Michael Spratt

The offender, a lawyer, pleaded guilty to mischief for defacing the National Holocaust Monument with red paint and the words 'FEED ME' to protest the war in Gaza.

The Crown argued the offence was motivated by hate, but the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of a hateful motive, finding instead that the offender acted despite knowing his actions would cause fear and trauma to the Jewish community.

The court considered the offender's first-time status, mental health issues, and the severe collateral consequences to his career, balancing these against the significant harm caused and the need for denunciation.

The offender was sentenced to 5 months in custody (credited as time served) and 24 months of probation.

The accused, previously found not criminally responsible for assault and criminal harassment, appeared before the Ontario Review Board for an annual hearing.

The hospital and Crown submitted that the accused continues to pose a significant threat to public safety, which the Board accepted.

The hospital requested a transfer to the Royal Ottawa Hospital to allow the accused to be closer to her oncologist for breast cancer treatment.

The Board approved the transfer, maintaining the current disposition conditions.

The applicant brought an application to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a hotel room, arguing a violation of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The police had relied on information from an anonymous caller, two confidential informants, and surveillance observations to obtain the warrant.

The court applied the Debot criteria and found the informant information to be compelling, credible, and corroborated.

The court concluded that the issuing justice had sufficient reasonable and probable grounds to issue the warrant and dismissed the application to exclude the evidence.

Sentencing following convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from a teacher's sexual abuse of a 14-year-old student during after-class meetings.

Applying the principles in s. 718, s. 718.01, and the Supreme Court's direction in Friesen, the court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, the inherently violent nature of sexual offences against children, the complainant's vulnerability, the offender's grooming behaviour, breach of trust, and the lasting psychological harm caused.

The court rejected reliance on pre-Friesen sentencing authorities that minimized non-penetrative abuse and found that a community-based sentence or one-year custodial term would be unfit.

A total sentence of 18 months' imprisonment followed by three years' probation was imposed, together with ancillary protective orders and conditional stays on the remaining counts.

The accused, Garrett Beal, was convicted of sexual assault against an intoxicated woman in her home.

This decision concerns the appropriate sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors such as the victim's intoxication, the assault occurring in her home with her child present, the intrusive nature of the assault, and the physical injury sustained.

Mitigating factors included the accused's lack of criminal record, good character, strong support system, and employment prospects.

The court rejected a conditional sentence as disproportionate and too lenient, and also rejected the Crown's request for a 3.5-4 year penitentiary sentence as too harsh.

The court imposed a sentence of 24 months in the penitentiary, followed by three years probation, a ten-year firearms prohibition, and a twenty-year Sex Offender Information Act order.

E.T., a young person, faced charges of robbery, possession of a weapon, disguise with intent, and possession of a stolen vehicle.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on a general resemblance of E.T. to one of the robbers, E.T.'s possession of a similar jacket seven days after the robbery, and his presence in the victim's stolen vehicle.

The court applied the principles of circumstantial evidence from R. v. Villaroman, emphasizing that an inference of guilt must be the only reasonable inference, not merely a probable one.

The court found that while E.T.'s guilt was more likely than not, the identification evidence was insufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for the robbery-related charges.

Similarly, for the possession of stolen vehicle charge, there was no evidence that E.T. had control over the vehicle or knowledge that it was stolen.

All charges were dismissed.

Miykael Goodridge was found guilty of trafficking crack cocaine and firearm offences.

The court delivered reasons for sentence, considering aggravating factors (loaded firearm, probation, weapons prohibition, limited criminal record, substance nature) and mitigating factors (youth, pre-sentence custody, house arrest, strong parental support, rehabilitative potential, and moral blameworthiness mitigated by systemic anti-Black racism).

Applying the principles from R. v. Morris, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation, emphasizing rehabilitation and addressing systemic over-incarceration of Black offenders.

The Crown sought to establish the voluntariness of statements made by the accused to police during a neighbourhood canvass and a subsequent interview at the police station.

The accused argued she was a suspect at the time of the interview and should have been cautioned.

The court found that, viewed objectively, the police did not have sufficient information to regard the accused as a suspect at that early stage of the investigation.

Considering the totality of the circumstances, including the lack of threats, promises, or oppression, the court ruled the statements were voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt.

In a murder trial where the Crown alleged the two accused killed the victim (the wife of one of the accused) to continue their affair, the Crown sought to introduce discreditable conduct evidence and hearsay statements of the deceased.

The court admitted statements made by the accused to a psychic regarding their hatred for the victim, finding the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect in a judge-alone trial.

The court also admitted the deceased's hearsay statements to a friend that she would not divorce, under the present state of mind exception, but excluded other statements regarding financial control and taking the children due to threshold reliability concerns.

During a joint trial for first-degree murder, the accused sought to introduce evidence of his co-accused's prior discreditable conduct involving knife attacks against her former spouse.

The accused argued this evidence supported his defence that the co-accused acted alone.

The co-accused opposed the admission, arguing it was highly prejudicial.

The court admitted the evidence, finding it sufficiently probative to the accused's right to make full answer and defence, and held that any prejudice to the co-accused could be mitigated by a limiting instruction in a judge-alone trial.

The accused, Bhupinderpal Gill and Gurpreet Ronald, were jointly charged with the first degree murder of Jagtar Gill, the wife of Bhupinderpal Gill.

The Crown alleged that the accused, who were engaged in an extramarital affair, planned and executed the murder so they could be together.

Jagtar Gill was found bludgeoned and stabbed to death in her home while recovering from hernia surgery.

The court found that Gurpreet Ronald entered the home and carried out the physical killing, while Bhupinderpal Gill aided in the murder by planning it, preparing the murder weapon, ensuring the victim was alone, and subsequently disposing of incriminating evidence.

Both accused were found guilty of first degree murder.

The accused was convicted of possession of fentanyl and crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime.

At the time of the offences, the accused was on full parole for prior drug trafficking convictions.

The Crown sought a 10-year sentence, while the defence sought 7 years.

The court weighed the aggravating factors of the accused's criminal record and parole status against mitigating factors, including strong family support, rehabilitative efforts, and the harsh conditions of pre-sentence custody during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused was sentenced to 7 years' imprisonment, less 777 days of pre-sentence custody credit.

The accused was convicted of eight offences including aggravated assault, possession of a prohibited weapon while prohibited, possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000, failing to comply with probation, uttering death threats to police officers, and resisting arrest.

The accused was acquitted of attempted murder.

The sentencing decision addresses the appropriate sentence for shooting a friend in the chest during an argument over music, resulting in non-permanent injuries.

The court imposed a global sentence of 6.5 years for aggravated assault, reduced to 5.5 years to account for totality principles and a consecutive sentence on the weapons charge.

The court considered mitigating factors including the accused's youth, limited violent record, and family support, as well as aggravating factors including the serious nature of the offence, criminal record, drug trafficking, and lack of remorse.

The decision also addresses the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on sentencing.

The three offenders were convicted of firearms trafficking and related offences.

Prior to sentencing, they applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unconstitutional post-verdict delay.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the delay fell below the 5-month presumptive ceiling established in Charley after deducting defence delay and the discrete event of a constitutional challenge.

On sentencing, the court found the mandatory minimum under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code had been struck down and was inapplicable.

Saberi and Montgiraud, both youthful first offenders with lower moral blameworthiness, received conditional sentences of 20 months.

Bruce, who facilitated three separate transactions and possessed drugs for trafficking, received a custodial sentence of 22 months.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault following a road rage incident in which she pushed a 66-year-old victim, causing the victim to fall to the roadway and sustain a fractured pelvis and broken pubic bone.

The victim required hospitalization and convalescence, and suffered significant ongoing physical and emotional injuries.

The defendant was sentenced to six months in custody followed by two years' probation with mandatory counselling, a DNA order, a ten-year weapons prohibition, and a no-contact order with the victim.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and attempting to choke the complainant to enable the assault arising from a sexual encounter after both parties had been drinking.

The trial judge identified consent and the alleged choking as the central issues and applied the criminal burden of proof together with the W.(D.) framework for competing accounts.

The court found significant reliability concerns and material inconsistencies in the complainant’s evidence, including contradictions with prior testimony and other witnesses on matters central to the alleged offences.

Concluding it was unsafe to convict on that evidence and that the Crown had not proved either non-consent or the choking allegation beyond a reasonable doubt, the court entered acquittals on both counts.

During a sentencing hearing for three offenders convicted of firearms offences, the Crown argued the court should conduct a fresh constitutional analysis of the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code, despite previous Superior Court decisions declaring it unconstitutional.

The court held that, following the Supreme Court's decision in Ferguson, a declaration of invalidity under s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act effectively removes the provision from the statute books.

Therefore, the previous declarations of invalidity are binding on courts of coordinate jurisdiction, and the mandatory minimum sentence is of no force and effect.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault following a road rage incident on Ogilvie Road in Ottawa.

The defendant cut off the complainant's vehicle, stopped abruptly, and exited her car to confront the complainant.

After an aggressive verbal altercation, the defendant pushed the complainant, causing her to fall to the roadway and sustain serious injuries including a fractured pelvis and broken pubic bone.

The defendant argued the charge should be dismissed on grounds that her action was reflexive rather than voluntary, or alternatively that she acted in self-defence.

The court found the defendant's actions were voluntary and rejected the self-defence claim, finding the force used was not reasonable in the circumstances.

The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault.

The accused, JS, was found guilty of eight offences, including assault, sexual assault, assault with a weapon, and uttering threats against his common-law partner, AG, and her dog.

The offences included two distinct sexual assaults, one involving a knife and threats of death.

The court considered mitigating factors such as no prior criminal record, pro-social history, and attempts at anger management, alongside aggravating factors including abuse of a common-law partner, the domestic setting of the crimes, forced vaginal intercourse, and use of a weapon.

The victim suffered significant psychological harm.

The court imposed a total sentence of five years and thirty days imprisonment, to be served partly concurrently and partly consecutively, rejecting the defence's request for a stay on the Kienapple principle for the second sexual assault.

Ancillary orders included a mandatory DNA order, a lifetime weapons prohibition, lifetime registration under the Sex Offender Information Registration Act, and a non-communication order with the victim.

The accused sought a ruling that his Charter rights were breached due to his arrest and detention exceeding 24 hours, and requested a stay of charges.

The court found that the police officer's decision to detain the accused overnight, resulting in a 25.5-hour detention before a show cause hearing, constituted a prima facie breach of sections 7, 9, and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings, balancing the seriousness of the breach against the gravity of the charges and the administration of justice, noting that the accused was released on bail the next morning.

The court admonished the police for the unreasonable detention.