Jasminka Kalajdzic

The respondent father moved to vary a temporary consent order to change the child's school registration and sought costs for the applicant mother's abandoned motion.

The court found that a material change in circumstances was not strictly required, but the father met the threshold.

However, the court determined it was in the child's best interest to remain at her current school and dismissed the motion.

The court awarded costs to the father for the abandoned motion on a substantial indemnity basis.

Following a mid-trial motion for interim child support and parenting time, the court determined the costs payable by each party based on divided success.

The mother was successful on the child support motion and cross-motion, while the father was successful on the parenting and school registration motion.

The court awarded net costs of $3,555 payable by the mother to the father, finding the father entitled to partial indemnity and some full indemnity costs due to an offer to settle.

The third party insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a third-party claim regarding insurance coverage.

The issue of first instance was whether the standard excluded driver endorsement (OPCF 28A) applies to 'other automobiles' not specifically listed on the policy.

The court held that 'other automobiles' are incorporated by reference into the OPCF 28A form, consistent with sections 225 and 240 of the Insurance Act.

Because the driver was an excluded driver at the time of the accident, there was no liability coverage while she operated another person's vehicle.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the third-party claim was dismissed.

The defendant moved for production of the plaintiff's accounting records pursuant to a 'best efforts' undertaking given at discovery.

The plaintiff, who claims over $2 million in lost profits from his gas station and variety store, argued he was not required to create formal accounting books.

The court held that 'books' in this context included the plaintiff's revenue and expense records, which were relevant and within his control.

The court ordered production of the records but allowed temporary redaction of supplier names pending a potential motion by the plaintiff for a protective order regarding commercially sensitive information.

The respondent mother brought a Motion to Change seeking retroactive and ongoing child support, alleging the applicant father fraudulently misrepresented his income for over a decade.

The father failed to file an Answer, and the matter proceeded as an uncontested trial.

The court found the father had hidden significant employment and rental income, imputing his 2025 income at $166,897.

The court ordered retroactive child support to January 1, 2015, and fixed ongoing support.

The mother's claims for damages for fraudulent misrepresentation and a novel tort of 'child support fraud' were dismissed, as child support is the right of the child and the harm could be remedied through retroactive support and costs.

The father was ordered to pay full recovery costs of $61,399.12 due to his bad faith conduct, and the court granted a lien against his properties to secure the amounts owed.

The plaintiffs requested an urgent case conference after the hospital defendants unexpectedly delivered a summary judgment motion and sought to have it heard concurrently with the scheduled class action certification motion.

The plaintiffs argued there was insufficient time in the existing timetable to respond.

Applying section 4.1 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court held it was compelled to order the summary judgment motion to be heard concurrently with the certification motion, as it could dispose of the proceeding in whole or in part.

A further case conference was ordered to revise the timetable.

The appellants operated a wedding venue on their property without obtaining building permits or proper zoning.

The Township issued an Unsafe Order and subsequently Orders Prohibiting Occupancy under the Building Code Act, citing the lack of a building permit.

The appellants appealed the Orders Prohibiting Occupancy.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal and rescinded the orders, finding that the absence of a building permit does not, on its own, constitute an 'unsafe' condition under s. 15.9(2) of the Act, and the Township committed a palpable and overriding error by using the orders for a collateral purpose.

The plaintiff, a personal support worker, was assaulted by an elderly resident with severe dementia shortly after his admission to a retirement home.

She sued the resident's son and power of attorney, alleging he failed to disclose the extent of his father's aggressive behaviour.

The son moved for summary judgment, arguing he owed no duty of care.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the novel duty of care analysis required factual findings regarding the son's knowledge and disclosures that could only be made at trial.

The plaintiffs also moved to add the retirement home's parent companies as defendants after learning the home was uninsured.

The court dismissed this motion, holding that the amendment was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, did not qualify as a misnomer, and lacked pleaded facts to justify piercing the corporate veil.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion challenging the validity of her late father's will, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The respondent estate sought full indemnity costs of over $42,000, while the applicant argued costs should be paid from the estate.

The court found that the applicant failed to meet the evidentiary threshold to engage public policy exceptions that would justify costs being paid from the estate.

However, the court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting the applicant's allegations of undue influence were not mere bald assertions.

The applicant was ordered to pay costs on a partial indemnity scale fixed at $25,000.

The plaintiffs in two proposed class actions regarding consumer loans for HVAC and home improvements brought a motion to stay hundreds of individual enforcement actions (Related Proceedings) commenced by the defendants against potential class members.

The court found that the plaintiffs had standing to bring the motion and that the test under s. 13 of the Class Proceedings Act applied, rather than the RJR-MacDonald injunction test.

However, the court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate a substantial overlap of issues across all unidentified Related Proceedings, and that a blanket stay would cause significant injustice to the defendants' lending businesses.

The court ordered the defendants to disclose the existence of the proposed class actions to consumers involved in the Related Proceedings.

The applicants challenged the respondent Humane Society's Board of Directors' decision to move to a closed membership model and their refusal to recognize over 100 new members who joined via an online portal.

The court found that the Board acted in bad faith by arbitrarily refusing to approve the new memberships to prevent them from voting against the new by-law.

Furthermore, the court interpreted the Not-for-Profit Corporations Act, 2010, concluding that the by-law amendments affecting membership transfers, notice, and proxy voting required a two-thirds special majority, not a simple majority.

The by-law was declared void and a new members' meeting was ordered.

The applicant, the deceased's daughter, sought directions under r. 75.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the validity of her late father's 2024 will, which revoked a 2020 will and left virtually the entire estate to the respondent, his wife of fifteen years.

The applicant alleged lack of testamentary capacity due to serious health conditions and opioid medications, suspicious circumstances surrounding the will's preparation by a lay friend rather than a lawyer, and undue influence by the respondent.

The court applied the minimal evidentiary threshold from Neuberger Estate v. York and found that multiple witnesses confirmed the deceased was alert, coherent, and understood the contents of the will when he signed it.

The respondent successfully answered the allegations of suspicious circumstances and undue influence.

The application was dismissed.

The court considered whether to appoint an amicus curiae in a family law proceeding involving self-represented parties with three young children.

Applying the framework from Morwald-Benevides v. Benevides, the court found the appointment justified given the high stakes, the complexity of financial issues, the unavailability of Legal Aid counsel in the region, the respondent's pattern of litigation abuse, and the siloed nature of parallel family, civil, and criminal proceedings bearing on the respondent's income and child support obligations.

The court appointed amicus with detailed terms specifying the scope of duties, including assisting with disclosure, trial preparation, and ensuring an orderly trial process, with funding managed by Legal Aid Ontario at Legal Aid rates.

The defendants sought leave to file a jury notice almost four years after pleadings closed in a motor vehicle accident action.

The court applied the two-part test from Proper v. Nikore, examining both the circumstances of the delay and prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court found that the defendants failed to establish that the omission of the jury notice was inadvertent, rejecting the argument that industry practice in motor vehicle cases should be judicially noticed.

The court also found that the plaintiff would suffer prejudice if leave were granted, as litigation strategy had been shaped by the assumption of a judge-alone trial, and the mediation settlement positions had been informed by that assumption.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the plaintiff.

The applicant sought to vary an interlocutory injunction previously granted on April 4, 2025, which restrained a blockade at the entrance of its premises at 2801 Howard Avenue.

The applicant sought to expand the injunction to include multiple additional addresses and a public street.

The respondents argued that the variation required the applicant to meet the full test for a civil injunction, including the stringent requirements under section 102 of the Courts of Justice Act for labour disputes.

The court found that the context had fundamentally changed from the original April order, as the parties were now engaged in a labour dispute following a lockout.

The court granted the motion in part, expanding the injunction to include the entrance at 305 Charles Street but rejecting the broader expansion sought.

The court found that the respondents had unlawfully obstructed two entrances for unreasonably lengthy periods but did not find evidence of other unlawful picketing or risk of physical harm.

The plaintiff commenced an action in January 2018 claiming over $5 million in damages arising from a crop failure allegedly caused by the defendant's seeds.

The action was administratively dismissed for delay on March 12, 2025, pursuant to Rule 48.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff moved to set aside the dismissal and sought approval of a litigation timetable.

The defendant opposed the motion, arguing that the action was over seven and a half years old with no explanation for five years of delay.

The court granted the motion to set aside the dismissal, finding that the plaintiff satisfied the legal test despite significant delay.

The court imposed a timetable for completion of examinations, undertakings, mediation, and trial set-down, and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant's costs of $6,500.

The defendant brought a motion to compel the plaintiff to attend a defence neuropsychological assessment and for an extension of time to serve the resulting expert report.

The plaintiff had increased his damages claim from approximately $1.5 million to $2.1 million based on additional expert reports regarding future care costs delivered between August and October 2024.

The defendant requested the assessment in late October 2024, after the deadline for service of defence expert reports had passed on December 16, 2024.

The court found the defendant had a reasonable explanation for the delayed request, as the plaintiff's expert reports materially changed the damage claim.

The court granted the motion, ordering the plaintiff to attend the assessment on October 21, 2025, and granting leave to serve the report by November 30, 2025.

The court also granted the plaintiff leave to amend the statement of claim to increase the quantum of damages without additional terms.

Two proposed class actions were brought against consumer loan companies for allegedly engaging in unlawful business practices that misled consumers into signing loan agreements in breach of consumer protection legislation.

The plaintiffs sought interim motions for temporary stays of hundreds of related proceedings (primarily in Small Claims Court) pending final disposition of the class actions.

At a case conference, the court determined the sequencing of motions and set a litigation timetable.

The court ordered that the interim stay motions be heard before certification, finding that fairness and efficiency dictated this sequencing to prevent the defendants' enforcement actions from effectively mooting the class proceedings.

This is a costs decision arising from a mid-trial motion in a family law proceeding.

The applicant sought interim orders regarding parenting time and fall school enrolment for two children.

The applicant was successful on the school enrolment issue but the parenting time award was a compromise between the parties' positions.

The court awarded costs to the applicant on a partial indemnity basis, considering the applicant's success on one of two issues, the reasonableness of both parties' conduct, the disparity in incomes, and the time spent by counsel.

The plaintiff, Mihrali Celik, sought repayment of $240,000 USD allegedly taken by the defendants in 1995, along with damages and interest.

The defendants moved to strike the claim as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, arguing it was the third attempt to litigate the same matter, previously dismissed by two courts and the Court of Appeal.

The court found the claim barred by both issue and cause of action estoppel and as an abuse of process, striking the claim without leave to amend.

Costs of $13,000 were awarded to the defendants.