Connor Bildfell

The moving parties, comprising various social media companies including Meta, Snap, and TikTok entities, brought motions for leave to appeal the substantive and costs orders of Leiper J. The Divisional Court granted the motions for leave to appeal without costs and directed the parties to provide an agreed schedule for the exchange of appeal materials.

The plaintiff, Toronto District School Board, brought an action in negligence and public nuisance against several major social media corporations, alleging that their products were intentionally designed to be addictive to children and caused widespread mental health and behavioral issues among students.

The Board claimed it suffered direct economic damages in responding to these student harms, including increased costs for mental health services, security, and staff training.

The defendant corporations brought a motion to strike the statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, allowing the Board's novel claims in negligence and public nuisance to proceed.

This is an appeal from a commercial arbitration award that found a metal purchase and sale agreement between Franco-Nevada and Taseko had been frustrated due to the denial of federal environmental approvals for a gold mine project.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying a reasonableness standard of review, found the arbitrator's conclusion unreasonable.

The court held that the arbitrator misapplied the test for frustration by failing to properly consider foreseeability and by misinterpreting the contract as project- and timeline-specific, despite provisions allowing for changes and a long term.

The appeal was granted, overturning the frustration finding.

A motion for a sealing order for confidential information was also granted.

The appellants challenged the Federal Court of Appeal's decision setting aside the Copyright Board of Canada's tariff determination, which had held that s. 2.4(1.1) of the Copyright Act created a separate compensable 'making available' right triggering royalties both when works are made available online and again when downloaded or streamed.

The majority held that the Board's interpretation violated the principle of technological neutrality and was inconsistent with the text, structure, and purpose of the Act; correctness was the applicable standard of review as concurrent first instance jurisdiction between courts and the Board constitutes a sixth category of correctness review.

Section 2.4(1.1) was interpreted as clarifying only that s. 3(1)(f) applies to on-demand streams and that a work is performed as soon as it is made available for on-demand streaming, with Canada's obligations under art. 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty satisfied through a combination of existing performance, reproduction, and authorization rights.

The concurring minority would have applied a reasonableness standard but agreed the Board's decision was unreasonable for disregarding binding precedent and the principle of technological neutrality.

Appeal dismissed.

A not-for-profit disability rights organization sought public interest standing to challenge the constitutionality of British Columbia's mental health legislation permitting forced psychiatric treatment without patient consent.

After individual co-plaintiffs withdrew, the chambers judge dismissed the claim for lack of standing; the Court of Appeal remitted the matter for fresh consideration.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that legality and access to justice do not merit particular weight in the Downtown Eastside framework and that a directly affected individual co-plaintiff is not required for a public interest litigant to establish a sufficient factual setting.

Applying the three Downtown Eastside factors cumulatively, the Court granted the organization public interest standing and awarded special costs on a full indemnity basis throughout.

The Canadian Constitution Foundation challenged the constitutionality of section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibited making or publishing false statements about political figures with the intent to affect election results.

The provision was amended in 2018 to remove the word 'knowingly'.

The applicant argued this amendment rendered the provision an unjustifiable infringement on freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the removal of 'knowingly' was a substantive change, meaning the offence no longer required proof that the statement was known to be false.

Without this knowledge element, the provision failed the minimal impairment test under section 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act was declared to be of no force or effect.

The applicant challenged the constitutionality of section 91 of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibits certain false statements during an election period, and sought an urgent hearing timetable to have the matter decided before the end of the ongoing federal election.

The court dismissed the request for an expedited timetable, noting that the applicant delayed in bringing the application despite the legislation being in force for months.

The court emphasized that complex Charter challenges require careful preparation and should not be decided under artificial urgency, especially when a decision would likely not be rendered in time to materially impact the election.

A person with disabilities and long-term tenant of a non-profit housing corporation refused to disclose the value of a Henson trust established for her care and maintenance when applying for annual rent subsidy assistance.

The housing corporation denied the application on the ground that the trust constituted an 'asset' under its Asset Ceiling Policy, making the application incomplete.

The majority of the Court held that a Henson trust — where the beneficiary cannot compel distributions and cannot unilaterally collapse the trust — does not constitute an 'asset' within the ordinary meaning of that term in the rental assistance application, as it is not property the beneficiary can use to discharge debts or liabilities.

The Court further held that the tenancy agreement imposed a contractual obligation on the housing corporation to consider a complete assistance application, which obligation was breached.

The appeal was allowed, declaratory relief was granted, and the issue of monetary remedy was remitted to the court of original jurisdiction.