Michael Spratt

The applicant brought an application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel room, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police had relied on information from an anonymous caller, two confidential informants, and surveillance observations to obtain the warrant.

The court applied the Debot criteria and found the informant information to be compelling, credible, and corroborated.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant and dismissed the application to exclude the evidence.

The accused, Garrett Beal, was convicted of sexual assault against an intoxicated woman in her home.

This decision concerns the appropriate sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the victim's intoxication, the assault occurring in her home with her child present, the intrusive nature of the assault, and the physical injury sustained.

Mitigating factors included the accused's lack of criminal record, good character, strong support system, and employment prospects.

The court rejected a conditional sentence as disproportionate and too lenient, and also rejected the Crown's request for a 3.5-4 year penitentiary sentence as too harsh.

The court imposed a sentence of 24 months in the penitentiary, followed by three years probation, a ten-year firearms prohibition, and a twenty-year Sex Offender Information Act order.

E.T., a young person, faced charges of robbery, possession of a weapon, disguise with intent, and possession of a stolen vehicle.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on a general resemblance of E.T. to one of the robbers, E.T.'s possession of a similar jacket seven days after the robbery, and his presence in the victim's stolen vehicle.

The court applied the principles of circumstantial evidence from R. v. Villaroman, emphasizing that an inference of guilt must be the only reasonable inference, not merely a probable one.

The court found that while E.T.'s guilt was more likely than not, the identification evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the robbery-related charges.

Similarly, for the possession of stolen vehicle charge, there was no evidence that E.T. had control over the vehicle or knowledge that it was stolen.

All charges were dismissed.

Miykael Goodridge was found guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and firearm offences.

The court delivered reasons for sentence, considering aggravating factors (loaded firearm, probation, weapons prohibition, limited criminal record, substance nature) and mitigating factors (youth, pre-sentence custody, house arrest, strong parental support, rehabilitative potential, and moral blameworthiness mitigated by systemic anti-Black racism).

Applying the principles from R. v. Morris, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, emphasizing rehabilitation and addressing systemic over-incarceration of Black offenders.

The Crown sought to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused to police during a neighbourhood canvass and a subsequent interview at the police station.

The accused argued she was a suspect at the time of the interview and should have been cautioned.

The court found that, viewed objectively, the police did not have sufficient information to regard the accused as a suspect at that early stage of the investigation.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of threats, promises, or oppression, the court ruled the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a murder trial where the Crown alleged the two accused killed the victim (the wife of one of the accused) to continue their affair, the Crown sought to introduce discreditable conduct evidence and hearsay statements of the deceased.

The court admitted statements made by the accused to a psychic regarding their hatred for the victim, finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect in a judge-alone trial.

The court also admitted the deceased's hearsay statements to a friend that she would not divorce, under the present state of mind exception, but excluded other statements regarding financial control and taking the children due to threshold reliability concerns.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the accused sought to introduce evidence of his co-accused's prior discreditable conduct involving knife attacks against her former spouse.

The accused argued this evidence supported his defence that the co-accused acted alone.

The co-accused opposed the admission, arguing it was highly prejudicial.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it sufficiently probative to the accused's right to make full answer and defence, and held that any prejudice to the co-accused could be mitigated by a limiting instruction in a judge-alone trial.

The accused, Bhupinderpal Gill and Gurpreet Ronald, were jointly charged with the first degree murder of Jagtar Gill, the wife of Bhupinderpal Gill.

The Crown alleged that the accused, who were engaged in an extramarital affair, planned and executed the murder so they could be together.

Jagtar Gill was found bludgeoned and stabbed to death in her home while recovering from hernia surgery.

The court found that Gurpreet Ronald entered the home and carried out the physical killing, while Bhupinderpal Gill aided in the murder by planning it, preparing the murder weapon, ensuring the victim was alone, and subsequently disposing of incriminating evidence.

Both accused were found guilty of first degree murder.

The accused was convicted of possession of fentanyl and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At the time of the offences, the accused was on full parole for prior drug trafficking convictions.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence sought 7 years.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the accused's criminal record and parole status against mitigating factors, including strong family support, rehabilitative efforts, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment, less 777 days of pre-sentence custody credit.

The three offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unconstitutional post-verdict delay.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the delay fell below the 5-month presumptive ceiling established in Charley after deducting defence delay and the discrete event of a constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the court found the mandatory minimum under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code had been struck down and was inapplicable.

Saberi and Montgiraud, both youthful first offenders with lower moral blameworthiness, received conditional sentences of 20 months.

Bruce, who facilitated three separate transactions and possessed drugs for trafficking, received a custodial sentence of 22 months.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault following a road rage incident on Ogilvie Road in Ottawa.

The defendant cut off the complainant's vehicle, stopped abruptly, and exited her car to confront the complainant.

After an aggressive verbal altercation, the defendant pushed the complainant, causing her to fall to the roadway and sustain serious injuries including a fractured pelvis and broken pubic bone.

The defendant argued the charge should be dismissed on grounds that her action was reflexive rather than voluntary, or alternatively that she acted in self-defence.

The court found the defendant's actions were voluntary and rejected the self-defence claim, finding the force used was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault.

The accused, JS, was found guilty of eight offences, including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against his common-law partner, AG, and her dog.

The offences included two distinct sexual assaults, one involving a knife and threats of death.

The court considered mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record, pro-social history, and attempts at anger management, alongside aggravating factors including abuse of a common-law partner, the domestic setting of the crimes, forced vaginal intercourse, and use of a weapon.

The victim suffered significant psychological harm.

The court imposed a total sentence of five years and thirty days imprisonment, to be served partly concurrently and partly consecutively, rejecting the defence's request for a stay on the Kienapple principle for the second sexual assault.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, and a non-communication order with the victim.

The accused sought a ruling that his Charter rights were breached due to his arrest and detention exceeding 24 hours, and requested a stay of charges.

The court found that the police officer's decision to detain the accused overnight, resulting in a 25.5-hour detention before a show cause hearing, constituted a prima facie breach of sections 7, 9, and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings, balancing the seriousness of the breach against the gravity of the charges and the administration of justice, noting that the accused was released on bail the next morning.

The court admonished the police for the unreasonable detention.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences, sought leave under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to use the complainant's hospital records during cross-examination.

The records, which were disclosed by the Crown, contained statements made by the complainant to a social worker and physician that were inconsistent with her subsequent police statement.

The court weighed the factors under s. 278.92(3) and found that the accused's right to make full answer and defence outweighed the complainant's privacy interests.

The court granted the application, allowing the accused to use the records to prove prior inconsistent statements.

The accused, JS, was charged with eight counts including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against the complainant, AG.

The defence conceded guilt on six counts but disputed the sexual assault charges.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both AG and JS's testimonies, along with corroborating physical and witness evidence.

The court rejected JS's version of events regarding the sexual activity, finding AG's testimony credible and corroborated.

The defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent was also rejected.

JS was found guilty on all eight counts.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning the first-degree murder of Dady Junior Jean on November 4, 2015.

Four defendants were charged: Dominique P. Chrétien, Johnnie-Dean Locey-Derochie, Candy L. Locey, and Todd S. Turner.

The Crown sought committal of all four on first-degree murder.

The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to commit each defendant to trial on first-degree murder, considering the elements of planning and deliberation.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including motive, opportunity, communications, procurement of a firearm, and coordinated actions, supported reasonable inferences that all four defendants knew of and participated in a planned and deliberate murder.

All four defendants were committed to trial on first-degree murder.

The accused was charged with sexual offences against two complainants, with allegations spanning 1980-1981.

The Crown proceeded with a joint trial on all counts.

The accused applied for severance of the counts by complainant.

The court granted the severance application, finding that the benefits to the administration of justice in trying the counts together were minimal and that the cumulative effect of relevant factors, particularly the possibility of the accused testifying on one set of counts but not the other, and the uncertain merit of a similar fact evidence application, favoured separate trials.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an interaction with the complainant after a church service.

The complainant alleged the accused attacked her, choked her, and sexually assaulted her outside the church.

The accused testified that the interaction was consensual and related to faith healing, denying any sexual contact.

The court applied the W.(D.) test for credibility and found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including contradictions with video surveillance and prior testimony.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The offender was convicted of conspiracy to commit fraud and fraud after impersonating a bank customer and directing a financial institution to transfer $497,000 from the victim’s account to another account.

The scheme involved obtaining confidential banking information from a co‑conspirator and using it to take over the victim’s account.

The court considered significant aggravating factors including the large amount involved, planning and organization of the offence, commission of the offence while on release for a similar charge, and the offender’s prior fraud convictions.

Although the funds were ultimately recovered and the offender had family and health circumstances, denunciation and deterrence were emphasized.

A penitentiary sentence within the three‑to‑five‑year range for serious bank fraud was imposed.