M. Smith

Gregory Parker, a 42-year-old man with no prior criminal record, pleaded guilty to possession of 450 grams of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Police found him in a residence with significant quantities of various drugs, large sums of cash, and a taser, indicating a commercial-scale operation.

Parker stated his motivation was financial hardship.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of three to four years, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence due to the commercial scale and the impact of drug trafficking in Thunder Bay.

The defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day, or alternatively, an 18-month Downes credit for his strict bail conditions.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, finding it would not adequately reflect denunciation and deterrence given the commercial nature of the offence and the offender's pro-social background.

The court granted a six-month Downes credit for the pre-trial house arrest conditions.

Parker was sentenced to three years net penitentiary.

The Crown closed its case in a trial where the accused were charged with possession of various prohibited substances for the purpose of trafficking and possession of property obtained by crime.

The accused brought motions for directed verdicts of acquittal on all counts.

The court granted the directed verdict of acquittal for the charge of possession of property obtained by crime, finding no reasonable inference could connect the seized cash to drug trafficking.

However, the court dismissed the motions for the drug trafficking charges, finding sufficient circumstantial evidence of constructive possession and intent to traffic for a reasonable jury to potentially convict.

The applicant brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude evidence of drugs and firearms seized during the execution of a search warrant at his apartment, alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The applicant argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) relied heavily on confidential informants whose criminal records were not fully disclosed, and lacked sufficient corroboration linking him to the specific apartment.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the information from fourteen confidential informants and sources was compelling, specific, and adequately corroborated by police surveillance.

The court concluded the issuing justice had sufficient grounds to issue the warrant and, alternatively, would not have excluded the evidence under s. 24(2).

The applicants, charged with drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime, sought to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a rural property, alleging violations of their s. 10(a) and (b) Charter rights.

The court found moderate and minor breaches of s. 10(a) and (b) due to a delay in transporting one applicant to the police detachment to contact counsel and a failure to promptly inform both applicants of additional charges.

However, the court found no breach of the duty to hold off eliciting evidence.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the breaches were not deliberate or systemic, had a minor impact on the applicants' Charter-protected interests, and society's interest favoured adjudication on the merits.

The application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) was dismissed.

The plaintiff in a wrongful dismissal action brought a motion for summary judgment.

At a case conference, the parties agreed not to proceed with the summary judgment motion at this time and consented to a timetable for mediation, documentary discovery, and oral discovery.

The court established the timetable and remained seized of any scheduling issues, noting it was too early to determine if a streamlined trial procedure would be appropriate.

The defendants brought a pre-trial application challenging the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain a Search Warrant (ITO) for the Thorndale premises, arguing a breach of their s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

They sought to exclude the seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The court found that the ITO provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the search warrant, concluding that the totality of circumstances, including frequent visits by the target's vehicle to the premises, its movements before and after suspected drug transactions, and counter-surveillance driving, established a credibly-based probability of evidence of a Controlled Drugs and Substances Act offence.

Therefore, no s. 8 Charter violation occurred.

Even if there had been a breach, the court determined that the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was not serious, and the real and reliable evidence was of significant probative value, outweighing the impact on the accused's interests.

The application was dismissed.

The defendants applied under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of charges due to unreasonable delay, as the time from charge to the anticipated end of trial exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found no defence-caused delay and no discrete events that would justify the delay.

Furthermore, the case was not deemed particularly complex to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay.

Despite acknowledging significant judicial resource limitations, the court concluded that the 30.5-month delay was unreasonable and granted the application, staying the charges against both defendants.

The Crown sought to admit expert forensic accounting evidence from Jeffrey J. Good to establish that approximately $49,500 in seized currency was proceeds of drug trafficking.

The defendants were jointly charged with possession of various prohibited substances for trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court applied the two-step admissibility test for expert evidence from *Mohan* and *White Burgess*.

While the expert was qualified, the court found the evidence lacked logical relevance to directly link the seized funds to drug trafficking over the seven-year period analyzed.

Concerns were also raised regarding the unexplained expansion of the expert's mandate from one defendant to both, and the arbitrary selection of the seven-year period.

The court concluded that the potential prejudicial effects of the evidence, including inviting speculation and devolving the case into a remote inquiry, outweighed its slight probative value.

Consequently, the expert evidence was deemed inadmissible.

The accused was charged with assault causing bodily harm and threatening death following an incident at his apartment.

After a night of drinking, an argument erupted between the accused and his girlfriend, which escalated from the bedroom to the hallway and lobby.

The Crown's case relied on two civilian witnesses whose credibility was significantly compromised.

The trial judge found the Crown's evidence unreliable and accepted the accused's version that he bit the complainant in an immediate, unpremeditated reaction to being bitten first.

The court dismissed both charges, finding reasonable doubt on the facts and applying the broader "reflex action" doctrine established in case law.

The Palkowski defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action for failure to pay two outstanding costs orders and for security for costs.

The plaintiff opposed, claiming impecuniosity.

The court found the plaintiff failed to establish impecuniosity but declined to dismiss the action immediately, granting the plaintiff 60 days to pay the outstanding costs.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed due to delay in bringing the motion and the complexity of the case, making the merits a neutral factor.

No costs were awarded for either the current motion or the prior motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal order.

The plaintiff brought an action for negligence and battery against a locum chiropractor, alleging that the chiropractor performed a cervical spine adjustment in contravention of a 'No C/S ADJ' note in her chart, causing a disc herniation at C7-T1.

The court found as a fact that the defendant did not perform a cervical adjustment, but rather performed thoracic adjustments that were consistent with the plaintiff's previous treatments.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to establish causation on a balance of probabilities, as the onset of neurological symptoms occurred hours later, and the disc herniation could have been caused by minor daily trauma given the plaintiff's pre-existing degenerative disc disease.

The court further found that the defendant met the standard of care and had obtained valid informed consent.

The action was dismissed.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial where the plaintiff was awarded approximately $150,000 in damages, the court determined the costs of the action.

The plaintiff sought over $600,000 on a substantial indemnity basis, while the corporate defendants argued no costs should be awarded due to proportionality and settlement offers.

The court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $424,584.33, finding that the defendants' 'hardball' litigation tactics and pursuit of a baseless after-acquired cause defence unnecessarily prolonged the trial.

The court also denied costs to the successful individual defendant, finding her conduct was the fundamental reason the trial was necessary.

The accused sought to re-elect trial mode from the Ontario Court of Justice to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice following an adverse severance application decision.

The Crown opposed the re-election, arguing that the trial had already commenced with the severance hearing and therefore re-election required Crown consent.

The court held that once a seized trial judge begins to receive evidence on a severance application, the trial is underway for purposes of Criminal Code section 561(2), and the right to re-elect without consent expires 14 days before that point.

The re-election application was denied.

The accused applied for severance of counts relating to two separate criminal incidents—one in Ottawa involving the alleged robbery, assault, and unlawful confinement of Justin Huynh, and another in Richmond Hill involving similar offences against Linton Campbell.

The accused sought to sever the counts to avoid prejudice and to preserve her tactical choice whether to testify.

The court denied the severance application, finding significant factual overlap between the incidents, viable similar fact evidence connecting them, and no objective foundation for the accused's stated intention to testify on one set of charges but not the other.

The accused was charged with three counts of robbery and three counts of unlawful confinement arising from a single incident on August 20, 2013, involving three teenage victims.

The Crown's case relied primarily on identification evidence from one victim who made tentative pre-trial identifications through internet photographs and a police photo line-up, coupled with circumstantial evidence including the accused's use of the nickname "Konvict," which matched the name used by the robber during the incident.

The court found the identification evidence credible and reliable despite its equivocal nature, and convicted the accused on all counts.

Sentencing following guilty pleas to multiple drug trafficking offences and participation in a criminal organization.

The offender had no prior criminal record and no substance abuse history but admitted engaging in trafficking heroin, cocaine, and marijuana solely for profit.

The parties jointly proposed an eight‑year penitentiary sentence.

The principal dispute concerned credit for 1,335 days spent on stringent bail conditions prior to sentencing.

The court held that stringent bail conditions can be considered a mitigating factor but the appropriate credit is discretionary; in the circumstances the offender received two years credit, resulting in six years of imprisonment.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an order dismissing their motion for leave to examine a non-party treating chiropractor for discovery under Rule 31.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as leave to appeal a substantial indemnity costs award arising from that motion.

The underlying action alleged chiropractic negligence for performing cervical spine adjustments contrary to a chart notation prohibiting such adjustments.

The motions judge had found that the non-party had already provided the relevant information about the timing of the chart notation and that the plaintiffs’ attempt to question why the notation was made was beyond the scope of the pleaded issues.

The court held that the plaintiffs failed to establish good reason to doubt the correctness of the order or that the proposed appeal raised issues of sufficient importance under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

Leave to appeal both the substantive decision and the costs award was denied.

In a civil jury trial, the plaintiff brought a motion seeking to question sworn jurors for potential bias relating to abortion after the jury panel had already been selected and sworn.

The plaintiff relied on survey evidence suggesting Canadians hold strong views on abortion and argued that questioning jurors was necessary to identify potential prejudice.

The court held that civil juries are presumed capable of setting aside personal views through the trial process and judicial instructions, and that there was insufficient evidence of widespread bias that would justify such questioning.

The court emphasized the discretionary nature of challenges for cause in civil proceedings and warned that permitting such questioning could create delays and open the floodgates to inquiries on many personal characteristics.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated by delay exceeding 20 months between accusation and trial.

The applicants argued that Crown delay of approximately 7 months and institutional delay of approximately 8.5 months, combined with inherent and actual prejudice, rendered a fair trial impossible.

The Crown countered that much of the delay was neutral, resulting from mutual agreement of all counsel to delay trial pending exhaustive negotiations on resolution.

The court found that the bulk of the delay resulted from a mutual understanding among all counsel to postpone setting an early trial date to permit further investigation and reconsideration of reasonable prospect of conviction, particularly regarding identification evidence.

The court concluded that s. 11(b) was not breached, as the delay fell within Morin guidelines for a serious multi-accused prosecution, and any actual prejudice was attributable to the fact of the charges rather than the delay itself.