Thomas M. Slahta

The appellant, Annabelle Maritza Edgeworth, appealed an order which dismissed most of the claims in her action.

Her action alleged that the respondents (lawyers, an insurer, and a medical assessor) conspired to suppress a defence medical report in a prior personal injury case, leading to claims for unlawful means conspiracy, intrusion on seclusion, conspiracy to injure, and misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that a failure to comply with a procedural rule (r. 33.06) was not a "wrongful act" for unlawful means conspiracy, and the intrusion on seclusion claim failed as the medical examination was consented to.

The court also affirmed the removal of the appellant's counsel due to a conflict of interest.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Centurion Mortgage Capital Corporation brought a motion for determination of a mortgage priority dispute with The Guarantee Company of North America (GCNA) regarding a condominium development project.

The court found that counsel for both parties had agreed in May 2016 that Centurion's mortgage would have priority over GCNA's mortgage, except with respect to purchasers' deposits.

The court also held that GCNA was precluded by proprietary estoppel from relying on a registered postponement acknowledgment to assert priority over Centurion's mortgage.

The court declared Centurion's mortgage subordinate only with respect to deposits and ordered the deletion of the postponement acknowledgment from title.

The appellants appealed from a motion judge's decision that dismissed their motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment for a declaration that three agreements of purchase and sale were valid and enforceable.

The central issue was the interpretation of handwritten amendments to the agreements that used the terms "verdict" and "official verdict" in place of the defined term "OMB Decision." The appellants argued that the use of different terms presumptively indicated different meanings were intended.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's conclusion that the terms had the same meaning, finding that the parties' clear intention was to condition the agreements on receipt of a final decision from the Ontario Municipal Board regarding a proposed development.

This endorsement addresses the determination of full indemnity costs following contempt proceedings.

The plaintiff, Sycor, claimed $280,530.83, while the defendants proposed $216,843.46.

The court reiterated that full indemnity costs cover all reasonably incurred fees and disbursements, not extra services.

The defendants challenged the hourly rates of the plaintiff's counsel and discrepancies in billed hours.

The court found the plaintiff's counsel's rates reasonable for Toronto's Commercial List, dismissing the argument that lower defence counsel rates should be determinative.

The court also rejected the use of outdated Civil Rules Committee cost guidelines for full indemnity costs.

A deduction of $22,000 was made for discrepancies in billed hours for the liability phase, but time spent on a preceding judicial settlement conference was deemed reasonably incurred.

Ultimately, the defendants were ordered to pay Sycor costs of $258,530.83 on a joint and several basis.

In the penalty phase of a civil contempt motion, the plaintiff sought to strike the defendants' pleadings, punitive damages, fines, and costs after the defendants were found to have intentionally failed to produce sales invoices and emails, and swore a false affidavit of documents.

The court declined to strike the pleadings or award punitive damages, noting the documents were eventually produced.

Instead, the court ordered the defendants to pay fines of $7,500 and $5,000 to the plaintiff, costs thrown away of approximately $20,000, and the costs of the contempt motion on a full indemnity basis.

Following a successful motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the defendants' conduct, which included oppressive actions, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to cooperate with the court-appointed investigator, warranted an elevated costs award.

The court fixed costs at $170,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the defendants.

The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, previously obtained a judgment setting aside a transfer agreement and declaring a constructive trust over her one-third interest in corporate assets diverted by the defendants.

Following the appointment of an expert to trace the diverted assets, the plaintiff brought a motion for an interim payment under section 248 of the OBCA and Rule 20.

The court found that the defendants had improperly used corporate funds to pay their legal fees and the expert's costs, and had diverted several real estate properties and sale proceeds.

The court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $6,098,427 as an interim payment representing her undisputed one-third interest in the diverted assets and improperly paid expenses.

The plaintiffs brought a $10 million solicitor negligence action against their former lawyers arising from legal services provided during a shareholder dispute and mediation leading to a buyout of the plaintiffs’ interest in a shoe business.

They alleged the lawyers forced them into a sale, misrepresented valuation implications, failed to protect a purported 50% ownership interest, and negligently advised bringing an unsuccessful motion to set aside a mediated agreement.

The court rejected the allegations, finding the plaintiff was a sophisticated businessperson who actively participated in negotiations, reviewed drafts, and instructed counsel throughout.

The evidence showed the mediated agreement was knowingly entered into as a binding agreement with a reasonable valuation date and arbitration mechanism.

The court held the defendants met the standard of care of a reasonably competent lawyer and that any strategic decisions fell within a reasonable range of professional judgment.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 39.02(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to examine opposing litigation counsel under Rule 39.03 in connection with a forthcoming motion for particulars.

The motion arose after cross‑examination revealed that the affiant, a lawyer at the plaintiff’s firm, lacked personal knowledge of key factual assertions in her affidavit and had relied on information prepared by counsel.

Applying the factors articulated in First Capital Realty Inc. v. Centrecorp Management Services Ltd., the court held the proposed examination was relevant, arose from matters uncovered during cross‑examination, would not cause non‑compensable prejudice, and could not reasonably have been sought earlier.

The court further held that proportionality and a contextual approach supported allowing the examination where the relevant information was uniquely within counsel’s knowledge.

Leave to examine the lawyer was therefore granted, with costs reserved.

Following a successful civil action in which a transfer agreement was set aside and the plaintiff was declared to hold a one‑third interest in certain assets, the court determined the appropriate scale and quantum of costs.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, arguing the defendants’ conduct involved breach of fiduciary duty, undue influence, misrepresentation, and unconscionability.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were warranted because the defendants’ conduct was reprehensible, including exploiting a vulnerable family member and deliberately failing to produce relevant financial records during litigation.

After considering objections regarding duplication of counsel, abandoned claims, and the reasonableness of hours billed, the court fixed costs globally.

The court awarded $525,000 inclusive of taxes and disbursements.

Following a judgment in favour of the plaintiff, the court addressed the appropriate process for determining costs.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $587,000, while the defendants argued that the matter should be referred to an assessment officer because the plaintiff had not produced detailed dockets or invoices supporting the claimed fees and disbursements.

The court held that under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial judge should ordinarily fix costs and that referral to an assessment officer is reserved for exceptional cases.

The absence of detailed dockets did not make the case exceptional, particularly where a proper costs outline had been provided in accordance with the rules.

The court declined to order an assessment and directed a further written exchange of submissions after disclosure of dockets if requested.

The plaintiff's husband died in a construction accident, leaving her as the sole heir to his one-third interest in a successful family construction and real estate business.

While emotionally distraught and relying heavily on her sister-in-law to manage the estate and business affairs, the plaintiff signed a Transfer Agreement giving up her husband's shares and real estate interests in exchange for a condominium of significantly lesser value.

The plaintiff brought an action to set aside the Transfer Agreement.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the sister-in-law and brother-in-law had abused their relationship of trust, and set aside the agreement on the grounds of undue influence, unconscionability, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.

The court also declared that the plaintiff was entitled to a one-third interest in various joint venture properties that had been improperly diverted to a company solely owned by the sister-in-law.

A not‑for‑profit campus radio corporation sought a winding‑up order under the Winding Up and Restructuring Act after losing its broadcast licence, premises, and funding.

The opposing party argued the court lacked jurisdiction, that the members’ resolution was invalid because it referred to “dissolution” rather than “winding up,” and that potential derivative claims should proceed.

The court held that the distinction between “dissolve” and “wind up” was immaterial in the circumstances and that the corporation had no meaningful assets or operational purpose.

The court rejected the argument that speculative derivative claims justified preserving the corporation’s existence.

A winding‑up order was granted and the opposition dismissed.