Andrea Lynn Bourke

The moving party, a self-represented litigant subject to a vexatious litigant order, sought to abandon her appeal of an order dismissing her application for relief from candidacy ineligibility under the Canada Elections Act, and sought costs of the appeal against the Chief Electoral Officer.

The appeal was rendered moot after Elections Canada reinterpreted s. 65(i) of the Act and removed the moving party from the ineligibility list.

The court addressed whether a grant of leave under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act to commence a proceeding extends to appeals, holding that it does not and a fresh grant of leave is required.

Despite the moving party's failure to obtain leave, the court granted leave in the exceptional circumstances.

However, costs were declined, as the Agency's prior interpretation was reasonable and its proactive reinterpretation advanced Charter values.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application to set aside a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitration award.

They argued the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by misapplying the causation standard and that the award violated public policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the narrow scope of judicial review for arbitration awards under the Commercial Arbitration Code.

The court held that the tribunal acted within its jurisdiction and that the award did not conflict with Canadian public policy, which requires a very high standard for intervention.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

The applicants sought an order requiring the federal government to regulate Twitter to prevent it from refusing to sell them 'promoted tweets' for their political documentary film.

The Attorney General moved to dismiss the application for failing to state a reasonable cause of action.

The court applied the Supreme Court of Canada's test for positive rights under section 2(b) of the Charter, finding that the applicants were not effectively precluded from meaningful expression, as they could still use regular tweets and other advertising mediums.

The court also held that the relief sought was not justiciable, as it would require the court to set legislative priorities.

The motion was granted and the application was dismissed.

The applicants sought to set aside a NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitral tribunal's damages award, arguing the tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction, breached procedural fairness, and rendered an award contrary to Canadian public policy.

The tribunal had previously found Canada breached its NAFTA obligations regarding an environmental assessment for a proposed quarry, but in the damages phase, awarded only $7 million USD for the lost opportunity of a fair assessment rather than the $440 million claimed for lost profits.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding the tribunal correctly applied the international law standard of proof, did not breach natural justice in its procedural rulings regarding expert reports, and rendered a decision that was not contrary to public policy.

The Canadian Constitution Foundation challenged the constitutionality of section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act, which prohibited making or publishing false statements about political figures with the intent to affect election results.

The provision was amended in 2018 to remove the word 'knowingly'.

The applicant argued this amendment rendered the provision an unjustifiable infringement on freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that the removal of 'knowingly' was a substantive change, meaning the offence no longer required proof that the statement was known to be false.

Without this knowledge element, the provision failed the minimal impairment test under section 1 of the Charter.

Consequently, section 91(1) of the Canada Elections Act was declared to be of no force or effect.

The appellant, Dr. Lynn Gehl, appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing her application for registration as an "Indian" under the Indian Act.

Dr. Gehl's entitlement to status turned on the 1985 amendments to the Act, which restored status to individuals whose ancestors had been unjustly deprived of it.

The central issue was whether the Registrar's Policy, which imposed strict evidentiary requirements for proving paternity, unreasonably denied Dr. Gehl registration when the identity of her paternal grandfather was unknown.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and granted a declaration that Dr. Gehl was entitled to be registered under section 6(2) of the Indian Act.

The applicants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision refusing to grant an interlocutory injunction to suspend the operation of s. 46(3) of the Fair Elections Act ahead of a federal election.

The impugned provision removed the Chief Electoral Officer's discretion to authorize voter identification cards as a valid form of identification.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's conclusion that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

Public interest organizations and individual electors sought an interlocutory injunction to suspend a provision of the Fair Elections Act that prohibited the Chief Electoral Officer from authorizing the Voter Information Card as proof of identity or residence for voting in a federal election.

The applicants alleged the provision infringed the right to vote under s.3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and risked disenfranchising certain groups.

The court held the challenge raised a serious issue and that disenfranchisement could constitute irreparable harm.

However, binding appellate authority establishes a rule against granting interlocutory relief that effectively suspends electoral legislation immediately before an election.

Applying that principle, the balance of convenience favoured allowing the legislation to remain in force pending a full constitutional hearing.

The applicants sought urgent scheduling of an interlocutory injunction motion in a constitutional challenge to amendments under the Fair Elections Act affecting federal voting procedures, including voter information cards and vouching.

The court held that requests for expedition must balance procedural fairness, potential irreparable harm, and the practicality of a timetable for the parties and the court.

Given the complexity of the Charter issues and the extensive social science and expert evidence, the court declined the very early hearing date sought by the applicants but ordered an expedited case-managed schedule culminating in a two-day motion hearing in July 2015.

An advocacy organization challenged the constitutionality of federal legislation repealing the long‑gun registry created under the Firearms Act.

The applicant argued that eliminating the registration requirement for non‑restricted firearms violated s. 7 of the Charter by increasing risks to life and security of the person, and violated s. 15 by disproportionately endangering women, particularly in situations of intimate partner violence.

The court held that the alleged harm resulted from private violence rather than state action and that s. 7 does not impose a positive obligation on the state to maintain a risk‑reduction regulatory scheme.

The evidentiary record failed to establish a causal link between repeal of the registry and increased violence or gender‑based harm.

The legislation was therefore constitutional and represented a policy choice within Parliament’s authority.