Licence Appeal Tribunal File Number: 17-002762/AABS
In the matter of an application pursuant to subsection 280(2) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, in relation to statutory accident benefits.
Between:
Lucia Derenzis
Applicant
and
Gore Mutual Insurance Company
Respondent
DECISION
VICE-CHAIR:
Craig Mazerolle
APPEARANCES:
For the Applicant:
Ashu Ismail, Counsel
Joseph Campisi, Counsel
Peter Murray, Counsel
For the Respondent:
Arthur R. Camporese, Counsel
HEARD:
By review of the record and transcripts of the April 17 – 21, 2023 videoconference hearing
OVERVIEW
1Lucia Derenzis, the applicant, was involved in an automobile accident on November 24, 2015, and sought benefits pursuant to the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule - Effective September 1, 2010 (the “Schedule”). The applicant was denied benefits by the respondent, Gore Mutual Insurance Company, and applied to the Licence Appeal Tribunal - Automobile Accident Benefits Service (the “Tribunal”) for resolution of the dispute.
2Following a videoconference hearing held from April 17 – 21, 2023, and after informing the parties that the adjudicator who heard the matter would be unable to provide a decision, the Tribunal issued a motion order on June 19, 2024. In short, the Tribunal ordered this matter to “proceed by having a new adjudicator review the existing record (i.e., the recording and/or transcript of the hearing and all records that were made exhibits at the hearing) and render a decision.” On July 8, 2024, the respondent provided the Tribunal and the applicant with a copy of the transcripts from the hearing.
ISSUES
3The issues in dispute are:
i. What is the quantum of monthly attendant care benefits (“ACB”) that the applicant is entitled to receive from the respondent from the date of loss to date and ongoing?
ii. Is the applicant entitled to interest on any overdue payment of benefits?
iii. Is the respondent liable to pay an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664 because it unreasonably withheld or delayed payments to the applicant?
RESULT
4I find the applicant has not established that she is entitled to any outstanding ACB payment.
5The applicant is not entitled to interest, nor is she entitled to an award.
ANALYSIS
Attendant Care Benefit
6I find the applicant has not established that she is entitled to any outstanding ACB payment.
7Section 19 of the Schedule states that an insurer shall pay for all reasonable and necessary expenses incurred by or on behalf of an insured person as a result of an accident for attendant care services provided by an aide or attendant. Section 3(7)(e) establishes when an expense can be said to be incurred. Most notably for this case, s. 3(7)(e)(iii) states:
the person who provided the goods or services,
(A) did so in the course of the employment, occupation or profession in which he or she would ordinarily have been engaged, but for the accident, or
(B) sustained an economic loss as a result of providing the goods or services to the insured person.
8Section 42(1) of the Schedule provides that an application for an ACB must be in the form of, and contain the information required to be provided in, the version of the document entitled Assessment of Attendant Care Needs (“Form-1”).
9The applicant has the burden of proving entitlement to payment of an ACB on a balance of probabilities.
10The respondent takes the position that it has paid all the ACB that the applicant is entitled to. The applicant disagrees. In particular, the parties disagree on the following:
i. Whether the applicant has established that her family provided the attendant care services at issue;
ii. Whether the applicant demonstrated that her daughter and husband sustained an economic loss as a result of providing attendant care services;
iii. If her family’s attendant care services are not found to have been incurred, whether they can be deemed incurred, pursuant to s. 3(8) of the Schedule; and,
iv. Whether the applicant is barred from receiving any ACB payment for the period between April 18, 2017 and November 14, 2022, pursuant to s. 55(1) of the Schedule.
11For the following reasons, I find the respondent is not successful in its attempt to bar the applicant from receiving payment of the ACB due to s. 55(1). I further find the applicant has not established that there is any outstanding ACB payment based on either her daughter’s or husband’s services. For the daughter, I find the applicant has not provided sufficient details about her attendant care services to conduct the analysis required for an ACB claim. I also find the applicant has not established an economic loss for her daughter. For the husband, I find that the applicant has not established that these services were incurred, pursuant to s. 3(7)(e)(iii)(B) of the Schedule. Finally, I will not grant the applicant’s request to use my authority to deem the services incurred under s. 3(8).
12I do note that, during the videoconference hearing, the applicant asked the Tribunal to answer two questions about her ACB claim: i.e., the “Form 1 reasonable and necessary amount”, as well as the amount that was incurred. Though the ACB issue was broadly described in prior Tribunal orders as a question of “quantum”, I do not find it necessary to make a general finding about what Form 1 amount would be considered reasonable and necessary. Rather, by concluding that the applicant did not meet her onus to demonstrate that the services at issue were incurred (and there is no basis to deem them incurred), I find there is no need to conduct a determination of what amount might be payable if later incurred.
Section 44 Examinations Attendance
13I conclude that the applicant’s entitlement to the ACB is not limited by virtue of a missed s. 44 examination.
14The respondent submits the applicant’s non-attendance at a s. 44 examination on April 18, 2017 should bar her claim for an ACB up and until she remedied the breach on November 14, 2022. In a motion order released October 6, 2022, the Tribunal found the applicant’s non-attendance “triggers the provisions of s. 55.” Therefore, in line with res judicata, the respondent argues the Tribunal must follow this earlier ruling. I do not agree, as I find the respondent has presented a narrow reading of the October 2022 motion order.
15Section 55(1) disallows an insured person from proceeding with an application if they did not attend an IE. Section 55(2) allows the Tribunal to permit non-compliant applicants to continue with their applications, while s. 55(3) provides the Tribunal the authority to add “terms and conditions” to this permission.
16Briefly, the parties attended a motion hearing on August 10, 2022 to address the respondent’s request to bar the applicant’s application from proceeding, pursuant to s. 55. Vice-Chair Flude found the applicant breached her obligations under s. 44, so “the provisions of s. 55” were triggered. However, under the subheading “Discretion under ss. 55(2) and (3)”, Vice-Chair Flude went on to conclude that it “would be unjust… to strike her claim”. Instead, the parties were ordered to set up a “mutually agreeable date for… an attendant care IE”. If the applicant failed to attend this IE, the respondent could then “move for an order staying this application.” In other words, I find Vice-Chair Flude used s. 55(2) to allow the applicant’s application to proceed, despite this breach.
17Beyond a narrow reading of the motion order, I also find the respondent’s additional submission about how this analysis should be guided by s. 42(14) and s. 42(15) of the Schedule is unhelpful.
18Section 42(14)(b) allows an insurer to dispense with its obligation to pay an ACB for the period after “the person failed or refused to comply… and before the insured person submits to the examination”.
19First, it is not clear why this argument does not appear to have been pursued during the motion hearing. Further, s. 42(15)(c) states that s. 42(14) does not apply if an insured person has “a reasonable explanation for not complying”. In the motion order, the Vice-Chair determined it would be “unjust” to stay the application. I understand that these provisions are not mirror images of each other, namely, s. 55(2) does not include the words: “reasonable explanation”. Yet, I find the motion order is a clear indication that Vice-Chair Flude found this breach should not bar the applicant’s claim, so long as the s. 44 examination was eventually completed. By accepting the logic of this earlier order, namely, the Vice-Chair’s ruling that barring the claim “would be unjust”, I conclude it would be unreasonable to bar payment of an ACB based on s. 42(14).
20For these reasons, I conclude that the applicant’s entitlement to the ACB is not limited by virtue of a missed s. 44 examination.
Attendant Care Services Provided by the Applicant’s Daughter
21I find the applicant has not provided sufficiently detailed information about the services provided, or economic loss sustained, by her daughter to establish any outstanding payment of the ACB.
22The respondent argues that the applicant did not provide enough details about her daughter’s attendant care services, e.g., there is “no breakdown of how much time she spent daily, weekly or hourly”. Additionally, even though the parties spent a significant amount of time arguing about the necessity of supervision services during the hearing, the respondent argues that there is no indication on the Expense Claim Forms (“OCF-6s”) that this attendant care service was provided to the applicant. Overall, the respondent submits that the “tribunal cannot simply look at the expense that’s described on an invoice and order payment without consideration of the number of hours of services received in relation to that Form 1.” In support of this position, the respondent cites S.M. v. Unica Insurance Inc., 2020 CanLII 61460 (ON LAT) (“S.M.”).
23I find the guidance provided by S.M. is of assistance to this determination, and, as this ruling is based on extensive case law from the Tribunal, I find the adjudicator’s analytical framework is compelling. Of note, at paragraph 15 of S.M., the adjudicator determined it is not enough for attendant care providers to claim a payment based on the general amount listed on an invoice. Rather, there must be a detailed breakdown of the hourly rates and services, regardless of the “technical and somewhat arduous” nature of this “mandatory” endeavour:
… I agree with Unica that the correct approach in assessing attendant care owing is the “hourly rate” approach. In my view, it is an error to simply look at the expense as presented on an invoice and order payment without a consideration of the number of hours of services received in relation to the hourly rates established on the Form-1 and/or by the [FSCO Superintendent’s Guideline No. 03/10 – Attendant Care Hourly Rate Guideline (“Guideline”)]. In a similar vein, it is error to simply state that an insured is entitled to “up to $6,000”, as the Tribunal did in this matter. While S.M. is correct that the Tribunal decisions on which Unica relies are not binding, the “hourly rate” approach was the approach taken in A.H. v. Belair Direct Insurance Company and in the Tribunal’s recent reconsideration decisions of S.K. v. Aviva and R.K. v. Aviva, decisions that I find provide a helpful and, in my view, correct, framework for this analysis. S.K. and R.K. are especially on point. It is a technical and somewhat arduous exercise, but I find a mandatory one under the Guideline.
24I find the daughter’s invoices lack the kind of “hourly rate” information detailed in S.M. Her OCF-6s all cover monthly periods during which attendant care services are being claimed, and they all include a table of tasks. Along the vertical side of the table, there is a list of attendant care tasks, such as supervision, exercise assistance, grooming, etc. The days of the week are then listed along the top.
25Aside from the occasional comment written in the margins (e.g., the December 2016 invoice noted that the applicant performed exercises for about 10 minutes at a time), there is virtually no information about the amount of time her daughter spent performing these tasks during any given month. Instead, the invoices only list the days of the week when a particular type of task was performed. For instance, it is unclear whether a checkmark in the row for “Extra Laundry” under the column for “Monday” means that this task was performed every Monday that month, or if it was only performed once or twice. There is also no indication of how long these tasks took to complete. These sparse details do not conform with the “hourly rate” analysis laid out in S.M., as the only minute-by-minute breakdown of these tasks can be found in the Form 1 itself—an insufficient basis for establishing payment.
26This lack of information is then further compounded by the fact that only the total dollar amount being sought is listed on the OCF-6. Again, in contrast with the standard laid out in S.M., there is no total number of hours included on the invoices. Instead, at the bottom of each task/day of the week table, there is a space where the daughter was asked to fill in her “Hourly Rate” and the total number of hours she provided services. “$25.00” is listed as the hourly rate on all her invoices, but none of them list the total number of hours that she spent performing these services, let alone the amount of time spent on each individual task. I would also note that $25.00 per hour is above the hourly rates provided for in the Superintendent’s Guideline No. 01/18: Attendant Care Hourly Rate Guideline.
27I further find that the daughter’s testimony does not adequately fill in the “hourly rate” information missing from the OCF-6s. While I have no issue with the credibility of her testimony, the daughter’s answers did not reach the level of specificity required to conduct an analysis like the one proposed in S.M. For instance, when discussing how she went from spending the night at the applicant’s home to more of (in the words of applicant’s counsel) a “day shift” arrangement, the daughter noted that it “would always depend what time my Dad would come home.” When asked to expand on this point, the applicant’s daughter noted that “sometimes it could be 3:00, sometimes it would be 5:00.” Similarly, when asked to detail how long she was staying overnight at the applicant’s house, the daughter answered: “For a long time, for months.”
28Then, when asked about the OCF-6s during cross-examination, the daughter again provided general responses about the extent of the services she provided. For example, respondent’s counsel asked the daughter about changes to the frequency of the services she provided in and around the Summer of 2016 [emphasis added]:
Q. Did your involvement start to decrease to about four days per week in and around the summer of 2016?
A. Yes, that - my papers show that, yes.
Q. And was it fairly consistent after that, until you moved back in with your parents in 2021?
A. Yes. I know I wasn't as helpful during the weekends.
Q. Including the Friday?
A. Yes. I don't know for how long, I don't know if it was the whole time, I do not remember. I just remember weekends for sure.
29Again, I have no issue with the credibility of the daughter’s testimony, especially as admissions, like the one quoted above, demonstrate that she made significant efforts to accurately relay her recollection of events. I also acknowledge that the applicant’s daughter is not a professional attendant care provider, so the level of detail she can provide about these services should be understood in that context. However, I still find her responses were not specific enough to conduct the “hourly rate” analysis needed to assess the ACB claim. Instead, I conclude the applicant has not met her onus to establish any outstanding ACB payment based on the daughter’s attendant care services.
30In her reply, the applicant argued that the respondent could have used s. 46.2 of the Schedule to obtain more information from the daughter. Section 46.2 states that an “insurer may request” information from a service provider. However, there is no obligation on an insurer to exercise this discretion. As such, I find the applicant has not provided a compelling explanation for why the respondent’s decision not to use s. 46.2 assists her in meeting this evidentiary onus.
31As I find her daughter’s evidence does not possess a sufficient level of detail to establish any outstanding ACB payment, I can then conclude the applicant’s arguments about her economic loss are moot. Specifically, the applicant claims the respondent did not properly assess her daughter’s economic loss, e.g., it removed CPP and EI contributions from the calculation. Yet, without sufficient detail about the services provided, I find it is not necessary for me to address any alleged errors made by the respondent in determining her economic loss.
32Regardless, the respondent raised several credible challenges to the applicant’s evidence about her daughter’s economic loss. For instance, the respondent had concerns with the daughter’s financial records (e.g., a pay cheque from February 2015 was supposed to account for services rendered throughout the year, but only mentioned a date range of a few weeks), along with inconsistent evidence regarding hours works and hourly pay. The applicant contested these arguments by contending these concerns should have been raised earlier. The applicant also cited a letter from the daughter’s employer that confirmed she stopped working to assist with her mother’s care. It is unclear from the transcript as to whether the “letter” the applicant is referring to is the employer’s December 15, 2015 letter or December 15, 2016 letter, but I note that both letters provide largely the same information about the daughter’s inability to work resulting from the applicant’s care.
33In reviewing the documents and testimony, I find the respondent has raised credible challenges to the daughter’s claim of an economic loss. It is not clear what, if any, economic loss can be attributed to the provision of attendant care, since the daughter could not provide specific details about her remuneration from her employer. For instance, the applicant provided her daughter’s pay cheques for the years 2012, 2013, 2015, and 2017. There are significant differences in the total, annual amounts. Yet, when asked on cross-examination about this work (e.g., hours worked per week in 2012; hourly rate in 2015; etc.), she did not have any specific responses. This lack of detail about the daughter’s remuneration makes it difficult to establish what, if any, economic loss can be attributed to the provision of attendant care. For instance, if the daughter’s hours of work and rate of pay cannot be determined, it is difficult to see how the applicant can establish, on a balance of probabilities, that specific hours dedicated to her attendant care services would impact the daughter’s employment pay. This difficultly is then further compounded by the lack of specific details the daughter was able to provide about the time she spent providing attendant care services.
34For these reasons, I find the applicant has not provided sufficiently detailed information about the services provided, or economic loss sustained, by her daughter to establish any outstanding payment of the ACB.
Economic Loss of the Applicant’s Husband
35I find the applicant did not present sufficient evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that her husband experienced an economic loss as a result of providing attendant care services.
36In support of this claim, the applicant argues that providing attendant care must have had an impact on her husband’s finances, as he had to take time away from his lawn care business. According to the applicant, it is not fair for her to take on the cost of an accountant’s report, because this loss is clear and intuitive.
37Additionally, since her psychological symptoms made it difficult for her to invite strangers into her home, the applicant could not accept attendant care from anyone but her family. The need to establish an economic loss for family members under s. 3(7) of the Schedule has, according to the applicant, created an unequal distinction that is not compliant with the protection of family status and disability in the Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19 (“Code”).
38The respondent contends that the applicant’s evidence about her husband’s economic loss is insufficient. Further, regarding her argument about the Code, the respondent suggests that the Tribunal cannot amend the Schedule.
39The applicant’s husband testified that there were new business opportunities he could have pursued following the accident. However, he was unable to develop these leads, because of the time needed to meet his wife’s attendant care needs. Since he was unable to pursue this additional work, the applicant’s position is that there was an economic loss.
40I find the husband’s version of events does not align with his answers on cross-examination, and it does not match up with the documentary evidence before me. First, during cross-examination, the applicant’s husband accepted that his corporate gross income grew between 2016 and 2019, and then again in 2022. I find these answers challenge the applicant’s position that there was an intuitive economic loss caused by providing attendant care services.
41Second, the husband’s corporate tax records for the 2016 to 2021 tax years reveal there were regular, year-over-year increases in his business’s total sales. There was a decrease in the total sales between the 2018 and 2019 tax years, but this decrease was later reversed by the 2020 tax year. There was also a significant jump between the 2020 and 2021 tax years, with the business’s total sales increasing over 45% between the two years. Overall, and on a balance of probabilities, I find her husband’s testimony and tax records do not support the applicant’s position about this alleged economic loss.
42I also find the applicant’s position concerning the Code is not compelling. The protected ground of “family status” is defined at s. 10(1) of the Code as the “status of being in a parent and child relationship”. This definition does not extend to marital relationships. Relatedly, the applicant’s arguments about the protected ground of disability were linked to family status, so, by finding that the definition of family status does not apply to the husband’s claim, I have not been provided with a compelling explanation for how the ground of disability can establish a standalone claim of unequal treatment.
43I do note that marital status is a protected ground under the Code, but the applicant did not provide submissions on this ground.
44For these reasons, I find the applicant did not present sufficient evidence to establish on a balance of probabilities that her husband experienced an economic loss as a result of providing attendant care services.
Deemed Incurred
45I find that the applicant has not established that I should engage the discretion provided by s. 3(8) to deem her family’s attendant care services incurred.
46Section 3(8) of the Schedule states:
If… the Licence Appeal Tribunal finds that an expense was not incurred because the insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed payment of a benefit in respect of the expense, the Licence Appeal Tribunal may, for the purpose of determining an insured person’s entitlement to the benefit, deem the expense to have been incurred.
47The applicant supports this claim by submitting that Tribunal case law has established that an insurer cannot rely on its own reports without providing an explanation for why it prefers them over the insured person’s evidence. The applicant also takes issue with some of the respondent’s adjusting decisions, including an allegation that it allowed its assessors to delay releasing their reports. She also highlights testimony from its adjuster, Ken Jones, to claim that the respondent did not properly explain the ACB to her in its correspondence.
48Section 3(8) requires a causal link between the insurer’s unreasonable behaviour and the insured person’s decision whether to incur an expense. However, the applicant’s allegations about unreasonable behaviour are largely unrelated to her decision over whether to receive attendant care. Rather, her submissions involve issues with how her claim was handled, e.g., the interaction between the respondent and its assessors. There is little explanation of how this behaviour impacted whether the services were incurred or not, and, as a result, I find the applicant has not demonstrated that I should exercise this discretion.
49I do accept that one of the allegations appears, on its face, to be connected to the initial decision to incur these services, i.e., the respondent allegedly failed to explain the ACB to her. However, even if I accepted that there was a breach of the respondent’s obligations, I have not been provided with a compelling explanation of how this breach would engage s. 3(8). Put simply, the applicant claims to have received the attendant care services from her family, and there is no explanation of how properly explaining the ACB to her would have impacted her family’s ability to demonstrate an economic loss, nor is there an indication that the services were delayed or inhibited by this alleged breach.
50For these reasons, I find that the applicant has not established that I should engage the discretion provided by s. 3(8) of the Schedule in this case.
Non-Compliance with “Medical and Any Other Reasons”
51I find the applicant’s argument about the respondent’s alleged failure to provide a compliant set of “medical and any other reasons” does not assist her in demonstrating entitlement to any outstanding ACB payment.
52Specifically, the applicant claims that the respondent’s initial Form 1 (dated February 17, 2016, completed by Ranu Singh, occupational therapist [“OT”]) was not accompanied by medical reasons. As such, this Form 1 was not a compliant response to her initial Form 1 from Sasha Stewart, OT (dated December 20, 2015). Or, as the applicant argued during the hearing:
Our submission is that [the respondent’s initial Form 1] cannot apply because according to Mr. Jones [the adjuster] when he gave his evidence the insurance company did not provide the obligatory statutorily mandated response to the applicant, and that is their obligation to advise of the medical and other reasons for reducing the amount of care from $8,000 to $1,123. That is the position.
53Put together, the applicant submitted that “if the tribunal agrees that Ranu Singh’s Form 1 cannot be relied upon as establishing the amount of care because the insurance company didn’t abide by their obligations, then we’re stuck with Sasha Stewart’s assessments”. The respondent did not explicitly address this argument in closing submissions.
54Though there was no explicit reference to a Schedule provision in the applicant’s closing submissions, I assume the reference to “medical and other reasons” means she is relying on s. 42(3):
Within 10 business days after receiving [the Form 1], the insurer shall give the insured person a notice that specifies the expenses described in the assessment of attendant care needs the insurer agrees to pay, the expenses the insurer refuses to pay and the medical and any other reasons for the insurer’s decision.
55I find the applicant’s argument is not compelling. First, regardless of whether an adjuster believes there is compliance with the Schedule, this assessment is ultimately up to the Tribunal. As such, I place little weight on this part of Mr. Jones’ testimony.
56Second, there is no will-pay provision associated with s. 42 of the Schedule. For instance, if an insurer fails to comply with the notice requirements under s. 38(8) when denying payment of a medical benefit, it may be required to pay that benefit pursuant to s. 38(11). I have not been directed to any similar provision related to breaches under s. 42.
57Third, even if I found the respondent failed to provide compliant “medical and any other reasons”, and I accepted the applicant’s position that only Ms. Stewart’s attendant care recommendations were properly before me, the applicant would still need to demonstrate that she incurred these recommended services. Put another way, it is not enough for an applicant to provide an expert opinion recommending a certain monthly amount of attendant care services. The Schedule states that these services must be incurred before they are payable. Therefore, without evidence of incurred services, the applicant has not established entitlement to any outstanding ACB payment—regardless of the impact of any alleged s. 42 breach on the evidentiary record before me.
58For these reasons, I find the applicant’s argument about the respondent’s alleged failure to provide a compliant set of “medical and any other reasons” does not assist her in demonstrating entitlement to any outstanding ACB payment.
Applicant’s Other Arguments
59Finally, turning to her other arguments, the applicant submits the respondent’s Form 1s and expert evidence are not reliable. She also contends that the psychological impact of her accident-related condition needs to be understood when assessing her claim. I do not find these arguments impact the findings I have made above.
60Some of the alleged deficiencies the applicant raised with the respondent’s Form 1s and expert evidence include: Ms. Singh did not testify at the hearing; the opinion of Susan Szainwald, OT, did not account for the applicant’s pain and incontinence, etc. The applicant also alleges that Ms. Szainwald’s cross-examination revealed a falsehood in her report (dated January 23, 2023). Further, the applicant claims her condition must be understood as a shift from physical pain (including a hernia) to psychological pain, namely, diagnoses of chronic pain disorder, somatic symptom disorder, etc. According to the applicant, support for the impact of her psychological condition on her attendant care needs is found in the report of Dr. R. Van Reekum, psychiatrist (dated January 28, 2023), who found the applicant requires 24-hour care.
61I find that the applicant’s allegations about the insufficiency of the respondent’s Form 1s and its expert evidence do not address the question of incurred services. Put another way, even if I accepted the applicant’s criticisms of Ms. Singh’s and Ms. Szainwald’s expert opinions, the applicant must still demonstrate that the services were incurred in accordance with the Schedule. In a related vein, even if I accepted the opinion of Dr. Van Reekum, the deficiencies noted above in the applicant’s evidentiary record would persist.
62Taken together, I find the applicant has not met her onus of demonstrating entitlement to any outstanding ACB payment.
Interest
63Interest applies on the payment of any overdue benefits pursuant to s. 51 of the Schedule. Since there is no outstanding payment, the applicant is not entitled to interest.
Award
64The applicant sought an award under s. 10 of Reg. 664. Under s. 10, the Tribunal may grant an award of up to 50 per cent of the total benefits payable if it finds that an insurer unreasonably withheld or delayed the payment of benefits.
65In support of an award, the applicant relies on largely the same arguments as her claim under s. 3(8), though she added that the respondent failed to properly explain how she could receive the catastrophic level of funding. However, since there is no outstanding payment of benefits, there is no basis for an award.
ORDER
66For the above reasons, I find:
i. The applicant has not established that she is entitled to any outstanding ACB payment.
ii. The applicant is not entitled to interest or an award.
iii. The application is dismissed.
Released: February 25, 2025
Craig Mazerolle
Vice-Chair