Holly Kallmeyer

This ruling addresses requested changes to the jury charge in a medical negligence trial concerning the standard of care and the admissibility and weight of evidence regarding minority medical practice, usual practice, and the distinction between buttock numbness and saddle anaesthesia.

The court reviews the law on minority practice, the role of expert evidence, and the proper approach to weighing conflicting testimony, ultimately declining to make certain amendments requested by the defendant and clarifying the law for the jury.

The applicants, including several current and former sex workers and a sex worker advocacy organization, brought a constitutional challenge against several provisions of the Protection of Communities and Exploited Persons Act (PCEPA), which criminalized the purchase of sexual services and related activities.

The applicants argued that the provisions violated sections 7, 2(b), 2(d), and 15 of the Charter by replicating the harms of the previous prostitution laws struck down in Bedford.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the provisions did not violate sections 7, 2(d), or 15 of the Charter.

While the Attorney General conceded that certain provisions violated section 2(b) freedom of expression, the court found these limits were demonstrably justified under section 1 of the Charter as a proportionate response to the pressing and substantial objective of reducing the demand for sex work and protecting vulnerable persons from exploitation.

These are supplementary reasons to an appeal previously dismissed, addressing the calculation of losses for investors.

The Court of Appeal accepted the appellants' submissions that interest should be calculated on a simple, annual basis, consistent with the "Fixed Interest Rate" clause in the Loan Participation Agreements.

Consequently, the amounts awarded to the respondents in the original judgment were varied to reflect this simple interest calculation.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment holding appellants liable on guarantees related to a syndicated mortgage.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that personal and corporate guarantees were incorporated by reference into the investment agreements, despite investor unawareness and limiting clauses, based on objective contractual interpretation and trustee disclosure duties.

However, the Court varied the damages calculation, ruling that the interest rates specified in the Loan Participation Agreements (10% or 12%) should apply, not the 18% rate from the Loan Commitment.

The appeal was dismissed on liability but allowed on the interest rate calculation.

This costs endorsement followed grouped appeals concerning a wind-up order.

The appeals brought by Mark Libfeld and Corey Libfeld regarding the exclusion of the Shanontown transaction were unsuccessful.

The appeals brought by Jay Libfeld and Sheldon Libfeld concerning a procedural provision in the wind-up order were successful.

Consequently, Jay Libfeld and Sheldon Libfeld were entitled to costs from Mark Libfeld and Corey Libfeld.

The court found the amounts sought by Jay and Sheldon to be excessive due to duplication of materials and disproportionality to the necessary work for the appeals, and ordered a reduced costs schedule.