Meredith E. Jones

The plaintiffs in a medical malpractice action sought leave to amend their Statement of Claim for a fourth time.

The defendant physicians opposed several amendments, arguing they introduced new statute-barred claims for wrongful death and spoliation of evidence, added new allegations based on unpleaded facts, and impermissibly withdrew prior admissions.

The court allowed most of the amendments, finding they merely particularized the existing factual matrix, but struck specific sentences that implicitly advanced a statute-barred wrongful death claim, contained inflammatory language, or pleaded immaterial legal conclusions regarding non-delegable duties.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an incident in November 2021 where he sexually assaulted his roommate despite her prior and explicit rejection of his advances.

The defendant pleaded not guilty and applied for a verdict of not criminally responsible by reason of mental disorder (NCRMD) under section 16 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown conceded that the defendant suffered from a qualifying disease of the mind, but contested whether he was incapable of appreciating the nature and quality of his actions or knowing they were wrong.

The court found that while the defendant suffered from a mental disorder, the evidence was insufficient to establish that he lacked the requisite capacity under section 16, and therefore rejected the NCRMD application.

The defendants, Canada School of Public Service et al., brought a motion to set aside a noting of default entered by the self-represented plaintiff, Elsa Joseph.

The plaintiff argued that a 20-day timeline applied under the Rules of Civil Procedure and that the defendants were in contempt for non-compliance with court orders.

The court found that while the Crown Liability and Proceedings Regulations suggested a 30-day timeline, even assuming a 20-day timeline, the interests of justice favored setting aside the default.

The court found the defendants' delay was extremely short (about three days), their reasons for delay reasonable (seeking to finalize the statement of claim content), and that they showed a continued intention to defend the matter.

The court also ordered the matter to case management, finding it a useful tool for this complex action with a self-represented plaintiff who misunderstood the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay $2,500 in partial indemnity costs due to her unreasonable conduct in noting default and refusing to set it aside.

The plaintiffs brought an action against a child welfare agency following the suicide of a teenager in its care.

After the expiry of the two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act, the plaintiffs sought to add a doctor and a hospital as defendants, arguing that the late discovery of a clinical note constituted special circumstances or fraudulent concealment.

The moving parties brought summary judgment motions to dismiss the action against them as statute-barred.

The court granted the motions, finding no evidence of fraudulent concealment and concluding that the plaintiffs' delay in pursuing the action and seeking to add the parties did not justify extending the limitation period.

The accused, Mr. Breton, brought an application to exclude evidence under section 24(2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, following previous findings of serious section 8 Charter violations by the police.

The court applied the three-part test from R. v. Grant, assessing the seriousness of state conduct, the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, and society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The court found the police conduct to be serious and deliberate, including disingenuous warrant applications, warrantless searches of outbuildings, and oppressive personal searches.

The impact on the accused's privacy and dignity was deemed significant.

While the evidence was reliable and critical to the Crown's case, the court concluded that the strong pull for exclusion from the first two Grant factors outweighed society's interest in admission.

Consequently, all evidence obtained after 9:00 a.m. on December 1, 2009, including property seized under three warrants and derivative evidence, was excluded from the trial.

Miykael Goodridge was found guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and firearm offences.

The court delivered reasons for sentence, considering aggravating factors (loaded firearm, probation, weapons prohibition, limited criminal record, substance nature) and mitigating factors (youth, pre-sentence custody, house arrest, strong parental support, rehabilitative potential, and moral blameworthiness mitigated by systemic anti-Black racism).

Applying the principles from R. v. Morris, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, emphasizing rehabilitation and addressing systemic over-incarceration of Black offenders.

The applicant, charged with various drug and property offences, brought an application to exclude evidence obtained during a search of his rural property.

The police initially obtained a warrant to search for a handgun but subsequently found large amounts of cash and drugs, leading to a second warrant.

The court found the first warrant was overbroad and excised portions allowing searches of outbuildings.

The court also found the police breached the applicant's section 8 Charter rights by unreasonably seizing cash from his person during the initial entry.

Finally, the court ruled the second warrant was invalid due to improper 'adjudicator shopping' by the affiant, rendering the subsequent seizures warrantless.

The section 24(2) analysis was deferred to a later hearing.

The self-represented plaintiffs brought three separate actions against two hospitals, seven physicians, and the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, alleging medical malpractice, falsification of records, breach of privacy, and improper regulatory investigations relating to psychiatric treatment provided between 2004 and 2012.

The defendants brought motions for summary judgment and motions to strike the claims.

The Superior Court of Justice granted the motions and dismissed all three actions.

The court found that the claims against the hospitals and physicians were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the plaintiffs had discovered the claims years before commencing the actions.

The court also held that the hospitals were not vicariously liable for the actions of independent physicians.

The claims against the College were struck because the College owes no private law duty of care to complainants, and the actions constituted an abuse of process by attempting a collateral attack on the statutory complaints and review process.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood-alcohol concentration in excess of the allowable limit.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath readings on Charter grounds, arguing that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the Approved Screening Device demand and Intoxilyzer demand, and that there was a six-minute delay in advising the accused of rights to counsel.

The court found no section 8 Charter violation regarding the breath demands, but found a breach of section 10(b) regarding the delay in providing rights to counsel.

Applying the section 24(2) test, the court admitted the breath readings and found the accused guilty.

The appellants sought to add three health care providers as defendants to a medical malpractice action more than two years after the original injury.

The motion judge dismissed the motion on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge applied the wrong test under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held that the motion judge failed to make proper findings of fact regarding when the appellants knew or ought reasonably to have known of their claims against the proposed defendants.

The court also found that the motion judge erred in treating lack of due diligence as a standalone ground for finding claims statute-barred.

The key distinction was that the claims against the proposed defendants differed from the claim against the original defendant, as they involved allegations that the health care providers failed to take immediate action once cauda equina syndrome was suspected, information that was only revealed during examinations for discovery in 2015.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff Liliana Siggillino's action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action concerned a dispute over the 2008 transfer of a family farm, where Liliana alleged misrepresentation regarding its value.

The central issue was when Liliana discovered her claim, specifically when she first read a 2008 property valuation report.

The court found Liliana's evidence regarding the discovery date to be contradictory and not credible, preferring her earlier statements and a 2013 letter indicating she read the report in 2008.

The court also found that a reasonable person in her circumstances ought to have known of the claim by July 30, 2008, through reasonable diligence.

Consequently, Liliana's action was dismissed as statute-barred.

The Team Lead-Civil in the Toronto Region issued an administrative endorsement assigning Justice P. Cavanagh as the case management judge for the actions and directed that a case conference be held as soon as possible.

The accused was charged with trafficking in cocaine under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence from an undercover operation (Project O'Tamper) targeting a steroid dealer.

The Crown alleged the accused supplied cocaine to the target through a brief, unobserved encounter in a parking lot.

The court found the evidence created strong suspicion but did not prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted due to insufficient evidence directly connecting him to possession or trafficking of cocaine, and the existence of reasonable alternative inferences consistent with innocence.

This costs endorsement followed successful summary judgment motions by the Bachly Defendants, the Township of Oro-Medonte, and the third party W.R. Hodgson, dismissing the plaintiffs' grading claims and the Bachly Defendants' third-party claim against Hodgson.

The court assessed the reasonableness and proportionality of the costs sought by the successful parties against the plaintiffs.

It determined that the plaintiffs were liable for the costs of the Bachly Defendants and the Township, and also for the third party Hodgson's costs, applying principles that allow for third-party costs against an unsuccessful plaintiff when the third-party proceedings were a natural and inevitable consequence of the plaintiff's action.

The court fixed specific amounts for partial indemnity costs for each successful party.

The plaintiffs brought claims for lot grade deficiencies against the defendants (Bachly Investments Inc., 411931 Ontario Ltd. o/a Heights of Moonstone, The Township of Oro-Medonte) and a third party claim was brought by the Bachly Defendants against W.R. Hodgson.

The defendants and third party brought summary judgment motions to dismiss these claims, primarily arguing they were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002, and that there was no evidence of professional negligence against Hodgson.

The court granted the summary judgment motions, finding that the plaintiffs' grading claims were statute-barred as they knew or ought to have known of the issues by summer/fall 2010, and that the plaintiffs failed to provide expert evidence establishing a breach of standard of care or causation against Hodgson.

The court also found that a prior release only covered a specific driveway issue and not the broader grading claims.

The court determined costs for several motions following a previous endorsement.

Filomena Siggillino was ordered to pay costs for an abandoned motion.

Filomena, Teresa Scalamogna, and Lilianna Siggillino were ordered to pay costs for a successful Vesting Order motion brought by 2377544 Ontario Inc. and an unsuccessful Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) motion brought by Filomena.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, rejecting the request for substantial indemnity, and adjusted the claimed amounts based on the complexity of the proceedings, the results achieved, and the clarity of the costs submissions.

This endorsement addresses two motions within related legal proceedings concerning a "family feud" over a property.

Robert Di Toro, on behalf of 2377544 Ontario Inc., sought a vesting order to facilitate the sale of a property, with $1,500,000.00 to be paid into court as previously ordered by Master Short.

Filomena Siggillino, the mother of the other parties, brought a cross-motion for leave to register her own Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the property, alleging fraudulent misuse of a Power of Attorney by her daughters, Teresa Scalamogna and Lilianna Siggillino.

The court dismissed Filomena's cross-motion for a CPL, finding no tenable cause of action against Robert/2377544 Ontario Inc. and that damages would be an appropriate remedy.

The court also noted the disingenuous position of Teresa and Lilianna in supporting their mother's motion, which undermined their own prior claims, constituting an abuse of process.

Consequently, the court granted the vesting order sought by 2377544 Ontario Inc., allowing the property sale to proceed with the specified funds paid into court.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine.

The court considered a joint submission on sentencing, which included a further two years less one day incarceration (resulting in an effective five-year sentence with pre-trial custody credit), a ten-year firearms prohibition, and a DNA order.

The primary dispute was the Crown's application for a fine in lieu of forfeiture under s. 462.37 of the Criminal Code, for the $64,850 received by the accused from an agent in four drug transactions.

The defence argued the fine should be less, as the accused was merely brokering and did not retain the full amount.

The court, relying on the broad definition of "property" in s. 2 of the Criminal Code and Supreme Court jurisprudence, ruled that possession and control of the money, even if transferred to a supplier, was sufficient to impose the full fine.

A fine of $64,850 was imposed, with five years to pay.

The appellant brought a motion to set aside an order quashing his appeal to the Divisional Court for want of jurisdiction.

The underlying action claimed $15 million in damages, which exceeds the $50,000 monetary limit for appeals to the Divisional Court under the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant argued the appeal should have been transferred to the Court of Appeal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, noting the appellant had not sought a transfer in his materials and had proceeded in the Divisional Court despite being alerted to the jurisdictional issue.

The appellants appealed the summary dismissal of their medical malpractice action.

The motion judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the appellants failed to rebut the presumption of discoverability under s. 5(2).

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge failed to consider receipts for medical records that suggested a later discovery date.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pleadings are not evidence and the receipts alone, without an explanation linking the records to the discovery of the claim, were insufficient to overcome the statutory presumption.