Holly Kallmeyer

The applicant, TD Waterhouse, brought a motion seeking to appoint an implementation monitor to oversee the repatriation of its data from the respondent, EIS, and to amend a prior mandatory injunction.

TD Waterhouse alleged that EIS breached their agreement by commingling backup data and failing to report an attempted data breach.

The court found a technical breach regarding the commingled backup CDs but no breach regarding the thwarted cyberattack.

The court declined to appoint an implementation monitor or reduce the applicant's costs for data repatriation, finding such remedies unwarranted.

However, the court amended the injunction to require the respondent to continue providing transition services until 12 months after the data repatriation is complete.

The plaintiffs in two proposed class actions regarding consumer loans for HVAC and home improvements brought a motion to stay hundreds of individual enforcement actions (Related Proceedings) commenced by the defendants against potential class members.

The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the motion and that the test under s. 13 of the Class Proceedings Act applied, rather than the RJR-MacDonald injunction test.

However, the court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a substantial overlap of issues across all unidentified Related Proceedings, and that a blanket stay would cause significant injustice to the defendants' lending businesses.

The court ordered the defendants to disclose the existence of the proposed class actions to consumers involved in the Related Proceedings.

This ruling addresses requested changes to the jury charge in a medical negligence trial concerning the standard of care and the admissibility and weight of evidence regarding minority medical practice, usual practice, and the distinction between buttock numbness and saddle anaesthesia.

The court reviews the law on minority practice, the role of expert evidence, and the proper approach to weighing conflicting testimony, ultimately declining to make certain amendments requested by the defendant and clarifying the law for the jury.

The moving parties brought motions for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal without costs.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order of the motion judge dated May 8, 2023.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in a brief endorsement.

Costs of $20,000 were awarded to the responding parties.

These are supplementary reasons to an appeal previously dismissed, addressing the calculation of losses for investors.

The Court of Appeal accepted the appellants' submissions that interest should be calculated on a simple, annual basis, consistent with the "Fixed Interest Rate" clause in the Loan Participation Agreements.

Consequently, the amounts awarded to the respondents in the original judgment were varied to reflect this simple interest calculation.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment holding appellants liable on guarantees related to a syndicated mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that personal and corporate guarantees were incorporated by reference into the investment agreements, despite investor unawareness and limiting clauses, based on objective contractual interpretation and trustee disclosure duties.

However, the Court varied the damages calculation, ruling that the interest rates specified in the Loan Participation Agreements (10% or 12%) should apply, not the 18% rate from the Loan Commitment.

The appeal was dismissed on liability but allowed on the interest rate calculation.

This costs endorsement followed grouped appeals concerning a wind-up order.

The appeals brought by Mark Libfeld and Corey Libfeld regarding the exclusion of the Shanontown transaction were unsuccessful.

The appeals brought by Jay Libfeld and Sheldon Libfeld concerning a procedural provision in the wind-up order were successful.

Consequently, Jay Libfeld and Sheldon Libfeld were entitled to costs from Mark Libfeld and Corey Libfeld.

The court found the amounts sought by Jay and Sheldon to be excessive due to duplication of materials and disproportionality to the necessary work for the appeals, and ordered a reduced costs schedule.

Four brothers who equally owned a complex real estate development partnership experienced a complete breakdown in their business relationship, leading to a court-ordered wind-up and sale of the business.

Two brothers appealed the trial judge's decision to exclude a specific real estate transaction from the wind-up order, arguing breach of fiduciary duty.

The other two brothers appealed a provision in the judgment requiring them to certify compliance with the wind-up and disclosure orders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals regarding the excluded transaction, deferring to the trial judge's factual findings that it was conducted outside the partnership.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the certification provision, striking it on the basis that requiring certification of vague obligations in a highly hostile environment would unfairly expose the parties to unwarranted contempt proceedings.