32 total
Pleadings in land claim found to seek only monetary relief, not recovery of Crown lands.
At a trial management conference, an issue arose as to whether the plaintiff's pleadings in an Indigenous land claim action sought the recovery of Crown lands or merely monetary relief for alleged breaches of duty.
The court ruled that determining this issue before trial was necessary.
Analyzing the pleadings, the court found the claim exclusively sought equitable compensation, damages, and accounting, and did not properly plead any present-day interest in or right to recover actual Crown land in the Haldimand Tract.
Appeal and fresh evidence motion dismissed on consent.
The parties settled a civil appeal and an associated motion to produce fresh evidence.
On consent, the Court of Appeal dismissed both proceedings with prejudice and without costs.
As part of the settlement, Ontario undertook not to enforce the $3,000 costs award made below.
The court directed that the order issue on consent in accordance with the settlement terms.
An action against the Crown for failing to resolve an Indigenous land claim was struck.
A self-represented plaintiff sought damages for financial losses allegedly caused by uncertainty regarding his corporation's land ownership due to an unresolved Indigenous land claim by Six Nations against Canada and Ontario.
The defendants brought cross-motions to strike the claim.
The court dismissed the action on multiple grounds: the proceeding was a nullity against Ontario due to failure to provide the mandatory 60-day notice required by the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019; the claim was plainly and obviously statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002; and the plaintiff failed to establish a cognizable cause of action in negligence or breach of fiduciary duty against either defendant.
The court also dismissed the plaintiff's motion to amend the pleadings to add corporate plaintiffs.
The court issued procedural directions for upcoming out-of-court expert examinations and the appointment of a pre-trial judge.
This endorsement from a case conference addressed several procedural issues in a complex litigation involving Indigenous land claims.
The court provided directions regarding preparatory materials for upcoming out-of-court expert examinations, including the appointment of a hybrid commissioner and deadlines for expert report summaries and legal arguments.
The court also addressed a dispute regarding the scope of cross-examination of an expert witness, directing the parties to narrow issues concerning adversity of interest before seeking further judicial determination.
Finally, the court confirmed the appointment of a pre-trial judge and scheduled the next case conference.
The court adjourned a case conference to allow parties to resolve disputes over expert reports and trial length.
This endorsement from a case conference addresses procedural issues in a complex litigation, specifically disputes regarding the admissibility of expert reports and estimates of trial length.
The court noted progress in resolving these issues and scheduled a further case conference to revisit them and receive an update on an expert witness's health.
The court issued procedural directions regarding a pre-trial evidence motion, expert report deadlines, and trial scheduling.
This endorsement from a case conference addresses several procedural issues in a complex litigation.
It sets a timetable for a forthcoming motion by the Attorney General of Canada regarding the taking of evidence from certain witnesses before trial.
The court also noted Ontario's expected late delivery of expert reports, discussed the parties' differing estimates for trial length and scheduled a follow-up conference, and provided guidance on addressing concerns about trial presentation software (CaseLines).
The Court of Appeal affirmed that the Missanabie Cree First Nation's reserve land entitlement under Treaty No. 9 crystallized in 1906.
The Missanabie Cree First Nation appealed a trial decision that determined the "crystallization date" for calculating their Treaty No. 9 reserve land entitlement was 1906, the year they adhered to the Treaty.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly interpreted the Treaty's reserve clause and the common intention of the parties, and properly distinguished other treaty cases.
The court also addressed ancillary issues, admitting fresh evidence of a settlement between Canada and MCFN, lifting a sealing order on the settlement, and dismissing Canada's abuse of process motion to dismiss the appeal against it.
The court issued procedural directions regarding expert evidence scheduling, trial timetables, and trial presentation software.
This endorsement from a case conference addresses several procedural issues in a complex litigation, including the taking of expert evidence before trial, Canada's missed deadline for an expert report, the appointment of pre-trial and trial judges, the use of trial presentation software, and Ontario's Crown immunity defence.
The court scheduled a motion for expert evidence and provided directions for parties to prepare a trial timetable and discuss judicial assistance.
The court ordered Canada to pay $150,000 in interim costs for pre-trial expert examinations but awarded no costs for the motion.
The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion seeking leave to examine three expert witnesses before trial.
The parties largely resolved the motion, leaving the court to adjudicate the quantum of interim costs payable by Canada to the plaintiff (Six Nations of the Grand River Band of Indians) and the costs of the motion.
The court awarded the plaintiff $150,000 in interim costs to indemnify for financial prejudice due to duplicated work and early incurred expenses from the pre-trial examinations.
The court declined to award costs for the motion itself, finding that all parties had compromised their positions and no exceptional circumstances warranted a costs award.
Motion for production of Crown brief in civil action adjourned pending completion of ongoing criminal prosecution.
The plaintiff in a civil defamation action sought an order under Rule 30.10 for the production of the complete and unredacted Crown brief relating to his ongoing criminal prosecution for sexual assault.
The Attorney General opposed the motion, arguing that disclosure could compromise the integrity of the ongoing criminal proceedings and risk witness taint.
The court dismissed the motion, finding that the public interest in protecting the ongoing criminal prosecution outweighed the plaintiff's need for the documents at the early stage of the civil action.
The motion was adjourned sine die until the completion of the criminal proceedings.
Constructive trusts imposed over two properties based on parties' proportional contributions to joint real estate venture.
The plaintiff claimed beneficial ownership of two residential properties legally owned by the defendant, relying on alleged express trust documents or, alternatively, an equitable trust.
The court found the express trust documents were forgeries.
However, based on the parties' joint venture to flip the properties and their respective financial contributions to acquisition, maintenance, and improvements, the court imposed constructive trusts.
The plaintiff was awarded an 81 percent beneficial interest in one property and a 32 percent beneficial interest in the other to remedy unjust enrichment.
An unconditional offer of $10 million is not a like amount to a conditional third-party offer of $15.3 million under a right of first refusal.
This appeal concerned an option agreement granting a right of first refusal for land.
The appellant, 864773 Ontario Inc., purported to exercise its option to purchase the property for $10 million, arguing it was a "like amount" to a third-party offer of $15.3 million, considering alleged development costs.
The application judge found the offer invalid.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal, affirming that the $10 million offer was not a "like amount" to the $15.3 million offer, particularly in the absence of expert evidence to support the claimed adjustments for development costs.
The court also allowed the respondents' cross-appeal to vary the judgment language to facilitate the sale to the third party.
Motion to amend pleadings denied as proposed claims of undue influence and fiduciary breach lacked material facts.
The plaintiff grandmother sued her defendant grandson to recover funds she allegedly loaned him to pay estate debts and repair a home.
She brought a motion to amend her Statement of Claim to add allegations of undue influence, breach of fiduciary duty, and punitive damages, as well as to plead evidence obtained during discovery.
The court dismissed the motion, finding it plain and obvious that the proposed amendments could not succeed because undue influence is not a stand-alone cause of action, the material facts for breach of fiduciary duty were not pleaded, and there was no independent actionable wrong to support punitive damages.
The Court of Appeal upheld a trial judgment awarding a daughter compensation for caregiving and dismissing claims for occupation rent.
The appellants, granddaughters of the deceased Rosa Galvano, appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent, Nellie Galvano (the deceased's daughter), $273,039.54 from the estate for personal care provided to Rosa from December 2007 to February 2012.
The appellants raised three grounds of appeal: (1) that the respondent should pay occupation rent for remaining in the house after the six-month period specified in the will and that such rent should be set off against the care award; (2) that the trial judge erred in allocating all occupancy costs to Rosa's care in the final five years rather than maintaining the prior cost-sharing arrangement; and (3) that the estate was owed unaccounted income of approximately $5,000.
The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's reasoning and discretionary decisions.
The plaintiff's misrepresentation action regarding a family farm transfer was dismissed as statute-barred.
The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff Liliana Siggillino's action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.
The action concerned a dispute over the 2008 transfer of a family farm, where Liliana alleged misrepresentation regarding its value.
The central issue was when Liliana discovered her claim, specifically when she first read a 2008 property valuation report.
The court found Liliana's evidence regarding the discovery date to be contradictory and not credible, preferring her earlier statements and a 2013 letter indicating she read the report in 2008.
The court also found that a reasonable person in her circumstances ought to have known of the claim by July 30, 2008, through reasonable diligence.
Consequently, Liliana's action was dismissed as statute-barred.
Costs denied to successful responding party on anti-SLAPP motion due to statutory presumption.
The plaintiff successfully defeated the defendant's anti-SLAPP motion in a defamation action and subsequently sought costs on a substantial or partial indemnity basis.
The court considered the presumption against costs to a successful responding party under s. 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.
The court declined to award costs, finding no compelling reason to depart from the statutory presumption and noting that awarding costs solely because the impugned comments lacked public interest could deter the use of anti-SLAPP legislation.
Police do not owe a private law duty of care to families of crime victims.
The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision striking out their negligence claim against the Toronto Police Services Board without leave to amend.
The appellants alleged the police owed them a duty of care in investigating a crime affecting their family.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the precedent in Wellington v. Ontario established that police do not owe a private law duty of care to victims of crime and their families in relation to police investigations.
The court rejected the appellants' arguments that their case was distinguishable based on their lack of certain victim remedies or their assistance to police in the investigation.
Anti-SLAPP motion dismissed; defamatory gossip about a real estate agent did not constitute a matter of public interest.
The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.
The plaintiff, a real estate agent, sued the defendant, a community association board member, for allegedly spreading false rumours about her professional conduct and real estate licence.
The court found that while the broader community dispute regarding lot severances was a matter of public interest, the specific defamatory words complained of were mere gossip and personal attacks unrelated to that public interest.
The motion was dismissed.
The court dismissed a plaintiff's motion to convert her individual misrepresentation action into a class proceeding.
The plaintiff, Zheng Lou, brought a two-branched motion: (1) for court approval of a settlement reached with defendant Baomin Yi, and (2) to convert her individual action against London Life Insurance Company into a class action.
The court dismissed the motion for settlement approval, finding no jurisdiction to approve settlements in regular actions.
The court also dismissed the motion to convert the action into a class proceeding, holding that an additional threshold test beyond Rule 26 of the Rules of Civil Procedure must be met for such conversions.
This threshold was not satisfied due to serious limitation period issues, problems with the proposed class definition, common issues, preferable procedure criteria, and the suitability of the plaintiff as a representative.
Summary judgment Motion granted
The plaintiff sought a status hearing under Rule 48.14(5) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to establish a timetable for the action and extend the time to set it down for trial.
The motion was opposed by two defendants, Sulekha Patel and Nikita Patel.
The court applied the two-part test for contested status hearings, requiring the plaintiff to provide an acceptable explanation for delay and demonstrate that the defendants would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.
The court found the plaintiff's explanation, citing corporate financial and organizational difficulties, to be adequate.
It also determined that the opposing defendants had not suffered non-compensable prejudice, partly due to their own inaction during periods of delay.
The motion was granted, and a case conference was ordered to set a timetable for the remaining steps, including a potential summary judgment motion, discoveries, and mediation.
Costs were ordered to be borne by each party.