Anya Kortenaar

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm knowing its possession is unauthorized and possession of a firearm contrary to a prohibition order.

The offences involved the offender handling a restricted handgun in a commercial office while subject to two prior lifetime weapons prohibitions.

The Crown sought a total sentence of 3 years less pre-sentence custody, while the defence sought an 18-month conditional sentence.

The court found the offences fell within the true crime end of the spectrum, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence given the offender's recidivism and disregard for court orders.

The court imposed a sentence of 2 years for the unauthorized possession and a consecutive 6 months for the breach of the prohibition order, less 3 months credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 2 years and 3 months remaining to serve.

The accused pleaded guilty to obtaining a material benefit from the sale of sexual services contrary to section 286.2 of the Criminal Code.

Between April 8 and August 16, 2022, the accused facilitated and profited from the complainant's sale of sexual services through advertising, managing communications with clients, booking hotel rooms, and transporting the complainant across multiple cities.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less one day followed by 18 months of probation, finding that while denunciation and deterrence are paramount sentencing objectives for sexual commodification offences, the circumstances of this case—involving a single adult victim, no violence or coercion, and the accused's rehabilitation efforts—warranted a community-based sentence rather than incarceration.

The decision addresses whether the complainant D.P. may give recognition evidence identifying S.P. and Geza Gelencser in videos found on a laptop seized from Mr. Gelencser’s home.

The court finds that D.P. is in a better position than the jury to identify S.P. and Mr. Gelencser based on her prior acquaintance and specific knowledge, and admits the evidence.

The Crown brought an application under s. 714.2 of the Criminal Code to allow the complainant in a human trafficking case to testify by videoconference from Thailand.

The accused opposed the application, arguing that the complainant's acute credibility and substance abuse issues required in-person testimony to satisfy the principles of fundamental justice.

The court granted the application, finding that the credibility issues were not so acute as to preclude remote testimony, and imposed conditions to safeguard the accused's fair trial rights, including restricted hours and the presence of a Thai judicial officer.

The defendant, a high school mathematics teacher, was convicted of two counts of sexual assault against two 15-year-old female students, involving inappropriate touching.

The Crown sought 12 months incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors including the breach of trust by a teacher, the victims' vulnerability, and the ongoing negative impact on the victims.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's loss of employment and emotional suffering.

The court also considered the defendant's prior assault conviction in 2009, which indicated a pattern of inappropriate touching.

The court found the mandatory minimum sentence of one year imprisonment under s. 271(a) of the Criminal Code to be constitutionally invalid under s. 12 of the Charter in this case.

The defendant was sentenced to two months intermittent incarceration, followed by two years of probation, a DNA order, lifetime SOIRA registration, and ten-year weapons and s. 161 prohibitions.

Crown counsel, on behalf of Complainant C.G., applied for an order lifting a mandatory publication ban under s. 486.4 of the Criminal Code, which had been imposed in incest proceedings.

C.G. wished to publicize her story to encourage other victims and aid her healing.

The other complainant, H.B., did not consent to lifting the ban, and the Accused, T.S.H., opposed it due to concerns about youth criminal justice information.

The court acknowledged its jurisdiction to revoke the ban given C.G.'s consent, but ultimately refused the application, prioritizing H.B.'s privacy interests and the criminal justice system's assurance of victim identity protection.

The court suggested alternative ways for C.G. to tell her story without revealing her identity.

Following convictions for historical incest involving non-consensual sexual intercourse with two younger sisters, the court imposed a penitentiary sentence.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence remained the primary sentencing objectives despite the passage of time, while treating the offender's age, medical frailty, lack of recent offending, and limited record as mitigating factors.

A conditional sentence was rejected as inadequate given the abuse of trust, the victims' vulnerability, the repeated conduct, and the profound long-term harm described in the victim impact material.

A total sentence of three years' incarceration was imposed, together with pre-sentence custody credit and ancillary DNA, weapons prohibition, and no-contact orders.

In a judge-alone criminal trial involving allegations that a high school teacher touched three 15-year-old students in intimate areas during math instruction, the Crown sought count-to-count admission of similar fact evidence.

Applying the similar fact framework, the court held the allegations of two complainants were sufficiently similar, independent, and probative on actus reus, intentional touching, and sexual context to outweigh prejudice, but excluded the third complainant's evidence from similar fact use because of reliability concerns.

On the merits, the court found the thigh touching of one complainant and the thigh and breast touching of another were intentional and objectively sexual, supporting convictions for sexual assault under s. 271.

The court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching was for a sexual purpose under s. 151, and entered acquittals on the sexual interference counts.

The counts relating to the third complainant were dismissed because reliability concerns created a reasonable doubt.

The accused sought a ruling that his Charter rights were breached due to his arrest and detention exceeding 24 hours, and requested a stay of charges.

The court found that the police officer's decision to detain the accused overnight, resulting in a 25.5-hour detention before a show cause hearing, constituted a prima facie breach of sections 7, 9, and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

However, the court dismissed the application for a stay of proceedings, balancing the seriousness of the breach against the gravity of the charges and the administration of justice, noting that the accused was released on bail the next morning.

The court admonished the police for the unreasonable detention.

The accused, charged with sexual assault and other offences, sought leave under s. 278.92 of the Criminal Code to use the complainant's hospital records during cross-examination.

The records, which were disclosed by the Crown, contained statements made by the complainant to a social worker and physician that were inconsistent with her subsequent police statement.

The court weighed the factors under s. 278.92(3) and found that the accused's right to make full answer and defence outweighed the complainant's privacy interests.

The court granted the application, allowing the accused to use the records to prove prior inconsistent statements.

The accused was charged with criminal harassment and disobeying a court order following a prolonged period of stalking and harassing his ex-wife and her new partner.

The accused repeatedly breached a family court restraining order by attending the ex-wife's residence, leaving items on her partner's car, and sending inappropriate communications.

The court rejected the accused's arguments that he lacked the requisite mens rea and that his actions were justified by a desire to protect his daughter.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding his motivations to be a pretext for his harassing behaviour.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

Following a judge-alone criminal trial, the court convicted the accused on three counts of historic incest involving two complainants who were his sisters.

The court admitted evidence of prior discreditable conduct from the accused's youth as relevant to context, motive, power dynamics, and the complainants' delayed disclosure, finding its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Applying the governing principles for assessing adult testimony about childhood events, the court found both complainants credible and their evidence sufficiently reliable on the essential elements of penetration, knowledge of blood relationship, and identity.

The court held that no count-to-count similar fact analysis was necessary because the convictions could be entered on the direct evidence alone.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and threatening death following an incident at his apartment.

After a night of drinking, an argument erupted between the accused and his girlfriend, which escalated from the bedroom to the hallway and lobby.

The Crown's case relied on two civilian witnesses whose credibility was significantly compromised.

The trial judge found the Crown's evidence unreliable and accepted the accused's version that he bit the complainant in an immediate, unpremeditated reaction to being bitten first.

The court dismissed both charges, finding reasonable doubt on the facts and applying the broader "reflex action" doctrine established in case law.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of assault and one count of mischief, arguing that the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence and improperly used bad character evidence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to high deference, particularly given corroborating evidence such as an audio recording.

The court also determined that the trial judge's comments on the accused's behavior while intoxicated were findings of fact based on the totality of evidence, not improper propensity reasoning, and that the judge was aware of the limited use of discreditable conduct evidence.

Procès criminel portant sur des allégations d’agression sexuelle, de contacts sexuels et d’invitation à des contacts sexuels contre une enfant de moins de seize ans dans un contexte familial.

Le tribunal a appliqué le cadre de W.(D.) et a conclu que la plaignante était crédible malgré des incohérences périphériques, son jeune âge au moment des événements et un délai de divulgation.

La défense fondée sur l’absence d’occasion, soit que l’accusé n’aurait jamais été seul avec la plaignante, a été rejetée comme improbable et contraire à l’expérience de la vie et au bon sens.

Les éléments des articles 271, 151 et 152 du Code criminel ont été jugés établis hors de tout doute raisonnable.

En raison de l’ordonnance de non-publication, les renseignements identificatoires doivent être protégés.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, robbery, and break and enter.

The central issue was the identity of the accused as one of the perpetrators.

The Crown relied on circumstantial evidence, including the accused's fingerprints found on a drug jar at the scene, cell phone records, and the accused's prior lies to the police.

The defence presented an alibi and argued that the fingerprints could have been left during earlier, legitimate drug transactions with the victim.

The court found the accused and his alibi witness not credible due to inconsistencies and vagueness.

However, the court also found the victim's testimony to be inconsistent and unreliable, particularly regarding his memory, the identity of "TYBO" (a client recorded in his drug book), and the frequency of washing his drug jars.

Given the conflicting evidence and the victim's lack of credibility on key points, the court was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's guilt was the only reasonable inference.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence in a pre-trial motion that the accused failed to report an altercation to the police, arguing it was relevant to rebut their anticipated claim of self-defence.

The accused argued that admitting such evidence would violate their common law and constitutional right to silence, which arises the moment events occur that could give rise to a criminal charge.

The court agreed with the accused, holding that the right to silence precedes any interaction with police and that the accused, being both suspects and victims, were entitled to remain silent.

The Crown's motion to lead the evidence was dismissed.

The accused, charged with aggravated assault and robbery, brought a pretrial motion to exclude statements he made to police during two interviews.

He argued the first statement was involuntary due to police trickery—specifically, the failure to disclose fingerprint evidence—and that he was psychologically detained, resulting in Charter breaches.

The court applied the Oickle and Grant frameworks, finding the first statement was voluntary and the accused was not detained, as he attended the station willingly and was free to leave.

Consequently, the second statement was not tainted, and all statements were ruled admissible.

The accused, a personal support worker at a long-term care facility, pleaded guilty to assaulting an elderly dementia patient in a wheelchair.

The assault was captured on video surveillance and consisted of 11 strikes to the victim's face during a diaper change.

The victim suffered no physical injuries but the family experienced significant emotional trauma.

The court imposed a 90-day intermittent jail sentence with 18 months' probation, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles.

The court rejected a conditional sentence order, finding that incarceration was necessary to protect vulnerable populations and deter similar conduct by caregivers.

Following a judge-alone trial on a 45-count indictment, the court found that the accused engaged in a sustained pattern of drugging women with GHB or Ketamine and sexually assaulting them while they were unconscious or otherwise incapable of consenting.

The court applied the law of conscious consent, incapacity, and administering a stupefying substance under s. 246(b) of the Criminal Code, and admitted count-to-count similar fact evidence to assess intent, absence of consent, and the lack of any air of reality to mistaken belief in consent.

The court also relied on expert evidence concerning the pharmacological effects of GHB and Ketamine and on disturbing cellphone images and videos created by the accused.

Convictions were entered on most assault, sexual assault, stupefying substance, and drug trafficking counts, with acquittals on a limited number of counts where the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

Because of the publication ban, this summary avoids identifying protected persons.