D. Lee

The applicant challenged LAT and HRTO decisions arising from the denial of statutory accident benefits after the insurer relied on an IME report without producing the physician for cross-examination.

The court held that the LAT lacked jurisdiction to issue a second reconsideration decision more than a year later and while appeal and judicial review proceedings were already perfected, as that step was not taken within a reasonable time and offended functus officio and finality principles.

The court further accepted that the earlier LAT decisions could not stand because reliance on the challenged expert report without cross-examination breached procedural fairness.

The LAT and HRTO decisions were quashed and remitted, with costs of $15,000 awarded against the insurer on the LAT matter, but no costs awarded to the applicant on the HRTO matter.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of application for judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying motor vehicle accident benefits.

The moving party had previously discontinued an application for judicial review due to adverse case law that was later reversed by the Supreme Court of Canada.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no apparent grounds for relief, as the causation issue had already been decided on appeal and the allegations of institutional bias lacked specifics.

The court also noted the lengthy delay and the principle of finality weighed against granting the extension.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim order by the Animal Care Review Board regarding the removal of 41 cats from her home.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the application as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found the application was moot because the Board had already decided not to dismiss the applicant's appeals and had scheduled further hearings to address her constitutional issues.

The court also found the application premature, as it challenged an interim order before the administrative proceedings were completed.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of a preliminary decision by the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) that stayed her application for statutory accident benefits until she consented to the release of insurer's examination reports.

The applicant had revoked her consent, arguing that the involvement of a third-party vendor compromised the independence of the assessments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review as premature, holding that absent exceptional circumstances, courts should not interfere with ongoing administrative processes until they are completed.

The court found no exceptional circumstances, noting that issues regarding the independence of medical assessments should be raised before the ultimate trier of fact.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a noting in default, default judgment, and leave to issue a writ of possession arising from a defaulted second mortgage.

The defendant argued she was waiting for particulars and relying on a companion action against a third party.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the defendant had ample notice of enforcement proceedings, failed to act promptly, and presented no arguable defence on the merits.

The insured brought a motion for a determination that its insurer had a duty to defend it in an action arising from the sale of a commercial building containing asbestos.

The insured also sought an order allowing it to select its own counsel due to a potential conflict of interest.

The court found that the underlying statement of claim alleged both intentional misconduct and negligence, and that the negligence claim was not derivative.

Therefore, the insurer had a duty to defend.

However, the court dismissed the request for independent counsel, finding no reasonable apprehension of a conflict of interest that would disentitle the insurer from its right to control the defence and appoint counsel.