Peter Murray

This is a costs ruling following a 16-day trial where the defendant, TD General Insurance Company, was the successful party, having proven fraud against the plaintiff, Shelly Legault.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs of over $366,000.

The court, exercising its discretion under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01, found the plaintiff's conduct (perpetrating fraud, suing for $1M, and prolonging litigation for seven years) warranted substantial indemnity costs.

While acknowledging some excessive time spent by defendant's counsel due to inadequate investigation, the court ultimately fixed the costs payable by the plaintiff to the defendant at $289,609.84, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, balancing reasonableness and proportionality.

The plaintiff sued her home insurer after it denied her claim for a fire loss.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that the plaintiff committed fraud in her claim for Additional Living Expenses (ALE) by submitting a fake lease and using the rent money for other purposes.

The court found that the plaintiff and her purported landlord engaged in a deliberate scheme to obtain money from the insurer under the guise of rent.

Because the plaintiff made a willfully false statement in her proof of loss regarding the ALE, her entire claim was vitiated.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed, and the insurer's counterclaim for repayment of amounts already paid out was granted.

During a trial regarding an insurance claim denial, the plaintiff brought a mid-trial motion to exclude the testimony of two of the defendant's witnesses.

The plaintiff argued that the defendant's financial compensation of these witnesses for their preparation time and trial attendance constituted an abuse of process.

The court found that the witnesses, who were former employees and agents of the defendant, were 'professional' fact witnesses who required extensive preparation time to review voluminous documents.

The court held that compensating such witnesses for their preparation time is reasonable and does not automatically taint their evidence.

The motion to exclude the testimony was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision that dismissed her action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and struck her pleadings as frivolous, scandalous, and vexatious.

The core of her claim concerned how her insurer handled her statutory accident benefits claims, alleging a conspiracy with healthcare practitioners to stage examinations and produce false reports, and breach of privacy.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's finding that the Licence Appeal Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes related to statutory accident benefits under s. 280 of the Insurance Act, regardless of how the claims are framed.

The Court also upheld the denial of leave to amend pleadings and dismissed the appeal regarding costs due to procedural non-compliance and lack of error in principle.

The appellant appealed the summary judgment dismissal of his action against the City of Toronto, which was based on his failure to provide timely notice under s. 42(6) of the City of Toronto Act, 2006, and the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding errors in her conclusion that the appellant failed to establish a reasonable excuse for the three-year delay in providing notice, despite having sufficient information to investigate earlier.

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a motion to strike, the defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis and requested that the costs be paid personally by the plaintiff's lawyers.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff lacked the mental capacity to instruct her counsel to commence the action.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity and personal costs, noting that if the defendants genuinely believed the plaintiff was under a disability, they should have sought the appointment of a litigation guardian or challenged the lawyers' authority under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, Celia Yang, claimed $150 million in damages against her insurer and various service providers, alleging misconduct in the administration of her statutory accident benefits (SABs) claims.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the statement of claim, arguing it contravened pleading rules, the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction (as SABs disputes fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Licence Appeal Tribunal), and the claims failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action (including breach of Charter, PIPEDA, tort of bribery, spoliation, breach of contract, inducing breach of contract, fiduciary duty, and conspiracy).

The court dismissed the action, finding the statement of claim scandalous, the court lacked jurisdiction over SABs-related complaints, and the pleaded causes of action were untenable.

The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, including opposing counsel, a medical expert, and an insurer from a previous personal injury action, alleging they conspired to suppress a defence medical report.

The defendants brought motions to strike the conspiracy claims under Rule 21 and to remove the plaintiff's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The court granted the motions to strike, finding that non-compliance with the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding medical reports does not constitute an unlawful act for the purposes of civil conspiracy.

The court also ordered the removal of the plaintiff's counsel, as a lawyer from the firm was likely to be called as a witness regarding the remaining misrepresentation claim.

A lawyer appealed the dismissal of an application for a declaration that sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge found the appellant lacked both private and public interest standing to bring the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the impugned provisions affected him personally and directly, and that his scholarly contributions and representation of affected clients did not establish a genuine interest in the outcome or demonstrate that the application was a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

This decision concerns a costs award following the dismissal of the applicant's constitutional challenge to sections of the Insurance Act.

The court had previously found the applicant lacked standing and that the challenge failed on its merits.

The applicant argued for no costs, citing public interest, or a reduced award based on public sector salaries of Crown counsel.

The court rejected both arguments, stating that the litigation was speculative and without merit, and that costs for Crown lawyers are not reduced due to their salaried status.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable by the applicant to the Province of Ontario, which represented approximately one-third of a reasonable claim.

The applicant, a personal injury lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act, which limit pre-trial recovery of lost income and grant sole jurisdiction to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule disputes, respectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

On the merits, the court found no breach of sections 15(1) or 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor a violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the impugned provisions did not create distinctions based on prohibited grounds, deprive individuals of life, liberty, or security of the person, or usurp superior court jurisdiction for a novel area of law.