Gustavo Fabian Camelino

The Receiver brought a motion seeking a declaration that certain transfers made by the debtor to third-party creditors were transfers at undervalue under section 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and an order for repayment.

The debtor's principal had breached a preservation order by using a tax refund to pay personal and corporate debts owed to the third parties, who received the funds in good faith without knowledge of the receivership or the court order.

The court found that while the transfers met the criteria for transfers at undervalue, the exceptional circumstances of the case warranted exercising discretion to not require the third parties to repay the funds.

The Receiver's reports and fees were approved.

This endorsement addresses a motion by TruGrp Inc. to set aside a prior vacating order, specifically concerning the interpretation of the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice's role as custodian of lien security and the substitution of a letter of credit with a bank draft.

The court had previously directed that the Accountant and the Bank of Montreal (BMO) be served to provide their positions.

Both the Accountant and BMO confirmed that a bank draft could be accepted under specific conditions outlined in the letter of credit or with a further court order for substitution.

TruGrp's concerns regarding lien security extinguishment were addressed by these positions, leading to the effective withdrawal of the motion on its merits, with only costs remaining in dispute.

TruGrp Inc. moved to set aside an ex parte order vacating its construction liens, arguing that the form of letter of credit used as security was uncertain and inconsistent with the Construction Act and the Accountant's statutory role.

Karmina Holdings Inc. opposed, arguing the motion was meritless and that the letter of credit form was standard.

The court dismissed Karmina's procedural challenges but adjourned the motion to allow the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice and the Bank of Montreal to make submissions on the core dispute regarding the sufficiency and statutory compliance of the letter of credit.

The plaintiff was severely injured in a recreational hockey game when the defendant delivered a blindside hit to his head.

The plaintiff suffered a concussion, broken teeth, and facial cuts, leading to long-term cognitive and functional limitations that impacted his ability to work as a personal trainer.

The defendant argued the collision was accidental and that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent due to his choice of facial protection and chronic cannabis use.

The court found the defendant fully liable, concluding the hit was intentional or reckless and outside the bounds of fair play.

The court awarded the plaintiff $702,551 in damages, including general damages and past and future income loss.

The plaintiff, Drew Casterton, sued the defendant, Gordon MacIsaac, for injuries sustained during a recreational hockey game collision.

The court found MacIsaac liable for intentionally or recklessly causing a blindside hit to Casterton's face, which was deemed outside the bounds of fair play.

The defence of contributory negligence, based on Casterton's choice of a half-visor and alleged cannabis impairment, was rejected.

Casterton was awarded general damages, past income loss, and future income loss, totaling $702,551, but punitive damages were not granted.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their wrongful dismissal action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The appellants were dismissed for cause in November 2009 and commenced their action in July 2015, approximately six years later.

The appellants argued that they did not know whether a civil proceeding was an appropriate means to seek remedy until related criminal proceedings were resolved.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, holding that "appropriate" under section 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act means legally appropriate, not whether the proceeding will succeed.

The court distinguished Winmill v. Woodstock (Police Services Board) on the basis that the civil and criminal matters were not mirror images of each other in this case.

The defendant sought costs following its successful motion for summary judgment which dismissed the plaintiffs' action as statute-barred.

The defendant claimed $37,691.87 in total costs, while the plaintiffs argued for $22,575.67.

The court reduced the defendant's fees due to duplication of work by senior and junior counsel and disallowed certain disbursements, including computer research charges.

Costs were fixed at $32,802.35 on a partial indemnity basis, payable by the plaintiffs within 60 days.

This case addresses a contractual dispute between a midwifery practice group (AMMA) and three former associate midwives regarding a clause requiring the withdrawal of hospital privileges upon termination of their agreements.

The court examined whether the clause applied to an expired contract, whether privileges were 'held through' the practice group, and if the clause constituted an unreasonable restraint of trade.

The court found the 'termination' clause ambiguous and, applying contra proferentem, ruled it did not apply to an expired contract.

However, it found that privileges were indeed 'held through' the practice group for the purpose of the clause.

The court also determined that the clause was not a restraint of trade under Ontario's formalistic approach, as it did not prohibit competition but merely required the withdrawal of privileges obtained through the association.

The application was dismissed against one respondent (whose contract expired) but allowed against the other two (whose contracts were terminated).

The defendant MacEwen Petroleum Inc. brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' wrongful dismissal claim as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued the limitation period should run from the date of their criminal acquittals, not the date of termination, citing exceptions for claims against state agents.

The court found that the plaintiffs' claim was discoverable on the date of termination (November 9, 2009) and did not fall within the narrow exceptions for tolling the limitation period, which are typically reserved for cases involving police misconduct where civil and criminal claims are "mirror images." The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs' claims were dismissed as statute-barred.

The appellant appealed an order of the Licence Appeal Tribunal directing the revocation of its liquor licence.

The revocation was based on findings that the appellant permitted a patron to remove alcohol, permitted unlawful gambling, and that the manager obstructed and assaulted an inspector.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error of law in the Tribunal's assessment of the evidence or its application of the test under s. 6(2)(d) of the Liquor Licence Act.

The plaintiff tripped at the entrance of a store, sustaining injuries.

She sued the tenant (Swirls) and the landlord (Anastasios) under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue for trial.

The court found no breach of the duty of care, noting the entrance was properly constructed and a warning sign was present, which the plaintiff admitted seeing.

The plaintiff's expert opinion on warning sign specifics (capitalization, color) was deemed illogical and moot.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against all defendants and Swirls' cross-claim against Anastasios were dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, with the plaintiff bearing the majority.

The plaintiff tripped at the entrance of a store, sustaining injuries.

She sued the tenant (Swirls) and the landlord (Anastasios) under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

Both defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing no genuine issue for trial.

The court found no breach of the duty of care, noting the entrance was properly constructed and a warning sign was present, which the plaintiff admitted seeing.

The plaintiff's expert opinion on warning sign specifics (capitalization, color) was deemed illogical and moot.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against all defendants and Swirls' cross-claim against Anastasios were dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the defendants, with the plaintiff bearing the majority.

Following a successful motion for partial summary judgment, the plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the defendants' conduct, which included oppressive actions, breach of fiduciary duty, and failure to cooperate with the court-appointed investigator, warranted an elevated costs award.

The court fixed costs at $170,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes, payable by the defendants.

The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, previously obtained a judgment setting aside a transfer agreement and declaring a constructive trust over her one-third interest in corporate assets diverted by the defendants.

Following the appointment of an expert to trace the diverted assets, the plaintiff brought a motion for an interim payment under section 248 of the OBCA and Rule 20.

The court found that the defendants had improperly used corporate funds to pay their legal fees and the expert's costs, and had diverted several real estate properties and sale proceeds.

The court ordered the defendants to pay the plaintiff $6,098,427 as an interim payment representing her undisputed one-third interest in the diverted assets and improperly paid expenses.

The appellant and respondent jointly owned a property and had joint debt with an execution creditor.

After the property was sold under power of sale, a surplus remained.

The appellant had filed a consumer proposal, triggering a stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The application judge ordered the execution creditor's debt to be paid from the total surplus before dividing the remainder equally between the appellant and respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the stay of proceedings precluded the execution creditor from recovering against the appellant's share.

The joint tenancy was severed, and the execution creditor's debt could only be paid from the respondent's 50 percent share of the surplus.

The Regional Municipality of Peel appealed a trial judgment finding it solely responsible for flood damage to the plaintiffs' homes caused by sewer backups during heavy rainfalls in 1995 and 1996.

The Region argued that the City of Brampton's storm sewer system was deficient and contributed to the flooding.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's finding that the flooding was caused by a failure of the sanitary sewer system, which the Region took over responsibility for in 1974.

There was no evidence that Brampton's storm sewer system was negligently operated or caused the flooding.

The appellants brought an application in Ontario for a declaration that assignments of mining licences relating to Mongolian properties were null and void.

The motion judge stayed the application, finding no real and substantial connection to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the connection to Ontario was weak and that any declaratory or injunctive order would likely be unenforceable in Mongolia under the rules of private international law regarding foreign land.

The appellant financed insurance premiums for the respondent, taking an assignment of the right to receive any unearned premiums as security.

After the respondent defaulted and obtained CCAA protection, the appellant sought to enforce its security.

The motion judge held that the appellant's security interest was not perfected because it was not registered under the PPSA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the assignment of unearned premiums is a transfer of an interest in or under a policy of insurance, which is exempt from PPSA registration under s. 4(1)(c) of the PPSA and s. 138 of the Insurance Act.