Allison Farley

Global Fuels Inc. appealed an Associate Justice's order that dismissed its motion to compel the defendants to provide a further and better affidavit of documents.

The original motion was dismissed because the requested documents were deemed irrelevant and the request disproportionately broad, seeking thousands of pages of irrelevant material.

The appeal judge upheld the Associate Justice's decision, agreeing that the documents sought, which were not related to gas stations with exclusivity contracts with Global Fuels, were irrelevant to the pleaded causes of action (unlawful interference, inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy).

The court also affirmed the proportionality principle, noting that Global Fuels could have narrowed its request.

The appeal was dismissed, and Global Fuels Inc. was ordered to pay costs.

The appellant, Gerald Sternberg, appealed the dismissal of his action against Cresford Capital Corporation, seeking payment as a guarantor for a vendor take-back mortgage.

Sternberg had sold land to Cresford, which then assigned the agreement and mortgage to a single-purpose corporation that defaulted.

Cresford's name appeared as guarantor on the electronic mortgage registration, but Cresford argued this was an error and that no guarantee agreement existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to Cresford, finding no guarantee agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge correctly interpreted the agreements and that the electronic registration was an error inconsistent with the parties' bargain.

The Court emphasized the high standard of deference to the motion judge's contractual interpretation and found no reversible error.

This case involved cross-motions for summary judgment concerning the enforceability of a personal guarantee provided by a defendant for a corporate mortgage.

The plaintiff, a mortgagee, sought to enforce the guarantee against the defendant guarantor, despite multiple mortgage extensions made without the guarantor's knowledge or consent.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, particularly the strict construction of guarantee clauses, especially for accommodation sureties.

It found that specific language in the Mortgage Schedule, which defined a time-limited guarantee, amended the broader Standard Charge Terms that allowed for extensions without affecting the guarantee.

Consequently, the guarantor's liability was held to have terminated upon the expiration of the initial term, rendering the guarantee unenforceable at the time of default.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay under Rule 24.01(1)(c), arguing the plaintiff failed to set the action down for trial within six months of the close of pleadings.

The court found an inordinate and inexcusable 2.5-year delay.

This delay resulted in substantial prejudice to the defendants' ability to defend the action due to the death of Albert Gilbert, a crucial witness whose oral promises formed the basis of the plaintiff's claim.

The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion for a certificate of pending litigation and disclosure of real estate transactions regarding a property he previously occupied.

The defendant second mortgagee brought a cross-motion to dismiss the action against it and for a judicial sale of the property.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion, finding damages were an adequate remedy and the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate a prior default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court granted the defendant's motion, dismissing the action against it on the basis of res judicata and ordering a judicial sale of the property.