The Tribunal found she failed to meet the minimum gross farm income requirement and did not qualify for an exemption due to an unusual production year.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave, finding that the applicant's grounds of appeal raised factual issues rather than questions of law.

The appellant municipality appealed a Small Claims Court judgment finding it liable in negligence after a branch from a municipally-owned tree fell on the respondent's leased vehicle.

The Divisional Court upheld the finding of liability, concluding the trial judge made no palpable and overriding error in finding the municipality had notice of the hazard.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding damages, reducing the award from $10,000 to $4,314.88, as the costs associated with the respondent's voluntary early termination of the vehicle lease lacked a sufficient nexus to the municipality's negligence.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments for a shopping mall for the 1996 and 1997 taxation years.

The appellant argued the Board erred by failing to use a recent arm's length sale price as the best evidence of market value, and by applying a 'current value' approach rather than a 'market value' approach.

The Divisional Court held that the Board's treatment of the recent sale was a question of mixed fact and law and thus not appealable.

However, the Court found the Board erred in law by applying a 'current value' (unencumbered fee simple) approach, which was introduced by 1997 amendments not applicable to the years in question.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the Board for redetermination based on the correct 'market value' test.