Jonathan Silver

The appellant, an environmental advocacy group, appealed decisions of the Ontario Energy Board granting leave to construct four natural gas projects.

The appellant argued that the Board erred in law and breached procedural fairness by denying its requests to file proposed survey and expert evidence and to convene a technical conference.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board applied the correct legal test by balancing the probative value of the evidence against regulatory efficiency.

Applying the Baker factors, the Court held that the appellant, as an intervenor, was owed a duty of fairness at the lower end of the spectrum, and the Board's procedural choices did not amount to a denial of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Enbridge Gas Inc.'s appeal, upholding the Divisional Court's finding that the 1957 franchise agreement between Enbridge and the County of Essex had not expired under the rule against perpetuities.

The court found that the Ontario Energy Board (OEB) erred in law by misapplying the rule against perpetuities, focusing on the duration of the right rather than the vesting of the interest.

The court also held that the Divisional Court was not bound by its earlier decision in Dawn-Euphemia and that the OEB could not impose a new franchise agreement unless the existing one had lapsed or was about to lapse.

The appellant, Gerald Sternberg, appealed the dismissal of his action against Cresford Capital Corporation, seeking payment as a guarantor for a vendor take-back mortgage.

Sternberg had sold land to Cresford, which then assigned the agreement and mortgage to a single-purpose corporation that defaulted.

Cresford's name appeared as guarantor on the electronic mortgage registration, but Cresford argued this was an error and that no guarantee agreement existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to Cresford, finding no guarantee agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge correctly interpreted the agreements and that the electronic registration was an error inconsistent with the parties' bargain.

The Court emphasized the high standard of deference to the motion judge's contractual interpretation and found no reversible error.

The appellant sought leave to file a reply factum in an appeal, asserting that the respondent's factum introduced new issues, specifically regarding whether a secondary argument was properly raised on appeal and the applicability of the doctrine of merger.

The court found that new issues were indeed raised by the respondent and granted the appellant leave to file a reply factum, while denying the respondent the right to file a sur-reply factum.

Costs for the motion were reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The applicants, a registered political party and its fund, sought judicial review of the Chief Electoral Officer's decision refusing to pay them three quarterly per-vote subsidies following the 2022 provincial election.

The applicants sought an order of mandamus compelling payment or, alternatively, a finding that the decision was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court held that the CEO had rendered a reviewable decision involving statutory interpretation, making mandamus unavailable.

Applying a reasonableness standard, the Court found the CEO's interpretation of the Election Finances Act—that the party was ineligible for the payments based on the 2021 amendments—was reasonable.

The application was dismissed.

In the receivership of the Stateview entities, Tarion Warranty Corporation brought a motion seeking declaratory relief on behalf of purchasers who had paid deposits for pre-construction homes.

Tarion argued that the deposits were subject to an express or constructive trust and sought a remedial constructive trust to elevate the purchasers' priority.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the purchasers had contractually subordinated their interests to secured lenders.

While an express trust existed for contracts with early termination provisions, the funds were not segregated.

The court declined to impose a remedial constructive trust, as doing so would improperly upset the priority scheme under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

This motion concerned the priority of new home purchasers' deposits in the bankruptcy of residential real estate developers (Stateview entities).

Tarion Warranty Corporation sought declaratory relief, arguing that the deposits were subject to express or constructive trusts due to unjust enrichment, which would elevate purchasers' claims.

The court dismissed Tarion's motion, finding that purchasers' agreements contained subordination clauses giving priority to secured lenders.

The court also determined that while express trusts existed for some purchasers with early termination provisions, these were not statutory deemed trusts.

Furthermore, there was no unjust enrichment for purchasers without express trusts, as the operation of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act constituted a juristic reason.

The court declined to impose a remedial constructive trust, emphasizing the high bar for such remedies in insolvency proceedings and the lack of a close causal connection between the deposits and the real property proceeds.

This is an appeal from an order of the Commercial List judge concerning insolvency proceedings.

The appellants, Bryton, sought to exercise an option to purchase a property and obtain orders declaring the option valid and immune from challenge by other creditors under various acts (Fraudulent Conveyances Act, Assignments and Preferences Act, Canada Business Corporations Act oppression remedy, and Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act).

The application judge dismissed Bryton's request for a vesting order and declaratory relief, finding that the claims were not res judicata and that declaratory relief was not the appropriate vehicle to pre-emptively bar unadjudicated creditor claims.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, confirming that the validity of the option was not res judicata and that the refusal to grant declaratory relief was a proper exercise of discretion, as the application procedure was not suitable for dismissing unproven claims.

This is an appeal from a commercial arbitration award that found a metal purchase and sale agreement between Franco-Nevada and Taseko had been frustrated due to the denial of federal environmental approvals for a gold mine project.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a reasonableness standard of review, found the arbitrator's conclusion unreasonable.

The court held that the arbitrator misapplied the test for frustration by failing to properly consider foreseeability and by misinterpreting the contract as project- and timeline-specific, despite provisions allowing for changes and a long term.

The appeal was granted, overturning the frustration finding.

A motion for a sealing order for confidential information was also granted.

The appellant infringed a patent held by the respondents for metallocene linear low-density polyethylenes (thin but strong plastics).

Following a liability finding, a reference judge awarded the respondents an accounting of profits equal to the appellant's actual revenue minus actual full costs, and also awarded springboard profits — profits earned post-patent-expiry causally attributable to infringement during the patent period.

The majority dismissed the appeal, holding that an accounting of profits requires disgorgement of all profits causally attributable to the invention using a three-step framework; the appellant's concession that no non-infringing option existed precluded reduction of the award; and springboard profits are legally permissible and factually supported.

Côté J. dissented, arguing the differential profit approach should have been available and the matter remitted to the Federal Court.

The applicant, a non-Catholic student at a Catholic high school, challenged a school board policy requiring student trustees to be Roman Catholic.

The Divisional Court held that the policy was not protected by the denominational school rights in s. 93(1) of the Constitution Act, 1867, because the role of student trustee did not exist at Confederation and does not involve governance.

The court found the policy violated the equality rights of non-Catholic students under s. 15(1) of the Charter and could not be justified under s. 1.

Furthermore, the policy was found to be ultra vires the school board as it conflicted with provincial regulations.

The policy was quashed.

The respondent requested a correction to a costs endorsement, noting the judge had mistakenly written the fee total instead of the all-inclusive total of fees, taxes, and disbursements.

The applicants objected, arguing the endorsement was clear and the issue should be raised on cross-appeal since an appeal had already been commenced.

The court corrected the transposition error, amending the costs award to the intended all-inclusive amount of $2,288,314.57, noting the Court of Appeal would prefer the corrected outcome over a cross-appeal about a typo.

The applicant political party sought judicial review of the Chief Electoral Officer's responses to its complaints regarding the exclusion of its candidates from third-party organized election debates.

The applicant argued that the exclusion constituted illegal campaign contributions and violated Charter rights.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Chief Electoral Officer's disposition of the complaints did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision and did not affect any legal rights or privileges, and therefore was not subject to judicial review under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Following a successful appeal, the appellant sought its costs of the original application on a substantial indemnity basis, citing the respondent's bad faith dealing.

The Court of Appeal declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the respondent's conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible, scandalous, or outrageous.

The Court awarded the appellant partial indemnity costs fixed at $100,000.

The appellant sought to sell 15 gas stations in Ontario and Quebec, requiring the assignment of leases and credit/debit card agreements.

The respondent refused to consent to the assignments unless the appellant agreed to a five-year contract extension.

The application judge found the refusal unreasonable for the leases but dismissed the application entirely due to Quebec choice of law and forum selection clauses in some leases.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the judge erred by not granting relief for the Ontario stations, by failing to apply the strong cause test to depart from the forum selection clauses, and by not finding that the duty of good faith precluded the respondent from unreasonably withholding consent to the credit/debit card agreements.

Nation Rise sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke its Renewable Energy Approval for a wind farm project.

The Minister had revoked the approval based on concerns about harm to bat maternity colonies, an issue not raised by the parties before the Environmental Review Tribunal or on appeal.

The Divisional Court quashed the Minister's decision, finding it unreasonable because the Minister lacked statutory authority to raise new issues on appeal, applied the wrong legal test by using a precautionary approach, and misapprehended the evidence.

The Court also found the Minister breached procedural fairness by failing to give notice of the new issue and denying the parties an opportunity to make submissions on remedy.

The ERT's approval of the project was reinstated.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal hearing related to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) proceedings of Urbancorp Cumberland 2 GP Inc. and related entities.

The panel reviewed the costs requests from the appellants and respondents and found the amounts reasonable.

Specific costs were ordered to be paid out of the Estate of the Cumberland Group to the appellants (Toro Aluminum, Speedy Electrical, Dolvin Mechanical) and two respondents (Guy Gissin, Tarion Warranty Corporation).

The Monitor and the Attorney General of Ontario did not seek costs.

This appeal concerns the effectiveness of a statutory trust under s. 9(1) of Ontario's Construction Lien Act (CLA) in Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) insolvency proceedings.

Unpaid contractors (appellants) claimed a trust over proceeds from the sale of condominium units by the insolvent developer (Cumberland Group).

The motion judge denied the trust, relying on Re Veltri Metal Products Co., reasoning that the CCAA Monitor's involvement prevented the trust from arising.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, clarifying that a s. 9(1) CLA trust can be effective in CCAA sales processes and is only displaced by federal paramountcy if it conflicts with a specific CCAA priority.

The court distinguished Veltri, stating it did not prevent a s. 9(1) trust when proceeds exceed mortgage debt and expenses, and confirmed the "deemed receipt" rule.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Minister of the Environment revoking their authority for a wind farm project.

Three procedural motions were brought: CanWEA sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court, the Landowners sought leave to intervene as parties, and the respondent moved to strike fresh evidence filed by the applicants.

The court granted CanWEA leave to intervene, denied the Landowners leave to intervene without prejudice to their right to bring a separate application, and adjourned the motion to strike evidence to the panel hearing the underlying application.

The appellant, a federally-regulated Crown corporation, appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision reinstating a Health and Safety Officer's direction that the employer had contravened s. 125(1)(z.12) of the Canada Labour Code by failing to ensure that workplace safety inspections covered letter carrier routes and points of call beyond the physical depot building.

The appeals officer had concluded that the statutory inspection obligation applied only to workplaces the employer physically controls, and the Federal Court upheld that decision.

The majority of the Supreme Court applied the Vavilov framework for reasonableness review and held that the appeals officer's interpretation — confining the inspection duty to employer-controlled premises — was reasonable, internally coherent, and defensible in light of the text, context and purpose of the provision.

The appeal was allowed and the appeals officer's order was restored.