Benjamin E. Jefferies

The plaintiff, a masonry subcontractor, sued the defendant general contractor for breach of a Contract A formed during a public construction tendering process, alleging the defendant was obligated to use it as the masonry subcontractor after naming it on its tender form submitted to the school board.

The court found no contract existed between the parties because the defendant never issued a call for tenders to subcontractors and no bid depository system was in place, meaning the Ron Engineering Contract A framework did not apply.

The court further held that even if a contract existed, the plaintiff's bid was materially non-compliant with the tender specifications, and the plaintiff failed to prove it suffered any damages given its inability to isolate expected profit from overhead costs and its mitigation income from other projects.

The Plaintiff, 2449442 Ontario Inc., was awarded $82,752 at trial in a construction lien case, while the Defendant, Cambridge Drywall Services LTD. (CDS), succeeded on its counterclaim for $30,000, resulting in a net recovery of $52,752 for the Plaintiff.

CDS successfully defended against 87% of the Plaintiff's total claim.

This decision addresses the parties' claims for costs.

The court considered factors under Rule 57, including divided success and CDS's offer to settle, which, though not compliant with Rule 49.10(2) due to timing, exceeded the Plaintiff's net recovery.

The court also addressed the applicability of simplified procedure rules under the Construction Act.

Ultimately, the court ordered CDS to pay the Plaintiff $100,000 in costs plus HST and disbursements, reflecting a reduction from the Plaintiff's claimed costs due to the divided success and CDS's reasonable, albeit non-compliant, offer.

The plaintiffs sought summary judgment in a simplified procedure action for breach of contract arising from a failed residential real estate transaction.

The defendant purchasers counterclaimed, alleging misrepresentation regarding an "in-law" suite and frustration of contract due to market changes.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motion, finding that without cross-examinations (not permitted under Rule 76), it could not weigh evidence or make credibility findings, and there were gaps in the damages evidence.

The court also granted leave to amend the plaintiffs' claim to correct a defendant's name.

The appellant, Barry James Gallant, appealed a motion judge's finding that the respondent, Miranda Bailey's, obligations as a guarantor on a mortgage loan ended on June 28, 2014, and that she was not bound by subsequent mortgage extensions made without her notice.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error.

The motion judge had reasonably interpreted the mortgage documents, including standard terms, the mortgage agreement, and the mortgage schedule, to conclude that the guarantee's duration was limited to the 12-month period set out in the mortgage agreement, thereby modifying the standard terms.

The applicant sought to terminate the respondents' occupancy of her home, arguing it was a familial arrangement and not a tenancy.

The respondents contended they had a valid tenancy under the Commercial Tenancies Act based on an unsigned agreement and part performance.

The court found the arrangement was familial, not a tenancy, and ordered the respondents to vacate the property, emphasizing that family arrangements can negate the intention to create a legal tenancy.

This case involved cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the enforceability of a personal guarantee provided by a defendant for a corporate mortgage.

The plaintiff, a mortgagee, sought to enforce the guarantee against the defendant guarantor, despite multiple mortgage extensions made without the guarantor's knowledge or consent.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, particularly the strict construction of guarantee clauses, especially for accommodation sureties.

It found that specific language in the Mortgage Schedule, which defined a time-limited guarantee, amended the broader Standard Charge Terms that allowed for extensions without affecting the guarantee.

Consequently, the guarantor's liability was held to have terminated upon the expiration of the initial term, rendering the guarantee unenforceable at the time of default.