Michael Odumodu

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment for damages arising from the defendants' breach of an agreement of purchase and sale for residential property.

The defendants agreed to purchase the property for $1,600,000 with an August 15, 2022 closing date but failed to close because the sale of their own home did not complete.

The plaintiffs subsequently resold the property to third parties for $1,325,000.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the agreement was unconditional, the defendants breached by failing to close, and the plaintiffs took reasonable mitigation steps.

The court awarded damages of $169,376.51 after deducting the forfeited deposit and saved commissions.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Rene Luypaert’s appeal from an order granting the sale of a jointly owned property and a writ of possession for another property, both owned by his parents, for whom his sisters acted as litigation guardians.

The court found no error in the application judge’s refusal to grant an adjournment, in the application of the Partition Act, or in the issuance of the writ of possession.

The court also confirmed its jurisdiction to hear the appeal, given the mixed nature of the relief granted.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff, a golf course operator, sought an interim injunction to regain possession of the golf course after the defendant owner purported to terminate their lease agreement.

The lease included a profit-sharing arrangement.

The defendant alleged breaches including failure to obtain a liquor license, poor record-keeping, and self-dealing by the plaintiff's principals, specifically pocketing cash from memberships and restaurant sales.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case or irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favored the defendant due to the plaintiff's "unclean hands" and the irreparable breakdown of trust in the profit-sharing venture.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for breach of contract arising from a failed residential real estate transaction.

The defendant purchasers counterclaimed, alleging misrepresentation regarding an "in-law" suite and frustration of contract due to market changes.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that without cross-examinations (not permitted under Rule 76), it could not weigh evidence or make credibility findings, and there were gaps in the damages evidence.

The court also granted leave to amend the plaintiffs' claim to correct a defendant's name.

The appellant appealed a decision and was partially successful, achieving a $1,000 reduction in damages, but the respondent succeeded on the main issue of liability.

The respondent had also made offers to settle that would have significantly reduced the amount paid by the appellant.

The court awarded costs of the appeal to the respondent in the amount of $6,000, which was the amount proposed by the appellant.

The appellant car dealership appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $20,179 in damages for misrepresenting the condition of a used vehicle that had previously been designated a 'lemon'.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on liability and the damages for financing and repair costs, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part by setting aside the $1,000 award for mental stress, as there was no medical evidence to support it.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following a trial where the plaintiffs were successful in their breach of contract claim against the defendants, arising from an aborted business sale.

The court had previously found the defendants committed an anticipatory breach and awarded damages of $53,310.04.

The plaintiffs sought $70,000 in costs, while the defendants argued no costs should be awarded, citing the judgment amount being below the Rule 76 threshold.

The court, applying Rule 57.01, found that costs were appropriate given the plaintiffs' success, their Rule 49 offer, and the defendants' unfounded allegation of civil fraud, which complicated the trial.

The court awarded the plaintiffs an all-inclusive amount of $64,000 for costs.

The appeal was scheduled to be heard, but at the outset, counsel for the respondent raised a potential conflict of interest regarding one of the appellant's counsel, who had previously acted for the respondent in the same dispute.

The court adjourned the appeal and set a schedule for the respondent to bring a conflict motion, reserving the costs of the attendance to the judge hearing the motion or the appeal.

This trial concerned a failed asset purchase agreement for a fastener distribution business.

The plaintiffs, vendors of the business, sued the defendants, purchasers, for breach of contract after the transaction failed to close.

The defendants argued the agreement was void for uncertainty and that the plaintiffs had made fraudulent misrepresentations regarding sales and inventory.

The court found the agreement enforceable, dismissed the misrepresentation claims, and determined that the defendants committed an anticipatory breach by attempting to renegotiate the purchase price.

The plaintiffs were awarded damages, calculated based on the expectancy principle, though the amount was adjusted from their initial claim.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages and indemnification arising from the purchase of a defective commercial truck.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the contract by failing to provide a reasonably fit vehicle and subsequently failing to honour an agreement to exchange the truck.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on breach of contract and indemnification, finding no palpable and overriding error in the interpretation of the contract or the admission of parol evidence.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, dismissing the action against the individual appellants because there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil or find them personally liable for the corporation's breach of contract.

This appeal concerned the priority of a solicitor's charging order over construction lien trust funds, specifically whether interest on the contract price is included in the trust funds.

Sutherland Law, the appellant, appealed the Divisional Court's decision which had granted Great Northern Insulation Services Ltd. priority for its claim, including interest, over Sutherland Law's charging order.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Divisional Court's decision, holding that interest on the contract price is included in the trust funds under the Construction Lien Act, and that the Divisional Court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court also confirmed that there is only one trust fund for subcontractors and that a contractor cannot claim against trust funds if it used trust funds to pay another subcontractor.

The appeal was dismissed.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a costs award.

The motion was heard in writing and dismissed without costs.

The applicant, operating a tree-service business as a sole proprietor under the name 'Arbor-Aide', brought an application alleging the respondent corporation, 'Arbor Aid Ltd.', passed off its business as the applicant's contrary to the Trade-Marks Act and common law.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to establish the requisite goodwill in the respondent's geographic area of operation.

Furthermore, the court found no likelihood of confusion given the descriptive nature of the names, visual differences, and distinct business models, and concluded there was no evidence of actual or potential damages.

The appellant subcontractor appealed a trial judge's decision granting priority to a solicitors' charging order over the subcontractor's trust claim under the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that funds payable to the contractor by the owners on account of an assigned lien were trust funds under section 8 of the Act.

The court held that the subcontractor's trust claim, including interest on the trust funds, takes priority over the solicitors' charging order.

The applicants, children of Theresa Hutter, brought a cross-motion in an ongoing application concerning their mother's capacity and financial management.

Theresa, diagnosed with dementia, had moved to British Columbia with her son Fred (a respondent and her attorney for property).

The applicants sought to amend their application to compel Fred to pass accounts and for specific financial directions.

The court affirmed its jurisdiction despite Theresa's residence in British Columbia, citing the origin of the powers of attorney in Ontario and the presence of assets held in trust in the province.

Leave to amend the application to seek a passing of accounts was granted, as the applicants demonstrated a genuine interest in Theresa's welfare and a reasonable belief that a court might order an accounting.

However, the court declined to order an immediate passing of accounts due to insufficient clear evidence of mismanagement at this stage, instead ordering Fred to provide specific financial disclosure from January 1, 2018.

The court also declined to issue specific directions regarding payments for Theresa's care or property expenses.

The moving party, a law firm representing the general contractor in a consolidated construction lien and breach of contract action, brought a motion for a charging order under s. 34 of the Solicitors Act for unpaid legal fees.

The motion was opposed by a subcontractor who had obtained a judgment against the general contractor and served a notice of garnishment on the property owners.

The court granted the charging order, finding that the law firm was instrumental in recovering funds for its client.

The court further held that the funds recovered were not trust funds under the Construction Lien Act, and therefore the solicitor's charging order took priority over the subcontractor's garnishment notice.

The plaintiff contractor was hired to renovate a barn for the defendants under a lump sum contract.

The contractor claimed the defendants agreed to a second contract with an increased price for a third floor, and also claimed for various oral extras.

Two unpaid suppliers registered construction liens against the property.

The court found that the defendants only agreed to the original contract and that no third floor was built.

The court assessed the claimed extras, allowing some and dismissing others.

The court also determined the owners' holdback liability to the lien claimants under the Construction Lien Act.

This endorsement addresses cost issues following a summary judgment motion and an allegation of judicial bias raised by the plaintiffs.

The judge declined to recuse himself, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $25,000 in costs to Thomson Mahoney Delorey (TMD) as per agreement.

However, the Shirley defendants were awarded no costs for the motion, as they had attended on a watching brief without formal participation.

No additional costs were awarded for dealing with the bias allegation.

The defendant bankruptcy trustee brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for conversion and negligence on the basis that the two-year limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff claimed a half-interest in a boat that her bankrupt husband had purportedly gifted to their son, which the trustee subsequently seized and sold.

The court found that the trustee took possession of the boat on May 30, 2011, and the statement of claim was issued exactly two years later on May 30, 2013, making it within the limitation period.

The court also noted that the alleged conversion likely occurred when the boat was sold, not when possession was taken.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed.

The personal respondents requested to be removed as parties to a human rights application alleging workplace discrimination and reprisal.

The Tribunal denied the request, applying the principles from Sigrist and Carson.

The Tribunal found that the corporate respondent had not assumed liability for the personal respondents' actions, nor indicated it would satisfy any remedy ordered against them.

Furthermore, the applicant made specific allegations regarding the conduct of both personal respondents that would not be adequately addressed if they were removed.